Home  |  Browse  |  Authors  |  Advanced Search  |  Help
Login | Create Account
Herold, Florian (July 2003): Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences. Discussion Papers in Economics 2003-5

Metadaten exportieren

Autor(en) recherchieren

Lesezeichen anlegen

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Reader
278Kb

Abstract

This paper studies the evolution of both characteristics of reciprocity - the willingness to reward friendly behavior and the willingness to punish hostile behavior. Firstly, preferences for rewarding as well as preferences for punishing can survive evolution provided individuals interact within separated groups. This holds even with randomly formed groups and even when individual preferences are unobservable. Secondly, preferences for rewarding survive only in coexistence with self-interested preferences. But preferences for punishing tend either to vanish or to dominate the population entirely. Finally, the evolution of preferences for rewarding and the evolution of preferences for punishing influence each other decisively. The existence of rewarders enhances the evolutionary success of punishers, but punishers crowd out rewarders.

Item Type:Paper (Discussion Paper)
Keywords:Reciprocity ; Evolution of Preferences ; Group Selection ; Coevolution ; Fairness
Subjects:Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics
Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Game Theory
Dewey Classification:300 Social sciences
300 Social sciences > 330 Wirtschaft
Journal of Economic Literature classification:C72, D63, D64, D83
URN:urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-40-9
Language:English
ID Code:40
Deposited On:13. Apr 2005
Last Modified:28. Jun 2010 14:26
Open Access LMU is powered by EPrints 3 which is developed by the School of Electronics and Computer Science at the University of Southampton. More information and software creditsAbout