On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets

Kesternich, Iris and Schumacher, Heiner (October 2009): On the Use of Information in Repeated Insurance Markets. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 280

Abstract

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of "unused observables" that is information which

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: repeated games, insurance markets, oligopoly, unused observables
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B7 - Globalisierung und der Anstieg der Vorstandsbezüge
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: G22, L13
• Language: English