| Bester, Helmut and Wärneryd, Karl (February 2006): Conflict and the Social Contract. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 94 |
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215Kb |
Abstract
We consider social contracts for resolving conflicts between two agents who are uncertain about each other's fighting potential. Applications include international conflict, litigation, and elections. Even though only a peaceful agreement avoids a loss of resources, if this loss is small enough, then any contract must assign a positive probability of conflict. We show how the likelihood of conflict outbreak depends on the distribution of power between the agents and their information about each other.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | conflict, social contracts, asymmetric information |
| Collections: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A1 - Allokationsmechanismen in Organisationen und Märkten |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13457-7 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 13457 |
| Last Modified: | 10. Jul 2012 13:10 |
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