Distorted performance measurement and relational contracts

Budde, Jörg (November 2006): Distorted performance measurement and relational contracts. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 203

Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of alternative performance measures in an agency model in which contracting incorporates both formal and informal agreements. It is shown that under a proper use of verifiable and unverifiable performance measures, the two types of contracts are complements, regardless of the principal’s fallback position. The analysis therefore contrasts earlier results of the literature, and provides a rationale for the application of subjective performance information, as it is frequently incorporated in strategic performance measurement systems.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• Language: English