|Claussen, Jörg and Kretschmer, Tobias and Spengler, Thomas (2010): Market leadership through technology – Backward compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry. Discussion Papers in Business Administration 2010-5|
This is the latest version of this item.
The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership.
|Item Type:||Paper (Discussion Paper)|
|Keywords:||backward compatibility market leadership network effects two-sided markets|
|Collections:||Munich School of Management|
Munich School of Management > Discussion Papers
Munich School of Management > Discussion Papers > Communication Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||L15, L82, O33|
|Deposited On:||30. Jan 2012 08:58|
|Last Modified:||22. May 2012 10:33|
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Backward Compatibility to Sustain Market Dominance – Evidence from the US Handheld Video Game Industry. (deposited 12. May 2010 12:57)
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