| Buccirossi, Paolo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo (September 2005): Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 74 |
|
373Kb |
Abstract
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | amnesty, corruption, collusion, financial fraud, governance, hold up, hostages, illegal trade, immunity, law enforcement, leniency, organized crime, self-reporting, whistleblowers |
| Collections: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C2 - Intellektuelles Eigentum, Aneignung von Innovationserträgen und Innovationswettbewerb Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | K42, K21 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13477-8 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 13477 |
| Last Modified: | 10. Jul 2012 13:11 |
Repository Staff Only: item control page