ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1627-800X
(2024):
Probabilistically coherent credences despite opacity.
In: Economics and Philosophy, Vol. 40, No. 2: pp. 497-506
[PDF, 154kB]

Abstract
Real human agents, even when they are rational by everyday standards, sometimes assign different credences to objectively equivalent statements, such as ‘Orwell is a writer’ and ‘E.A. Blair is a writer’, or credences less than 1 to necessarily true statements, such as not-yet-proven theorems of arithmetic. Anna Mahtani calls this the phenomenon of ‘opacity’. Opaque credences seem probabilistically incoherent, which goes against a key modelling assumption of probability theory. I sketch a modelling strategy for capturing opaque credence assignments without abandoning probabilistic coherence. I draw on ideas from judgement-aggregation theory, where we face similar challenges of defining the ‘objects of judgement’.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 160 Logic |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-122121-4 |
ISSN: | 0266-2671 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 122121 |
Date Deposited: | 05. Nov 2024 15:11 |
Last Modified: | 05. Nov 2024 15:11 |