Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

Schweinzer, Paul (June 2006): Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 136

Abstract

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually increasing offers.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: Gradual bargaining, Common values, Incomplete information, Repeated games
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A3 - Markt- und Auktionsdesign in komplexen Umgebungen
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C73, C78, D44, D82, J12
• Language: English