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Hainz, Christa (September 2007): Creditor Passivity: The Effects of Bank Competition and Institutions on the Strategic Use of Bankruptcy Filings. Discussion Papers in Economics 2007-32

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Abstract

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and less credit rationing.

Item Type:Paper (Discussion Paper)
Keywords:Creditor passivity, bank competition, information sharing, institutions, bankruptcy, relationship banking
Subjects:Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Financial Markets
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Economics of Information
Dewey Classification:300 Social sciences
300 Social sciences > 330 Wirtschaft
Journal of Economic Literature classification:G21, G33, K10, D82
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-2028-7
Language:German
ID Code:2028
Deposited On:09. Oct 2007
Last Modified:28. Jun 2010 14:36
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