| Bartling, Björn and Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus M. (June 2012): Discretion, Productivity and Work Satisfaction. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 383 |
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281Kb |
Abstract
In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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| Keywords: | high-performance work systems, wages, discretion, gift exchange, job satisfaction |
| Collections: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A4 - Unvollständige Verträge, Marktinteraktion und soziale Vergleichsprozesse |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | M5, J3 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13171-9 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 13171 |
| Last Modified: | 10. Jul 2012 13:05 |
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