Size and soft budget constraints

Crivelli, Ernesto and Staal, Klaas (October 2006): Size and soft budget constraints. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 172

Abstract

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: bailouts, soft-budget constraints, jurisdictional size, public goods, spillovers
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A5 - Unvollständige Vertragsbeziehungen und die Gestaltung von Residualrechten
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: H4, H7, R1
• Language: English