The Timing of Climate Agreements under Multiple Externalities

Schmidt, Robert C. and Strausz, Roland (November 2011): The Timing of Climate Agreements under Multiple Externalities. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 366

Abstract

We study the potential of cooperation in global emission abatements with multiple externalities. Using a two-country model without side-payments, we identify the strategic effects under different timing regimes of cooperation. We obtain a positive complementarity effect of long-term cooperation in abatement on R&D levels that boosts potential bene?t of long-term cooperation and a redistributive effect that destabilizes long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric. We show that whether and what type of cooperation is sustainable, depends crucially on the kind rather than on the magnitude of asymmetries.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: climate treaty; timing of cooperation; multiple externalities; long-term commitment
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A1 - Allokationsmechanismen in Organisationen und Märkten; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C5 - Wettbewerbspolitik als Steuerung von Wettbewerbsprozessen
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D62, F53, H23, Q55
• Language: English