|Heinemann, Friedrich and Kocher, Martin G. (2010): Tax compliance under tax regime changes. Discussion Papers in Economics 2010-17|
In this paper we focus on the compliance effects of tax regime changes. According to the economic model of tax evasion, a tax reform should affect compliance through its impact on tax rates and incentives. Our findings demonstrate the importance of at least two further effects not covered by the traditional model: First, reform losers tend to evade more taxes after the reform. Second, a reform from a proportionate to a progressive system decreases compliance compared to a switch in the reverse direction. However, the level of compliance is generally higher under a progressive than under a proportionate regime.
|Item Type:||Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Keywords:||tax reforms, tax compliance, experiment|
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Institutional Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology|
300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
|JEL Classification:||C72, C91, H26|
|Deposited On:||25. Mar 2010 14:51|
|Last Modified:||25. May 2012 11:16|
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