| Fehr, Ernst and Kremhelmer, Susanne and Schmidt, Klaus M. (2005): Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights. Discussion Papers in Economics 2005-21 |
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Abstract
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
| Item Type: | Paper (Discussion Paper) |
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| Keywords: | Ownership Rights; Double Moral Hazard; Fairness; Reciprocity; Incomplete Contracts |
| Collections: | Economics Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Micro-Economics Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Industrial Organization Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Behavioral Economics Economics > Discussion Papers in Economics > Institutional Economics |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 300 Social sciences, sociology and anthropology 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C7, C9, J3 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-727-9 |
| Language: | English |
| ID Code: | 727 |
| Deposited On: | 11. Nov 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 25. May 2012 11:12 |
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