



LUDWIG-  
MAXIMILIANS-  
UNIVERSITÄT  
MÜNCHEN

VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE FAKULTÄT



Claudia M. Buch; Iris Kesternich; Alexander Lipponer;  
Monika Schnitzer:

Financial Constraints and the Margins of FDI

Munich Discussion Paper No. 2009-17

Department of Economics  
University of Munich

Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät  
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

Online at <http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11054/>

# Financial Constraints and the Margins of FDI\*

Claudia M. Buch (University of Tübingen, IAW, and CESifo)

Iris Kesternich (University of Munich)

Alexander Lipponer (Deutsche Bundesbank)

Monika Schnitzer (University of Munich, CEPR, and CESifo)

September 2009

## Abstract

Recent literature on multinational firms has stressed the importance of low productivity as a barrier to the cross-border expansion of firms. But firms may also need external finance to shoulder the costs of entering foreign markets. We develop a model of multinational firms facing real and financial barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), and we analyze their impact on the FDI decision (the extensive margin) and foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We provide empirical evidence based on a detailed dataset of German multinationals which contains information on parent-level and affiliate-level financial constraints as well as on the location the foreign affiliates. We find that financial factors constrain firms' foreign investment decisions, an effect felt in particular by large firms. Financial constraints at the parent level matter for the extensive, but less so for the intensive margin. For the intensive margin, financial constraints at the affiliate level are relatively more important.

Keywords: multinational firms, heterogeneity, productivity, financial constraints

JEL-classification: F2, G2

---

\* Corresponding author: Monika Schnitzer, University of Munich, Akademiestr. 1, D-80799 Munich, Germany, Phone: +49 89 2180 2217. E-mail: schnitzer@lrz.uni-muenchen.de.

This paper represents the authors' personal opinions and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank. This paper was written partly during visits by the authors to the Research Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank as well as while Claudia Buch was visiting the CES Institute in Munich and the NBER in Cambridge, MA, and Monika Schnitzer was visiting the University of California, Berkeley. We gratefully acknowledge the hospitality of these institutions as well as being allowed access to the Deutsche Bundesbank's Foreign Direct Investment (*MiDi*) Micro-Database. We also gratefully acknowledge funding under the EU's 7<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme SSH-2007-1.2.1 "Globalisation and its interaction with the European economy" as well as funding by the German Science Foundation under SFB-TR 15. Valuable comments on earlier drafts were provided by Paul Bergin, Theo Eicher, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Alessandra Guariglia, Galina Hale, Florian Heiss, Heinz Herrmann, Beata Javorcik, Nick Li, Kalina Manova, Assaf Razin, Katheryn Niles Russ, Alan Taylor, Shang-Jin Wei, Joachim Winter, Zhihong Yu, participants of seminars at the Deutsche Bundesbank, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, the University of California (Berkeley, Davis, San Diego), the University of Madison, the University of Munich, the University of Nottingham, the University of Stanford, the University of Washington, Seattle, and at the San Francisco Fed. We would also like to thank Timm Körting and Beatrix Stejskal-Passler for their most helpful discussions and comments on the data and Cornelia Düwel, Anna Gumpert, and Sebastian Kohls for their valuable research assistance. All errors and inconsistencies are solely our own responsibility.

# 1 Motivation

Multinational firms are larger than their domestic counterparts. For European firms, Mayer and Ottaviano et al. (2007) show that multinational firms are also more productive, generate higher value added, pay higher wages, employ more capital per worker, and they employ a larger number of skilled workers. In the theoretical literature, the characteristic size patterns of multinational firms are explained mainly by differences in productivity. According to this explanation, observed internationalization patterns reflect real constraints since only the more productive firms can afford to shoulder the fixed costs of market entry.

These stylized facts are confirmed by our data for German companies, where firms owning foreign affiliates are indeed substantially larger than purely domestic firms (Graph 1a). Yet, the two groups of firms also differ in a number of other respects. Multinational firms, for instance, have lower debt ratios and higher cash flows. This suggests difficulties in obtaining external finance as an additional impediment to foreign expansions.<sup>1</sup> However, most of the theoretical literature considers the impact of financial constraints to be of lesser importance, arguing that foreign direct investment (FDI) and the associated financing decisions can largely be treated separately.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this paper is to assess the (relative) importance of real and financial barriers for the cross-border expansion of firms. In doing so, we distinguish between the decision to enter a foreign market for the first time (the extensive margin) and the decision on the volume of foreign affiliate sales (the intensive margin). We proceed in two steps.

In a first step, we theoretically analyze how productivity and financial constraints affect a firm's choice to become a multinational firm under conditions of limited internal funds and the need to obtain external debt finance. Our model features limited contract enforceability and liquidation costs as two sources of inefficiencies in financial contracting that are particularly relevant for foreign investments. The model provides a set of testable implications concerning the impact of financial constraints, productivity, and host-country characteristics on firms' internationalization choices. In particular, we predict that financial constraints are

---

<sup>1</sup> In the crisis that started in 2007, for instance, an increasing number of German firms reports credit constraints as an impediment to expansion into foreign countries (DIHK 2009).

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Markusen (2002).

more likely to affect the extensive than the intensive margin, unless financial constraints are severe. Furthermore, we predict that financial constraints are more strongly felt for large firms, as they are more likely to be interested in foreign expansion.

In a second step, we provide empirical evidence using data for German firms. We obtain information on the foreign affiliates of German firms from a detailed firm-level database provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank, the Direct Investment Micro-Database (*MiDi*). Furthermore, we use data on the balance sheets of firms in Germany from both the *Dafne* database provided by Bureau van Dijk and the *Hoppenstedt* database. Our data are unique as they allow measuring financial constraints and productivities at the parent level for both domestic firms *and* for multinationals, as well as financial constraints at the affiliate level. This enables us to analyze the extensive and the intensive margins of FDI. Furthermore, we can evaluate the relative importance of financial constraints at both the parent and at the affiliate level, a question that has – to the best of our knowledge – not been addressed in the literature so far. In contrast to earlier work focusing on manufacturing firms, our sample also contains services firms.

Our research is motivated by recent theoretical work stressing the importance of productivity for firms' international expansions. Seminal papers focusing on firms' export decisions are Bernard et al. (2003) and Melitz (2003). Helpman et al. (2004) extend the Melitz model to account for multinational firms. The key to these models is that, *ex ante*, firms do not know their productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productivity from a commonly known productivity distribution, and the level of productivity becomes common knowledge as well. Depending on the level of productivity, firms exit the market, they produce only for the domestic market, they become exporters, or they set up affiliates abroad.

The implicit assumption of these models is that firms can finance foreign operations internally and/or without incurring an external finance premium. Recent papers introduce financial constraints into the Melitz model. The focus of these models is on firms' decisions to export. Chaney (2005) predicts that financially constrained firms are less likely to be able to cover the fixed costs of exporting. Manova (2006) examines the interaction of productivity and credit constraints and their impact on the export decision as well as the volume of export.

Recent empirical work shows that financial frictions indeed affect export behavior. Using panel data on bilateral exports at the country level, Manova (2006) finds that financially more

developed countries are more likely to export, and that the effect is more pronounced in financially vulnerable sectors. Firm-level studies show that financial constraints matter more for the extensive margin than for the intensive margin of exports (Berman and Héricourt 2008), that export starters enjoy better financial conditions (Bellone et al. 2008), and that financially healthy firms are more likely to export (Greenaway et al. 2007).<sup>3</sup> Stiebale (2008), in contrast, finds no effect of financial constraints on a firm’s export decision once observed and unobserved firm heterogeneity is accounted for.

This paper provides complementary evidence on the role of financial frictions for FDI. As predicted by our model, we find that productivity and financial constraints have a significant impact on German firms’ internationalization decision. Economically, productivity and financial constraints are of similar importance, but financial constraints matter most to the subset of firms that consider investing abroad. Our model also suggests that the extensive margin is more likely to be affected than the intensive margin, unless financial constraints are severe. Our empirical analysis shows that parent financial constraints have indeed a negative impact on the extensive margin of FDI, but less so on the intensive margin, mirroring findings by Berman and Héricourt (2008) for exports. However, we also find that, in contrast to the parent-level constraints, the affiliate’s financial constraints matter for the intensive margin. This observation points towards a hierarchy of financing the intensive margin, with affiliate financing being preferred over parent financing.

In the following section, we present our model of multinational firms. In section three, we describe our data and provide descriptive statistics. Section four provides empirical evidence, and section five concludes.

## 2 Finance and the Margins of FDI: Theory

In this section, we analyze a firm’s choice to become a multinational firm and the volume of sales of its foreign affiliates in the presence of financial constraints. Firms incur fixed costs of market entry as well as variable costs of production. They finance their foreign expansion using internally generated funds as well as an external bank credit, potentially secured by col-

---

<sup>3</sup> Evidence on the reverse causality from exporting to financial conditions is mixed (Bellone et al. 2008, Greenaway et al. 2007).

lateral. Financing decisions are made under uncertainty.

Financial constraints are firm-specific; they do not merely reflect differences across firms with regard to productivity. We do not specify the sources of “financial heterogeneity” but there are several reasons why firms may have different financial constraints. Firms differ, for instance, with regard to their customer structure and, thus, the probability of being hit by an adverse demand shock. Firms also differ with regard to the quality of their management and, thus, the ability of outside lenders to extract information on the profitability of an investment project.

Financial contracting in our model suffers from potential inefficiencies due to limited enforceability of financial contracts, a problem particularly relevant when investing in a foreign country. Enforceability differs across countries and may be linked to the development of the financial market as well as the presence of home country banks abroad. With limited contract enforcement, collateral may be required to obtain credit financing. However, collecting and liquidating collateral generates transaction costs, and the amount of collateral available may be limited. The need for costly and limited collateral confines the use of external finance and thus the foreign expansion of firms.

To see how the model works, consider the decision problem of a multinational firm that can invest abroad to serve the foreign market.<sup>4</sup> The firm’s alternative investment option is normalized to zero.<sup>5</sup> To set up a foreign affiliate, the firm has to incur a fixed cost of market entry  $F$ . Once the firm has decided to set up a foreign affiliate, it has to choose the level of sales. Thus, we capture both the extensive and the intensive margins of the firm’s foreign expansion strategy. To fix ideas, consider the following variable production cost func-

tion,  $k(x) = \frac{x^2}{2(1 + \beta)}$ , where  $x$  denotes the quantity produced and sold by the foreign affiliate.

The productivity of the parent firm, which also spills over onto the foreign affiliate, is captured by  $\beta$ . The larger the fixed cost of entry and the lower a firm’s productivity, the larger

---

<sup>4</sup> We focus on horizontal FDI. The qualitative implications of our model with regard to the impact of financial constraints would also go through for vertical FDI.

<sup>5</sup> It is straightforward to extend our model and to include an outside option like exports that depends positively on the firm’s productivity. As we show in Buch et al. (2009), the firm’s productivity level matters relatively more for the investment opportunity abroad than for the outside option of exporting. The qualitative results of our model are unchanged.

are the “real barriers” that a firm faces when entering foreign markets.

The firm also faces a “financial barrier” in the form of a cash-in-advance constraint because set up and production costs have to be paid before production starts and before revenues are generated. Revenues that can be generated on the foreign market are uncertain. Serving the foreign market yields positive revenues  $px$  with probability  $q$  and zero revenues with probability  $(1-q)$ , where  $p$  is the foreign price level.<sup>6</sup>

### Benchmark case without liquidity constraints

Before we describe the impact of financial constraints on investment decisions, consider as a benchmark the first-best situation where the firm is not liquidity constrained. The firm can finance both the fixed cost of entry and the variable cost of production from internal funds  $L$ . Thus, it maximizes the following profit function:

$$(1) \quad \pi = qpx - k(x) - F = qpx - \frac{x^2}{2(1+\beta)} - F$$

Taking the first-order condition, solving for the optimal sales of the affiliate  $x_{FB} = (1+\beta)qp$  and inserting it back into the profit function (1) yields the following profits under the first-best solution ( $FB$ ):

$$(1') \quad \pi_{FB} = \frac{1}{2}q^2p^2(1+\beta) - F$$

Thus, if liquidity is not an issue, the investment takes place if and only if  $\pi_{FB} \geq 0$ , i.e. if net profits of the investment are positive. Not surprisingly, profits depend positively on the firm’s productivity ( $\beta$ ), i.e. less productive firms are less likely to be able to cover the fixed cost of market entry.

### Foreign expansion with liquidity constraints

Consider now the situation where the firm is liquidity constrained, which we define as a situation in which its liquid assets  $L$  are not sufficient to cover the costs associated with market

---

<sup>6</sup> We abstract from exchange rate changes, i.e. revenues generated on the foreign market can be remitted 1:1 into domestic currency. Russ (2007) has a model in which endogenous adjustment of exchange rates affects firms’ entry decisions.

entry and production. Thus, the firm needs external finance. We assume that external finance is raised in the form of debt finance and, specifically, credits from banks. Firms can obtain credits from domestic or foreign banks. We do not model this choice explicitly and hence do not impose restrictions with regard to the degree of integration of financial markets. However, domestic and foreign banks may differ with regard to their ability to enforce contracts. For instance, if domestic banks maintain affiliates in the foreign country, too, they are in a better position than banks operating abroad solely to monitor the affiliates and collect collateral. This adds to the comparative advantage that they already have in terms of knowledge about the domestic parent. The focus on external debt finance assumption reflects the fact that external equity finance plays a limited role for German firms (Bayraktar et al. 2005). Also, theoretical considerations suggest a “pecking order” of external finance according to which external equity finance and portfolio capital are dominated by bank lending.

Let  $D$  denote the credit necessary to finance the fixed and variable costs of entry for a production level  $x$ , given the available liquid funds  $L$ , i.e.  $D = k(x) + F - L$ . Furthermore, let  $(1+r)D$  denote the repayment of principal plus interest payment that the firm is supposed to pay. Like Manova (2006) and others, we assume that credit repayment is possible only if the revenues from foreign sales are positive. In particular, we rule out the possibility that the parent firm steps in and repays the affiliate’s credit if the affiliate is not able to do so. This implies also that the credit repayment  $(1+r)D$  cannot exceed the revenues  $px$ , i.e.  $(1+r)D \leq px$ . Banks are assumed to operate competitively and to determine the interest rate such as to just break even in expected terms.

To capture enforcement problems in financial contracts, we assume that credit repayment cannot be enforced with certainty, even if revenues are positive, but only with probability  $\mu$ , with  $0 \leq \mu < 1$ . The enforcement parameter  $\mu$  has two interpretations. On the one hand, it can reflect different institutional quality across countries. Legal systems may, for instance, differ with regard to the degree of creditor friendliness and the enforceability of contracts.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, it could reflect a greater presence of home-country multinational banks in the host country. These banks may be able to acquire useful information on the host-country environ-

---

<sup>7</sup> Harrison et al. (2004) report that financial development lowers financial constraints.



ment and be able to monitor firms more closely through their affiliates abroad. This reduces informational asymmetries and makes it more likely that credit enforcement is successful.

The firm can collateralize (part) of its credit with assets from two potential sources. First, the firm can pledge its fixed cost investment in the foreign affiliate,  $F$ , as collateral. Second, the firm can use an exogenously given collateral,  $\bar{C}$ , provided by the parent company, to secure the credit. Let  $C \leq \bar{C} + F$  denote the collateral actually chosen to secure the credit, the exact value of which is determined endogenously below. If the credit is not repaid, the creditor can seize the collateral to cover her losses. However, she can realize only a fraction  $\theta$  of the collateral when liquidating it.<sup>8</sup> Thus, liquidating the collateral involves a dead weight loss of  $(1 - \theta)C$ .

There are two situations where liquidation of a collateral (potentially) becomes an issue. Suppose the affiliate has positive revenues but the creditor fails to be able to enforce the repayment. Then, the bank has the option to liquidate the collateral. However, it would be inefficient to do so, due to the dead weight loss of liquidation. In this case, we assume that efficient renegotiation will make the firm pay  $\theta C$ , i.e. the amount that the bank can realize from liquidating the collateral, to avoid inefficient liquidation, and the bank will accept this offer.<sup>9</sup> If revenues are not positive, however, liquidation of the collateral cannot be avoided.

Now, consider the zero profit condition for banks which determines the interest rate for a given choice of  $C$ :

$$(2) \quad \mu q(1+r)D + (1 - \mu q)\theta C = D$$

Banks obtain the promised credit repayment  $(1+r)D$  only if credit repayment can be enforced. In all other cases, they obtain the liquidation value of the collateral,  $\theta C$ , either because this is what the firm pays voluntarily, after renegotiation, or this is what they receive from actually liquidating the collateral. Solving for  $(1+r)D$ , we find that banks charge a risk premium over and above the risk-free rate which is declining in the probability of success of

---

<sup>8</sup> Without loss of generality, we assume that the efficiency loss is the same for both kinds of collateral goods.

<sup>9</sup> This assumes that the firm can hold the bank down to its outside option of liquidating the collateral. It would be straightforward to modify this assumption and let the two parties split the gains from not liquidating the collateral. However, given our assumption of a perfectly competitive banking market, the first assumption seems to be the most convincing one.

the project ( $q$ ) and in the efficiency of the liquidation procedure, ( $\theta$ ):

$$(3) \quad (1+r)D = \frac{D - (1 - \mu q)\theta C}{\mu q}.$$

Recall from above that the maximum repayment cannot exceed revenues, requiring:

$$(4) \quad (1+r)D = \frac{D - (1 - \mu q)\theta C}{\mu q} \leq px.$$

Note that the smaller  $\mu$ , the more important it is to pledge a collateral for this condition to be satisfied. However, due to the dead weight loss in case the collateral is actually liquidated, which happens with positive probability, the firm limits the collateral pledged to the minimum required to obtain the desired credit. Inserting  $D = k(x) + F - L$  and solving for  $C$  yields the minimum collateral needed to finance the fixed cost of market entry and a given level of affiliate sales  $x$ , taking into account that the collateral has to be non-negative:

$$(5) \quad C^*(x) = \max \left\{ 0, \frac{[k(x) + F - L] - \mu q p x}{(1 - \mu q)\theta} \right\}$$

The larger the required credit, the larger is the minimum collateral needed. Note, however, that the collateral cannot exceed the upper bound specified above,  $\bar{C} + F$ . We consider, in turn, the cases where this upper bound of collateral constrains the firm's optimal sales choice and where it does not, starting with the case of a non-binding collateral constraint.

## 2.1 Non-Binding Collateral Constraint

Suppose for a moment that the collateral constraint is not binding. Then, for a given level of affiliate sales  $x$  and collateral  $C$ , the firm expects the following profits:

$$(6) \quad \pi = qpx - \mu q(1+r)D - (1 - \mu)q\theta C - (1 - q)C - [k(x) + F] + D.$$

The first term reflects the expected revenues, the second term the debt repayment that can be enforced with probability  $\mu$  if revenues are positive, which happens with probability  $q$ . If credit repayment cannot be enforced, the firm voluntarily pays what the bank would be able to collect in the event of liquidation,  $\theta C$ , to avoid costly liquidation, as discussed above. If revenues are not positive, however, the collateral will be liquidated, as captured by the fourth

term. The last terms capture the cost of market entry and production and the credit obtained by the firm to finance these costs, respectively.

The firm maximizes its profits by choosing the optimal sales of the affiliate  $x$ , taking into account the collateral needed to finance market entry and production,  $C^*(x)$ :

Using  $D = k(x) + F - L$  and the equations (3) and (5) for  $(1+r)D$  and  $C^*(x)$ , we obtain:

$$(6') \quad \pi = qpx - k(x) - F - (1-q)(1-\theta) \max\left\{0, \frac{[k(x) + F - L - \mu qpx]}{(1-\mu q)\theta}\right\}$$

Note that if  $C^*(x) = 0$ , i.e. if no collateral is needed to secure the credit, financing costs do not bias the investment decision. If collateral is needed, however, expected profits are lowered by the expected liquidation cost,  $(1-q)(1-\theta)C^*(x)$ .

The following proposition characterizes the solutions of the firm's maximization problem.

***Proposition 1: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins***

The profit-maximizing sales level  $x^*$  is characterized by the following solution:

$$(7) \quad x^* = \begin{cases} \frac{1+\mu z}{1+z} (1+\beta)qp < x_{FB} & \text{for } C^*(x^*) > 0 \\ (1+\beta)qp = x_{FB} & \text{for } C^*(x^*) = 0 \end{cases} \quad \text{with } z = \frac{(1-q)(1-\theta)}{(1-\mu q)\theta}$$

The maximum profit the firm can attain is given by

$$(8) \quad \pi^* = \begin{cases} \frac{(1+\mu z)^2}{(1+z)} \frac{1}{2} (1+\beta)q^2 p^2 - z(F-L) - F \leq \pi_{FB} & \text{for } C^*(x^*) > 0 \\ \frac{1}{2} (1+\beta)q^2 p^2 - F = \pi_{FB} & \text{for } C^*(x^*) = 0 \end{cases}$$

provided that the maximum exogenous collateral is not binding, i.e.

$$\bar{C} \geq C^*(x^*) - F$$

Proof: See Appendix

Note that for  $\mu = 1$ , the optimum level of sales is the same as the first-best level. Also, if  $\theta = 1$ , then  $z = 0$ , and again the optimum level of sales is the same as in the first-best case. Thus, the optimum level of sales differs from the first-best choice only if *both*  $\mu < 1$  and

$\theta < 1$ . The intuition for this is straightforward. Only if contract enforcement is less than perfect may a collateral be required to obtain a credit, and only if the use of a collateral is costly does it affect the marginal cost of financing the production. Thus, only if a costly collateral is required do profits fall short of first-best profits.

Of course, the firm will engage in FDI only if the maximum profits from investment are non-negative. The following proposition characterizes the comparative statics for the firm's extensive and intensive margins of investment.

***Proposition 2: Non-Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics***

*Changes in the following parameters affect the probability of non-negative profits and thus the probability of engaging in FDI:*

$$\frac{d\pi^*}{d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{dp} > 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{d\theta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{d\mu} > 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{dF} < 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{dL} > 0, \quad \frac{d\pi^*}{dC} = 0$$

*Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative static results for the optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales:*

$$\frac{dx^*}{d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{dp} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{d\theta} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{d\mu} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{dF} = \frac{dx^*}{dL} = \frac{dx^*}{dC} = 0$$

Proof: See Appendix

Both the optimal volume of sales and the firm's profits increase in the firm's productivity and in the lucrativeness of foreign markets. Furthermore, better contract enforcement in the host country has a positive effect on sales and profits because it lowers the requirement to use costly collateral, and improving the efficiency of liquidating collateral reduces costs. Higher fixed cost lower expected profits not only directly but also indirectly. The larger the fixed cost, the fewer liquid funds are left for financing the investment. Less liquid funds, in turn, mean greater need for using costly collateral. Hence, there is an indirect negative effect of fixed cost over and above the direct effect. However, fixed cost and internal funds do not affect the optimal level of sales choice because the marginal cost of using collateral does not depend on how much collateral is actually needed. The maximum collateral, in turn, has no effect on profits and on the firm's choice of sales as long as it does not impose a binding constraint.

This scenario describes the situation of a mildly financially constrained investor. The need for credit financing and the requirement of providing collateral increase the marginal cost of investment and hence limit the volume of sales and profits. However, as long as the collateral requirement does not impose a binding constraint, the constraints are not as severe, as fixed cost and internal funds affect the extensive margin only, not the intensive margin.

## 2.2 *Binding Collateral Constraint*

Consider now the case where the collateral constraint is binding for the optimal sales level determined above,  $x = x^*$ , i.e.

$$(9) \quad \bar{C} + F < C^*(x^*) \equiv \left\{ 0; \frac{[k(x^*) + F - L] - \mu q p x^*}{(1 - \mu q)\theta} \right\}.$$

In this case,  $x^*$  cannot be implemented because the credit constraint becomes binding. Instead, production settles at a smaller level  $\bar{x}$  that is determined by the maximum available exogenous collateral:

$$(10) \quad \bar{C} + F = \frac{[k(\bar{x}) + F - L] - \mu q p \bar{x}}{(1 - \mu q)\theta}.$$

Solving this equation for  $\bar{x}$  and inserting it into the firm's profit function, yields the constrained optimal level of sales choices and profits as characterized by the following Proposition.

### ***Proposition 3: Binding Collateral Constraint – Extensive and Intensive Margins***

*Suppose the maximum exogenous collateral imposes a binding constraint on the firm's optimal choice of the level of sales, i.e.*

$$(11) \quad \bar{C} < C^*(x^*) - F$$

*Then, the investor can attain a maximum profit of*

$$(12) \quad \bar{\pi} = q p \bar{x} - [k(\bar{x}) + F] - (1 - q)(1 - \theta)[\bar{C} + F] \leq \pi^*$$

*Where the level of sales  $\bar{x} < x^*$  is determined by equation (10)*

Proof: See Appendix

Not surprisingly, profits fall short of the second-best profits that can be attained if the collateral constraint is non-binding. The following proposition characterizes the comparative static results for the extensive and intensive margins.

***Proposition 4: Binding Collateral Constraint – Comparative Statics***

*The following comparative static results characterize the extensive margins of FDI, summarizing which parameters are more or less likely to ensure non-negative profits:*

$$\frac{d\bar{\pi}}{d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{dp} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{d\theta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{d\mu} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{dF} < 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{dL} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{\pi}}{dC} > 0$$

and

$$\frac{d^2\bar{\pi}}{dC d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\bar{\pi}}{dL d\beta} > 0.$$

*Furthermore, the intensive margin is described by the following comparative statics for the optimal volume of foreign affiliate sales:*

$$\frac{d\bar{x}}{d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{dp} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{d\theta} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{d\mu} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{dF} < 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{dL} > 0, \quad \frac{d\bar{x}}{dC} > 0$$

and

$$\frac{d^2\bar{x}}{dC d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{d^2\bar{x}}{dL d\beta} > 0.$$

Proof: See Appendix

Like above, productivity, lucrativeness of foreign markets, contract enforcement, and the efficiency of collateral liquidation positively affect both the extensive and the intensive margin of foreign direct investment. Unlike before, however, fixed costs and internal funds now affect the level of sales as well, because higher fixed cost (or fewer internal funds) leave fewer funds for the financing of production, which cannot be compensated by increasing credit financing if the collateral constraint becomes binding. And of course both margins are positively affected if the collateral constraint becomes less binding.

We also find that the financial status of the firm as captured by the liquid funds and the collateral available plays a more important role for more productive firms, since they are the

ones more likely to invest. Thus, a high productivity is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for foreign expansion.

This scenario captures the case of a more severely financially constrained firm that is not only exposed to higher marginal cost of credit financing, but that is also constrained in its access to collateral. The firm is constrained not only at the extensive, but also at the intensive margin of expansion. Of course, in reality, the two cases may be considered as representing the two limits of a continuous distribution, with marginal cost of using a collateral increasing in the size of the collateral. It would be straightforward to generalize our set up and to allow for a more continuous distribution of financial constraints.

### 2.3 *Financial Constraints at the Affiliate Level*

So far, we have assumed the liquid funds ( $L$ ) and the exogenous collateral ( $\bar{C}$ ) to be provided by the parent firm. For the market entry decision, this is the natural assumption. Over time, however, the foreign affiliate may in turn accumulate earnings and collateral goods that may affect the financing constraints for the volume of sales. A natural extension of the model would thus be to take into account liquid funds and collateral goods provided by the affiliate itself. It seems plausible to conjecture that funds provided by the affiliate incur lower opportunity cost and/or dead weight losses than funds provided by the parent firm.<sup>10</sup> If this is the case, we would expect funds provided by the affiliate to be used first, and only if they are not sufficient would we expect them to be supplemented by funds provided by the parent.

### 2.4 *Summing Up*

The model has rich implications for the determinants of firms' intensive and extensive margins of foreign activities. Higher productivity, more efficient liquidation of collateral, better contract enforcement, and more lucrative foreign markets always increase the volume of affiliate sales. Higher fixed costs decrease and higher internal funds increase activities. The impact of these variables on the intensive margin depends on whether the collateral constraint is

---

<sup>10</sup> This is a topic discussed extensively in the literature on internal capital markets. See for example Brusco and Panunzi (2005) or Inderst and Laux (2005). For a survey see Stein (2003).

binding. They have no effect on the intensive margin if the available collateral is sufficiently large. Likewise, the impact of the size of the collateral depends on the scenario considered. It should matter most when the collateral available is low. Finally, our model predicts that financial constraints matter more for larger, more productive firms, since these firms are more likely to be interested in foreign expansions. Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the comparative static analyses.

### 3 Data and Stylized Facts

#### 3.1 Data Sources<sup>11</sup>

To investigate the importance of real and financial constraints for the foreign investment choices of firms, we use data from three sources. *Dafne* and *Hoppenstedt* are commercial databases providing financial information on a large panel of firms that are active in Germany.<sup>12</sup> We use these datasets to obtain information on parent-level financial constraints and productivity. Information on the number of German firms' foreign affiliates, their sales, the host countries, and affiliate-level financial constraints are obtained from the firm-level database on multinational firms *MiDi* (Microdatabase Direct Investment), provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank (Lipponer 2008).

To eliminate outliers, we start from the full *Dafne* dataset and drop firms with negative values for key variables such as sales and total assets. Also, as we need information on cash flow and sales, we eliminate observations for firms which do not report an income statement. We additionally truncate some of the data at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> percentile. Finally, we drop observations showing large changes in sales or in the number of employees from one year to another (increase by a factor of 10 or drop to 1/10 or less) in order to control for possible merger-induced outliers.

Table 4 compares the structure of the sample after the outlier correction (“corrected sample”)

---

<sup>11</sup> See Table 2 in the Appendix for details.

<sup>12</sup> *Dafne* is the German equivalent to the European firm-level database *Amadeus*. Bayraktar et al. (2005) also use the German data from *Amadeus* for an analysis of firm-level domestic investment behaviour.



and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“regression sample”). The two samples are fairly similar in terms of the percentage allocation of the number of firms across sectors. We have also compared the structure of our sample to the sectoral structure of the German economy as a whole, and the rank correlation in terms of sectoral structure of sales has proven to be quite high.

### 3.2 *Dependent and Explanatory Variables*

#### Extensive and Intensive Margin

By merging the firm-level databases *Dafne* and *Hoppenstedt* with information on the foreign affiliates of German firms provided in *MiDi*, we obtain a dataset which includes two groups of firms. The first group contains purely domestic German firms, i.e. firms which do not hold affiliates abroad (‘Domestic Firms’) (94.5 % of the firm-year observations). The second group consists of German firms with foreign affiliates (‘German MNEs’) (5.5 %). From *MiDi*, we also obtain a count variable on the number of affiliates that a given parent operates abroad. This serves as an additional proxy for the extensive margin of foreign activities, which measures complex FDI strategies involving many affiliates. We also have information on the volume of a firm’s foreign affiliates’ sales as a measure of the intensive margin.

#### Productivity

In line with the theoretical model, we use cost efficiency as a firm-level measure of productivity. Cost efficiency is given by parent sales over total costs, i.e. labor costs plus the costs of other inputs. A higher value reflects higher cost efficiency, hence we expect a positive sign. Higher sales relative to total costs might also reflect higher mark-ups. The expected sign of the coefficient would be the same. We include the size of the parent as a measure for its productivity, and the expected sign is positive.

#### Fixed costs

The parent’s fixed costs of investment are proxied by the ratio of fixed over total assets. We use the ratio rather than the level of this variable as we additionally account for size effects in our regressions. We expect a negative impact of the fixed asset share on the extensive margin. The impact of this variable on the intensive margin could be insignificant, according to our

model, if the collateral available is sufficiently large.

### Internal funds

In our model, we distinguish liquid funds from less liquid collateral as two determinants of financial constraints. Log cash flow of the parent is used to measure the internal funds available for financing a particular investment project. This variable should have a positive impact on the extensive margin of foreign activities. As in the case of fixed cost, its impact could be insignificant on the intensive margin if the collateral available is sufficiently large. In addition, we look at retained earnings of the affiliate as a measure for the liquid funds available to the affiliate to finance the intensive margin. Again, the expected sign is positive or insignificant.<sup>13</sup>

### Collateral

The debt ratio measures leverage at the parent and at the affiliate levels *ex ante*. We can interpret the debt ratio as a measure of the firms' collateral – firms which are more highly leveraged *ex ante* have, *ceteris paribus*, fewer assets available that can serve as collateral for new credits. Hence, the expected sign for the parent debt ratio is negative for both the extensive and the intensive margins if the collateral constraint is binding. Similarly, the expected sign for the affiliate debt ratio is negative for the intensive margin. Firms may also report a high leverage ratio precisely because they have taken out a credit in order to finance FDI. If this were the correct interpretation, we should expect a positive sign of the coefficient.

### Foreign market size

In our theoretical model, we have described the attractiveness of the foreign market in terms of the price that firms can fetch abroad for their product. In our empirical model, we distinguish two aspects of foreign market size. The first is the size of the market measured through its GDP. The second is the state of development of a foreign market measured through GDP per capita. We expect a positive sign for both variables.

---

<sup>13</sup> Following Kaplan and Zingales' (1997) criticism, there has been a lively debate on the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivities as a measure for financial constraints. The focus of the discussion have been endogeneity issues as well as issues of adequately taking into account access to external finance. See also Brown et al (2009) for an overview of this discussion. We use lagged variables to address the simultaneity of firm-level variables issue. We also include the debt ratio, as discussed below.

### Contract enforcement

The probability of contract enforcement depends on two parameters – an index measuring the difficulty of contract enforcement as well as the presence of affiliates of German banks abroad. The variable (*weak*) *contract enforcement* gives the number of procedures required to enforce contracts, and the expected impact is negative. This variable can be expected to influence both, the entry decision as well as the volume of activities, and we include it for both margins. Affiliates of German banks should be at an advantage over other lenders with regard to monitoring foreign affiliates and enforcing contracts. We use *MiDi* to obtain information on the volume of *FDI of German banks* by country, and we expect a positive impact on the intensive margin.

### 3.3 *Stylized Facts*

In Graphs 1a-1e, we visualize the differences between German MNEs and Domestic Firms by plotting the Kernel densities of size (Graph 1a), cost efficiency (Graph 1b), cash flow (Graph 1c), the debt ratio (Graph 1d), and the share of fixed assets (Graph 1e).

Graph 1a confirms stylized facts reported in earlier papers using firm-level data (e.g. Mayer and Ottaviano et al. 2008): MNEs are larger than purely domestic firms. Unreported one-sided *t*-tests on the equality of the means between the two sub-samples show that this difference is statistically significant. Measuring size through the volume of sales gives a very similar result. MNEs also exhibit a somewhat lower share of fixed assets (Graph 1e). Graph 1b shows that differences between the two types of firms in terms of cost efficiency are small and, in fact, not significant.

Hence, while the dividing line between multinationals and non-multinationals is not as clear-cut as might have been expected on the basis of the cost efficiency of these firms, the dividing line is clear for measures of financial status. Multinationals have significantly higher cash flow (Graph 1c) and lower debt ratios (Graph 1d). Prima facie, these graphs suggest that heterogeneity with regard to the openness and international orientation of firms could be driven by financial factors just as by real factors.

## 4 Productivity versus Financial Constraints: Regression Results

Our main empirical model relates financial constraints and productivity to the pattern of internationalization at the firm level. We are interested in two main questions. First, do financial constraints and productivity affect the probability of investing abroad? Second, do these factors affect the volume of foreign affiliates' sales? We answer these questions in two steps. In a first step, we analyze the determinants of the firms' extensive margin of FDI using the probability of investing abroad and the number of affiliates as dependent variable. In a second step, we analyze the sales of affiliates across countries, i.e. the intensive margin. We also estimate the extensive and intensive margins jointly using a Heckman selection model.

### 4.1 Extensive Margin

Our baseline regression for the extensive margin – the decision to enter a foreign market – is given by the following probit model:

$$(12) \quad \Pr(FDI)_{i,k,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{Z}_{k,t} + \alpha_3 I + \alpha_4 S + \alpha_5 T + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where  $\Pr(FDI)_{i,k,t}$  indicates whether a firm  $i$  has invested abroad in year  $t$  in country  $k$ .  $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$  ( $\mathbf{Z}_{k,t}$ ) are vectors of firm-level (country-level) control variables.<sup>14</sup> We include the ratio of sales over total costs as a measure of cost efficiency. Our main proxies for financial barriers are cash flow and the debt ratio. The country-level control variables are GDP, GDP per capita, and the severity of contract enforcement. We additionally include firm size, and a full set of industry ( $I$ ), German states ( $S$ ), and time ( $T$ ) dummies. These dummies capture systematic differences across industries and states as well as common macroeconomic effects. We also include an exporter dummy to account for the fact that exporting is typically a stepping stone into international markets (see Helpman et al. 2004). This variable turns out to be positive and significant on the extensive margin regarding the number of affiliates abroad but insignificant regarding the probability of owning foreign affiliates.

Table 5 shows the results. Column (1) has the baseline specification for the full regression sample. In columns (2)-(7), we split the sample by size, by sector (manufacturing versus ser-

---

<sup>14</sup> Firm-level regressors are lagged by one period to account for the simultaneity of the explanatory variables.

vices), and by legal status (listed versus unlisted). While the sub-sample of listed firms is small (6,165 versus 51,922 firm-country-year observations), it nevertheless serves as a useful test of the impact of financial frictions. A priori, we expect financial frictions to be less important for the listed firms with access to a larger range of financial sources.

Larger and more efficient firms are more likely to be multinationals. *Size* has a positive and significant impact on the probability of being a multinational, and this effect is robust across specifications. Contrary to expectations, *cost efficiency* is negative and significant in some specifications. This effect is driven by certain sub-samples such as the large firms and the services sector firms and suggests that size is a better proxy for productivity than cost efficiency.

Our measure for fixed cost of market entry, the *fixed asset share*, has a strong and significantly negative impact on the probability of investing abroad for all specifications, as expected.<sup>15</sup> Berman and Héricourt (2008) as well as Manova (2006) interpret the fixed asset share as capturing the tangibility of assets, and hence as a measure of easier access to external finance secured by collateral. Following their interpretation, the expected effect is positive. The negative coefficient we find suggests that, for FDI, our interpretation is the more appropriate one. Financial constraints have a significant and robust impact on the extensive margin. *Cash flow* is mostly positive and significant. The *debt ratio* has an insignificant impact, consistent with the prediction of the model for non-binding collateral constraints.

The marginal effects reported in Table 5 show a similar importance of productivity and financial frictions. Generally, however, fixed costs of entry (the fixed asset share) and the country-level variables are more important than variables such as size or the debt ratio. Mean elasticities also shows the strongest response to changes in log GDP (elasticity of +0.66), cost efficiency (-0.45), firm size (+0.30), the fixed asset share (+0.23), and cash flow (+0.16).

To study the interaction of productivity and financial constraints, we split the sample. We take firm size as an indicator for firm productivity. One of the financial variables – the debt ratio – is insignificant for both groups. The other – cash flow – matters for large firms, but not

---

<sup>15</sup> An alternative interpretation of this finding is that firms with a large share of intangibles and thus firm-specific know-how are more likely to venture abroad. These firms would also have a lower fixed asset share.

for small firms. The latter finding may look counterintuitive at first sight, as one would expect smaller firms to be more opaque and hence more likely to be affected by financial constraints. Our finding is, however, consistent with the prediction of our model that financial constraints should matter the more, the more productive the firm and hence the more interested it is in expanding abroad.<sup>16</sup> Financial constraints, in other words, do not impede the foreign expansion of small firms because these firms are not productive enough to invest abroad in the first place. It is also consistent with the finding of Berman and Hericourt (2008) who observe that productivity has no effect on a firm's export decision if the firm faces financial constraints.

The country-level variables are significant and have the expected sign. GDP is positive and significant, and GDP per capita is positive and significant for the full sample and for most of the sample splits, thus confirming the expectation that market size matters. Consistent with our model, greater difficulties with contract enforcement lower the probability that a given German firm enters a particular country.

In sum, our results show that parent-level financial constraints and productivity affect the extensive margin of foreign entry: larger, more efficient, and firms with a lower share of fixed assets are more likely to become multinationals. In addition, country-level variables capturing contract enforcement and market size play an important role for the entry decision.

#### 4.2 *Extensive Margin: Number of Affiliates*

An alternative way of looking at the extensive margin of firms' foreign activities is to count the number of foreign affiliates that a given parent holds. Adding an affiliate implies new set-up costs, hence the count data models presented in Table 6 provide information on the determinants of complex FDI strategies. The count data models differ in their assumptions regarding the moments of the distribution and the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity. These models, therefore, allow controlling for the large share of zeros in our data to a differ-

---

<sup>16</sup> Chaney (2005) distinguishes three classes of firms, with low, intermediate and high productivity. He predicts that firms with low productivity are not affected by financial constraints, since investing abroad is not a viable option for them, even without financial constraints. More productive firms, instead, are hampered by financial constraints in their foreign expansion strategy. In his model, very productive firms are by construction not liquidity constrained and hence not affected by financial constraints.

ing degree.<sup>17</sup> The basic count data model is the Poisson model which is quite restrictive in assuming that the conditional mean of the dependent variable equals the conditional variance. The Negative Binomial model allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity and for overdispersion. It is the preferable model, as the equidispersion assumption is strongly rejected for our data. Finally, zero-inflated models assign an even higher weight to the probability of observing a zero in the dependent variable.

Results from count data models support our finding that larger, less indebted parents, firms with a lower share of fixed assets, and firms with higher cash flow are more active internationally. Cost efficiency is negative or insignificant. The debt ratio has a negative impact on the extensive margin when using the number of foreign affiliates. This is consistent with the interpretation of high debt ratios as indicators of low collateral at the parent level which is available to back up new lending.<sup>18</sup>

### 4.3 *Intensive Margin: Sales of Affiliates*

We now focus on the sales of the foreign affiliate, while taking the decision to *become* a multinational as well as its location as given. The dependent variable  $\log(\text{Sales})_{ijk,t}$  are the sales of affiliate  $j$  of parent  $i$  in country  $k$ , and the regression equation includes control variables at the parent level ( $\mathbf{Z}_{i,t}$ ), at the affiliate level ( $\mathbf{Z}_{j,t}$ ), and at the country level ( $\mathbf{Z}_{k,t}$ ):

$$(13) \quad \log(\text{Sales})_{ijk,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \mathbf{Z}_{i,t} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{Z}_{j,t} + \alpha_3 \mathbf{Z}_{k,t} + \alpha_4 S + \alpha_5 T + \varepsilon_{ijk,t}$$

We estimate this equation as a parent-level fixed effects model; results are given in Table 7. In contrast to the results for the extensive margin, all our parent-level measures for real and financial constraints are insignificant for the intensive margin. Given that most parent characteristics are already absorbed by the fixed effects, variables that capture parents' real and financial constraints do not have an additional impact on the sales of their affiliates. The retained earnings of the affiliate enter with a positive and significant sign in all specifications. Hence, the availability of liquid funds which also reflects the profitability of the affiliate mat-

---

<sup>17</sup> For a detailed description of count data models, see, for example, Jones et al. (2007).

<sup>18</sup> Naturally, we omit the country-level variables from these regressions.

ters for the volume of activities.

Our host-country regressors again yield the expected signs. German firms have larger foreign affiliates in larger countries and in countries hosting many German banks. While the impact of market size per se is not surprising and would, in fact, be borne out by many theoretical models, the positive impact of bank FDI is in support of our theoretical model. A greater presence of home country banks and thus familiarity of domestic lenders with the foreign market should improve the collection of information on the foreign affiliate. This increases the probability that collateral can be collected abroad, thus lowering the costs of financing and increasing the volume of lending.

In columns (2)-(5), we perform similar sample splits by size and sector. The overall findings are very similar with two exceptions. Size (negative) and cash flow (positive) are weakly significant (at the 10%-level) for the large firms. The positive sign on cash flow is consistent with the previous finding that financial constraints matter most for firms with larger foreign activities. Also, within the group of already large firms, the relatively small ones have higher foreign affiliate sales.

Whereas parent-level frictions do not matter for the volume of activities, financial frictions at the affiliate level have an impact on affiliate sales. This is a novel finding since, to the best of our knowledge, the joined impact of parent- and affiliate-level financial frictions has not been analyzed before. These results suggest a hierarchy of financing foreign expansion, where preference is given to local funds and only if they are not sufficient, parent funds are used, albeit at potentially higher opportunity cost.

#### *4.4 Heckman Selection Model*

So far, we have treated the decision whether to enter a foreign country and the decision how much to produce and sell separately. To check whether this assumption is justified, we estimate a Heckman selection model, which explicitly accounts for the selection into the FDI mode (Table 8). We use state dummies as exclusion restrictions, thus accounting for the fact that – historically – different regions in Germany have different degrees of international openness. Variables measured at the affiliate level and German bank FDI abroad are included in the outcome but not in the selection equation. The Mills ratio in the outcome equation –



affiliate sales – is insignificant, which justifies our earlier assumption to model the extensive and the intensive margin separately.

Qualitative results by and large confirm earlier findings. It is interesting to see that some variables affect the probability of setting up an affiliate, but not the volume of its sales. Higher cash flow has a positive impact on the selection into foreign status but not on the volume of sales. This effect is, consistent with the findings reported above, driven by the large firms. Country-level variables such as GDP and GDP per capita have a strong positive impact on the extensive margin, but none on the intensive margin.

Some parent-level variables such as cost efficiency (negative), size (positive) and fixed asset share (negative) have a consistent impact on both margins.<sup>19</sup> Affiliate's retained earnings have a strong and significant positive impact on the intensive margin, thus confirming the previous finding that distinguishing parent- and affiliate level frictions is important. (Weak) contract enforcement also influences both margins negatively, as expected. Bank FDI has the expected positive impact on the intensive margin.

Finally, splitting the sample into small and large firms confirms that selection into foreign status is affected by financial constraints for the large firms. Market size has a positive and significant impact on the volume of foreign sales of large firms and a negative impact on sales of small firms. This reflects scale economies and the sorting of smaller firms into smaller markets.

#### 4.5 *Summing Up*

Comparing our empirical results to the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1, we find that they are more consistent with the scenario of non-binding than with the scenario of binding collateral constraints. Our measure for the parent's internal funds, cash flow, is consistently significant for the extensive margin, but not for the intensive margin. Our measure for the parent's collateral, the debt ratio, is mostly insignificant at both the extensive and intensive margin, the only exception being the Heckman selection equation for large firms and the count model of affiliates where the coefficient of the parent's debt ratio is significantly nega-

---

<sup>19</sup> Note that results in Table 8 are not fully comparable to those in Table 7 since we do not include parent fixed effects in Table 8 but state, sector, and year fixed effects.

tive. The fixed asset share as our measure for fixed cost is significantly negative at the extensive and insignificant at the intensive margin, with the exception of the Heckman outcome equation. Size is always significantly positive for the extensive margin, and, in the Heckman outcome equation, also for the intensive margin. Inconsistent with the model, our alternative measure of productivity (cost efficiency) is frequently insignificant or exhibits the wrong sign. A similar observation has been made by Greenaway et al (2007) who find insignificant coefficients for their measure of productivity (TFP) on firm's export choice, but significantly positive coefficients for size.

## 5 Conclusions

Multinationals are large. Earlier literature focuses on differences in productivity across firms as an explanation for this stylized fact. More productive firms find it easier to shoulder the fixed costs of foreign entry, thus being more likely to enter new markets. This paper analyzes the importance of financial constraints as an additional barrier to entry into foreign markets.

We provide a theoretical model and empirical evidence using data on firms' extensive margin of foreign activities (the probability to be a multinational firm) as well as their intensive margin (the volume of affiliate sales across countries). Considering real barriers to entry as captured by size/productivity and entry cost, we find that larger firms and firms with a smaller share of fixed assets are consistently more likely to become multinationals, and these firms also have larger foreign activities. Cost efficiency, in contrast, does not have the expected positive impact.

Considering financial constraints, our empirical results confirm that these constraints matter for foreign expansions. Parents with larger cash flow are more likely to become multinationals and have more affiliates. For the intensive margin, we find a weaker impact of parent-level financial constraints, but a strong positive impact of affiliate's retained earnings. This suggests a financing hierarchy for the intensive margin, with affiliate financing to be the first and parent financing to be the second choice. Furthermore, considering the interaction of real and financial barriers, financial constraints matter more for large firms because these firms are most likely to expand abroad.

The findings of our paper have a number of implications for different literatures. To the lit-

erature of multinational firms, we add a mechanism through which productivity and financial constraints interact. Models ignoring financial constraints would predict that enhancement of firm productivity could improve firms' access to foreign markets. Our results suggest that high productivity may be a necessary, but not a sufficient precondition for foreign expansion. Lowering financial constraints might be just as important, as even large and productive firms are hampered in their internationalization strategy by financial constraints.

To the banking literature, we add a mechanism explaining why banks and non-financial firms typically expand into foreign markets in tandem. One reason for the "follow their customer" patterns in the data could be that home-country banks that are active abroad could have comparative advantages over local banks in enforcing credit repayment and in assessing the creditworthiness of FDI projects. This does not ultimately resolve the "follow their customer" question, but the specific interaction between financial and real barriers to entry that we stress may provide the possibility of testing this link more structurally.

Finally, our findings can have implications for the international macroeconomic literature. Essentially, the financial constraints imbedded in our model are similar to financial accelerator mechanisms used to model the interaction between the financial sector and business cycles. In this sense, extensions of our model might provide useful insights into credit channel mechanisms in open economies and the persistence of shocks triggering entry into foreign markets.

## 6 References

- Bayraktar, N., P. Sakellaris, and P. Vermeulen (2005). Real versus Financial Constraints to Capital Investment. European Central Bank. Working Paper 566. Frankfurt a.M.
- Bellone, F., P. Musso, L. Nesta, and S. Schiavo (2008). Financial Constraints as a Barrier to Export Participation. Observatoire Français Conjonctures Economiques. Document de travail 2008-29. Paris.
- Berman, N., and J. Héricourt (2008). Financial Factors and the Margins of Trade: Evidence from Cross-Country Firm-Level Data. Documents de Travail du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2008.50. Paris.
- Bernard, A.B., J. Eaton, J.B. Jensen, and S. Kortum (2003). Plants and Productivity in International Trade. *American Economic Review* 93(4): 1268-1290.
- Brown, J., Fazzari, S.M., and B.C. Peterson (2009). Financing Innovation and Growth: Cash Flow, External Equity and the 1990 R&D Boom. *Journal of Finance* 64 (1): 151-185.
- Brusco, S., and F. Panunzi. (2005). Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets 49(3): 659-681.
- Buch, C.M., I. Kesternich, A. Lipponer, and M. Schmitzer (2009). Exports versus FDI Revisited: Does Finance Matter? University of Tübingen, Deutsche Bundesbank, and University of Munich. Mimeo.
- Chaney, T. (2005). Liquidity Constrained Exporters. University of Chicago. Mimeo.
- Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK) (2009). *Auslandsinvestitionen in der Industrie*. Berlin und Brüssel.
- Greenaway, D., Guariglia, A., and Kneller, R. (2007). Financial factors and exporting decisions. *Journal of International Economics* 73: 377-395.
- Harrison, A.E., McMillan, M., and I. Love (2004). Global Capital Flows and Financing Constraints. *Journal of Development Economics* 75(1): 269-301.
- Helpman, E., M.J. Melitz, and S.R. Yeaple (2004). Export versus FDI. *American Economic Review* 94 (1): 300–316.
- Inderst, R., and C. Laux (2005). Incentives in Internal Capital Markets: Capital Constraints, Competition, and Investment Opportunities. *RAND Journal of Economics* 36(1): 215-228.
- Jones, A.M., N.Rice, T. Bago d’Uva, and S. Balia (2007). *Applied Health Economics*. Routledge. New York

- Kaplan, S.N., and L. Zingales (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financial constraints? *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112: 169-215.
- Lipponer, A. (2008). *Microdatabase Direct Investment – MiDi. A Brief Guide*. Deutsche Bundesbank. Frankfurt a. M.
- Manova, K. (2006). Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Working Paper 14531. Cambridge, MA.
- Markusen, J.R. (2002). *Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
- Mayer, T., and G.I.P. Ottaviano et al. (2007). *The Happy Few: The Internationalisation of European Firms*. Bruegel Blueprint Series. November. Brussels.
- Melitz, M. (2003). The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity. *Econometrica* 71: 1695-1725.
- Russ, K. (2007). The Endogeneity of the Exchange Rate as a Determinant of FDI: A Model of Money, Entry, and Multinational Firms. *Journal of International Economics* 71(2): 267-526.
- Stein, J. (2003). Agency, Information and Corporate Investment. In G.M. Constantinides, M.H., and R.M. Stulz (Editors). *Handbook of the Economics of Finance*. Volume 1A: 111-165. Elsevier North-Holland.
- Stiebale, J. (2008). Do Financial Constraints Matter for Foreign Market Entry? Ruhr Economic Papers No. 51. Essen.

## 7 Mathematical Appendix

### Proof of Proposition 1

We obtain  $x^*$  by taking the first-order condition from (6) or (6') respectively, setting it equal to zero and solving for the optimal  $x^*$ . To see that  $x^* \leq x_{FB}$ , note that  $\frac{1+\mu z}{1+z} < 1$  if  $\mu < 1$ , which is required for a positive collateral to be needed.  $\pi^* \leq \pi_{FB}$  follows directly from  $x^* \leq x_{FB}$  and can be shown analytically by checking that  $\pi_{FB} > \pi^*$  whenever  $C > 0$ .

Q.E.D.

### Proof of Proposition 2

Consider first  $x^*$ . It is straightforward to see that:

$$\frac{dx^*}{d\beta} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{dp} > 0, \quad \frac{dx^*}{dF} = \frac{dx^*}{dL} = \frac{dx^*}{dC} = 0$$

To obtain the remaining comparative statics, we evaluate first:

$$\frac{dz}{d\theta} = \frac{-(1-q)(1-\mu q)\theta - (1-q)(1-\theta)(1-\mu q)}{(1-\mu q)^2 \theta^2} = -\frac{(1-q)}{(1-\mu q)\theta^2} = -\frac{z}{\theta(1-\theta)} < 0$$

and

$$\frac{dz}{d\mu} = \frac{(1-q)(1-\theta)q}{(1-\mu q)^2 \theta} = \frac{zq}{(1-\mu q)} > 0$$

Using these derivatives, we obtain:

$$\frac{dx^*}{d\theta} = (1+\beta)qp \frac{(1+z)\mu \frac{dz}{d\theta} - (1+\mu z) \frac{dz}{d\theta}}{(1+z)^2} = -(1+\beta)qp \frac{(1-\mu) \frac{dz}{d\theta}}{(1+z)^2} > 0$$

$$\frac{dx^*}{d\mu} = (1+\beta)qp \frac{(1+z) \left[ \mu \frac{dz}{d\mu} + z \right] - (1+\mu z) \frac{dz}{d\mu}}{(1+z)^2}$$

and

$$= (1+\beta)qp \frac{(1+z)z - (1-\mu) \frac{dz}{d\mu}}{(1+z)^2} = (1+\beta)qp \frac{z}{(1+z)^2} \left[ 1 + z - \underbrace{\frac{(1-\mu)q}{(1-\mu q)}}_{< 1} \right] > 0$$

Consider next the comparative statics for  $\pi^*$ .

$\frac{d\pi^*}{d\beta} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\pi^*}{dp} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\pi^*}{dF} < 0$ ,  $\frac{d\pi^*}{dL} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\pi^*}{dC} = 0$  are straightforward to see. To see

that  $\frac{d\pi^*}{d\theta} > 0$  and  $\frac{d\pi^*}{d\mu} > 0$ , note that  $\frac{dx^*}{d\theta} > 0$  and  $\frac{dx^*}{d\mu} > 0$ . Using a revealed preference argument, it follows that the profit has to be increasing in these parameters as well.

Q.E.D.

### Proof of Proposition 3

We find the constrained optimal choice of  $\bar{x}$  by solving the collateral constraint:

$$\bar{C} + F = \frac{[k(\bar{x}) + F - L] - \mu q p \bar{x}}{(1 - \mu q)\theta}$$

for  $\bar{x}$ . This gives us a quadratic function of  $\bar{x}$  which has the following solutions:

$$\bar{x}_{1/2} = (1 + \beta)\mu q p \pm \sqrt{(1 + \beta)^2 \mu^2 q^2 p^2 - 2(1 + \beta)[F - L - (1 - \mu q)\theta(\bar{C} + F)]}$$

Since we are looking at constrained levels of sales that fall short of the second-best level of sales  $x^*$ , the solution for the investor is to choose the larger of the two levels of sales.

Q.E.D.

### Proof of Proposition 4

Consider first  $\bar{x}$ . It is straightforward to see that:  
 $\frac{d\bar{x}}{d\beta} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dp} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dF} < 0$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{dL} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{d\bar{C}} > 0$ ,  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{d\theta} > 0$

Finally, note that  $\frac{d\bar{x}}{d\mu} > 0$ , because increasing  $\mu$  relaxes the collateral constraint. To see this, note that the right-hand side of:

$$\bar{C} + F \geq \frac{[k(\bar{x}) + F - L] - \mu q p \bar{x}}{(1 - \mu q)\theta}$$

decreases in  $\mu$ , for a given  $\bar{x}$ . To see this, note that:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{d \left[ \frac{[k(\bar{x}) + F - L] - \mu q p \bar{x}}{(1 - \mu q)\theta} \right]}{d\mu} = \\ & \frac{(1 - \mu q)\theta(-q p \bar{x}) - (F + k(\bar{x}) - L - \mu q p \bar{x})(-q\theta)}{(1 - \mu q)^2 \theta^2} = \\ & -q\theta \frac{p\bar{x} - (F + k(\bar{x}) - L)}{(1 - \mu q)^2 \theta^2} < 0 \end{aligned}$$

To see the comparative statics for  $\bar{\pi}$  note that they have the same signs as the comparative statics for  $\bar{x}$  because they follow from relaxing (or tightening) the constraints on the constrained choice of  $\bar{x}$ . Q.E.D.

**Table 1: Summary of the Theoretical Model and Empirical Measurement**

This Table summarizes the comparative static results of the model presented in Section 2. See Table 2 for the definitions of the empirical variables.

Parameter	Measurement	Proposition II: Non-binding collateral constraint		Proposition IV: Binding collateral constraint	
		Extensive margin	Intensive margin	Extensive margin	Intensive margin
Productivity ( $\beta$ )	Cost efficiency Sales / Total assets	+	+	+	+
Foreign prices ( $p$ )	GDP GDP per capita	+	+	+	+
Liquidation value ( $\theta$ )		+	+	+	+
Probability of contract enforcement ( $\mu$ )	Bank FDI	+	+	+	+
Probability of no contract enforcement ( $1 - \mu$ )	(Weak) contract enforcement	-	-	-	-
Fixed costs ( $F$ )	Fixed / Total assets	-	0	-	-
Internal funds ( $L$ )	Cash flow of the parent Retained earnings of the affiliate	+	0	+	+
Collateral ( $C$ )	Debt ratio of the parent	0	0	+	+



**Table 2: Data**

Unless otherwise indicated, parent-level information comes from *Dafne* (Bureau van Dijk) and *Hoppenstedt*, affiliate level information comes from *MiDi* (Microdatabase Direct Investment, Deutsche Bundesbank). Country-level information comes from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. All values in €1,000 (unless otherwise indicated). Cash flow and cost efficiency are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at the 1st and 99th percentile. Fixed asset share, the debt ratio, and sales are corrected for outliers by truncating the data at the 99th percentile

Variable	Definition
<i>Parent-level data</i>	
Cash flow	Cash flow from operations
Cost efficiency	Sales / total cost (cost of materials + labor cost)
Debt ratio	Total debt / total assets
Firms with foreign affiliate	0/1 dummy for firms with foreign affiliates from <i>Dafne-MiDi</i> -merge
Fixed asset share	Fixed assets / total assets
Number of foreign affiliates	Count of total number of affiliates worldwide obtained from <i>MiDi</i>
Sector definitions	We use two definition of sectors: (i) A <u>broad</u> definition of 28 sectoral groups is used for sample splits (see also Table 5), (ii) a <u>narrow</u> definition of about 64 sectors at the 2-digit-level, used to generate sector-level dummy variables
Sales	Turnover
<i>Affiliate-level data</i>	
Debt ratio	Total debt / total assets
Sales	Aggregate turnover of parent <i>i</i> in country <i>j</i> in year <i>t</i> , i.e. data are aggregated across all affiliates in a given country for a given parent and weighted by the parent's ownership share
Retained earnings / total assets	Revenue reserves / total assets
<i>Country-level data</i>	
Bank FDI	Aggregate volume of FDI of German banks in country <i>j</i> in year <i>t</i> , calculated from <i>MiDi</i> in €1,000
(Weak) contract enforcement	From the World Bank's "Doing business" database ( <a href="http://www.doingbusiness.org/">http://www.doingbusiness.org/</a> ), we use the variable "Enforcing contracts / Procedures (number)"
GDP	Host country GDP per capita in constant USD, converted into €bn, World Bank (2008)
GDP per capita	Host country GDP per capita per capita in constant USD, converted into €1,000, World Bank (2008)

### Table 3: Descriptive Statistics

This Table provides summary statistics for the regressions reported below. GDP per capita is in €1,000. Negative values in ln(GDP per capita) hence come from countries with a GDP per capita of less than €1,000. Minimum and maximum values for affiliate-level variables are not reported due to confidentiality reasons.

#### a) Extensive margin

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Cash flow (log)	176,034	5.347	2.245	0.000	10.653
Cost efficiency	136,093	1.344	0.444	0.383	4.750
Debt ratio	203,325	0.561	0.291	0.000	0.999
Exporter dummy	211,205	0.072	0.259	0.000	1.000
FDI dummy	211,205	0.020	0.140	0.000	1.000
Fixed / total assets	184,882	0.267	0.269	0.000	0.970
Size (log)	211,143	7.825	2.404	0.000	18.922

#### b) Intensive margin

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
<u>Affiliate-level</u>					
Debt ratio	17,475	0.516	0.269	...	...
Retained earnings / total assets	17,475	0.059	0.132	...	...
Sales (log)	16,582	10.095	1.286	...	...
<u>Parent-level</u>					
Cash flow (log)	3,980	11.171	4.207	0.000	19.441
Cost efficiency	3,682	1.307	0.330	0.393	4.690
Debt ratio	5,269	0.433	0.229	0.000	0.999
Fixed assets / total assets	4,924	0.246	0.219	0.000	0.963
Number of foreign affiliates	4,222	4.429	9.878	1.000	...
Size (log)	5,129	13.919	3.726	3.296	21.484
<u>Country-level</u>					
Bank FDI (log)	296	11.601	2.282	4.754	16.812
(Weak) contract enforcement (number of procedures)	243	36.078	6.373	21.000	51.000
GDP (log)	438	4.541	1.873	-0.664	9.762
GDP per capita (log)	434	1.707	1.386	-1.853	4.001

**Table 4: Corrected Versus Regression Sample**

This table compares the sample corrected for outliers (“corrected sample”) and the sample used for the regressions in Table 6 (“Regression sample”). The two samples differ because of missing observations for the explanatory variables.

	Regression sample				Corrected sample			
	Number	%	Sales (million €)	%	Number	%	Sales (million €)	%
Agriculture & Fishing	1,172	1.63	5,242	0.14	2,435	1.49	12,744	0.16
Chemicals	1,219	1.70	158,715	4.23	1,908	1.17	251,227	3.17
Construction	8,166	11.36	136,271	3.63	17,220	10.56	184,209	2.32
Education	273	0.38	3,293	0.09	798	0.49	17,049	0.21
Energy	2,308	3.21	183,807	4.90	4,271	2.62	598,190	7.54
Financial services	323	0.45	25,840	0.69	1,906	1.17	109,836	1.38
Food & Tobacco	1,568	2.18	169,024	4.50	2,865	1.76	387,082	4.88
Furniture	1,043	1.45	54,521	1.45	1,804	1.11	49,107	0.62
Glass	902	1.25	66,058	1.76	1,515	0.93	52,436	0.66
Health	2,302	3.20	75,202	2.00	4,596	2.82	158,890	2.00
Hotels & Restaurants	600	0.83	7,202	0.19	1,549	0.95	17,713	0.22
Coking	84	0.12	82,420	2.20	163	0.10	64,276	0.81
Leather	62	0.09	3,122	0.08	99	0.06	3,052	0.04
Machinery	3,502	4.87	262,599	7.00	5,934	3.64	317,839	4.01
Metals	4,063	5.65	138,351	3.69	7,619	4.67	283,242	3.57
Mining	279	0.39	13,555	0.36	572	0.35	128,760	1.62
Office equipment	2,695	3.75	235,198	6.27	4,718	2.89	253,050	3.19
Other services	2,382	3.31	72,376	1.93	6,482	3.97	213,489	2.69
Paper	1,566	2.18	62,047	1.65	3,052	1.87	138,107	1.74
Real estate & Business services	13,854	19.27	595,754	15.87	44,063	27.02	1,536,041	19.37
Rubber & Plastics	1,248	1.74	82,808	2.21	2,152	1.32	88,540	1.12
Textiles	736	1.02	22,114	0.59	1,335	0.82	55,160	0.70
Trade & repair	16,706	23.23	1,041,823	27.76	34,642	21.24	2,047,607	25.82
Transport & Communication	3,460	4.81	158,111	4.21	8,341	5.11	631,385	7.96
Vehicles	786	1.09	82,430	2.20	1,436	0.88	297,970	3.76
Wood	435	0.60	11,598	0.31	920	0.56	20,855	0.26
n.e.c	177	0.25	4,149	0.11	684	0.42	13,808	0.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>71,911</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3,753,631</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>163,079</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>7,931,660</b>	<b>100.00</b>

**Table 5: Probability of Owning Affiliates Abroad**

This table reports results of probit regressions using a 0/1 dummy variable of owning foreign affiliates as the dependent variable. All explanatory variables are at the parent level (P). Sample splits are at the sample median. Sector, state, and year fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level.

	Full sample	Large	Small	Manufacturing	Services	Listed	Unlisted
Log size t-1 (P)	0.009*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.003)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.004)	0.008*** (0.001)
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.010*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.009)	-0.011*** (0.003)
Debt ratio t-1 (P)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.016 (0.010)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.011 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.030 (0.021)	-0.006 (0.005)
Log cash flow t-1 (P)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.004*** (0.001)
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)	-0.037*** (0.007)	-0.051*** (0.013)	-0.017*** (0.005)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.032*** (0.009)	-0.097*** (0.032)	-0.031*** (0.007)
Log GDP	0.019*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)	0.021*** (0.001)	0.017*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.002)	0.018*** (0.001)
Log GDP per capita	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.004)	0.001 (0.001)
(Weak) contract enforcement	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.000)
Exporter (0/1)	0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.003** (0.001)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.002)
Observations	58,087	29,493	28,594	32,537	22,681	6165	51,922
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.134	0.138	0.108	0.153	0.124	0.235	0.121
log likelihood	-9,500	-5,899	-3,532	-5,446	-3,553	-1,222	-8,197

**Table 6: Determinants of the Number of Affiliates**

This table reports the estimated coefficients of the Poisson (Negative Binomial, Zero-Inflated Poisson ZIP) regression using the total number of affiliates of each German firm as the dependent variable. Year fixed effects included. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level.

	(1) Poisson	(2) NegBin	(3) ZIP
Log size t-1 (P)	0.008*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.000)	0.012*** (0.002)
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.009** (0.004)
Debt ratio t-1 (P)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.024*** (0.006)
Log cash flow t-1 (P)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.009*** (0.001)
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)	-0.048*** (0.007)	-0.019*** (0.002)	-0.065*** (0.009)
Exporter (0/1)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.001)	0.008*** (0.002)
Observations	71,911	71,911	71,911
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.677	0.321	0.322
log likelihood	-27,438	-18,295	-20,976

**Table 7: Determinants of the Volume of Affiliate Sales**

This table reports results of parent fixed effects panel regressions using the log sales of affiliates of domestic multinational  $i$  in host country  $j$  as the dependent variable. (P) = parent-level variables, (A) = affiliate-level variables. In Panel (b), sample splits are at the sample median. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level.

	Full sam- ple	Large	Small	Manufac- turing	Services
Log size t-1 (P)	-0.029 (0.048)	-0.128* (0.076)	0.055 (0.061)	-0.014 (0.060)	-0.078 (0.093)
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)	-0.112 (0.142)	-0.014 (0.332)	-0.118 (0.150)	-0.479 (0.322)	-0.059 (0.184)
Debt ratio t-1 (P)	-0.165 (0.277)	-0.072 (0.404)	-0.285 (0.404)	-0.065 (0.375)	-0.100 (0.483)
Log cash flow t-1 (P)	0.033 (0.045)	0.125* (0.073)	-0.039 (0.056)	0.033 (0.057)	0.088 (0.088)
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)	0.009 (0.217)	0.021 (0.262)	0.049 (0.434)	-0.250 (0.322)	-0.212 (0.424)
Retained earnings / total assets t-1(A)	0.585*** (0.137)	0.447** (0.176)	0.868*** (0.220)	0.535*** (0.155)	0.777** (0.305)
Debt ratio t-1 (A)	-0.086 (0.077)	-0.017 (0.103)	-0.175 (0.116)	-0.092 (0.089)	0.001 (0.169)
Log GDP	0.139*** (0.018)	0.175*** (0.024)	0.088*** (0.027)	0.138*** (0.020)	0.141*** (0.038)
Log GDP per capita	0.084*** (0.024)	0.094*** (0.033)	0.056 (0.035)	0.084*** (0.028)	0.094* (0.053)
Log bank FDI	0.066*** (0.012)	0.043*** (0.017)	0.097*** (0.019)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.100*** (0.025)
(Weak) contract enforcement	-0.012*** (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.018*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.017** (0.007)
Constant	8.531*** (0.337)	8.769*** (0.627)	8.319*** (0.441)	8.827*** (0.542)	8.155*** (0.619)
Observations	3,507	1,796	1,711	2,363	1,052
R <sup>2</sup>	0.134	0.142	0.140	0.138	0.157
Cross-sections	864	283	581	537	341


**Table 8: Heckman Selection Model**

This table reports results of a Heckman selection model using the log sales of affiliates of domestic multinational  $i$  in host country  $j$  as the dependent variable. (P) = parent- level variables, (A) = affiliate-level variables. State, sector and year fixed effects included. Sector fixed effects included in the selection equation. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level.


	Full sample		Large		Small	
	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection	Outcome	Selection
Log size t-1 (P)	0.316*** (0.047)	0.144*** (0.014)	0.360*** (0.055)	0.126*** (0.024)	0.006 (0.147)	0.140*** (0.032)
Cost efficiency t-1 (P)	-0.540*** (0.094)	-0.179*** (0.041)	-0.450*** (0.128)	-0.214*** (0.057)	-0.525*** (0.166)	-0.050 (0.066)
Debt ratio t-1 (P)	0.047 (0.113)	-0.073 (0.056)	-0.152 (0.168)	-0.200** (0.083)	0.240 (0.225)	0.071 (0.084)
Log cash flow t-1 (P)	0.005 (0.028)	0.064*** (0.013)	-0.007 (0.040)	0.096*** (0.018)	0.014 (0.052)	0.019 (0.020)
Fixed asset share t-1 (P)	-0.688*** (0.220)	-0.517*** (0.091)	-0.903*** (0.276)	-0.479*** (0.134)	0.283 (0.506)	-0.448*** (0.135)
Log GDP	0.090 (0.081)	0.291*** (0.009)	0.210*** (0.077)	0.299*** (0.013)	-0.594** (0.260)	0.288*** (0.014)
Log GDP per capita	-0.017 (0.038)	0.037*** (0.014)	-0.047 (0.048)	0.045** (0.019)	0.068 (0.073)	0.028 (0.022)
(Weak) contract enforcement	-0.019*** (0.006)	-0.016*** (0.003)	-0.020*** (0.008)	-0.016*** (0.003)	0.014 (0.017)	-0.017*** (0.004)
Retained earnings / total assets t-1 (A)	0.326** (0.155)		0.471** (0.220)		-0.062 (0.215)	
Debt ratio t-1 (A)	-0.044 (0.083)		-0.189* (0.114)		0.070 (0.122)	
Log bank FDI	0.090*** (0.015)		0.088*** (0.019)		0.091*** (0.022)	
Constant	5.903*** (1.704)	-5.045*** (0.572)	4.183** (1.960)	-5.461*** (0.518)	16.814*** (5.285)	-4.832*** (0.664)
Observations	57,672	57,672	24,196	24,196	33,476	33,476
Censored observations	55,373	55,373	22,804	22,804	32,569	32,569
Mill's ratio	0.166	0.166	0.337	0.337	-2.083	-2.083
Standard error	0.322	0.322	0.297	0.297	1.042	1.042
$\rho$	0.183	0.183	0.345	0.345	-1.000	-1.000

# Graph 1: Firm Characteristics by Multinational Status


(a) Firm size




(b) Cost efficiency



(c) Cash flow



(d) Debt ratio



(e) Fixed asset share

