In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers

Goldluecke, Susanne and Kranz, Sebastian (July 2010): In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 332

Abstract

In this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Language: English