



Studienabschlussarbeiten

Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Brenner, Adrian:

The prolonging Abyssinian Crisis
Contemporary conflict politics of the Ethiopian
government

Bachelorarbeit, Sommersemester 2024

Gutachter*in: Colschen, Lars

Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Geschwister-Scholl-Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Politikwissenschaft

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

<https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.121613>



Münchener Beiträge zur Politikwissenschaft

herausgegeben vom
Geschwister-Scholl-Institut
für Politikwissenschaft

2024

Adrian Brenner

**The prolonging Abyssinian Crisis.
Contemporary conflict politics of
the Ethiopian government**

Bachelorarbeit bei
Dr. Lars C. Colschen
2024

Abstract

This thesis constructs and derives multiple approaches to explain and make sense of the actions of the current residing government in Ethiopia under prime minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (ዐቢይ አሕመድ ዐሊ) and the Prosperity Party (ብልጽግና ፓርቲ) regarding intra-Ethiopian violence as well as wider conflicts in the Horn of Africa. Approaches include firstly a lens through modern Ethiopian history, helping to contextualize and map out the contemporary conflicts gripping the country and region. Further a policy analysis framework of the official security policies, politics and military actions of the Ethiopian government in form of a stakeholders' network. This network is extended with the resonance of these politics in the international realm. Lastly the impact of Abiy's rule will be explored through an examination of a two-way survey of the peoples of Ethiopia on the issue, with the first way being a statistical evaluation of quantifiable questions and the second an examination of subjective written answers. The survey was independently conducted during April 2024 in Ethiopia and Germany. This multi-approach system allows for distinct layers of perspective, leading to more in-depth and case-specific findings.

Preface

The wars and conflicts of Ethiopia and further in the Horn of Africa are layers upon layers, stories within stories. At the outset of the writing process one inevitably ties himself to a certain narrative, however strong one tries to stay within clear objectivity. Certain omissions of viewpoints and stories thus cannot be prevented. This is imperative to keep in mind.

During my time in Ethiopia I learned and observed a lot. I am thankful to all who mustered the courage to participate in this paper's survey and the true friends I made along the way. I will not forget the relentless heart shown by the peoples of Ethiopia.

አመሰግናለሁ or *thank you*

Contents

- Abbreviations** 4
- 1. Introduction** 5
- 2. Modern History** 8
 - 2.1 From Menelik II to the Fall of Addis Ababa 8
 - 2.2 History of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 12
- 3. A conflict-centred Policy Analysis of the FDRE** 14
 - 3.1 Stakeholder Framework 14
 - 3.1.1 Idea and Procedure 15
 - 3.1.2 Implementation 16
 - 3.1.3 Model and Expansion 16
 - 3.2 To-date Policy Reflection 26
- 4. A survey-based Impact Evaluation** 28
 - 4.1 Operationalization 28
 - 4.1.1 Potential Confounding Factors 28
 - 4.1.2 Procedure and Iteration 30
 - 4.1.3 Survey Insights and Robustness 35
 - 4.2 Opinionated Questions 35
 - 4.3 Results and Network-Implications 37
- 5. Conclusion and Discussion** 40
 - 5.1 Conclusion 40
 - 5.2 Discussion 42
- Appendix** 45
 - Visualisations and Photography 45
 - Replication Data 51
- References** 52

Abbreviations

By alphabetical order

ADP	Amhara Democratic Party
ALF	Agew Liberation Front
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Party
ARDUF	Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front
ASF	Amhara Special Forces
AU	African Union
BGPDUF	Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front
BPLM	Benishangul People's Liberation Movement
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EDF	Eritrean Defence Forces
ENDF	Ethiopian National Defense Force
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EPRP	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party
ESX	Ethiopian Securities Exchange
ESPDP	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GERD	Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
GPDM	Gambela People's Democratic Movement
GPLA	Gambella People's Liberation Army
HNL	Hareri National League
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KDP	Kimant Democratic Party
NGO/HRO	Non-Governmental Organization/Human Rights Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODP	Oromo Democratic Party
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PDRE	People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PMG	Provisional Military Government
PMAC	Provisional Military Administrative Council
PP	Prosperity Party
RSF	Rapid Support Forces
SAF	Sudanese Armed Forces(1)/Somali Armed Forces(2)
SEPDC/M	Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition/Movement (ambiguous)
SNLF	Sidama National Liberation Front
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region
SSR	Somali State Resistance
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UFEFCE	United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces
UN	United Nations
USSR	Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
WFP	World Food Programme
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WTO	World Trade Organization
(US)AID	(United States) Agency for International Development

Survey Abbreviations

AA	Addis Ababa
BD	Bahir Dar
DB	Debre Birhan
DD	Dire Dawa
ME	Mek'ele
MN	Munich

1. Introduction

On November 2, 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa the delegations of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) met and signed the peace deal that would end the infamous Tigray War two years after it officially started on November 3, 2020. The treaty came into effect on November 3, 2022 and was later on finalised in Nairobi, Kenya on November 12, 2022. (Mersie, 2022, para. 2) The news quickly spread around the globe, something finally seemed to had worked, yet the parties involved in the conflict and active international observers knew that this treaty would be far from an immediate stop to the nation’s violence and problems. (Reuters, 2022, para. 3ff.) If not handled carefully the situation could even turn out to become an incentive for a new conflict.

Barely a few months later such suspicion became reality, violence returned to Ethiopia, if it ever truly left. War broke out in Amhara, a regional state south of the previously war-torn regional state Tigray.¹ It officially started on April 9, 2023, just short of half a year after the deal in Pretoria was signed.² Setting the war into motion were multiple raids by the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) aimed to disarm the Amhara Special Forces (ASF) and local militias, generally known as Fano (ፋኖ)³, which resulted in heavy resistance and a series of protests throughout Amhara. (Kaledzi, 2023, para. 1ff) Yet, why was resistance so fierce in Amhara, subsequently leading to war? The same ASF were established and armed by the ENDF to fight gruelling combat missions in the Tigray War just the years prior. Same as the ASF, the local Fano militias were former allies of the ENDF during the Tigray War. (Endeshaw, 2023, para. 7)(Bach, 2022, p. 247f.) Feeling back-stabbed especially the Fano militias struck back, and so war erupted in Ethiopia again. At the same time another movement was increasingly showing its dissatisfaction with the state, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). The OLA was the armed wing of another movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), but split due to disagreements regarding their disarmament. (Gebissa, 2022, para. 9) As ENDF weapon convoys were redirected through their Oromia territory towards Amhara the OLA was starting to increase hit and run guerilla attacks on them.

Simultaneously in March 2023 a drastic halt and in June 2023 a full stop of humanitarian assistance by the United Nations (UN) under its flagship World Food Programme (WFP) and the United States (US) under the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was enforced after a large-scale corruption scheme of food aid diversion by military officials was discovered.⁴ (Office of Press Relations, 2023, p. 1)(World Food Programme, 2023, para. 2f.) In addition, on April 15, 2023

¹Ethiopia has a three level administrative division system. Regional states (ክልሎች), Zones (ዞን) and Districts (ወረዳ) and two distinct chartered cities, Addis Ababa (አዲስ አበባ) and Dire Dawa (ድረ ዳዋ). For more detail, See: (Figure 9: Administrative Map of Ethiopia).

²Albeit regional clashes taking place in Amhara since 2018 the armed conflict only erupted into a war from that point forward.

³Fano, in comparison to various other militia names, is not an abbreviation but a term equalling volunteer, patriot or historically, the Ethiopian struggles against injustice and foreign invaders. It started as a popular youth movement and formed into a cluster of several previously independent local militias. (Abbink, Bruijn, and Walraven, 2003, p. 101-108)(Sanches, 2022, pp. 14, 181–193)

⁴It was partly resumed in December 2023, but recent reports show that the introduced anti-corruption measurements by the US and UN are ineffective, aid does not adequately reach its designated positions and persisting droughts are worsening the situation as of early 2024. (UNOCHA, 2024, p. 2f.)

a full-scale civil war broke out in neighbouring Sudan, leading to new tens of thousands to seek refuge in Western Ethiopia, with large movements towards Western Amhara. These Sudanese population movements came on top of the constant influx of South Sudanese and Eritrean refugees which overwhelmed the western and northern Ethiopian border regions in the previous decade. (UNHCR, 2023, para 2ff.) Moreover, as other geopolitical conflicts of the 2020's dominate the spotlight of worldwide media new massacres and human rights violations committed in Ethiopia since 2023 fall short of significant reporting.

Being aware of all this, what are the reasons that drive the involved belligerents to continue fighting on? As the fighting is clearly causing more harm than good to every warring party and seemingly no real winner ever emerging, the question arises what the main parties, specifically the ENDF, directed by the FDRE under the new prime minister Abiy Ahmed Ali (**ዐቢይ አሕመድ ዐሊ**), gains from initiating a new war just barely after it so narrowly achieved a ceasefire in the previous one? Is the government under Abiy Ahmed Ali genuinely focused on uniting the peoples of Ethiopia and if not, is he simply to be put in the same box as other African strongmen, with the likes of Idi Amin Dada, Motubu Sese Seko or Hissène Habré who tried to *unify* their country through fear and sheer willpower?

As this conflict-nexus is broad in scale, the focus of this research paper will revolve around the role and actions of the FDRE, spearheaded by Abiy and his brand new political party, the Prosperity Party (**ብልጽግና ፓርቲ**) (PP). The overarching question of this study can thus be written as: What drives the conflict politics of the novel government of Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed Ali and the PP, does it actually improve national stability and how do the people of Ethiopia perceive its reformative ideals and consequent actions? When going about answering this multi-layered query it is vital to respect its depth. A multitude of conflicts in Eastern and Central Africa are commonly intertwined like a web with various actors and stakeholders affecting each other, sometimes lasting decades and further split on several levels along ethno-cultural, geo-political and socio-economic lines. As such, to make sense of the complex conflict structure currently unfolding within the nation of Ethiopia and further the surrounding region and to most accurately display what the present Ethiopian administration's aims, actions and their impact are, an approach to the issue from three distinct perspectives was chosen.

What do these three perspectives encapsulate? Firstly, the history of Ethiopia within the structure of the Horn of Africa. History arguably plays a vital role in comprehending current conflict behaviour, as in any other country. The incumbent government of Ethiopia i.e. draws a lot of its argumentative justifications for military campaigns from the mistakes or inaction of previous governments in power. A historical assessment of modern history is a necessity when aiming to fully grasp the roots of conflict and war situations of the present. Thereby this paper initiates with an essential introduction to 20th century history of Ethiopia and the country's developments of the first two decades of the 21st century. While being necessary, this section will be held brief, as elaboration will be narrowed down on only the events deemed important for contemporary conflict situations.⁵ This section moreover serves the purpose of contextualising how the incumbent government of Ethiopia and FDRE system came to be.

⁵The lasting effects of 20th century Ethiopia and its consequences were much greater, not only on its people but on the entire continent, i.e. why the African Union Headquarters was chosen to be located in Ethiopia. Read further: (Innocent, Mumba, and Dirwai, 2014)

The second perspective follows a fundamental policy analysis in a stakeholder framework, based on practical investigations of the Ethiopian government's policies regarding war and conflict. The analysis is guided by principles of Schneider as arranged in (Schubert and Bandelow, 2014, p. 259-286). The focus lies on identifying the drive behind the government's policies and actions due to their position in a conflict-based network. The paper proposes that it is key to investigate how the actors FDRE and ENDF construct a, from their viewpoint, rational reasoning behind their behaviour which may be limited or influenced by other parties. The most fitting policy analysis methodology for such a case-nexus like Ethiopia is a multi-stakeholder approach, with the core actor being the FDRE. With a detailed network, it is moreover possible to analyse how effective the FDRE is in asserting control in its nation. Simply put, how stable is the nation? The time frame for analysis starts with Abiy Ahmed Ali becoming prime minister and de facto ruler of Ethiopia in April 2018 and discusses, beyond the policy changes, the corresponding military engagements of the ENDF since in various conflicts.

Further, reactions of other parties towards those conflict-related policy changes and subsequent military actions will be included. As the FDRE is actively engaged in all of the conflicts in Ethiopia it is not an unbiased party and thus drawing in the opinions and influence of other parties seems reasonable. Among UN and African Union (AU) bodies, the positions of other nations, Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) or Human Rights Organizations (HRO) active in the region will be analysed. This establishes a balance of interests and how, if at all, these bodies can be categorized in the stakeholders' network.

A third and very vital perspective which will be evaluated in this paper is the one of the people, the ones who have to effectively endure the consequences of conflict and partly cannot escape it. In other words, an examination of the impact of the policies and actions by the FDRE on its civilian population. Yet, including this viewpoint is rather challenging in regards to adhering to academic standards, as it can draw upon either heavily biased, inconclusive or falsified information.⁶ Conclusively, to collect present day opinions and metrics with as little bias as possible an independent survey was deemed useful. The survey was conducted in Ethiopia and Germany during April 2024 and was split into two main parts.⁷ The first survey part were choice based questions, valid for statistical evaluation, to make the answers of all participants comparable and quantifiable. The second part introduces open questions, thus enabling the appraisal of written answers of participants, providing a more in-depth look on intimate opinions beyond numbers. This sections deliberately aims, in contrast to the other parts of the study, to build a position that is solely structured around the conflict-affected population, everyday Ethiopians.

Lastly this paper focuses on discussing potential unmentioned causes and actors behind violence events. The paper further does not work towards reducing it's findings to a singular reason, like only blaming administrative mismanagement, but to broaden the understanding behind the difficulty of

⁶Survey results and information on internal conflicts provided by the state of Ethiopia should generally be evaluated carefully, as mentioned it is an active warring party in all of them. UN and AU bodies can also draw upon administrative data presented by the government.

⁷The point of partly conducting the survey in Germany is to further include the points of view of the Ethiopian diaspora residing in Germany.

modern conflicts in the region and to provide a variety of positions.⁸ Based on the paper's findings an outlook on expected actions by the state regarding the conflicts that are affecting the nation, as well as their potential effects, is provided.

2. Modern History

The first angle through which to understand the decision-making of the current government of Ethiopia are the developments during the 20th century of the region, including past wars and conflicts which significantly shaped and built the country into what it is today, effectively becoming the FDRE. After that the same procedure is applied on the time under the FDRE system from 1995 until April 2018, when Abiy Ahmed Ali became prime minister, initiating the newest chapter of Ethiopian politics.

2.1 From Menelik II to the Fall of Addis Ababa

Menelik II (Ge'ez: ዳግማዊ ምኒልክ)⁹, born in 1844, was crowned king of Shewa (ሸዋ) in 1866, a regional kingdom under the feudalistic absolute monarchy which was the Ethiopian Empire, also known at the time under its old name of Abyssinia (Ge'ez: ሐበሳተ). Menelik II, with modern weaponry and equipment provided by the French and British, was able to conquer much disputed territory in the Horn of Africa during his great conquests, known as the Agar Maqnat (አገር ማቅናት) from 1878 until 1904, that marked much of the borders of Ethiopia until today.¹⁰ (Irons, 2013, p. 16)(Tibebu, 1995, p. 40f.) After the sudden death of Tigrayan-born Emperor Yohannes VI (Tigrinya: የሓንሰ ሸይ) at the Battle of Gallabat against the Sudanese Mahdist State Menelik II instantly declared himself emperor in 1889 and assumed the position to make sure the son of Yohannes VI lost all claim to the imperial throne. (Chisholm, 1911, p. 128)(Mockler, 2002, p. 89)

The newly expanded empire however faced its first serious threat of collapse in the form of the Italian Empire.¹¹ Italy had started to invade and directly colonize part of the coast along the Red Sea in what would become the vital Italian colony of Eritrea by the late 1880's, simultaneously to when Abyssinia's armies fought much further inland during the Oromia and Odagen campaigns. (Chisholm, 1910, p. 745-747) As Italy secured the coast and thus naval access, the nation set its sights inward, war ensued shortly after. Much to the surprise of the Italian colonialists however Menelik II decisively defeated their army at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, which remains famous throughout Ethiopia and Africa as the first victory of any African nation over an invading colonial power. (Guazzini, 2008, 287f.) The

⁸A very similar case of such a conflict-nexus is the cluster gripping the provinces North Kivu, Ituri, and Haut-Uele in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). A comparison regarding the longevity and resemblances of both conflicts is suitable for further works.

⁹Note that nobility names during this period were still partly written in the ancient Ge'ez system and not the Amharic, Tigrinya or Oromo ones which became common tongues throughout much of the empire centuries prior. It is comparable to Latin in European culture. In this paper, all names written in the Ge'ez or Tigrinya systems, as such deviating from the standard Amharic one, will be marked accordingly. The Oromo language adopted the Latin script around the 1970's. (OLF, 2000, para. 15)

¹⁰For a visual extend of the empire, see: (Figure 14: Abyssinia's Increase under Menelik II)

¹¹Another came in the form of hunger. The Great Famine of 1888 to 1892, also know as *Evil Days* (ክፉ ቀናት) killed up to 35% of the region's population, estimated at around 12 million. (Gill, 2010, p. 27) The famine was due to drought and mostly rinderpest, introduced by European livestock. It was an infectious virus that decimated local cattle populations which had no prior exposure, with only around 1 in 10 cattle surviving. (Dorosh and Rashid, 2012, p. 257)

conquests of Menelik II and his successful struggles against invasion heavily centralized and unified the kingdoms of Abyssinia and thus set the foundation of what is nowadays commonly understood when referring to a shared *Ethiopian Identity*. During his reign until his death in 1913 Abyssinia began to rapidly emerge from a period marked by isolation and disunity among its peoples.

Before Menelik II died in 1913, aged 69, he appointed his grandson, Lij Iyassu (Ge'ez: ልጅ ኢየሱስ) to succeed him to the throne in 1909.¹² Iyassu assumed the position of emperor in 1913, albeit not being coronated. A mix of his young age, bad decisions and surprisingly blatant disinterest in ruling quickly made him unpopular among the empire's elite. (Henze, 2000, p. 194)(Marcus, 1995, p. 251-262)(Pankhurst, 1968, p. 107) The empire's nobility decided to finally depose of him in a coup d'état in 1916 before any coronation procedure could be enacted.¹³(David Hamilton Shinn, Ofcansky, and Prouty, 2004, p. 228) Thereby Menelik's daughter, Zewditu (Ge'ez: ዘውዲቱ), became Ethiopia's first female empress and was crowned in 1917. As she was more focused on preserving traditional Ethiopian values she did not much engage in foreign policy, leaving her cousin, the regent Ras Tafari Makonnen (ራስ ተፈሪ መኩንን)¹⁴ to step in. (Tesfu, 2008, para. 4) Meanwhile the Italians, French and British all tightened their respective grip over the colonies neighbouring imperial Ethiopia, yet none attempted to attack the Empire during her reign. At the point of her death in 1930, much of the country was already under the de facto control of her cousin Tafari. (Gebissa, 1996, p. 129ff.)

Ras Tafari Makonnen adopted the throne name Haile Selassie I (Ge'ez: ቀዳማዊ ኃይለ ሥላሴ) and was crowned emperor the same year, 1930. Selassie sought to modernize Ethiopia utilizing political and social reforms. Notably he officially abolished slavery throughout Abyssinia and presented the promulgation of the Empire's first written constitution in 1931, only a year after assuming office. This adoption altered the country's form of government from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy. (Merid and Meckelburg, 2024, p. 110ff.)(Marcus, 1987, p. 116f.)

When the Italian empire attacked in 1936, marking the start of the Second Italo-Ethiopian War he was unable to properly prepare and defend Ethiopia, as the Ethiopian army simply did not modernize quickly enough over the prior 40 years when compared to Italy, as it was too disorganized due too infighting. (Barker, 1968, p. 237ff.) During most of Italy's occupation of Ethiopia he was in exile in Bath, England. (Haber, 1996, para. 1) Selassie decided to visit Sudan to assist British and Egyptian forces in anti-Italian coordination in Ethiopia and in 1941 following the successful East African campaign by the Allies returned to Addis Ababa to again rule the Ethiopian Empire. (Barker, 1971, p. 156) After the Italian withdrawal from its decade-long colony of Eritrea, Selassie laid his sights on the unclaimed region of Eritrea, vital for Ethiopia to connect its economy to the ever more important growing global shipping industry again. He quickly acted to dissolve the Federation of Ethiopia and Eritrea, founded in 1950 by the UN, and against international law annexed Eritrea into

¹²Yet, due to Iyassu's youth he was appointed a regent which would overlook his reign until he would come of age, Ras Tessema Nadew (ራስ ተስማ ናደዉ). Tessema however died in 1911, leaving Iyassu to try to go it alone. (Marcus, 1995, p. 241ff.)

¹³Iyassu lost all final support because of his Muslim sympathies and potential interest in joining World War I. (Zewde, 2002, pp. 126f)(Nicolle, 1997, p. 48)

¹⁴Ras (ራስ) is a title translatable to chief or prince. (Jaide, 2014, para. 1)

the Ethiopian Empire, creating a new regional state. This was done under the pretext that up to the establishment of the colony of Eritrea by Italy, it rightfully belonged into the Ethiopian Empire and was wrongfully taken by Italian colonialists. The opinions of Eritreans was not sought upon by Selassie. (Ewing and Abdi, 1972, p. 45f.) Furthermore, Selassie was key in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and served as its inaugural chairman.¹⁵ However, due to his pro-American and western bloc positioning his involvement and underlying motives within the OAU were unclear, he was i.e. not in favour of a more united Africa under socialist principles, a principle which many other African leaders in the OAU pushed for at the time.¹⁶ (Keller, 1988, p. 92)

On September 12, 1974 however Haile Selassie was deposed in a military coup orchestrated by a Marxist-Leninist military junta known simply as the *Derg* (**ደርግ**)¹⁷, during the Ethiopia revolution of 1974 that started with uprisings and unrest across broad lines of military officials and later all social classes and ages, pushing for countrywide reforms for all.¹⁸ Haile Selassie I died just short of a year of being deposed on August 22, 1975.¹⁹ Selassie, much like Menelik II, strongly advocated for and embodied ideas of a strong and unified Ethiopia, first in the political order of the continent of Africa, second to none.²⁰ Albeit the mistakes and flaws during the last years of his rule Haile Selassie I is still, even more so that Menelik II, the most influential historic individual when speaking of Ethiopia and an Ethiopian identity.

The new Derg movement was at first led by three figureheads, Mengistu Haile Mariam (**መንግሥቱ ገይሉ ማርያም**), Aman Mikael Andom (Tigrinya: **አማን ሚካኤል አንዶም**) and Tafari Benti (**ተፈሪ በንቲ**), with Mengistu having both Aman and Tafari, among other Derg officials, executed in 1974 and 1977 respectively due to beliefs of their conspiracy with a rebellious movement know as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), thus assuming sole power of the state. (Keller, 1988, p. 185f.) Mengistu installed a government, which was socialist in name but much more authoritarian and military in style. Next to head of state he further became Derg chairman in 1977 and created the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE). (Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 4) His rule was marked by massive militarization financed and supplied by the Soviet Union (USSR), the Eastern bloc and partly Cuba.²¹ This mass import of Soviet weaponry and equipment into the nation is one of the main reasons, as to why middle-sized and small firearms are still widely and cheaply available

¹⁵The OAU was the predecessor of the AU.

¹⁶The Ethiopian Empire was heavily reliant on American supplies, aid and equipment Selassie deemed a necessity for the modernization of the Empire at the time. See: (Agyeman-Duah, 1994)

¹⁷The term Derg literally speaking translates to *council* or *committee*. The Derg was formed by imperial military officials and police due to low or unpaid wages as well as Selassie's handling of the Eritrean war of independence, raging since 1961. The Derg's official name was initially the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) which turned into the Provisional Military Government (PMG) after officially abolishing the feudalistic monarchy thus solidifying power in 1975. (Gebreyehu, 2010, pp. 321-327)

¹⁸Precise issues included access for all to education, agrarian reforms, workers and general human rights reforms. (Gupta, 1978, p. 158ff.)

¹⁹It is assumed that he was strangled to death in the basement of his palace. (The New York Times, 1994, para. 2)

²⁰Such a profound self-confidence portrayed by Selassie, coupled with the fact that the country was the only one never to be, strictly speaking, colonized by a European power further led to a great many other African nations adopting the colours of the Ethiopian flag, green, yellow and red into their own. (Bisi Media, 2021, para. 4 f.)

²¹This grand scheme militarization took up pace in 1976 in Moscow, when the Ethiopian delegation signed a large military assistance agreement with the USSR. Ethiopia further dissolved nearly all agreements with the US and expelled American officials. (Papp, 1979, p. 110-130)(Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 3)

in all of Ethiopia as of today, leading to even the smallest oppositions being fairly well equipped. In addition, starting in 1977 the Derg commenced a purge, later labelled by many as the Qey Shibir (ቀይ ሽብር)²², a campaign which cost many people their lives, mostly through harsh starvation tactics and mass executions to ensure compliance. It left a deep mark along the civilian population with almost no family escaping unscathed.²³

The Somali state in July 1976, wanting to capitalize on the early disarray in the Derg's Ethiopia, attacked Ethiopian positions in the disputed Ogaden region in an attempt to incorporate all ethnic Somali areas of Ethiopia, which they under their impression rightfully owned under the greater Somalia plan.²⁴(Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 3) Caught by surprise, the Ethiopian forces were initially driven back deep into Ethiopia proper, but as the country transitioned to the Eastern bloc Soviet support shifted from Somalia towards the Ethiopian side and the military was further backed by Cuban combat experts and personnel. The majority of the Somali military were forced out of the Ogaden by early 1978. The Somali state was so thoroughly beaten in the Ogaden War, with war crimes like mass rape and summary executions widespread by the Ethiopian military, that the originally strong post-colonial nation never managed to recover or regain control over its own territory.²⁵(Lefort, 1983, p. 260f.)(Clapham, 1990, p. 235) Simultaneously secessionist forces in what is now Somaliland increased their presence. (Law, 2013, p. 227)

The Derg's governance was officially abolished in 1987 after the creation of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) albeit Mengistu and Derg officials still staying the de facto rulers of the country. In 1989, the TPLF merged with other opposition movement, the most significant being several Amhara and Oromo liberation fronts, to form the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).²⁶ (Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 7) In May 1991 the forces of the EPRDF advanced on Addis Ababa.²⁷ Albeit the many insurgencies, spearheaded by the TPLF, the downfall of the Derg was accelerated by the 1983-1985 famine and its effects in Ethiopia. (Waal, 1991, p. 2) The Derg-controlled Addis Ababa fell to the EPRDF on May 26, 1991 and with it the brutal legacy of the Qey Shibir in Ethiopia as well as a near two decade long gruelling civil war. Meanwhile the fight for Eritrean independence raged on and in early 1991, after 30 years, The Eritrean People's Liberation front (EPLF), led by Isayas Afewerki (Tigrinya: ኢሳያስ አፈወርቅ) emerged victorious and established a provisional government. This government independently administered Eritrea until early April 1993 when Eritreans voted for independence in a UN monitored referendum. (United Nations, 1993, para. 52f.) Eritrea was, also later on with Ethiopia's approval, declared independent on April 27, 1993.²⁸

²²Qey Shibir translates to *red terror*.

²³The Qey Shibir's true cost of life is unknown, as estimates vary between 150.000 to up to 1.6 million. (Metaferia, 2009, p. 67)(Harff and Gurr, 1988, p. 359-371)

²⁴Somalia at the early stages and in preparation for the war was armed by the USSR. (Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 3)

²⁵Until this day it is considered to be a primary example of a failed state. (Stanghellini, 2023, para. 2-11)

²⁶Alongside the Derg coming into power under the pretext of the Ethiopian revolution a lot of other political movements in the nation never approved of its leadership and so an informal civil war started in 1974, lasting the entirety of the Derg's reign.

²⁷Mengistu fled Ethiopia for Zimbabwe, where he continues to reside to this day. (Zulu, 2022, para. 1)

²⁸While Afewerki promised swift and free elections only shortly after the referendum, he never stayed true to these promises, elections were never held until today. (Adamu, 2020, para. 1-7)

In July 1991, the EPRDF coalition established the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) which was guided by a charter that functioned as a periodic constitution under at the time TPLF leader Meles Zenawi Asres (መለስ ዜናዊ አስረስ). (Marcus, Crummey, and Mehretu, 2024, para. 8) Yet, with the ushering of a new era new problems arose. In June 1992 the OLF withdrew from the government, in March 1993 part of the Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Coalition (SEPDC) also withdrew. The EPRDF, made up of several militarized factions which found a common enemy under the Derg, had to adequately address and fill the new power vacuum without bringing about a new conflict. The TPLF, under leadership of Meles, took up this challenge and decided to lead the TGE under the concept of ethnic federalism. Ethnic federalism refers to a form of governance which sees equally distributed power divides along ethnic lines in a country. Meles claimed it would protect all of Ethiopia's ethnic groups from repression by granting every ethnicity a guarantee of political autonomy, arguing that such a state model brings about a necessary balance within the country's many ethnically aligned factions and pledged to oversee the TGE's formation into a multi-party democracy. (Cohen, 1995, p. 157ff.) Whereas the EPRDF forces were successful in seizing most major arms of the Derg, such as tanks, artillery and aviation equipment, two decades of mass militarization left hundreds upon thousands of small arms and equipment still distributed throughout the civilian population of Ethiopia.

2.2 History of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

The first election for a constituent assembly by the TGE was held in June 1994. A new constitution was successfully adopted in Addis Ababa by said assembly on December 8, 1994 and came into force on August 21, 1995, effectively creating the FDRE.²⁹ (WIPO, 1995, p. 1ff.) Yet, the newly established FDRE faced a lot of challenges, not uncommon in fresh democratic systems on the African continent.³⁰ A general election was held in 1995 to elect the Parliament which elected Meles as Prime Minister and Negasso Gidada (ነጋሶ ጊዳዳ) as president, the EPRDF won 471 of the 547 available parliamentary seats.³¹ (African Election Database, 2013) Several opposition parties chose to boycott these elections, ensuring a landslide victory for the EPRDF, in spite of observers concluding that these oppositions could have fairly participated had they chosen to do so. (United Nations Development Programme, 1995, para. 1)

Despite these promising administrative changes, the nation did not stay at peace for long as a dispute over the Tigrayan border along Eritrea escalated into the Eritrean-Ethiopian War on May 6, 1998. It cost both sides a heavy toll of up to 100.000 dead and a further hundreds of thousand displaced civilians.³² With the Algiers Agreement the war and border issues were settled on June 12, 2000, see: (Figure 15: Eritrean-Ethiopian War Agreement). Nevertheless two major issues of that settlement remained with Ethiopia. They were firstly a nation remaining a landlocked country, unable to secure

²⁹It additionally formed a bicameral legislature and a brand new judicial system.

³⁰Explanations on why that transition, especially in Africa, is so difficult vary. For a very recent perspective, see: (Arriola, Rakner, and Walle, 2022)

³¹Note here that the new role of president is more ceremonial, with the true head of state under the FDRE constitution being the prime minister, who in addition is the commander in chief of the recently developed ENDF.

³²Casualty numbers here vary, as the fighting was not very coordinated and many combatants were unregistered. For an elaborated calculation method, see: (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2024, para. 1ff.)

the vital port of Assab and secondly, much to the detriment of all Tigrayans, the government accepted the loss of the ethnically Tigrayan city of Badme. It is crucial to mention, that the highest casualties among Ethiopians during this war were ethnic Tigrayans, as it was fought mostly on their lands. This enraged much of the local Tigrayan population who felt backstabbed by the state to agree to such terms in Algiers. (United Nations, 2000, p. 3f.) The FDRE's next three general elections were held in 2000³³, 2005³⁴ and 2010³⁵ in all of which the EPRDF and Meles won, despite heavy allegations of irregularities.

Following the natural death of Meles on August 20, 2012, Hailemariam Desalegn Boshe (**ካይለማርያም ደሳለኝ ቦሼ**) succeeded him as Prime Minister of the FDRE and Chairman of the ruling coalition on September 2012 and was formally elected in the 2015 general elections.³⁶ Despite the framework of strict ethnic federalism ethnic divisions became less sharp in Ethiopia as it might have been indicated, intermarriage was extremely commonplace, and the actual disparity and disaffection between groups became much more balanced. Furthermore, following Meles's death, the influence of the TPLF and subsequently the Tigray ethnic group became much lower, Hailemariam for instance is of Welayta ethnicity. (David H. Shinn and Ofcansky, 2013, p. 204)

Despite these potentially promising developments Hailemariam resigned on February 15, 2018, officially as a consequence of heavy protests in first the Oromo then Amhara regions, which killed hundreds of protesters with up to 2.000 being detained, he was the only leader in modern Ethiopian history to voluntarily resign, all previous rulers have either died or were overthrown.³⁷ (BBC News, 2016, para. 1ff.) The protests were mainly incited by the Addis Ababa Master Plan, this plan included the expansion of the chartered city of Addis Ababa on to constitutionally enshrined Oromo lands. 1.1 million hectares were affected, as the capital city's population grew rapidly. (Minority Rights Group International, 2014, para. 13)

Following the resignation of Hailemariam in February he remained caretaker of the position until Abiy Ahmed Ali was elected prime minister by Ethiopia's parliament on April 2, 2018. Hence the currently residing prime minister of Ethiopia, Abiy, the first Oromo to ever govern Ethiopia, came to power. His ideas and plans for the nation's future at that point known to no one but him.³⁸

³³the EPRDF won 481 of the 547 available parliamentary seats in 2000, securing the majority again. (African Election Database, 2013)

³⁴The EPRDF won 327 of the 547 available parliamentary seats in 2005, securing the majority, albeit close, again. (African Election Database, 2013)

³⁵The EPRDF won 499 of the 547 available parliamentary seats in 2010, securing the majority again. (African Election Database, 2013)

³⁶The EPRDF won 500 of the 547 available parliamentary seats in 2015, securing the majority again. (National Election Board of Ethiopia, 2015)

³⁷Despite the protests experts suggest, that his resignation may be linked to other causes: "Since coming to power, Mr Hailemariam has been seen by the political elite as weak and lacking in leadership. His resignation could be a move by the coalition to find a stronger leader, or it could signal divisions among the constituent parties along ethnic lines. Particularly visible is the tension between the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, which has seen its dominance and influence wane, and the Oromo People's Democratic Organisation, which is becoming increasingly more assertive" as per Kalkidan Yibeltal, BBC Amharic correspondent. (Yibelta, 2018, para. 9f)

³⁸The following conflict-centred policy analysis of this paper accordingly analyses the new page of Ethiopian policy under Abiy as of April 2018 until today.

Despite efforts by both leaders of the FDRE from 1995 to 2018 to improve national stability, conflicts still plagued the Horn of Africa and especially the nation itself. To put all major conflicts in which the state was further involved in since the establishment of the FDRE into perspective:³⁹

- Second Afar insurgency (1995–2018)
- Insurgency in Ogaden (1995–2018)
- Gedeo–Guji-Oromo conflict (1995–2018)
- Eritrean–Ethiopian War (1998–2000)
- Puntland-Somaliland conflict (1998–present)
- War in Somalia (2006–2009)
- Ethiopian crackdown in Ogaden (2007-2008)
- Djiboutian–Eritrean border conflict (2008)
- Somali Civil War (2009–present)
- Oromo conflict and protests (2014-present)
- Oromia–Somali conflict (2016–2018)
- Ethiopian civil conflict (2018–present)
- OLA insurgency (2018–present)

3. A conflict-centred Policy Analysis of the FDRE

This section firstly makes use of a stakeholder policy analysis framework of conflict-related policies and politics of the Ethiopian government under Abiy Ahmed Ali since his inauguration as prime minister on April 2, 2018. The main point of analysis is the increasingly important role of security policies and military activity in wake of resurgence of violence during his tenure. The focus lies on the ENDF, their engagement and code of conduct, as well as the administrative reasoning of the FDRE behind military utilization. Beyond that analysis reactive positions taken by international actors towards the consequent actions, the evolution of conflict-related policy changes and behaviour of the Ethiopian state under the leadership of Abiy will be analysed.

3.1 Stakeholder Framework

This section's core analysis follows foundational policy analysis principles by Dye (Dye, 1976) and Lasswell (Lasswell, 1951) fused into an actor-based theory of Schneider as arranged in (Schubert and Bandelow, 2014, p. 259-286). The analysis focuses on new policy-making and executive engagement of the FDRE government during the premiership of Abiy Ahmed Ali. The selected base method is a stakeholder analysis, aiming to identify and evaluate the roles and influences of different stakeholders on the main actor, the ENDF under the new FDRE government.⁴⁰ The method further draws upon

³⁹This list only includes conflicts that actually resulted in violence, battle related deaths and are precisely located in the Horn. This means that any wars beyond the borders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti are not listed, like the major Second Sudanese Civil War. Several regional tensions and small skirmishes are also not listed, as they did not evolve into full-fledged conflicts.

⁴⁰As per the policy analysis framework as per Schneider, see: (Schubert and Bandelow, 2014, p. 259-286)

the introduced lens of history, examining the historical development and context, and a process review with the objective to assess how and under what circumstances policy was implemented and politics enacted.⁴¹

3.1.1 Idea and Procedure

As for the case of Ethiopia, since mid 2018 multiple conflicts were still ongoing or newly redeveloping simultaneously and rapidly so. The Ethiopia Abiy inherited, with its multitude of evolving conflicts, is subsequently made up of a lot of armed stakeholders. Therefore, fitted for the case of Ethiopia, a case-specific scheme to list and evaluate stakeholders alongside their due conflict is proposed. It means that important changes in conflict-related policy-making and politics will be discussed within a conflict-web or -network, while assessing the developments of their respective conflicts.

To keep track of this stakeholders' conflict-network a visualisation scheme is proposed. The words actor and stakeholder will most importantly not be used interchangeably, as an actor refers to a party which actively engages in any given conflicts A to X, but in at least one. Yet a stakeholder refers to a party which is to some extent involved, but not actively so, in any given conflict A to X. This procedure helps to explore whether an e.g. release of prisoners by a given actor 1 in a region A to actor 2 was due to harsh fighting by that actor 1 in another region B with actor 3, thereby appeasing an to actor 1 essential stakeholder 1 in the first region A.⁴²

To map out a logical system, arrows are introduced. An arrow pointing from i.e. stakeholder 1 to actor 1 implies his influence on that actor 1. Arrows can also point both ways, if influence is deemed to be two-sided. Stakeholders can potentially also not bear any influence, as such only being influenced upon. Arrows can then further be separated in a red and black class. While a black arrow only signals influence on another party, a red arrow signals physical and violent engagement with another, with a one-sided red arrow translating to one-sided violence and a two-sided one to engagement by both parties.⁴³

Actors and stakeholders are moreover separated by a classification scheme being i.e. state or international bodies. Such a classification scheme is inspired by Schneider as in (Schubert and Bandelow, 2014, p. 267) albeit realms of classification being modified profoundly to fit the logic of the influence-/conflict-based network of this paper. To easily differentiate between stakeholders and actors in the networks, the former will be presented in italic writing. A simple example could look like this:

⁴¹The analysis will then be extended in (4. [Survey-based Impact Evaluation](#)) utilizing quantitative and qualitative survey data to measure the policy's outcomes in terms of its impact.

⁴²Deemed to be key changes in policy not related to conflict will as such be mentioned to assess the relation of e.g. foreign economic stakeholders with conflict actors.

⁴³An argument could be made that red arrows are not necessary as the model already differentiates between stakeholders (passive) and actors (active) but that model would not take into account that actors can also only demonstrate influence without violent engagement. Subsequently parties demonstrating red arrows have to, per definition, automatically be actors, not stakeholders. Following, actors can also engage in conflict if they fully assert control over another actor which engages in conflict violently, i.e. a governmental actor over its military branch actor. The goal in the network is to create a viable, yet straightforward visualisation of the conflict-complexity gripping Ethiopia.




Figure 1: Dummy Scheme (Source: Own visualisation)

3.1.2 Implementation

Besides becoming Prime minister Abiy at the same time became chairman of the EPRDF. Abiy's government immediately started to release a lot of political prisoners jailed by the EPRDF. Moreover under Abiy many *anti-terrorism* laws, previously used to jail political opponents, were stopped. Abiy stated that such laws were unconstitutional: "Our constitution doesn't allow it, but we have been torturing, causing bodily damages and even putting inmates in dark prison cells." (Al Jazeera, 2018, para. 3) In June he further ended the state of emergency which had been going on for over two years. (Al Jazeera, 2018, para. 6) On December 1, 2019 he then proceeded to dissolve the EPRDF party and replaced it with his own, the PP. The PP further absorbed a multitude of smaller independent parties, this act made the current state of Ethiopia essentially a one party state since late 2019.⁴⁴ (Ezega News, 2019, para. 1-4) Abiy argued for such reforms with a push for a unified and centralised Ethiopian nationality rather than outdated ethnic-federalist based interests which hinder the nations progress. The problem with such an absorption of multiple parties, even more than before under the already strong EPRDF, became widely visible with the 2021 general elections. The PP reached a majority in every votable category nationwide.⁴⁵ Consequently Abiy, already being commander in chief of the ENDF, became the state, the FDRE.



Figure 2: Conflict-Network 1.0 (Source: Own visualisation)

3.1.3 Model and Expansion

The base model will now be expanded upon by conflict-related actor and stakeholder activity within Ethiopia as well as the inclusion of international bodies in their relation towards the incumbent government of the FDRE. Under Abiy's tenure conflict networks in three distinct time frames will be

⁴⁴The merger included all the following former parties: Amhara Democratic Party (ADP), the Oromo Democratic Party (ODP), the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM), the Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party (ESPDP), the Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP), the Gambela People's Democratic Movement (GPDM), the Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF) and the Hareri National League (HNL). For the PP Logo, see: (Figure 10: Prosperity Party Logo).

⁴⁵For detailed election results, see: (Figure 13: 2021 Ethiopia General Elections).

analysed, 2018-2020 or pre Tigray War period, 2020-2022 or Tigray War period and 2023-present or post Tigray War period.

Abiy since the start of his tenure has immediately and eagerly pushed for major monetary reforms particularly in terms of redefining the nation’s economy. He started this process with a wave of economic reforms, opening the country to investors from across the globe, especially in terms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). He declared an economic growth policy in which private ownership through privatization of state-owned enterprises is at the centre with for instance investment opportunities in the nations railways, heavy industry and other manufacturing subsidiaries. (Maasho, 2018, para. 10-21) In regards to railways it goes to mention that Ethiopia and Djibouti have worked in a joined Ethio-Djibouti railway system, connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti City, with the help of China as the old Franco-Ethiopian railway was outdated and could not keep up with demand.⁴⁶ The railway system was opened and began commercially operating on January 1, 2018, it significantly picked up in size, in terms of freight shipments, under Abiy as in May 2018 Ethiopia acquired a stake in the Port of Djibouti City. (Maasho, 2019, para. 1ff.) Subsequently, as Ethiopian goods frequently and en mass pass through Djibouti, the nation became an economic stakeholder of the FDRE, as the FDRE paid high taxes and customs to utilize parts of the port in Djibouti City. Minimum shares on state owned companies like Ethiopian Airlines or Ethio-Telecom were also partly granted by the state. (Maasho, 2018, para. 1f.) By late 2020 the proposal of Ethiopia’s first stock exchange was discussed and the bill to open the exchange was passed in December 2020. The opening of the exchange, the Ethiopian Securities Exchange (ESX), was delayed several times and is currently planned for mid to late 2024.⁴⁷ Through such combined economic policy reforms foreign stakeholders entered the framework of Ethiopian politics on a grand scale for the fist time in its history. ”Between 2018 and 2022, China has been the main source of new FDI projects permitted in Ethiopia, accounting for 60% of all Greenfield FDI projects, with significant investments in manufacturing and services. The other main investing countries are Saudi Arabia, the United States, India and Turkey.” (Leiva, 2021) as cited in (Ashine, 2024, p. 8). As such six economic stakeholders since 2018 are introduced.⁴⁸




Figure 3: Conflict-Network 1.1 (Source: Own visualisation)

⁴⁶The mentioned China in this paper will always refer to the People’s Republic of China. For the railway line, see: (Figure 18: Ethio-Djibouti Railway Line).

⁴⁷For more details into the Draft for the ESX, see: (Ethiopian Securities Exchange, 2024)

⁴⁸Of course other nations also invest into the country but are considered marginal in comparison.

Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to end the longstanding dispute after the Algiers Agreement with the state of Eritrea on October 11, 2019, which officially ended all hostilities with Eritrea. At this point in time Abiy was seen as a reformist and most importantly peace-maker across international bodies like the UN and AU. Per report of David Child:

United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said peace efforts between Ethiopia and Eritrea had inspired hopes of regional “security and stability” and that the prime minister’s leadership had “set a wonderful example for others in and beyond Africa looking to overcome resistance from the past and put people first” [...] (AU) chief Moussa Faki described Abiy’s award as a source of “great pride”. (Child, 2019, para. 5f.)

Yet human right experts and organisations were weary of Abiy being awarded, with Amnesty International i.e. noting Abiy should “tackle the outstanding human rights challenges that threaten to reverse the gains made so far”. Warning that persistent tensions within Ethiopia “threaten instability and further human rights abuses”. (Child, 2019, para. 10-13) Amnesty international conducted a thorough investigation of ENDF and Ethiopian regional police force human rights violations in the Amhara region in 2019, finding widespread human rights breaches by local police forces, at that point known as the Liyyu Force, and ENDF troops. (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 17-32) In other words HROs/NGOs put significant pressure on Abiy’s government for resolving inner tensions.⁴⁹ It is of course arguable that the FDRE does not have to take these reports and opinions of HROs/NGOs seriously, but such ethical ignorance does not fair well with bodies like the UN which boasts influence over key international economic players like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Trade Organization (WTO) that pose to be crucial to the modern and industrialized Ethiopia Abiy envisions.⁵⁰ The IMF i.e. can easily downgrade the country’s credit rating or trust score and the WTO could block the nation from attending important global WTO meetings. Ethiopia is moreover in a lot of debt to the IMF and WTO due to huge loans taken out by pre-Abiy governments, before the huge stake of Chinese-based FDI in the late 2010’s. (Reuters, 2024, para. 7-9) In that sense the FDRE has to take internal human rights issues serious and work to resolve them, therefore being influenced by HROs/NGOs reporting in that area. The UN is in addition also influenced by such reports as the organization works closely with HROs like Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International. (Human Rights Watch, 2024, para. 3)

The established peace between Abiy and Afewerki moreover put both the FDRE and the state of Eritrea closer together. Eritrea, much more so than Ethiopia, is a totalitarian and repressive state single-handily ruled by Afewerki. The Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF), with compulsory service for all Eritreans aged older than 18 for at least 18 months, albeit usually much longer periods, are also directly under his command.⁵¹ (Amnesty International, 2014, p. 1) However the TPLF, ever since the

⁴⁹This pressure only increased the more reports came in in regards to major human rights violations over the time of his tenure. Reports included the likes of torture procedures in prisons, systematic rape, mass graves or starvation tactics. For instance the mentioned mass diversions of WFP and USAID food assistance by ENDF officials.

⁵⁰As the IMF and WTO are both an international and economic body simultaneously, two classes will be attributed to such bodies.

⁵¹As Eritrea will represent a different sovereign nation, which is not a stakeholder, a new class, State Body (foreign), will be introduced.

Ethiopian-Eritrean war, consider Eritrea strictly as an enemy and the issue around the city of Badme unresolved; but despite their still somewhat existing influence in Ethiopian politics they do not pose any say over Eritrea’s foreign policy.




Figure 4: Conflict-Network 1.2 (Source: Own visualisation)

In Tigray, the TPLF opposed and refused to join the PP and in an unprecedented move Tigrayan members of the FDRE left for Tigray. Despite the general elections being postponed by the FDRE in August of 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic the TPLF held elections in Tigray for the these elections in early September, 2020.⁵² (Paravicini, 2020, para. 2f.) The FDRE deemed the vote to be illegal and cut money to Tigray by major aid and assistance missions. On November 3, 2020, specialized Tigrayan police forces and Tigrayan militias, under the direction of the TPLF, attacked the northern command of the ENDF in Tigray region.⁵³ (Reuters, 2020, para. 12-14) The state responded swiftly the day after as the FDRE send large swaps of ENDF troops into Tigray, accusing the TPLF of election fraud and instigating violence against state forces. (Reuters, 2020, para. 15) This set a conflict into motion known as the Tigray War. The war soon expanded beyond the borders of just the federal Tigray region. During the height of the war the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces (UFEFCF) emerged. It formed from the TPLF, OLA, Sidama National Liberation Front (SNLF), Somali State Resistance (SSR), Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front (ARDUF), Agew Liberation Front (ALF), Kimant Democratic Party (KDP) and Gambella People’s Liberation Army (GPLA), with all these parties being united in a drive against the state. The UFEFCF’s goal was to dismantle the authority of Abiy in Ethiopia by force or diplomatic dialogue. (Al Jazeera, 2021, para. 1ff.) The existence of such a grand confederation made it clear that not only the TPLF was unsatisfied under the new style of ruling under Abiy, other parties and movements seemed to have needed a push to declare dissatisfaction. Seeing as the ENDF might be at capacity when having to be deployed all

⁵²For the official federal election results in mid 2021, see again: (Figure 13: 2021 Ethiopia General Elections).
⁵³To keep the network as simple as possible, these multiple bodies of police forces and Tigrayan militias will be incorporated into the single actor TPLF, as they are de facto under their control and do not represent independent, decision-making bodies. The TPLF, strictly speaking, is only a political party.

across the country Abiy decided to search for allies. He found these allies in the recently befriended Eritrea and its EDF as well as the popular Amharic Fano and the ASF, who were eager to establish their presence in South-Western Tigray, lands they deemed to be inherently Amharic. (The Africa Report, 2023, para. 4ff.) With the help of these new parties ENDF troops could be positioned more efficiently, alleviating two vital fronts.

While the UN was at the start very supportive of Abiy as he ended the Ethiopian-Eritrean War it especially expressed deep concerns as reports of seriously deteriorating humanitarian situations and ethnic violence came flooding in from HROs/NGOs working in the region. Once the Tigray War unfolded the UN pushed for an immediate ceasefire and return to diplomatic solutions, with little success. (The Guardian, 2021, para. 2) The AU also mentioned its concerns over the erupting violence but did little more than releasing statements. This potentially correlated with the fact that the organization was to a degree dependent on the FDRE, as its headquarters and many essential AU institutions are located in Ethiopia.⁵⁴ On top of purely foreign economic stakeholders the nations of China, Turkey, Russia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) all provided military support to the FDRE due to own geo-political interests of a strong Ethiopian state in the region. (Omna Tigray, 2021, para. 5ff.) All these actors will consequently represent state bodies (foreign).




Figure 5: Conflict-Network 1.3 (Source: Own visualisation)

Next is the addition of a groundwork focused around expanding the existing internal Ethiopian conflict-network by its foreign policy in the East-African theater as well as Ethiopian cross-border conflicts. The Al-Fashaga conflict i.e. was a conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)(1) and West-Amharic Fano militias, who were potentially supplied by the ASF, from December 15, 2020 until

⁵⁴These headquarters were further entirely engineered and built, among other AU projects, by China. After several investigations in 2018, it was also discovered that China used built-in monitors and microphones in these buildings to spy and listen on many conversations taking place in the AU. (Financial Times, 2018, para. 1f.) As a result China holds personal leverage over many AU members and politicians, unknown to the African public. The nation hence becomes a two-body stakeholder, clearly following not only economic goals but also its own foreign state policy in Ethiopia and a broader sense in the AU and Africa.

December 1, 2022.⁵⁵ (Bearak, 2021, para. 1f.) Further, with the completion and commissioning of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) the FDRE under Abiy's leadership started to put immense pressure on both Egypt and Sudan, two nations entirely dependent on the water in the river Nile which is a merger in Khartoum, capital of Sudan, from both the White Nile, sprouting in lake Victoria and the Blue Nile sprouting in lake Tana (ጣና ሐይቅ), Amhara, Ethiopia. The blue Nile contributes the majority of the water-flow of the Nile, with 65% and up to 72% depending on the season. (Keith, Ford, and Horton, 2016, p. 5)

Another problem during 2022 arose with the invasion of Al Shabaab forces into the Eastern Somali region of Ethiopia. While this invasion attempt was relatively quickly repelled the ENDF had to deviate essential troops and equipment to the border of Somalia.⁵⁶ (Maruf, 2022, para. 6f.)

How this invasion could happen in the first place is due to the current Somali state's executive force growing weaker in the late 2010's and early 2020's. The Somali Armed Forces (SAF)(2) are still heavily supported by both US and AU equipment and logistics, with both latter parties partly still actively fighting against the Al Shabaab insurgency as well, yet military analysts pose the SAF(2) will be practically dysfunctional on their own. (Williams, 2024, p. 4ff.) The US announced their full military retreat from Somalia in 2022 and the current joined AU/UN mission is to end in the fourth quarter of 2024, due to fully leave on December 31, 2024, with no sights on a renewal bill. (Abdi Sheikh and Paravicini, 2024, para. 1f.) The moment both these support missions completely withdraw from Somalia it is up for debate how the SAF plan to continue security operations as of early 2025.

Moreover, Ethiopia was growing ever more dependent on Djibouti as almost all of the nation's international imports as well as Ethiopian exports to other continents were still flowing through Port Djibouti. The initially mediocre taxes imposed were steadily increased by the Djiboutian government on Ethiopia and started to significantly cut into the country's profit margins. But as Djibouti is protected by international military heavyweights like China, the US, France or Saudi Arabia, all using its port for military purposes, it is impossible to annex the port of Djibouti from an Ethiopian perspective. (Yimer, 2021, para. 3) The Djiboutian government knows this and uses this shield to its advantage as taxes and customs paid by Ethiopia to Djibouti in 2023 totaled at a staggering 1.5\$ Billion or 86.4 Billion Ethiopian Birr. (Dahir, 2024, para. 6) Despite this heavy laying influence over the FDRE the state of Djibouti remains an economic stakeholder, as it is not trying to directly interfere in Ethiopia's affairs.⁵⁷

⁵⁵This conflict possibly posed another reason why the FDRE deemed it necessary to disarm the Fano militias as quickly as possible after the Tigray War, to mitigate future threats of the Fano going rouge.

⁵⁶Besides the invasion taking place not much is known about its actual severity and casualty count, with both sides claiming severely different casualty numbers. (Dhaysane, 2022, para. 1f.)

⁵⁷Note here that actors/stakeholders like China, US, Iran or the UN of course also act or hold stakes in other nations shown, like Djibouti or Sudan. Despite that, to keep the model clean and Ethio-centred the network was decisively not further expanded in such possible directions.

It is further possible to include the Afar-Somali skirmishes in North-Eastern Ethiopia, which shortly ebbed over into neighbouring Djibouti. Yet, as the clashes took place between unaffiliated Afari and Somali civilians and not any armed groups, plus no official state body being involved, these skirmishes were deemed unfit for the network and not included.⁵⁸ (Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2023, para 1f.)

In spite of these ongoing problems and disputes to the north and east of Ethiopia, the borders of Ethiopia with South Sudan and Kenya have remained largely peaceful since Abiy’s premiership, with the only notable development being the constant high stream of South Sudanese refugees seeking safety in Ethiopia’s Western Gambela region due to South Sudan’s internal conflicts, making the country somewhat dependent on Ethiopia as many South Sudanese reside there. (Oxfam, 2024, para. 18)




Figure 6: Conflict-Network 1.4 (Source: Own visualisation)

As the Tigray War ended with the Pretoria Agreement and was further implemented through the Nairobi Agreement a lot of conflicts reduced in their respective violence scale with the beginning of 2023. Yet the persisting core issue over the legacy of ethnic federalism remained unresolved and the conflicts were more temporarily force-stopped by the agreements. Since 2018 Abiy significantly tried to tackle and alter this nation-defining ethnic-federalist issue with the principle of Medemer (መደመር) that focuses on a future that maintains respect for all and aims to unite Ethiopia under a shared identity. Abiy wrote a book about this potentially Ethio-uniting principle, published in 2019, with a second volume published in 2023, see: (Ali, 2019)(Ali, 2023).⁵⁹

At the beginning of Abiy’s premiership both Fano, the Amharic youth movement, and the Qeerroo⁶⁰ signaled strong support for Abiy as prime minister, as he would symbolize a state figure more distant

⁵⁸Such cases of small-scale civilian infighting, sometimes among ethnic lines, sometimes among lines of class, albeit frequent do not fit in the realm of analysis of this network as all of such conflicts represent violence of non-affiliated bodies.

⁵⁹For the book’s cover see: (Figure 17: Medemer Cover).

⁶⁰The term translates to bachelor or simply youth. The movement follows a principle of strong Oromo nationalism and is linked to the OLF and partly the OLA. (Gardner, 2018, para. 10f.)(Qeerroo, 2022)

from the long ruling TPLF. The Qeerroo youth however quickly changed its perception of the new FDRE after a lot of Qeerroo figures were arrested in late 2019 and Hachalu Hundessa, an Oromo musician, was killed in mid 2020.⁶¹ (Gardner, 2018, para. 1f.) The state reacted harshly with thousands of arrests and bans on all demonstration-like events. Young Oromo's, previously supportive of Abiy were enraged, felt betrayed and joined the militant OLA en large. Protests against the FDRE demanding more autonomy throughout all of the Oromia regional state were at an all time high. The violence involving the OLA increased significantly in 2021 under the UFEFCF and sustained that level of intensity, despite the end of the Tigray War, until mid 2024. (Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2024, p. 13-17) Further, whereas the ENDF control most major roads and towns in Oromia and keeps the OLA militias out, in rural areas the OLA controls vast swaths of Oromia land. These rural areas remain crucial for the FDRE, as the Oromia region absorbs the economic and administrative capital of Addis Ababa in its entirety as well as large chunks of the Ethio-Djibouti railway line, key for the landlocked nation of Ethiopia, up until reaching the chartered city of Dire Dawa. It is from a geo-political and economic standpoint by the FDRE the most crucial regional state to bring lasting peace to. However negotiations by the state with the militant OLA failed in both in April 2023 and again in November 2023, a new round of talks for 2024 is not set yet. (Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2024, p. 16f.)

A similar switch up of alignment was observed in the also initially supportive Fano youth movement. In contrast to the Qeerroo in Oromia, who follow a lens guided by strong ethnic Oromo nationalism, the Fano in principal support a united Ethiopia but lay their main goal on the full restoration of Amharic governance over all of what they consider to be traditional Amhara homelands. (The Africa Report, 2023, para. 13f.) Under Abiy's leadership, although considered an improvement over the TPLF-led EPRDF government, support for the theoretical end of ethnic federalism was increasingly met with growing discontent. Fano, as of early 2024, interprets the PP as being too dominated by Oromo interests, marginalizing Amharic ones.⁶² (The Africa Report, 2023, para. 12f.)

Ethnic violence against Amharic civilians by armed but unaffiliated Oromos has further led to allegations by Fano that the FDRE was either unwilling or unable to protect Amharic populations. As the Tigray War ended the FDRE deemed the Fano to be too unpredictable and possibly dangerous and aimed to disarm their former allies. The situation intensified in April 2023, as anti-government movements and protests by Amhara youths and Fano gained profound momentum following several ENDF raids on ASF and Fano weaponry and equipment armories. Such harsh state-based efforts of disarmament, especially in the key central Amhara cities of Bahir Dar (ባሕር ዳር) and Gondar (ጎንደር) signaled distress among Fano and a tipping-point was reached. Fano declared full-scale armed resistance against the government. (The Africa Report, 2023, para. 21) Consequently the War in Amhara erupted. And as the ASF were an official government branch special police force those who opposed the disarmament as well, of whom there were many, quickly left the ASF or joined up with the Fano.

⁶¹Regardless of there being no evidence of the killing being done on the behalf of the government, such matters did not matter once the rumour spread.

⁶²With the Tigray War, disagreements were temporarily set aside as the federal government and Fano militias united against the TPLF. However, as the conflict ended on November 3, 2022, disputes quickly resurfaced.

The Fano further still consider southern parts of the Tigray regional state to be rightfully Amharic lands and increased attacks into South Tigray against civilians in 2023, after the Tigray War ended. (The Africa Report, 2023, para. 14-20.) The TPLF cannot effectively defend these regions as it was fully disarmed with the implementation of the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements, only small, unofficial Tigrayan militias remained. The balance of power in Ethiopia's north was profoundly shifted with Tigrayans seeking refuge behind ENDF lines.

Regardless of these issues in Ethiopia's core regions, throughout the periphery of the nation Abiy succeeded in ushering in upon a considerably more peaceful situation. This is starkly different to the leaderships in Addis Ababa before, which harshly put down any deemed to be potentially threatening political movement as violently as possible. The merger of several weaker parties into the PP meant that areas politically excluded under the EPRDF's rule were presented with new opportunities on a federal policy-making level and violence, especially after the dissolution of the UFEFECF, fell ever since, see: (Figure 11: Political Violence in Ethiopia). The FDRE increased talks with multiple armed groups in the Somali, Afar and Southern regions of Ethiopia, implementing disarmament and reintegration programs for i.e. the SSR, the SNLF, the BPLM and the ARDUF movements while moreover discussing sustainable peace and investment solutions with local politicians.⁶³ Political control of the outer regions is as such secured through the implementation of the PP.

The previously large and ethnically diverse regional state of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) was further allowed to split several times. Independence referendums were held in three distinct regions to allow for more autonomy for all. As of November 2023 the SNNPR successfully split into the Sidama Regional State, the Central Ethiopia Regional State, the South Ethiopia Regional State and the South West Ethiopia Peoples' Regional State. All new regions remained significantly more peaceful ever since, as the rezoning of internal borders was mainly met with support of local populations. (Africa News, 2023, para. 9) This development demonstrates that the FDRE can achieve peace and perhaps maintain it as well. While conflict rages in the Amhara and Oromia regions in the country's center, control of the periphery opens up the use of major resources of the FDRE to redirect into the core and away from the outer regions.

When moving away from internal problems, it becomes visible how much the FDRE under Abiy increasingly focuses on goals beyond its borders, especially on the ocean and the Nile river. Under Abiy the issue of a connection to the open oceans, in Ethiopia's case through access to the Red sea or Gulf of Aden, was publicly announced state policy. He revived the shut down and defunct Derg-Era Ethiopian Navy on paper and stated Ethiopia will gain access to the seas by any means necessary. (Mumbere, 2018, para. 8f.) The reason why this is such a pressing issue is because the lingering dependence on Djibouti is too unpredictable for global security reasons and increasingly too high a cost economically. Wanting to move away from this Djiboutian dominance Abiy pushed for and signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland on January 1, 2024, implicating future

⁶³See the homepage of the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission for the most recent developments: (Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, 2024)

recognition of its statehood and integration into the AU system.⁶⁴ (Yibelta, 2024, para. 1ff.) In return Somaliland granted Ethiopia autonomous access and land leases to parts of its vital port of Berbera. (Yibelta, 2024, para. 6f.) As Railway infrastructure already exists in Ethiopia in Dire Dawa through the Ethio-Djiboutian railway, laying track until Berbera through Hargeisa, the capital of Somaliland, thus connecting it to the existing network, can potentially be done quickly. This development comes much to the detriment of the state of Somalia which protested profoundly but is unable to intervene as it is still caught up by the long lasting incursion of Al Shabaab militants throughout the southern parts of the nation.

Further, as the Sudanese state since April 13, 2023 is taken up in a severe Civil War against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Ethiopia seized this opportunity to fill up its GERD damming system reservoir faster than agreed with Sudan and Egypt in previous years. (Yibelta, 2023, para. 12f.) This is possible as the more modernized and stronger Egyptian Air Force as of mid 2024 still cannot refuel at critical SAF(1) bases in Sudan, nevertheless conduct any sensible missions from Egypt into Ethiopia, as the Civil War rages on. Through the Sudanese Civil War Egypt thus practically lost its leverage position of boasting the stronger Air Force compared to Ethiopia, which Egypt on multiple occasions and meetings declared it would use if deemed unavoidable. (Yibelta, 2023, para. 25f.) This is a logical procedure from an Egyptian perspective as the nation cannot function without the Nile river. Nonetheless, to make sense of the FDRE's decision to fill up the dam faster, at the price of endangering bad relations with Egypt and Sudan, it is necessary to look at the benefits of such a rapid fill-up. The GERD is part of a currently two, potentially three part damming system making use of the natural steepness of the Blue Nile in Western Amhara which already produces great amounts of renewable energy, albeit only the GERD being in usage. The already built Saddle Dam could be connected to the energy grid much faster if the current fill rates continue.⁶⁵

As Ethiopia is urbanizing rapidly and still boasts a population growth rate of over 2.5% it is vital for the nation to have access large amounts of energy, both for industrial-economic and civilian usage.⁶⁶ (Yibelta, 2023, para. 6f.)(World Bank Group, 2024, para. 1f.) As the energy provided by the GERD system is domestic it on top slows the need to import energy sources from elsewhere, reducing more potential Ethiopian dependence on other nations. This tense situation between Egypt and Ethiopia is additionally suitable for future research as both nations joined BRICS, a currently evolving economic alliance, as of January 1, 2024.⁶⁷ (European Parliament, 2024, p. 1)

In addition, while the end of the Tigray war was welcomed by the UN the organization cautioned that more had to still be done to rebuilt and make the region safe for civilians, as reports of administrative human rights violations still persisted. According to conducts by the Ethiopian Human Rights Com-

⁶⁴Regardless of this development, as Somaliland is internationally, as of June 28, 2024, still de jure not considered to be an independent state it will continue to be portrayed as a rebellious body in the network.

⁶⁵To visualise the damming system, see: (Figure 18: Blue Nile Damming System)

⁶⁶For more information on Ethiopia's demography, see: (Figure 12: Demographics of Ethiopia as of 2020)(Statista, 2024)

⁶⁷BRICS is not an abbreviation but an acronym for the founding members of the alliance of Brazil, Russia, India, China and the later addition of South Africa.

mission, massive human rights violations were continuously carried out by ENDF troops with the likes of extrajudicial killings, massacres and undeclared torture and detentions. Such reports in turn did not alleviate the pressure put on the FDRE by HROs/NOGs going into 2024. A recent of such notable incidents includes the Merawi massacre on January 29, 2024, which left 60 to 100 residents dead in a ruthless execution by ENDF troops in Merawi town in Amhara Region. (Addis Standard, 2024, para. 2f.) As of early 2024 continuous droughts in the northern and eastern parts of the country, especially affecting the regions of Tigray, Afar and partly Amhara, worsened the humanitarian situation and the UN pressed for more aid deliveries while cautioning the government that the aid deliverers of the WFP or other agencies have to immediately reach their assigned destinations to avoid impending famine. If such steep reiterations and new anti-corruption measures show to be effective in 2024 will have to closely observed, as reports and estimates of hunger-related deaths in early 2024 in the Tigray region alone still signal severe issues. (The Guardian, 2024, para. 26) The international pressure to establish lasting food security on the FDRE remains.




Figure 7: Conflict-Network 1.5 (Source: Own visualisation)

3.2 To-date Policy Reflection

Under Abiy’s administration, the FDRE has still not established a clear roadmap for the country’s relationship with ethnic federalism nor tried to implement the proposed changes in Medemer on a broad scale except in theory. His tenure is characterized by a strong-arm approach towards political adversaries and significant political turmoil. To remain in power and prevent Ethiopia from fragmenting, the FDRE under Abiy has often realigned itself, aggravating new conflicts and shifting power balances.⁶⁸

⁶⁸Note here the example of ENDF raids on former Fano and ASF allies.

Abiy, as of mid 2024, primarily contends with insurgencies from the Fano militias in the Amhara regional state and the OLA in the Oromia regional state. The insurgencies in Ethiopia highlight enduring political issues that stem from previous administrations. Under Abiy's leadership, resolving these disputes without the imminent threat of state-based violence remains elusive, irrespective of where the blame lies. Although the Pretoria and Nairobi agreements temporarily halted the conflict between the state and the TPLF, recent clashes between minor Tigrayan militias and Fano forces indicate a fragile peace. Additionally, unsuccessful negotiations with the OLA have exacerbated the violence in Oromia, showing that the situation remains volatile. The FDRE since the end of the Tigray War continuously proposes reconciliation processes in form of the national dialogue, aimed at political common-ground between all parties in the nation. (Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, 2024)

In Ethiopia today, neither the government nor major opposition groups have shown a commitment to resolving political issues peacefully. Ongoing conflicts risk becoming entrenched, complicating sustainable peace efforts. The FDRE must appear to uphold the Pretoria agreement while ensuring stability in the contested territories in Southern Tigray between the Amhara and Tigrayan populations. However, allowing the TPLF-led interim government to regain control of these contested zones could spark a new conflict. Small, localized skirmishes might temporarily benefit Abiy by weakening both Fano and the TPLF. However, an escalation into broader conflict could lead to a new costly war, disrupting economic stability and increasing displacement. The ENDF has so far managed to contain conflicts in Southern Tigray, but future clashes are likely and may require additional security measures.

Moreover, while the number of total conflict parties has dramatically reduced the new main rebellious bodies potentially have a much broader population behind their movements. Oromos and Amharas make up the two biggest ethnic shares of the Ethiopian population, with 34.1% and 28.1% respectively, in comparison the Tigrayan population of Ethiopia only totals to around 6.9%. (Ethiopian Statistics Agency, 2007, p. 71-126) If the militant OLA and Fano movements were to gain significantly more track throughout both their regions respectively the FDRE's rule would be much more endangered than during the Tigray War period, where the main clashes were taking place in the nation's northern region, as significantly larger and more centred population movements would have to be dealt with immediately. If people however are truly discontent enough, especially in urban and administrative centres where national news spread fast, can be evaluated through the impact the FDRE under Abiy has on them.

4. A survey-based Impact Evaluation

This section presents an Impact Evaluation of the FDRE conflict-centred policies and politics in form of the evaluation of a survey, essentially presenting an extension of section (3.1 A conflict-centred Policy Analysis of the Ethiopian government) in terms of an effect analysis.⁶⁹ The objective lies in determining outcomes and effects of the FDRE policies and actions based on the opinions of the civilian population of Ethiopia. The evaluation makes use of both quantitative and qualitative data as it derives results of an independent survey of the opinions of the civilian population of Ethiopia.⁷⁰ As the sample size of the study is small the section's survey-based analysis does not aim to establish causal relationships but to enhance the findings of the previous policy-analysis by evaluating how civilians feel to be affected by the discussed developments.

4.1 Operationalization

The operationalization process will prepare the sample data of the statistically appraisable part of the survey and present multiple iteration results. It moreover expounds on deemed to be important observations and events during the same period, which might confound or skew results.

4.1.1 Potential Confounding Factors

A multitude of other factors have to be taken into account when extracting and evaluating information from a single format. Starting with the questions of the survey. They were formulated in a way of being more general statements, to achieve an outset of inducing bias for participants. The only two instances of naming an ethnic group beyond the general information were in the case of two questions about the Tigray War, indirectly referring to the people of Tigray. This instance was somewhat inevitable, as the war is called that way and a neutral formulation like *the recent grand war* or *the northern war* would have most likely caused confusion with the ongoing War in Amhara. As such it was decided not to opt out of naming the conflict for the purpose of clarity.

To present context on confounding events it is crucial to inform on where and when the survey was conducted. In total people were surveyed in six separate locations during several time frames:

- Addis Ababa (AA) (08.04 - 12.04 / 23.04 - 29.04)
- Bahir Dar (BD) (19.04 - 20.04)
- Debre Birhan (DB) (13.04)
- Dire Dawa (DD) (14.04 - 18.04)
- Mek'ele (MK) (21.04)
- Munich (MN) (08.04 - 13.05)

⁶⁹This is arguably essential as incorporating the impact of discussed policies provide for a more balanced conclusion.

⁷⁰It was conducted from April 8, 2024 until April 29, 2024 with a two week extension period for participants of the digital format to send their results in. The digital version and extension period only applied to participants in Germany. For access to all survey results and data, as well as further information and a dummy survey for own use, a GitHub repository was created, see: ([Replication Data](#))

In the month of April several events took place, partly during the conduct of the survey from 08.04.2024 until 29.04.2024 in mainland Ethiopia, as per the Ethiopian Peace Observatory. (Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2024a, Infographic) These events could have altered opinions of participants, possibly even after the survey was conducted.

- 2 APR: The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and Prosperity Party officials agree to begin political dialogue as per the Pretoria agreement.
- 4 APR: The Gambela regional government arrests 14 officials in connection with recent attacks on civilians.
- 7 APR: The Debre Birhan-Dessie road, closed in February due to insecurity, is reopened.
- 7-9 APR: Unknown militants kill 11 Muslim civilians in Bahir Dar, Motta, and Gondar towns, Amhara.
- 10 APR: Unidentified gunmen shoot and kill a political officer of the Oromo Liberation Front party in Meki, Oromia.
- 11 APR: OLA/OLF-Shane kill 11 ethnic Amhara civilians in Nono, West Shewa, Oromia.
- 12 APR: Three members of Fano militias clash with security forces in Addis Ababa.
- 13 APR: Clashes between Amhara and Tigray ethnic militias begin to escalate in Southern Tigray zone, Tigray.
- 13 APR: Issa Somali clan militias clash with Afar ethnic militias along the Afar-Somali regional borders.
- 18 APR: Representatives of the Afar people and Issa clan sign a ceasefire agreement to resolve the conflict over disputed territories.
- 26 APR: The National Dialogue Commission asks political parties to prepare agendas for an upcoming national dialogue.

Moreover, as there is, as of mid 2024, only mediocre to little violence in urban centres of the nation participants were asked in two instances how likely they thought of conflict arising in the near future or if they are at all concerned about potential future violence in Ethiopia.⁷¹ As the War in Amhara and the OLA insurgencies are still suppressed by the ENDF to regional clashes it would go to show how much, if at all, participants think they themselves could be affected by violence in the future.

Lastly, to create as little confusion as possible the survey introduction was held brief and focused on the anonymity and freedom of choice of every single participant. An explanation to each willing person of interest and participant was given that the survey was done independently, neither affiliated with the government of Ethiopia or Germany.

⁷¹Corresponding survey questions: (2.3, 3.3).

4.1.2 Procedure and Iteration

The study's findings will now be iterated and patterned. The study had a total of 232 participants with 29 invalid surveys, resulting in 203 valid surveys. The survey was split into four parts:

- 5 General information about the participant (anonymous) = (1.1 - 1.5).
- 7 questions answerable on a scale from 1 (=not at all) to 10 (=very much so) = (2.1 - 2.7).
- 6 questions answerable with YES or NO = (3.1 - 3.6).
- 6 questions answerable in a written format, enabling inflow of personal opinions = (4.1 - 4.6).⁷²

The main pattern after which all survey data was collected is location based. The participants answers of the first three statistically viable parts will thus firstly be iterated and designed after the survey's location pattern.⁷³ This pattern will be the only one iterated for, to investigate how the population in mainly large urban centres, including both chartered cities, feel about the contemporary conflict-related politics of the FDRE. As several participants for various reasons did not answer every question fully missing answer will be presented in the universal *NA*. To move through all statistical results as size-efficiently as possible all data will be presented in absolute, two-decimal rounded unit counts without additional percentages and will be keyed horizontally after their respective location.⁷⁴

The first survey section was the general information of the participants. Results are as following:

(1.1) Were you born in Ethiopia? / የተወለድኩ በኢትዮጵያ ነው?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	55	20	3	78
BD	34	3	0	37
DB	21	0	2	23
DD	39	2	1	42
ME	2	0	0	2
MN	12	9	0	21
TOTAL	163	34	6	203

(1.2) Do you consider yourself Ethiopian? / እራሳችሁን ኢትዮጵያዊ አድርጋችሁ ትቆጥራላችሁ?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	55	21	2	78
BD	34	3	0	37
DB	22	0	1	23
DD	38	2	2	42
ME	0	2	0	2
MN	14	7	0	21
TOTAL	163	35	5	203

⁷²These 6 questions are attributed to a separate section, as they are not statistically valuable. See: (4.2 Opinionated Questions).

⁷³Note here that all answers could further be iterated and designed after the participants ethnic distribution pattern, age or after i.e. answers in question 2.7 (the participant's general approval of the PP and Abiy Ahmed Ali). Such distinct analysis iteration patterns normally provide more insight into the participants opinions based on different factors. As this survey however does not classify as a pure experiment, these results most likely do not truly reflect the opinions of the full population, as the sample size is considerably small. For instance, when theoretically iterating for ethnicity in DD, where there were only 4 instances of Tigrayan participants and all vote very closely correlation still cannot seriously be considered. The main objective of this study segment remains to explore generally unbiased, non-administrative data, therefore accepting deficits on other levels.

⁷⁴A second and third keying after ethnicity and age were conducted but ultimately deemed unfit and sub-optimal for chapter-size and thesis reasons.

(1.3) Do you identify with one of the following groups: / ከሚከተሉት ቡድኖች አንዱን ለይተው ያውቃሉ:-⁷⁵

Location-Key	O	A	S	T	Si	G	W	H	Af	Ga	Other	NA	TOTAL
AA	31.83	17.83	4	4.83	3	7.5	2	1	1	2	1	2	78
BD	5.5	22.5	1	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	37
DB	13	3.5	0	1	2.5	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	23
DD	12.5	7.5	2	6	3.5	4.5	1	1	2	0	1	1	42
ME	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
MN	6.5	8	0	3.5	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	21
TOTAL	69.33	59.33	7	21.33	11	14	3	2	5	2	4	5	203

(1.4) Do you prefer the national Ethiopian identity or your Ethnic identity? / ብሔራዊ ኢትዮጵያዊ ማንነትህን ወይስ የዘር ማንነትህን ትመርጣለህ?⁷⁶

Location-Key	Ethiopian	Ethnic	NA	TOTAL
AA	45.5	29.5	2	78
BD	11.5	23.5	2	37
DB	15	8	1	23
DD	21	16	5	42
ME	0	2	0	2
MN	15	6	0	21
TOTAL	108	85	10	203

(1.5) How old are you? / ዕድሜህ ስንት ነው?⁷⁷

Location-Key	Mean Age	Median Age	Notable Outliers
AA	31.13	29	14, 56
BD	30.09	27	16, 54
DB	31.47	28	84
DD	30.36	29	50
ME	NA	NA	NA
MN	31.38	30	49, 58
TOTAL AVG.	30.89	29	—

Next were 7 scaling questions from 1 (=not at all) to 10 (=very much so). Results were as follows:

(2.1) How well-informed do you feel about recent conflicts in Ethiopia? / ስለ ኢትዮጵያ የቅርብ ጊዜ ግጭቶች ምን ያህል መረጃ እንዳላችሁ ይሰማችኋል?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	1	1	5	9	16	11	6	5	4	3	17	78
BD	0	1	1	3	6	5	5	1	3	1	11	37
DB	0	0	1	4	2	5	3	2	1	1	4	23
DD	0	1	2	1	6	9	6	3	2	3	9	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	2
MN	0	1	2	3	0	5	4	2	1	1	2	21
TOTAL	1	4	11	20	30	36	24	13	11	9	44	203

⁷⁵To fit the page ethnicities were abbreviated in this table. (O = Oromo, A = Amhara, S = Somali, T = Tigrayan, Si = Sidama, G = Gurage, W = Welayta, H = Hadiya, Af = Afar and Ga = Gamo. Further note here that participants were able to mark multiple answers, as one can in theory identify as i.e. both Oromo and Tigrayan. These totals were subdivided, to not weigh some persons twice. If a participant were to mark i.e. Oromo and Tigrayan he would be categorized as 0.5 Oromo and 0.5 Tigrayan. In some cases all categories were marked without a visible preference, in such a case no ethnicity was attributed. The cases of *other* included in AA once *Gedeo*, in BD twice *Eritrean* and in MN once *none at all*. For true population comparison, the last full national census of Ethiopia in 2007, which includes an ethnicity census, see: (Ethiopian Statistics Agency, 2007, p. 71-126).

⁷⁶In some cases participants answered this question by marking both, answers will likewise be weighed 0.5 and 0.5.

⁷⁷In this question's case NA and TOTAL are redundant columns as Mean and Median are calculated for by all given number. In the case of ME no age was given.

(2.2) How would you rate the media's coverage of conflicts in terms of accuracy and fairness? / የመገናኛ ብዙኃን ስለግጭቶች የሚያቀርቡትን ዘገባ ትክክለኛነት እና ፍትሃዊነት በተመለከተ እንዴት ይገምታሉ?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	8	4	9	7	13	7	1	2	4	4	19	78
BD	5	7	5	5	4	2	0	0	0	0	9	37
DB	1	5	1	3	1	0	0	2	2	1	7	23
DD	3	7	4	5	2	2	1	1	1	2	14	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MN	4	2	5	4	0	0	1	0	1	0	4	21
TOTAL	21	25	24	24	20	11	3	5	8	7	55	203

(2.3) How likely do you think it is that conflict in Ethiopia will arise in the near future? / በቅርብ ጊዜ ውስጥ በኢትዮጵያ ግጭት ሊፈጠር የሚችልበት እድል ምን ያህል ነው ብለው ያስባሉ?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	1	2	2	1	0	2	6	5	25	18	16	78
BD	0	0	2	1	2	0	4	11	6	9	2	37
DB	0	0	1	1	1	0	2	3	5	3	7	23
DD	0	0	3	1	0	0	2	6	13	12	5	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MN	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	4	1	6	3	21
TOTAL	1	2	8	5	4	5	16	29	50	48	35	203

(2.4) How satisfied are you with the government's handling of the recent Tigray war? / በቅርብ የተካሄደውን የትግራይ ጦርነት በመንግሥት አስተዳደር ምን ያህል ረክተዋል?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	4	4	3	4	7	9	6	5	4	14	18	78
BD	1	4	6	10	3	5	0	1	0	0	7	37
DB	1	1	2	3	6	2	0	0	2	2	4	23
DD	2	3	4	7	6	1	2	0	4	5	8	42
ME	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
MN	3	2	5	3	1	1	0	0	0	2	4	21
TOTAL	12	14	20	27	23	18	8	6	10	23	42	203

(2.5) How much do you agree that reconciliation processes of the Tigray war were successful? / የትግራይ ጦርነት የዕርቅ ሂደቶች ስኬታማ እንደነበሩ ምን ያህል ይስማማሉ?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	4	3	4	7	5	2	14	3	6	9	21	78
BD	2	5	8	4	8	2	1	0	0	0	7	37
DB	2	1	1	6	4	2	0	1	0	2	4	23
DD	5	5	6	2	3	0	1	1	4	3	12	42
ME	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
MN	7	2	3	2	0	1	0	0	1	1	4	21
TOTAL	21	16	22	21	20	7	16	5	11	15	49	203

(2.6) How much did you approve of the The Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)? / የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝቦች አብዮታዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ግንባር ምን ያህል አፀደቃችሁት?

(2.6.1) With Meles Zenawi Asres / ጋር መለስ ዜናዊ አስረስ (1995 - 2012)

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	6	5	9	11	8	1	1	1	1	0	35	78
BD	1	3	8	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	17	37
DB	2	4	5	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	9	23
DD	2	0	8	4	1	6	0	2	0	0	19	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MN	2	1	4	2	3	2	0	1	0	0	6	21
TOTAL	13	13	34	23	15	11	1	4	1	0	88	203

(2.6.2) With Hailemariam Desalegn / ጋር ኅይለማሪያም ደሳለኝ (2012 - 2018)

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	14	12	10	4	4	2	0	0	1	1	30	78
BD	5	10	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	37
DB	8	4	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	23
DD	6	10	1	3	2	1	1	0	0	0	18	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MN	4	3	1	6	0	1	0	0	0	0	6	21
TOTAL	37	39	19	18	7	4	1	0	1	1	76	203

(2.7) How much do you approve of the current government under Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party? / አቢይ አሕመድ ዐሊ እና ብልጽግና ፓርቲ ሥር ያለውን የአሁኑን መንግሥት ምን ያህል ያፀድቃሉ?

Location-Key	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	NA	TOTAL
AA	3	4	1	11	9	4	10	4	5	12	15	78
BD	0	2	8	10	10	2	2	2	0	0	1	37
DB	0	1	1	4	6	3	2	1	1	3	1	23
DD	2	3	5	4	9	3	3	2	4	5	2	42
ME	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
MN	0	4	2	3	3	4	0	1	0	2	2	21
TOTAL	5	14	17	32	37	16	17	10	10	22	23	203

The next survey sequence entailed 6 short question. Participants were asked to answer these questions with either YES / አዎ or NO / አይ:

(3.1) Have recent conflicts in Ethiopia influenced your perception of the government? / በቅርቡ በኢትዮጵያ የተከሰቱት ግጭቶች ለመንግሥት ያለዎትን አመለካከት ነክተውታል?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	68	5	5	78
BD	35	1	1	37
DB	20	2	1	23
DD	38	1	3	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	16	4	1	21
TOTAL	177	13	13	203

(3.2) Do you think foreign intervention has exacerbated conflicts in Ethiopia? / የውጭጣልቃ ገብነት በኢትዮጵያ ግጭት እንዲባባስ አድርጓል ብለው ያስባሉ?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	51	11	16	78
BD	23	5	9	37
DB	10	4	9	23
DD	26	2	14	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	16	2	3	21
TOTAL	126	24	53	203

(3.3) Are you concerned about the potential for future violence in Ethiopia? / በኢትዮጵያ ወደፊት ሊከሰቱ የሚችሉ የኃይል ጥቃቶች ያሳስቧችኋል?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	50	12	16	78
BD	25	1	11	37
DB	12	6	5	23
DD	21	2	19	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	12	4	5	21
TOTAL	120	25	58	203

(3.4) Do you believe that education about conflicts in Ethiopia is good? / በኢትዮጵያ ስለተከሰቱት ግጭቶች ማስተማር ጥሩ ነው ብለው ያምናሉ?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	30	24	24	78
BD	2	16	19	37
DB	4	9	10	23
DD	7	13	22	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	1	12	8	21
TOTAL	44	74	85	203

(3.5) Are you happy with the current political situation in Ethiopia? / አሁን ባለው የኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ሁኔታ ደስተኛ ነዎት?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	29	34	15	78
BD	3	27	7	37
DB	6	13	4	23
DD	15	20	7	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	5	12	4	21
TOTAL	58	106	39	203

(3.6) Do you agree with the current borders of Ethiopia? / አሁን ባለው የኢትዮጵያ ድንበር ትስማማላችሁ?

Location-Key	Yes	No	NA	TOTAL
AA	7	61	10	78
BD	1	34	2	37
DB	0	22	1	23
DD	1	35	6	42
ME	0	0	2	2
MN	7	13	1	21
TOTAL	16	165	22	203

4.1.3 Survey Insights and Robustness

The first thing to mention is the survey participation turnout of 55.5% or excluding invalid surveys 48.56%.⁷⁸ As such of the 465 people who showed initial interest in participating nearly half opted out. There could be several reasons for such a low turnout. As the survey was mainly conducted on the streets of urban centres by asking by-passers or people in shops or small diners on the streets' sides, potential participants may have decided to move on in their day with i.e. having to go to work or reach the bus. In addition, something else worth mentioning is the possible problem regarding the federal Ethiopian flag on the survey, see: (Figures 19/20: Conduct of Survey Example 1/2). During the conduct of the survey some potentially willing participants may have refused to fill out the document or remaining parts possibly based upon thinking that the federal Ethiopian flag in the top right corner represented an official state-based survey. While an explanation to each interested person before the conduct of the survey was given that the survey was done independently, neither affiliated with the government of Ethiopia or Germany, this point may have been lost in translation in some cases. This flag-based deterrent could partly explain the generally high non-participation rate. Beyond that, the turnout in ME was especially low with only 2 out of 22 initially interested persons participating, among dozens not showing, or not wanting to look like showing, interest in participating. This may have been due to a heavy presence of federal police continuously patrolling the city's streets, subsequently people may have not felt safe enough to participate.⁷⁹

In terms of robustness testing of the survey a few possibilities are suitable. Firstly, redoing the survey on a different and much broader sample population to gain insight into if the results of the first sample population hold. Secondly, iterating the results of the survey through several standard tests like the Chi-Test, T-test or a Gini-coefficient based on which correlation or values should be tested for. It is additionally possible to define and include control variables, helping to control for or limit potentially confounding factors. All such options can be utilized to work on extensions of this paper to further investigate how much and in which dimensions the Ethiopian population thinks of its incumbent government's conflict policies and actions. Yet, the aim of this section lies in presenting a general overview to enhance the stakeholder policy analysis thus refraining from a deep and extensive analysis.

4.2 Opinionated Questions

This section will portray two selected written opinions on each answerable question of the last survey part in writing. There are six such questions which result in twelve different opinionated selections. Note here that the selection process was not entirely randomized. As the survey only included 203 valid participation's in total pre-requirements based on location and utilization ability were made.⁸⁰ Here it has to strongly be reiterated that a different sample population not caught in this survey,

⁷⁸Note here the definition of a survey attempt. People who instantly rejected the survey were not counted towards survey attempts, only people who were initially interested but decided not to proceed upon being handed the survey physically are attributed to a survey attempt.

⁷⁹Beatings of civilians without or little reason by police are common throughout Ethiopia. (US Department of State, 2023, para. 58f.)

⁸⁰These pre-requirements included the chosen surveys to be, if possible, at least once originating from each different location and answers to be given in coherent, logical and decipherable sentences/words. It is to be noted that no opinion question was answered in ME.

thus not respected for in this paper, may present a totally different outcome equally reasonable and conclusive as the one in this paper. These personal questions were likewise formulated in a very indifferent way to hinder creating a certain narrative in the questions themselves.

Opinion question 1 (4.1): What is your opinion of Eritrea? What is your opinion of Isayas Afewerki?
/ ስለ ኤርትራ ምን አስተያየት አለዎት? ስለ ኢሳያስ አፌወርቂስ ምን አስተያየት አለዎት?

”Eritrea: As a country, it is in turmoil. Isayas: He seems like a dictator to me.”⁸¹

”It is part of Ethiopia. He is a slave master. The mother of my friend was killed by Eritrea.”⁸²

Opinion question 2 (4.2): What do you think are the root causes that fuel violence in Ethiopia? /
በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ዓመፅን የሚያቀጣጥሉ ዋና ዋና ምክንያቶች ምንድን ናቸው ብለው ያስባሉ?

”It is mainly due to government corruption and the genuine people’s movement for government change as well as nationalistic activities.”⁸³

”I think the no 1 root cause is attitude and political view mixed with Ethnicism boiling the country hence creating conflict and destabilizing the country. The leadership gap is also another challenge creating problems within nation to stay in power.”⁸⁴

Opinion question 3 (4.3): Can you share any personal experiences related to violence or conflict in Ethiopia? /
በኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ከዓመፅ ጋር በተያያዘ ያጋጠመህን የግል ተሞክሮዎች ማካፈል ትችላለህ?

”They drafted my father into the war. He did not return.”⁸⁵

”I was displaced from my home due to the conflict. I have seen and heard many painful stories.”⁸⁶

Opinion question 4 (4.4): What are your hopes and concerns for the future of Ethiopia? /
ለኢትዮጵያ የወደፊት ዕጣ ፈንታ ምን ተስፋዎችና ስጋቶች አሏችሁ?

”I hope the future generation will have to not participate in a war. I fear that it may happen again soon. With Egypt, Somalia or Eritrea, it does not matter, the sons never return home.”⁸⁷

”I think it is possible that under the current rule another war with Somalia or Egypt may come. This is sad because the young people will again suffer under such war like in Tigray. I only hear bad things from my brother.”⁸⁸

⁸¹Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (AA68).
⁸²Corresponding survey: (DD23).
⁸³Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (BD36).
⁸⁴Corresponding survey: (AA54).
⁸⁵Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (DD28).
⁸⁶Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (DB05).
⁸⁷Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (BD37).
⁸⁸Corresponding survey: (MN02).

Opinion question 5 (4.5): Do you think other people would agree with your opinions? / **ሌሎች ሰዎች ከእርስዎ አመለካከት ጋር ይስማማሉ ብለው ያስባሉ?**

"If the people need peace in Ethiopia they will agree but I really need peace. We are lack of peace & hearing good things."⁸⁹

"I have long left Ethiopia behind myself. So I cannot say as such for sure but hope all at least see the potential of the country."⁹⁰

Opinion question 6 (4.6): Would you like to say anything else? / **ሌላ ነገር መናገር ትፈልጋለህ?**

"The current government is not good, but it was much worse before. Chinese investments are helping with construction. I hope my children will be safe in the future."⁹¹

"Ahmed government tries promoting unity. This is good."⁹²

4.3 Results and Network-Implications

Upcoming is the evaluation of the participants answers and what they imply for the network. What insights do these results provide on how participants view the incumbent Ethiopian government and conflict related issues in Ethiopia?

To start, the true ethnic distribution of Ethiopia was not correctly depicted. After the 2007 census it is: Oromo (34.1%), Amhara (28.1%), Somali (7.4%), Tigrayan (6.9%), Sidama (4.9%), Gurage (3.7%), Welayta (3.2%), Hadiya (1.7%), Afar (1.7%), Gamo (1.6%), Other (15.1%). (Ethiopian Statistics Agency, 2007, p. 71-126) The sample population however depicted low Somali and Other distributions and a high Gurage distribution. This can be attributed to no survey being conducted in the Somali and southern regions and further around a third of all being taken in AA, a city close to the Gurage zone.

Under both the quantitative and qualitative survey findings it becomes highly visible that the grand majority of participants are unhappy or at the very least somewhat discontent with the current state of the country (3.5, 3.6), although a significant portion do not contribute these circumstances as being faults of the government or Abiy. Not only did Abiy and the PP fair much better in the numeric aspect compared to his predecessors Meles and Hailemariam under the EPDRF (2.6.1, 2.6.2, 2.7) but he also received written qualitative praise in regards to his attempts to change the nation's future. Such participants portrayed Abiy, in spite of his wrongdoings, as better than the leaderships before because his pushes for change, albeit including high risks, are better than constantly remaining stagnant. Only a small portion of participants felt that Abiy was the core issue of the problems and conflict in the country, they were primarily Amhara and Tigrayan.

⁸⁹Corresponding survey: (AA52).

⁹⁰Corresponding survey: (MN05).

⁹¹Translated from Amharic with EthioCloud. Corresponding survey: (BD24).

⁹²Corresponding survey: (DB17).

In some cases participants also felt the causes of the nation's problems are due to greed and ethnic/nationalistic views of others rather than it being an administrative issues, thereby in some sense attributing fault to societal and educational issues (3.4). A lot of participants also assumed that foreign nations contributed to the escalation of Ethiopia's issues as well (3.2). It is moreover notable that the majority of all participants seem to fear or at least consider the possibility of future escalations of violence in Ethiopia (2.3, 3.3). As to what exact violent conflict that may be, opinions differed. Beyond that it is notable that participants tend to feel very informed in regards to conflicts and issues surrounding Ethiopia (2.1) and yet viewed the media of the country to be less fair and accurate (2.2).

In addition, the German diaspora population, only lightly analysed by a 23 person-sized sample in the city of Munich, portrayed results of being less radical and more centred choices but remained equally fearful of future violence in Ethiopia. Diaspora participants were moreover more sceptical of the Abiy administration, raking it lower than participants on the mainland (2.7) and were more dissatisfied with the government's handling of the Tigray War (2.4, 2.5). Yet the diaspora, likewise to the mainland participants, viewed Meles and Hailemariam in a worse light than Abiy (2.6.1, 2.6.2). The diaspora population further regarded media covering violent events and Ethiopian conflicts just as inaccurate and unfair than their mainland counterparts (2.2).

To extend on the mentioned general discomfort in the sample population, the overwhelming majority of all participants thought that current conflicts in Ethiopia affected their view towards the FDRE and that they are starkly unhappy with the contemporary borders of Ethiopia (3.1, 3.6).⁹³ Opinions in the four newly independent regions of Ethiopia might yield much more positive findings.⁹⁴

Further, a lot of people beyond the survey numbers were seemingly not interested in their county's politics or it's conflicts. The turnout of the survey was mediocre and if the counting mechanism would have included every person who directly refused to participate the turnout would have been much lower. What this disinterest is attributable to is difficult to assume, as it could be a wide range of factors playing into people not wanting to participate in that exact moment.⁹⁵ Fittingly Schneider wrote about potential issues of low interests or hindrances for the civilian population towards politics in his network analysis: "Nicht alle Akteure, die von einem politikrelevanten Problem betroffen und an dessen Lösung interessiert sind, haben prinzipiell Zugang zur Politikarena erhalten." and added that: "Von einem Problem betroffen zu sein bedeutet nicht zwingend auch Interesse an einer Politik zu äußern, und Interesse impliziert nicht notwendigerweise Intervention." (Schubert and Bandelow, 2014, p. 265) In other words meaning that people, despite being affected by politics, do either not show interest in them or do show interest but do not have the means or drive to access politics thus are not able to intervene in them. While some do indirectly access politics, like young people joining Fano, the majority of the population remains politically disengaged.

⁹³Note here that no specification was made towards federal, regional or national borders. The goal was to detect any, if given, discomfort of the current zoning of the Ethiopian state.

⁹⁴A future extension of the survey in the southern regions thus seems reasonable as well.

⁹⁵Reasons were partly addressed in (4.1.3 Survey Insights and Robustness).

How do such results play into the stakeholders' network? It would be easy to assume that the civilian population is simply to be lumped together as one single stakeholder, defenseless and seemingly taking no part in the political system that defines contemporary Ethiopia. Yet this is not the full picture, why so? Ethiopia struggles with high youth unemployment rates and if employed mostly badly paying jobs, the country further boasts a broad young population and still a staggering informal child labour rate of up to 43%. (Ulandssekretariatet, 2024, p. 3) This is part of the reason why militia movements have easy play in hiring young men into the military, sometimes there is no better chance for young Ethiopians as the pay in militias, while also not being high, is the best financial opportunity provided. Even if the pay is on par with other jobs it can be argued that it is enticing to hold a weapon and wield physical power, especially if friends or neighbours joined a movement too. This is how the youth movement Fano got so popular, it actually has many similarities to pathfinder clubs and it resonated with a great many young people across Amhara. The same goes for the successful Oromo youth movement Queerro, despite not officially being militant. Thereby a reasoning behind many joining such movements is not far fetched.

The conflict network can therefore be extended upon a last time by two civilian bodies, the politically engaged population and the disengaged population. The diaspora population body can also play a role, by sending i.e. large sizes of remittances thus changing their home country's economic dynamics or engaging in large protests against their former government. Yet the Ethiopian diaspora mainly does not engage violently in such activities in the countries they are residing in. A different case, where the effects of a diaspora population should be reconsidered in such a network would be the case of Eritrea, where pro- and anti-Afewerki movements frequently clashed in e.g. Germany, Israel or the Netherlands in 2023 and 2024. (Plaut, 2024, para. 8-16). As the civilian bodies do not represent any affiliation they will not be attributed any class, neither will a new one be introduced as the interests of the population are too diverse. The body will be abbreviated with Pop. meaning population.




Figure 8: Conflict-Network 1.6 (Source: Own visualisation)

5. Conclusion and Discussion

This section will start with collecting all findings of the previous sections and further discuss how Ethiopian conflict politics might evolve in the future, especially in the coming years and what lasting effects this evolution might entail.

5.1 Conclusion

To conclude, in going about answering the overarching question this paper proposed, the most efficient way is to partition it into three sections. Firstly, what drives the conflict politics of the novel government of Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed Ali and his Prosperity Party?

The diverse approaches of this paper lead to dissimilar findings. History clearly blames Italian occupation, the previous dictatorship under the Derg regime and the concept of ethnic federalism introduced by Meles, affecting every Ethiopian until today. These influences which shaped Ethiopia into what it is today were not created by the incumbent government and it now has to deal with and try to resolve their lasting influences. The policy analysis finds the government guilty of much too authoritarian policy- and decision-making, sometimes needlessly lashing out against other fractions, with heavy handed reactions against protests or demonstrations and putting civilian lives in harms way. Intend behind this may include to express physical dominance and rule in the nation towards rebellious fractions. Abiy's vision of a greater Ethiopia which will stand at the forefront of Africa, united by Ethiopian ideals through Medemer and wealth have also yet to formalise themselves into clear policies and if the FDRE sets its goals towards emerging as the powerhouse on the continent it has to gain the trust of its neighbours and establish good relations on an international level, a direction in which it is currently not headed with some neighbours or supranational organizations.

On the other hand, since 2018 the Abiy administration has pushed for economic change, aiming to become an attractive investment hub in Eastern Africa and the nation's economic future indeed seems promising as major FDIs and loans, namely by China, alleviated previous international debts. Furthermore, the governments push for a diversified access to the ocean, away from Djiboutian dominance, is also built upon. However to garner more trust among international partners and HROs'/NGOs' ranks the FDRE has to significantly improve its internal human rights situation and address the lingering famine exposure in the north of the country. Further, countrywide peace talks, known as the national dialogue stutter and only show slow to sometimes even no progress. The next national dialogue set for 2024 is not announced yet, but it will give insights into if the FDRE is truly interested in lasting peace and ceasefires with the current militant rebellious actors or if it is more focused on trying to prolong contemporary conflicts to remain present in the regions.⁹⁶ Pioneering energy project like the GERD damming system additionally push for energy independence, key for every industrialized nation in the 21st century.⁹⁷

⁹⁶For up to date information on the next national dialogue, again see the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission website: (Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission, 2024).

⁹⁷For more detailed socioeconomic factors and trends in Ethiopia, see: (Statista, 2024).

Does it actually improve national stability?

The less central and periphrastric regions of the country can be deemed a success story under Abiy. He is the first leader of Ethiopia to include the voices of these regions on a national administrative policy-making level by incorporating most of their smaller parties, normally unsuccessful alone, into the new nation-defining PP. A greater national consensus among Ethiopia's outer regions significantly reduced small and local conflicts. Albeit some sporadic violence remaining, like on the Afar-Somali border or in the Benshangul-Gumuz region, violence levels significantly reduced since. Additionally the diverse peoples' of the SNNPR were allowed referendums for independent regional states, these referendums were overwhelmingly successful. Against this move it can of course be argued that these outer regions perpetually grow more dependent on the state and the PP, thus losing their federal leverage, but as of yet that is something the parties of these regions are willing to trade in for the resulting benefits. If this political alignment and its following peace hold will have to be observed and analysed with time, as of June 2024 the situation remains largely peaceful.

On the other hand Abiy's policies and decisions regarding the central and main regions of the country are much less successful, even if conflict here seemingly was inevitable from a historical point of view. There is little expectation among stakeholders that the national dialogue process will solve Ethiopia's core problems, namely the Fano and OLA insurgency will not be influenced by the national dialogue as the armed groups involved have as of June 2024 not participated and are not likely to do so in the future. Discussions on Ethiopia's future of ethnic federalism are expected to proceed without the involvement of significant groups like the OLA, leading to conclusions that predominantly support the government's perspective. This method may widen the divide between insurgents and supporters of the government, rather than creating a unified stance on essential matters. The ENDF, even after recent reforms, remains the FDRE's principal mechanism for tackling violence from insurgents and other security challenges.

In regards to foreign security it is crucial to mention that some of Ethiopia's neighbours are themselves caught up in deep civil conflicts, always having the potential to spill over into the country, but such developments are not directly attributable to the policy-making of the FDRE. The Ethiopian administration is however accountable for its preemptive and direct approaches towards some of those neighbours. It is testing limits of foreign relations with Egypt, Sudan and Somalia, disregarding treaties in term of the Nile river and downstream water security or the sovereignty of the Somali state by recognizing Somaliland and actively pushing for its independence. Since the end of the Tigray War the FDRE has further remained silent towards its interest in Eritrea, but potential plans of pursuing goals on its border or outright forced annexation are not far fetched or unfeasible in the future.

How do the people of Ethiopia perceive its reformative ideals and consequent actions?

This is the most difficult question posed, as it involves human sentiment towards violence, the answers depend. The rural youth is less open towards the radical reforms of the government, young Oromos especially feel left behind by the novel youngest political head of Ethiopia, who coincidentally is also Oromo. On the contrary Amharas deem the FDRE to be too Oromo-dominated, disregarding Amharic

interests. Further, as Fano attacks Southern Tigray, Tigrayans feel more and more left behind by the ENDF, which promised to upkeep order and safety after TPLF disarmament. Yet the diverse urban population, through findings in the survey, generally seems to accept political reforms by the FDRE which they view as long overdue, despite of these reforms including violent means if people resist their implementation, especially so in the chartered cities AA and DD. The urban population further seems to be willing to follow Abiy, why that is, due to more wealth or more education currently remains unanswered, as the survey did not scrutinize the personal information of participants as it put primary importance on anonymity.⁹⁸ In addition, the diaspora participant population seems to be more distrustful of the current government and media than the mainland population, yet due to the small diaspora sample size of 23 participants this should be taken with high scrutiny.

Another point is the disinterest of many Ethiopians towards their country's war torn status, a great many simply want nothing to do with conflicts or insurgencies happening in a different region and go on to focus on their own life, which is hard to sustain as it is. This reason, despite all other possibilities, may be a stark underlying factor explaining the mediocre success rate of the survey. Survey results further introduced two new stakeholders, the engaged and disengaged civilian population. These bodies seem to strongly affect the concurrent developments of Ethiopia. As with the death of the musician Hachalu Hundessa which caused a lot of politically unaffiliated youths to join the militant OLA or a lot of young Amharas joining the Fano after raids on weapon depots and crackdowns on ASF forces in Gondar and Bahir Dar in Amhara.

The statistical part of the survey also does not reflect this more human aspect of these conflicts. Ethiopia is an acutely complex context to investigate, not least because of multiple and often contradictory allegations from all sides in addition to the commonplace and widespread dissemination of mis- and disinformation, in particular online.⁹⁹ Yet issues of survey validity remain. These issues will become clear when i.e. trying to replicate the survey with the exact same distribution but different sample data, the possibility of reaching a dissimilar result will most likely not be minimal.

5.2 Discussion

What trace do these varying results ultimately leave behind and what other logical reasons did they not address?

It is rather difficult to directly slam the current government and label it as non-functional. While definitely classifying as an authoritarian-ruled government, the case of Ethiopia is much less simple as standard authoritarian regimes with strong control over their sovereign territory like Belarus, Iran or China. It is even arguable that the current state many outer federal regions in Ethiopia find themselves in are the most free and secure they ever have been.

Additionally, while a great many factors influence the government's behaviour towards conflicts in Ethiopia a very unique yet simple factor is overlooked or not respected by many parties. The boredom

⁹⁸What the defining factors are that lead to this perspective should be investigated in future research.

⁹⁹As distrust of media was found to be high in this paper's survey, yet portrayed knowledge of conflicts as very high, further research on media and its influence in Ethiopia is also deemed suitable.

of the average adolescent Ethiopian. This is seen by the examples of continuous struggles by the FDRE to achieve control over or meaningful popularity with Ethiopia's youth, with young people, that consider themselves not heard or respected for, frequently joining militant movements. As the demographic shift in Ethiopia will only increase the percentage of under 30 year old's in the next 20 to 30 years it will become interesting how much these movements can leverage their position or increase their autonomy within the realm of Ethiopia's political framework. As of 2024 youth movements like Fano and Qeerroo are already more important actors in Ethiopia than many official political parties and institutions, significantly altering the nation's entire political landscape. It becomes obvious how much of the role a broad young population, if not presented realistic opportunities by the state, can influence a nation. Nevertheless these movements do not represent actual physical threats to the status quo of the FDRE, as the ENDF outmatch them in all military categories.

Furthermore, divide among several levels in the nation remain prevalent, with subsequent argumentations still portraying an Ethiopia in black and white. How so? The step of acknowledging the suffering and hardships of *others* has been taken but what is lacking is perception. "Their problems are theirs and ours are ours. [...] That's how it has been for long." As per a 49 year old Tigrayan.¹⁰⁰ In other words the government as people alike fraction the nation to establish sides, not necessarily picking one in the process, to in turn adequately make sense of it.

Moreover, what really causes sudden violence of militants and their movements beyond distrust of the government? The reasoning varies, is blurred or often not reasonable at all. After the downfall of one rebel group, another group previously aligned to it may fear of being the next target of the government, thus preemptively striking federal troops, or vice versa the government fears of a possible strike consequently attacking first. While unprecedented violence is very often simplified and just pushed onto the lines of ethnic, religious or cultural divide, especially in complex conflicts along Eastern and Central Africa those reasons do not represent the entire truth.¹⁰¹ More often than not a sudden outbreak of conflict comes down to much more trivial reasons like a group of militants or federal soldiers not receiving their monthly pay, or them thinking not having received their fair share after a harsh battle. Another may be the fear of a few of being punished if they do not attack the by their generals indoctrinated enemies, like a trial of proving one's loyalty. It can further come down to how the pride of a man is damaged in his youth, as many young men in Ethiopia experienced domestic violence or forced labour when growing up.¹⁰² Consequently young men can be eager to join the military or any given militia, as being put in a uniform and being allowed to wield a weapon can be perceived as a from of self-respect or self-emancipation.

In the end it is critical to understand that there is no singular and definitive cause for the wars and conflicts in Ethiopia to prolong and even intensify since the establishment of the modern FDRE in

¹⁰⁰Corresponding Survey: (MN14, question 4.2).

¹⁰¹The best example of such a case is the infamous genocide in Rwanda, here the Hutu majority did not kill the Tutsi minority merely due to the fact that they are of a different ethnicity. Intricate conflicts in the Horn of Africa suffers the same fate of over-simplification.

¹⁰²Domestic violence on and child labour of young males in Ethiopia remains common. (Ulandssekretariatet, 2024, p. 3) The lasting effects on the psyche of these young men is difficult to classify.

1995 and further since Abiy's premiership in 2018. It is a web of intertwining events and reasons inside and around Ethiopia leading to sudden local power surges or detrimental loss of influence. The entire problem sometimes is too rationally approached. It is the combination of multiple of such personal drives, all unique in their own reasoning but necessary from their own perspective, that leads to violence. In the case of modern nations with a broad youth population a young man for instance may go to great lengths to stand out. What may really drive him to take up arms and fight is a combination of potential boredom, opportunism or hopelessness of possibly not receiving any better opportunity at life.

If Abiy however is able to unite the nation and control the popular but unpredictable youth movements, which is a heavy task in itself, nothing stands in his way of expanding Ethiopia. One possible land grab could include significant portions of Sudanese territory from a seriously weakened, war-torn state of Sudan, previously attempted by Fano in the Al-Fashaga region. The more likely scenarios however include either outright buying land and thus access to the sea from Somaliland or invading Eritrea to once again regain control over the long Ethiopian-ruled port of Assab. Not only Abiy and the PP but also Ethiopia's neighbours know just how critical access to the seas truly is in the 21st century and it seems under Abiy Ethiopia will throw everything at trying to achieve it. Most likely in both Somaliland and Eritrea. The potential of Ethiopian expansion under Abiy beyond its current borders seemingly has no limits. If Abiy manages to achieve all these goals the emerging state of Ethiopia would without doubt be the most dominant nation on the African continent once again as under Menelik II, significantly surpassing nations like Nigeria, South Africa or Egypt.

While this may be the best-case scenario for Abiy and his government, it is currently not feasible. The rebellious Fano and OLA as of June 2024 remain strong, dedicated and seem to have no reason to lay down arms or participate in dialogues, fearing the same fate as the TPLF if agreeing to disarmament. Nonetheless, the FDRE will continue to pressure these groups to lay down arms and push for uniting the nation militarily and politically. Ultimately however one has to pose the question at what cost all of it will come, even if Abiy manages to foster a unifying Ethiopian identity and integrate all remaining rebellious fractions. If this task is achieved and the state starts to seriously focus all of Ethiopia's resources outwards, it will most likely start a new conflict with one of its neighbours. As it stands now, while indeed being reformative, the actions of the incumbent government of the FDRE under Abiy's premiership come at a stark toll of hundreds of thousands losing their lives in a matter of just six years. How many more men, women and children will fall for the Ethiopian dream Abiy envisions, only time will tell.

Appendix

Visualisations and Photography




Figure 9: Federal Regions and Zones of Ethiopia (Source: (SUM1 and NordNordWest, 2023))



Figure 10: Prosperity Party Logo (Source: (Prosperity Party, 2020))




Figure 11: Political Violence in Ethiopia (Source: (Ethiopian Peace Observatory, 2024b))




Figure 12: Demographics of Ethiopia as of 2020 (Source: (Sdgedfegw, 2020))




Figure 13: 2021 Ethiopia General Elections (Source: (Ernacios, 2021))




Figure 14: Abyssinia's Increase under Menelik II (Source: (Zheim, 2014))



Figure 15: Eritrean-Ethiopian War Results (Source: (Skilla1st, 2017))



Figure 16: Blue Nile Damming System (Source: (NASA Earth Observatory, 2022))




Figure 17: Medemer Cover (Source: (Ali, 2020))



Figure 18: Ethio-Djibouti Railway Line (Source: (Skilla1st, 2016))



Figure 19: Conduct of Survey Example 1 (Source: Own photography)



Figure 20: Conduct of Survey Example 2 (Source: Own photography)

Replication Data

This paper's survey was not done by order or on behalf of the LMU GSI, the university sigil on the survey represents solely the academic affiliation. The Datasets and do-files for the survey's empirical analysis, as well as the Online appendix, can be found at GitHub in a separate repository:

<https://github.com/Adrian-Brenner-12422308/15135BachelorsThesisBrennerAdrian>

All calculations, models and graphs were conducted using R 4.3.0 with R Studio and/or .SaS with SAS OnDemand for Academics. Pure math on the other hand is directly inserted with LaTeX into the paper. Selected models and pictures are found in an additional Visualisation and Photography section. References towards the given sample survey in usage are always found in an additional footnote.

References

- Abbink, Gerrit Jan, Mirjam De Bruijn, and Klass Van Walraven (2003). *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*. Illustrated. Vol. II. African Dynamics. Brill.
- Abdi Sheikh, Aaron Ross and Giulia Paravicini (2024). *Exclusive: Somalia asks peacekeepers to slow withdrawal, fears Islamist resurgence*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/somalia-asks-peacekeepers-slow-withdrawal-fears-islamist-resurgence-2024-06-20/>.
- Adamu, Faria (2020). *This African Country Has Never Held National Elections*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://theelectionnetwork.com/2020/07/20/this-african-country-has-never-held-national-elections/>.
- Addis Standard (2024). *News: Residents in Merawi town, Amhara region in shock a week after at least 50 people killed in 'execution-style'*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://addisstandard.com/news-residents-in-merawi-town-amhara-region-in-shock-a-week-after-at-least-50-people-killed-in-execution-style/>.
- Africa News (2023). *Ethiopia: Upper House votes to form 12th regional state*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.africanews.com/2023/07/06/ethiopia-upper-house-votes-to-form-12th-regional-state/>.
- African Election Database (2013). *Elections in Ethiopia*. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://africanelections.tripod.com/et.html>.
- Agyeman-Duah, B. (1994). *The United States and Ethiopia: Military Assistance and the Quest for Security, 1953-1993*. Lanham [Md. (USA)] ; London: University Press of America.
- Al Jazeera (2018). "Ethiopia PM: Security agencies committed 'terrorist acts'". In: Accessed: 14.06.2024. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/6/19/ethiopia-pm-security-agencies-committed-terrorist-acts>.
- (2021). *Nine anti-gov't groups team up as Ethiopia recalls ex-soldiers*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/5/nine-anti-abiy-groups-team-up-as-ethiopia-recalls-ex-soldiers>.
- Ali, Abiy Ahmed (2019). *Medemer*. Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers.
- (2020). *Medemer Front*. Accessed: 18.06.2024. URL: <https://www.amazon.com/Medemer-Amharic-Abiy-Ahmed/dp/1599072041>.
- (2023). *Generation Medemer*. Addis Ababa: Tsehai Publishers. URL: <https://ethio.post/product/generation-medemer/>.
- Amnesty International (2014). *UN Human Rights Council, Twenty-sixth Session*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/afr640012014en.pdf>.
- (2019). *BEYOND LAW ENFORCEMENT - HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY ETHIOPIAN SECURITY FORCES IN AMHARA AND OROMIA*. URL: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR2523582020ENGLISH.pdf>.
- Arriola, Leonardo R., Lise Rakner, and Nicolas van de Walle (2022). "Democratic Backsliding in Africa? Autocratization, Resilience, and Contention". In: online edn, Oxford Academic, 19 Jan. 2023. Accessed: 27.05.2024. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: [10.1093/oso/9780192867322.003.0001](https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192867322.003.0001). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192867322.003.0001>.

- Ashine, Surafel Getahun (2024). “Assessment of Foreign Direct Investment Inflows into Ethiopia in Light of Peace and Security Challenges from 2018 to 2022”. In: *Cogent Economics & Finance* 12.1. DOI: [10.1080/23322039.2024.2308670](https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2024.2308670).
- Bach, Jean-Nicolas (2022). *Routledge Handbook of the Horn of Africa*. 1st Edition. London: Routledge. DOI: [10.4324/9780429426957](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429426957).
- Barker, A. J. (1968). *The Civilising Mission: The Italo-Ethiopian War 1935–6*. London: Cassell.
- (1971). *Rape of Ethiopia, 1936*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- BBC News (2016). *Ethiopia 'detains 1,600' under state of emergency*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-37716653>.
- Bearak, Max (2021). *A border war looms between Sudan and Ethiopia as Tigray conflict sends ripples through region*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/03/19/sudan-ethiopia-border-conflict/>.
- Bisi Media (2021). *Why Most African Flags Use the Red, Yellow, and Green Colors?* Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://medium.com/illumination-curated/why-most-african-flags-use-the-red-yellow-and-green-colors-61e90d6164c>.
- Bundesamtes für Migration und Flüchtlinge (2024). *Länderreport 66 Äthiopien - Sicherheitslage Oromia*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Behoerde/Informationszentrum/Laenderreporte/2024/laenderreport-66-Aethiopien.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2.
- Child, David (2019). *Ethiopia's Abiy Wins Nobel Award: How the World Reacted*. Accessed: 14.06.2024. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/11/ethiopia-abiy-wins-nobel-award-how-the-world-reacted>.
- Chisholm, Hugh (1910). “Eritrea”. In: *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 11th. Vol. 9. Cambridge University Press.
- (1911). “Menelek II”. In: *Encyclopædia Britannica*. 11th. Vol. 18. Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham, Christopher (1990). *Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia*. CUP Archive, p. 235.
- Cohen, John M. (1995). “‘Ethnic Federalism’ in Ethiopia”. In: *Michigan State University Press* 2.2, pp. 157–188.
- Dahir, Abdi Latif (2024). *Why a Port Deal Has the Horn of Africa on Edge*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/02/world/africa/ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal.html>.
- Dhaysane, Mohamed (2022). *Ethiopia's Military: 800 Al-Shabab Fighters Killed in Recent Clashes*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/ethiopia-s-military-800-al-shabab-fighters-killed-in-recent-clashes-/6689836.html>.
- Dorosh, Paul and Shahidur Rashid (2012). *Food and Agriculture in Ethiopia: Progress and Policy Challenges*. University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Dye, Thomas S. (1976). *Policy Analysis: What Governments Do, Why They Do It And What Difference It Makes*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
- Endeshaw, Dawit (2023). *Ethiopia to Dismantle Regional Special Forces in Favour of 'Centralized Army'*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-dismantle-regional-special-forces-favour-centralized-army-2023-04-06/>.

- Ernacios (2021). *Own work*. CC BY-SA 4.0. Accessed: 18.06.2024. URL: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=133731642>.
- Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission (2024). *Homepage*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://ethiondc.org.et/en/home/>.
- Ethiopian Peace Observatory (2023). *Afar-Somali Regions Border Conflict*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://epo.acleddata.com/afar-somali-border-conflict/>.
- (2024a). *EPO - Monthly Report April 2024*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://epo.acleddata.com/acleddatanew/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2024/05/image2-6.png>.
- (2024b). *Interactive Map Main Page*. <https://epo.acleddata.com>. Accessed: 07.06.2024.
- Ethiopian Securities Exchange (2024). *Rulebook Draft*. Accessed: 14.06.2024. URL: <https://esxethiopia.com/static/images/rule/file-2024-04-05T07-39-22.112Z-317031898ESXRrulebookDraftApril52024.pdf>.
- Ethiopian Statistics Agency (2007). *Population and Housing Census 2007 – National Statistical*. Accessed: 17.06.2024. URL: https://www.statsethiopia.gov.et/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/National_Statistical.pdf.
- European Parliament (2024). *Expansion of BRICS: A quest for greater global influence?* Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI\(2024\)760368](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_BRI(2024)760368).
- Ewing, William H. and Beyene Abdi (1972). *Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia Vol. I*. Addis Ababa: The Faculty of Law Haile Sellassie I University, pp. 45–46.
- Ezega News (2019). *The EPRDF Officially Ends; The Prosperity Party Begins*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.ezega.com/News/NewsDetails/7599/The-EPRDF-Officially-Ends-The-Prosperity-Party-Begins>.
- Financial Times (2018). *African Union accuses China of hacking headquarters*. Accessed: 06.06.2024. URL: <https://www.ft.com/content/c26a9214-04f2-11e8-9650-9c0ad2d7c5b5>.
- Gardner, Tom (2018). *'Freedom!': the mysterious movement that brought Ethiopia to a standstill*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/mar/13/freedom-oromo-activists-qeerroo-ethiopia-standstill>.
- Gebissa, Ezekiel (1996). “Prowess, Piety and Politics: the Chronicle of Abeto Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia (1909-1930) (review)”. In: *Northeast African Studies* 3.1, pp. 129–131. ISSN: 1535-6574.
- (2022). *The Boomerang Effect: How Political Betrayal Transformed Oromo Youth Protest to Armed Resistance*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://addisstandard.com/op-ed-the-boomerang-effect-how-political-betrayal-transformed-oromo-youth-protest-to-armed-resistance/>.
- Gebreyehu, Temesgen (2010). “The Genesis and Evolution of the Ethiopian Revolution and the Derg: A Note on Publications by Participants in Events”. In: *History in Africa* 37, pp. 321–327. DOI: [10.1353/hia.2010.0035](https://doi.org/10.1353/hia.2010.0035).
- Gill, Peter (2010). *Famine and Foreigners: Ethiopia Since Live Aid*. OUP Oxford.
- Guazzini, Federica (2008). “Review: Paulos Milkias and Getachew Metaferia (edited by), *The Battle of Adwa. Reflections on Ethiopia’s Historic Victory against European Colonialism*”. In: *Aethiopia*

11. Published by Universität Hamburg Asien Afrika Institut, pp. 287–291. ISSN: 1430-1938. URL: <https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/aethiopica/article/view/180/152>.
- Gupta, Vijay (1978). “The Ethiopian Revolution: Causes and Results”. In: *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs* 34.2, pp. 158–174. DOI: [10.1177/097492847803400203](https://doi.org/10.1177/097492847803400203).
- Haber, Lutz (1996). *The Emperor Haile Selassie I in Bath 1936–1940*. Occasional papers, The Anglo-Ethiopian Society. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://anglo-ethiopian.org/publications/articles.php?type=O&reference=publications/occasionalpapers/papers/haileselessiebath.php>.
- Harff, Barbara and Ted Robert Gurr (1988). “Toward an Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides”. In: *International Studies Quarterly* 32.3, pp. 359–371.
- Henze, Paul B. (2000). *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. DOI: [10.1007/978-1-137-11786-1](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-11786-1).
- Human Rights Watch (2024). *Submission to the United Nations Secretary-General on Autonomous Weapons Systems*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/05/06/submission- united-nations-secretary-general-autonomous-weapons-systems>.
- Innocent, Chirisa, Artwell Mumba, and Simbarashe O Dirwai (2014). “A review of the evolution and trajectory of the African Union as an instrument of regional integration”. In: *SpringerPlus* 3, p. 101. DOI: [10.1186/2193-1801-3-101](https://doi.org/10.1186/2193-1801-3-101).
- Irons, Roy (2013). *Churchill and the Mad Mullah of Somaliland: Betrayal and Redemption 1899-1921*. Pen and Sword.
- Jaide, Don (2014). *An Etymology of the word Ras-Tafari – By Ras Naftali*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.africaresource.com/rasta/sesostri-the-great-the-egyptian-hercules/an-etymology-of-the-word-ras-tafari-by-ras-naftali/>.
- Kaledzi, Isaac (2023). *Calm returns to Ethiopia’s Amhara after days of protests*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/calm-returns-to-ethiopia-s-amhara-after-days-of-violent-protests/a-65292356>.
- Keith, Bruce, David Ford, and Radley Horton (2016). “Considerations in managing the fill rate of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Reservoir using a system dynamics approach”. In: *The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation: Applications, Methodology, Technology* 14. DOI: [10.1177/1548512916680780](https://doi.org/10.1177/1548512916680780).
- Keller, Edmond J. (1988). *Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Lasswell, Harold D. (1951). “The Policy-Orientation”. In: *The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method*. Ed. by David Lerner and Harold D. Lasswell. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Law, Ian (2013). *Racism and Ethnicity: Global Debates, Dilemmas, Directions*. Routledge.
- Lefort, René (1983). *Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?* London: Zed Press, p. 260.
- Leiva, Mira (2021). *The state of play: FDI in Ethiopia*. Accessed: 14.06.2024. URL: <https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/features/the-state-of-play-fdi-in-ethiopia/?cf-view>.
- Maasho, Aaron (2018). *Ethiopia opens up telecoms, airline to private, foreign investors*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/ethiopia-privatisation/update-3-ethiopia-opens-up-telecoms-airline-to-private-foreign-investors-idUKL5N1T75Z4/>.

- Maasho, Aaron (2019). *Ethiopia to take stake in Port of Djibouti, its trade gateway*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL8N1S81QA/>.
- Marcus, Harold G. (1987). *Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936*. Red Sea Press. URL: <https://books.google.de/books?id=66aiVck7xIcC>.
- (1995). *The Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia 1844–1913*. Lawrenceville: Red Sea.
- Marcus, Harold G., Donald Edward Crummey, and Assefa Mehretu (2024). *Ethiopia*. Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ethiopia>.
- Maruf, Harun (2022). *Why Did Al-Shabab Attack Inside Ethiopia?* Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.voanews.com/a/why-did-al-shabab-attack-inside-ethiopia/6674783.html>.
- Merid, Takele and Alexander Meckelburg (2024). “Abolitionist Decrees in Ethiopia: The Evolution of Anti-Slavery Legal Strategies from Menilek to Haile Selassie, 1889–1942”. In: *Law and History Review* 42.1, pp. 97–117. DOI: [10.1017/S073824802300055X](https://doi.org/10.1017/S073824802300055X).
- Mersie, Ayenat (2022). *Ethiopia combatants sign deal to start implementing truce*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ethiopia-truce-implementation-start-immediately-mediator-says-2022-11-12/>.
- Metaferia, Getachew (2009). *Ethiopia and the United States: History, Diplomacy, and Analysis*. Algora Publishing.
- Minority Rights Group International (2014). *Ethiopia’s ‘Master Plan’ – good for development, damaging for minorities*. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://minorityrights.org/ethiopias-master-plan-good-for-development-damaging-for-minorities/>.
- Mockler, Anthony (2002). *Haile Sellassie’s War*. New York: Olive Branch Press.
- Mumbere, Daniel (2018). *Ethiopia PM wants a more professional army, equipped for modern warfare*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.africanews.com/2018/06/02/ethiopia-pm-wants-a-more-professional-army-equipped-for-modern-warfare/>.
- NASA Earth Observatory (2022). *Images, using data from the Level-1 and Atmosphere Archive & Distribution System (LAADS)*. Accessed: 18.06.2024. URL: <https://landsat.visibleearth.nasa.gov/view.php?id=149691>.
- National Election Board of Ethiopia (2015). *Official Results of the 24th May 2015 General Elections*. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://web.archive.org/web/20160305154240/http://electionethiopia.org/en/home.html>.
- Nicolle, David (1997). *The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia 1935–1936*. Westminster, MD: Osprey.
- Office of Press Relations (2023). *Pause on U.S. Food Aid in Tigray, Ethiopia*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/may-03-2023-pause-us-food-aid-tigray-ethiopia>.
- OLF (2000). *Letter from the Oromo Communities in North America to H.E. Mr. Kofi Anan, Secretary-General of the United Nations*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: https://archive.ph/20120905203327/http://www.romia.org/Letter_to_UN.htm.
- Omna Tigray (2021). *Foreign Involvement in the War on Tigray*. Accessed: 06.06.2024. URL: <https://omnatigray.org/foreign-involvement-in-the-war-on-tigray/>.
- Oxfam (2024). *Out of sight: Displacement and survival in Gambella, Ethiopia*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.oxfam.org/en/blogs/out-sight-displacement-and-survival-gambella-ethiopia>.

- Pankhurst, Richard (1968). *Economic History of Ethiopia*. Addis Ababa: Haile Selassie I University.
- Papp, Daniel S. (1979). "The Soviet Union and Cuba in Ethiopia". In: *Current History* 76.445, pp. 110–130. DOI: [10.1525/curh.1979.76.445.110](https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.1979.76.445.110).
- Paravicini, Giulia (2020). *Ethiopia's Tigray holds regional election in defiance of federal government*. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-politics-idUSKBN25Z35S>. Accessed: 17.06.2024.
- Plaut, Martin (2024). *Netherlands: Another Eritrean clash: This time in the Hague*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://martinplaut.com/2024/02/17/netherlands-another-eritrean-clash-this-time-in-the-hague/>.
- Prosperity Party (2020). *Logo of the Prosperity Party*. <https://www.facebook.com/prosperitypartypage>. Accessed: 19.06.2024.
- Qeerroo (2022). *Qeerroo. The National Youth Movement for Freedom and Democracy*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://qeerroo.org>.
- Reuters (2020). *Timeline: Key events leading to Ethiopia's crisis in Tigray*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN27M1O9/>.
- (2022). *Reaction to agreement on cessation of hostilities in Tigray*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/reaction-agreement-cessation-hostilities-tigray-2022-11-02/>.
- (2024). *IMF ends Ethiopia visit, deal not yet secured*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/imf-ends-ethiopia-visit-deal-not-yet-secured-2024-04-02/>.
- Sanches, Edalina Rodrigues (2022). *Popular Protest, Political Opportunities, and Change in Africa*. Taylor & Francis.
- Schubert, Klaus and Nils C. Bandelow (2014). *Lehrbuch der Politikfeldanalyse*. Berlin, München, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg. DOI: [10.1515/9783110408072](https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110408072). URL: <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110408072>.
- Sdgedfegw (2020). *Own work*. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=99605034>. CC BY-SA 4.0. Accessed: 18.06.2024.
- Shinn, David H. and Thomas P. Ofcansky (2013). *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*. Scarecrow Press.
- Shinn, David Hamilton, Thomas P. Ofcansky, and Chris Prouty (2004). *Historical Dictionary of Ethiopia*. Scarecrow Press.
- Skilla1st (2016). *Own work*. CC BY-SA 4.0, 18.06.2024. URL: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=49435448>.
- (2017). *Own work using: Eritrea location map.svg by NordNordWest*. CC BY-SA 3.0. Accessed: 18.06.2024. URL: <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=25055977>.
- Stanghellini, Alexandra (2023). *Somalia: A Failed State?* Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://catalystmcgill.com/somalia-a-failed-state/>.
- Statista (2024). *Socioeconomic Indicators - Ethiopia*. Accessed: 17.06.2024. URL: <https://www.statista.com/outlook/co/socioeconomic-indicators/ethiopia>.
- SUM1 and NordNordWest (2023). *Created from File:Ethiopia adm location map.svg by User:NordNordWest*. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=60779304>. CC BY-SA 4.0. Accessed: 19.06.2024.

- Tesfu, Julianna (2008). *Empress Zewditu (1876-1930)*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.blackpast.org/global-african-history/empress-zewditu-1876-1930/>.
- The Africa Report (2023). *Will the Fano drag Ethiopia back into civil war?* Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.theafricareport.com/322001/ethiopia-understanding-the-fano-and-the-fate-of-amhara/>.
- The Guardian (2021). *Ethiopia rejects calls for ceasefire in Tigray, claiming victory is near*. Accessed: 06.06.2024. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/03/ethiopia-rejects-calls-for-ceasefire-in-tigray-claiming-victory-is-near>.
- (2024). *At the door of death': desperation in Ethiopia as hunger crisis deepens*. Accessed: 19.06.2024. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2024/feb/09/tigray-ethiopia-war-drought-aid-suspended-hunger-crisis-death-desperation>.
- The New York Times (Dec. 15, 1994). "Ex-Rulers of Ethiopia Charged With Strangling Haile Selassie". In: URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/1994/12/15/world/ex-rulers-of-ethiopia-charged-with-strangling-haile-selassie.html>.
- Tibebu, Teshale (1995). *The Making of Modern Ethiopia 1896-1974*. Red Sea Press.
- Ulandssekretariatet (2024). *LABOUR MARKET PROFILE Ethiopia 2024/2025*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Ethiopia-LMP-2024-final.pdf>.
- UNHCR (2023). *In Ethiopia, UNHCR's Grandi urges more support for people fleeing Sudan*. Accessed: 21.06.2024. URL: <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/ethiopia-unhcr-s-grandi-urges-more-support-people-fleeing-sudan>.
- United Nations (1993). *Report of the Secretary-General on UNOVER [United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea]*. A/48/283. United Nations. URL: <https://undocs.org/A/48/283> (visited on 06/17/2024).
- (2000). *A/55/686-S/2000/1183 (Agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia)*. United Nations Peacemaker. Accessed 7 May 2024. URL: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ER%20ET_001212_AgreementEritreaEthiopia.pdf.
- United Nations Development Programme (1995). *Monthly Situation Report for Ethiopia May 1995*. Accessed: 22.06.2024. URL: https://www.africa.upenn.edu/eue_web/strp0595.htm.
- UNOCHA (2024). *Ethiopia - Situation Report, 1 March 2024*. Accessed: 29.05.2024. URL: <https://www.unocha.org/attachments/8e869f73-5f30-478b-b04b-7b5e3f4299f8/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20-%202016%20Feb%202024.pdf>.
- Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2024). *Eritrea-Ethiopia Conflict*. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/409>.
- US Department of State (2023). *2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ethiopia/>.
- Waal, Alex de (1991). *Evil Days: Thirty Years of War and Famine in Ethiopia*. New York & London: Human Rights Watch.

- Williams, Paul D. (2024). *The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/>.
- WIPO (1995). *Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/7438>.
- World Bank Group (2024). *Population growth (annual) - Ethiopia*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW?locations=ET>.
- World Food Programme (2023). *WFP Statement on Diversion of Food Aid in Ethiopia*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. URL: <https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-statement-diversion-food-aid-ethiopia-0>.
- Yibelta, Kalkidan (2018). *Ethiopia PM Hailemariam Desalegn in surprise resignation*. Accessed: 27.05.2024. BBC Amharic Service. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-43073285>.
- (2023). *Why is Egypt worried about Ethiopia's dam on the Nile?* Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-66776733>.
- (2024). *Ethiopia signs agreement with Somaliland paving way to sea access*. Accessed: 03.06.2024. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67858566>.
- Yimer, Nigusu Adem (2021). *How Djibouti Surrounded Itself by Military Bases*. Accessed: 08.06.2024. URL: <https://politicstoday.org/djibouti-surrounded-by-military-bases-of-china-us-france-uk-germany-others/>.
- Zewde, Bahru (2002). *A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855–1991*. Ohio University Press.
- Zheim (2014). *This file was derived from: Menelik campaign map 3 3.jpg*. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=81603450>. CC BY-SA 3.0. Accessed: 18.06.2024.
- Zulu, Blessing (2022). *Zimbabwe Willing to Extradite Mengistu, Vows to Investigate How Late Rwandan Fugitive Mpiranya 'Evaded Capture for Years'*. VOA Zimbabwe. Accessed: 12.06.2024. URL: <https://www.voazimbabwe.com/a/6577243.html>.