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

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Abstract

Since the advent of digitalisation, the media have had an increasing influence on the international information situation and thus on public opinion. Every day, headlines report on crises and conflicts around the world, sparking intense political debates in our everyday lives. Since 1851, The New York Times has played a key role in shaping these discussions in the U.S., reporting on major national and international events and offering real-time coverage of political conflicts that demand a response from the U.S. government.

This interplay between media coverage and political decision-making raises an important question: To what extent is the U.S. foreign policy shaped by media reporting?

This bachelor thesis analyses whether media coverage is an influential factor in foreign policy decision-making with regard to humanitarian military (non-)intervention in genocides. Through a case comparison of Rwanda (1994) and Kosovo (1999) — two starkly contrasting instances of international response — the analysis focuses on the use of media frames in newspaper articles in the New York Times and in political discourse. The use of media frames in newspaper articles in the New York Times and in political discourses will be analysed. The results are then compared. It becomes clear that the media is an influential factor in foreign policy intervention decisions.

1. Introduction

1.1. ‘Never Again’?

'NEVER AGAIN' was written on signs held up by survivors of the Buchenwald concentration camp in April 1945 (Totten, 2016, 197). Similarly, 'the international community vowed never again to allow atrocities like those of [World War II] happen again' (United Nations, 2008), creating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Genocide Convention, which entered into force in 1951.

However, the post-Cold War era was marked by an era of suffering caused by internal conflicts, which posed new challenges to the international community. (Donnelly, 2002, 100). So how much initiative on the part of states and coalitions of states is there in 'Never Again'?

The Nuremberg Trials (1945-1946) laid the foundation for the prevention and prohibition of such crimes in the future (Power, 2001). The U.S. took a leading role in the fight against genocide. The negotiations for the creation and development of the Genocide Convention were promoted by the presiding U.S. President Truman (Truman, 1949). Truman's successors also made 'Never Again' their mission. For example, Jimmy Carter (39th U.S. President) promised 'that never again will the world stand silent, never again will the world look the other way or fail to act in time to prevent […] genocide ' (Carter, 1979) and Ronald Reagan (40th U.S. President) repeated the pledge in 1985 (Reagan, 1985).

The presidency of U.S. President William Jefferson 'Bill' Clinton (1993-2001) was marked by humanitarian disasters that challenged the grand promise of 'Never Again' that had been reaffirmed throughout his presidency.[1]

A discrepancy was identified: while the USA initially demonstrated a reluctance to engage their military in response to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, ultimately declining to intervene, it opted in 1999 for an expeditious humanitarian military intervention in the Kosovo conflict.

[1] References to conflicts in Somalia (1992-1993), Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1992-1995) and Kosovo (1998-1999).

If one is aware that

- both cases involved significant human rights violations, including instances of genocide;
- Western states and the USA were politically and morally involved in both situations. They were aware of the extent of the violence and were under international pressure to react. It was hardly possible to look away;
- it is evident that the military and economic resources of the West, and the USA in particular, could have played a pivotal role in both cases;
- neither Rwanda nor Kosovo were major powers or strategic key players, and thus the geopolitical risks and military consequences of an intervention would have remained manageable for the USA; furthermore,
- the timing of these events, occurring during the same U.S. administration under President Clinton, may be seen as indicative of a consistent foreign policy.

The question thus arises as to what factors may have shaped the Clinton administration's decision regarding the deployment of military forces.

This work draws on the theories of liberalism and analyses the influence of media coverage on the government's foreign policy decision-making. This phenomenon is referred to as the 'CNN effect' (Jakobsen, 2000, 131). The paper analyses the CNN effect on the U.S. government in 1994 and 1999, using Piers Robinson's (1999) Media Policy Interaction Model.

The media coverage of the genocide in Rwanda and the crisis in Kosovo is analysed in order to identify the frames are implemented in relation to the question of humanitarian military intervention. Frames refer to the selection of specific issues, terms, and perspectives that set priorities in the coverage. This way, pro-frames supporting military intervention and contra-frames opposing it can be identified.

In the second phase of the study, the political discourse is analysed to ascertain whether and to what extent the previously identified frames are present in the political decision-making process. A comparison of the results of the coverage analysis with the policy discourse analysis

and a final comparison of the two case studies allows us to examine whether and to what extent the media shaped the U.S. government's decision-making process.

The findings of this thesis are consistent with the hypothesis that, in the context of policy uncertainty, the US government's decision-making process is shaped by a tendency to frame the issue in a way that supports intervention.

The response to the research question provides insight into understanding one of the possible factors that explains why decisions are made for or against humanitarian military intervention in comparable international crises. The issue of humanitarian military intervention is a prominent topic in the context of the numerous global political conflicts currently unfolding. One example is the Russia-Ukraine conflict (LTO, 2022).

Furthermore, this work has the potential to enhance our comprehension of the processes through which political decision-makers typically arrive at their decisions.

For those engaged in the field of political science, this work could provide a foundation for more sophisticated analysis of future developments, the formulation of recommendations, and a more informed review of past events.

At the same time, it sheds light on the role of the media, whose influence could in future be reflected more by decision-makers, the public and journalists themselves.

The methodology can be applied to research focus on other areas. It would be beneficial to explore how influencing factors (e.g. social media, social movements) shape public opinion. Potential topics for investigation could include, for example, health crises such as the corona pandemic or other topics in public discourse.

In the context of liberalist theory, the media can be considered as an influential actor, yet it is also part of a complex network of domestic influences (Jakobsen, 2000, 131). This must be taken into account when categorising the results.

1.2. State of Research & Research Gap

A number of studies have attempted to examine the influence of the media in the context of humanitarian military intervention and to answer the question of the media's influence on political decision-makers.

The studies conducted by Larry Minear et al. (1996), Warren Strobel (1997) and Nik Gowing (1994) employ interviews whose results are not sufficiently reliable due to a lack of standardisation (Robinson, 1999, 304). The question whether the media can shape the decision in favour of or against humanitarian military intervention, and whether they represent an influencing factor at all, remains a 'black box'.

Strobel presents a contradictory argument. On the one hand he mentions the conviction that the media can have a 'decided effect' on foreign policy decisions, on the other hand he states that there is 'little evidence of a push [...] nor is there evidence of a pull effect' (Strobel, 1997, 219 and 211).

Lance Bennett (1990) argues that media coverage often follows the debates and conflicts within government (Bennett, 1990, 103-125) and that when there is disagreement among the political elite, there is critical coverage of policy. This theory is also supported by Daniel Hallin (1993, 51-57). Robinson (2000) defines such an elite as comprising, executive, legislative and foreign policy advisors (Robinson, 2000, 615). If executives have already planned a firm course, any critical coverage will not be able to shape the policy direction. This is because a reasonably balanced relationship with critical coverage prevails (Robinson, 2000, 614-615). Bennett (1990) and Hallin (1993), who both describe the coverage of disagreement among the elite as defined in their studies, do not mention any conditions of critical media coverage that could shape political decision-making.

Martin Shaw (1996) uses a case study to analyse whether media coverage forced the government to intervene in a humanitarian way. In his study, Shaw describes what is known as 'media framing': the selection of certain issues. Terms and perspectives set priorities in coverage. These in turn influence how people understand a new issue. Interpretations and opinions can be 'framed' in this way (Shaw, 1996, 79). Shaw's work shows that media reports are not purely objective in their coverage of events but are characterised by emotional and illustrative representations that can have political effects by building up pressure on the government to 'do something' (Robinson, 1999, 306). As also criticised by Robinson (Robinson, 1999, 306), Shaw limits his analysis to media coverage and places little emphasis on the political decision-making process that takes place. The question is of how exactly the media may have shaped political decision-makers and whether media coverage was actually a significant framing factor. More in-depth analysis is needed to better categorise the real importance of the media in the political process.

In their 1995 case study, Livingston and Eachus (1995, 413-429) employ an analytical approach to examine the political process, specifically focusing on the examination of official statements. The research question asks about the controller of media coverage. It is commonly accepted that the media exerts a significant influence on political processes and outcomes. This evidence is insufficient to prove the actual influence of media coverage on humanitarian intervention. It is of great importance to consider comparable cases in which the media report on crises and U.S. foreign policy decides in favour of humanitarian military intervention on one occasion (Kosovo, 1999) and against it on another (Rwanda, 1994). As Robinson (1999, 307) also observed, the question remains as to why different decisions are made in despite of media coverage and comparable situations.

This paper addresses the beforementioned criticism and examines whether the media have an impact on decision-making, assuming that media coverage is framed and that there is political uncertainty. The political process is taken into account by analysing the discourse.

2. Theory

2.1. Liberalism and the CNN Effect Theory

The liberal theory of international relations argues that states do not pursue fixed, immutable national interests. Instead, governments act in a complex social and political context that is strongly influenced by social actors. These actors may include interest groups, political parties or public opinion. The preferences of governments are therefore shaped by social and political dynamics, which means that government decisions often reflect the interests and influences of these social actors. Although governments officially act on behalf of the state, their policy decisions often reflect the social and political forces at work in society (Auth, 2015, 157). These forces may include the media.

Technological progress has given the media new powers. A 'real-time transmission' of events can be generated (Robinson, 1999, 301). By reporting in real time, journalists can put pressure on the government more quickly and provoke reactions to political events. This phenomenon is called the 'CNN effect' (Jakobsen, 2000, 131). The name first appeared in the late 1990s, coinciding with the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and the Gulf War in 1991. During these times, the US media network ‘Cable News Network’ (CNN) reported on these events in great detail, and the first 'real-time broadcasts' of remote political events were created (Lawrence, 2019).

The CNN effect is based on the theory of liberalism and claims that 'the news can make policy' (Robinson, 1999, 303).

2.2. The Media-Policy Interaction Model proposed by Robinson (1999)

Previous approaches that attempt to explain the research question (see 1.2) open up valuable perspectives for answering the research question.

Robinson (1999) proposes the so-called Theoretical Media-Policy Interaction Model. According to this model, media coverage can only shape political decision-making if (1) the executive is uncertain about how to respond to a particular crisis (so-called policy uncertainty as already identified by Gowing, Strobel and Minear et al.) and (2) the media coverage is characterised by a specific media framing as identified by Shaw (see 1.2) (Robinson, 1999, 307-309).

It is necessary that beforementioned conditions are considered. When the government is uncertain about a specific political direction, there are no clear guidelines for the media, which means that a plan of action cannot be clearly controlled. Only in this context can journalists criticise the government's indecision and indirectly increase the pressure on certain decisions, which is known as the CNN effect (see 2.1).

3. Method

3.1. Research Design

This paper is based on Robinson's approach (see 2.2).

The model is based on the ‘scope condition’ that governments often face policy uncertainty in genocide due to the complexity and scale of such events (see 2.2) - an almost natural condition given the ethical, political and practical challenges. Consequently, the analysis is limited to the examination of media frames, which makes the model particularly advantageous.

Assuming that the theoretical model of media-policy interaction works, the following hypothesis can be made:

> *In the presence of political uncertainty regarding a humanitarian military intervention, the U.S. government's decision to intervene will be shaped by positive framing (A) (B: by*

negative framing) to the effect that the decision will be made in favour of intervention (A)(B: against intervention).

This results in the dependent variable: decision in favour (A) of a humanitarian military intervention (B: decision against a humanitarian military intervention) and the independent variable: positive media framing (A) (B: negative media framing).

The hypothesis will be tested through a case comparison analysis of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the 1999 genocide in Kosovo.

3.2. Definitions

3.2.1. Humanitarian Military Intervention

The term 'humanitarian military intervention' is not clearly defined.

‘Intervention' basically means extraterritorial intervention, usually without the consent of the territorial power. There is a spectrum of intervention intensity, ranging from less invasive measures such as diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions to full-scale military interventions (ICISS, 2001; Bellamy, 2011, 4-11). At the upper end of this spectrum there are military interventions involving the use of targeted force, such as air strikes or ground troops. This type of intervention is considered intensive because it involves the direct use of military force in a sovereign state to end human suffering and protect civilians.

The concept of 'humanitarian' intervention is generally agreed to encompass the use of force by one or more actors without the consent of the affected territorial power. Its purpose is to prevent or halt serious humanitarian crimes, particularly those directed against civilian populations (Holzgrefe, 2003.,18; Kapur, 2006, 98; Choi, 2013, 123). The protection of civilians is a key consideration when the government in question is unable or unwilling to take action itself. In such instances, military force is generally employed as a last resort (ICISS, 2001).

The defining feature of humanitarian military intervention is the level of force employed and the humanitarian rationale that justifies the use of military action.

A clear distinction between large-scale military interventions and small-scale border conflicts or sporadic exchanges of fire is important. This prevents confusion between the consequences

of limited border casualties or paramilitary operations and the effects of large-scale military interventions. Actions by border guards or police forces are not defined as 'military operations' (Choi, 2013, 123).

For the sake of clarity, this paper follows Kapur's (2006, 98) view that military force is only considered as such when at least 1,000 troops enter the territory of another state. Air and naval operations are also included as part of the intervention. Humanitarian objectives are pursued when the physical, political or economic well-being of the local civilian population is or should be protected.

3.2.2. Genocide

Genocide is a much debated political and legal term (Schabas, 2009, 123).

The law defines genocide as 'act[s] committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical or religious group [...]' (Genocide Convention, 1951, Art. II). The term genocide had already been used synonymously with crimes against humanity during the preparations for the Nuremberg trials, and the term was also used repeatedly by the prosecutors during the trials, but it never made it into the Charter of the International Military Tribunal due to legal interpretation concerns (Schabas, 2009, 125-126). The recognition of genocide as an international crime and its codification in the 1948 UN Convention (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide) is a kind of initiative to keep the promise of 'Never Again' and to correct 'Nuremberg's failure' by recognising the 'international criminality of atrocities committed in peacetime' as punishable international crimes (Schabas, 2009, 128).

Given the ongoing controversy surrounding the concept of genocide and the multitude of interpretations that exist, it is logical to extend this analysis to the phenomenon of 'ethnic cleansing'. This practice is increasingly regarded as a phenomenon of genocide.

The UN Commission of Experts, commissioned by the Security Council, stated that 'ethnic cleansing means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area. [It] is contrary to international law' (United Nation’s Commission of Experts, 1992). Like genocide, ethnic cleansing requires planning and organisation of the act (Lieberman, 2012, 45-46). Lieberman clarifies that although ethnic cleansing and genocide differ in their ultimate goal, the two forms of violence often merge,

meaning that ethnic cleansing can lead to genocide. Thus, when 'high morality through deportation or expulsion is predictable, intended, and expected', one should speak of both, or even only of genocide (Lieberman, 2012, 45).

Ruben Reike et al. (2013, 6) have identified reliable risk factors for genocide that have been consistently confirmed in various studies. These factors usually operate in combination and in varying degrees, including (1) economic or social instability that fosters violence and weakens state action, (2) ideological group segregation that morally justifies violence, and (3) a history of previous atrocities.

Alex J. Bellamy (2011, 12) added four 'red flags': (4) civil wars and broken peace agreements, (5) unconstitutional regime changes, (6) failing states with low legitimacy, and (7) radical revolutionary governments with ideological controversies.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to adopt the definition of genocide proposed by Barbara Harff (2003, 58) in this paper. Her definition accurately summarises the preceding version: 'Genocides […] are the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group' (Harff, 2003, 58).

3.2.3. Media Framing

The term 'media framing' refers to the process by which media coverage is designed to shape the recipient's (reader, television audience, etc.) perception of an event in a specific direction (Entman, 1991, 6-27). This is achieved through the use of a selection of keywords, images, as well as linguistic, visual and content-related design elements. Facts are typically presented in a manner that emphasises one aspect while neglecting others, thereby guiding the recipient's understanding.

To receive a sense of empathy the use of images or words by the media is employed. An illustration of this can be observed in the depiction of children in war zones (Van der Gaag & Nash, 1987, 28-30). Robinson (2000) refers to this type of framing as 'empathy framing'.

Robinson (2000) refers to 'distance framing' in coverage that focuses on factual, low-emotion communication. The objective here is to utilise a sober, often analytical interpretation to

encourage recipients to adopt a passive observational stance rather than an active one. Instead of children, destroyed buildings are shown. The vocabulary employed is sober: the film refers to the 'affected civilian population'.

This paper distinguishes between 'empathy framing' as so-called pro-military intervention framing (pro-frames) and 'distance framing' as so-called contra-military intervention framing (contra-frames).

Contra-framing includes 'cost-benefit framing', where attention is drawn to possible negative consequences such as high costs, resource consumption and risks of humanitarian military intervention. The plight of the civilian population is recognised, but the emphasis on the risks to one's own population - such as casualties among soldiers or high investments in weapons - promotes a negative attitude towards interventions.

3.3. Selection of Cases

3.3.1. Rwanda, 1994

Since the end of colonialism, there has been strong tension between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in Rwanda. While the colonial powers, particularly Belgium (Des Forges, 1999, 36), strongly favoured the Tutsi ethnic minority and oppressed the Hutu majority until July 1st, 1962, the 1959-1962 revolution led to a change of government. Since then, the Hutu population has ruled. The Tutsi were severely discriminated during the first two 'Hutu republics'[2] (Melvern, 2000, 17-18). Between December 1963 and January 1964, many Tutsi political opponents were killed. In addition, some 300,000 fled across the country's borders (Melvern, 2004, 8; Des Forges, 1999, 40). At the end of the 1980s, Rwanda suffered a political and economic crisis (Chrétien, 2003, 413; Uvin, 1997, 108), which also affected Habyarimana's one-party regime (Des Forges, 1999, 40). In 1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up mainly of Tutsi refugees, launched an attack. Its aim was to overthrow the regime and bring back the Tutsi refugees. Three years of civil war followed. Peace talks were held in 1992, and the Arusha Agreement provided for power-sharing between the RPF and the Hutu government. Other international actors and states also tried to reach a peace agreement between the war parties. Tanzania mediated between the parties, but the United Nations also provided observers and implemented the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR peacekeeping

[2] G. Kayibanda, J. Habyarimana.

mission) to achieve stability (Spelten, 1994, 119-120). Western countries such as France and the United States supported the negotiations. Despite the Arusha Agreement, the extremist Hutu government refused to share power. Tensions between the groups continued to rise.

On April 6th, 1994, President Habyarimana's plane, carrying him and Burundian President C. Ntaryamira, was shot down. A few hours after the crash, the Hutu began a systematic and planned killing of Tutsis. The death of President Habyarimana became the public catalyser or the planned attack on the Tutsi. Within 100 days, an estimated 800,000 people were killed (Harding, 2012, 61).

3.3.2. Kosovo, 1999

In the early 1990s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consisted of a patchwork of six republics - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia. Kosovo and Vojvodina were autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia. Because of the different republics, the former Yugoslavia was home to a wide variety of ethnic groups. This led to a political and economic crisis and a rise in nationalism. More and more political voices called for the independence of each republic, or at least for greater autonomy. Slovenia's first declaration of independence followed on June 25th, 1991. Croatia also declared independence on June 25th, 1991. However, there was a protesting Serbian minority in Croatia, which meant that the whole of Croatia did not achieve independence until 1998 with the help of the UN. In 1992, the fight for independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina continued until 1995. (The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2017).

In 1998-1999, a war of independence broke out in Kosovo. It was triggered by the decision of the incumbent Yugoslav Prime Minister Slobodan Milošević to abolish the autonomy of Kosovo (and Vojvodina)(Maliqi, 1999, 121-127).

There were already tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. Their roots go back to the Middle Ages. After the end of the Ottoman rule in 1912, Kosovo was incorporated into the Serbian Kingdom. This in turn led to conflicts between a Serbian minority and the Albanian majority in Kosovo (Maliqi, 1999, 121-127).

Due to growing nationalism, a new Yugoslav constitution was adopted in 1974 under Josip Broz Tito, which gave Kosovo more autonomy (Melčić, 1999, 221).

This autonomy was taken away in 1989 (see above) and the political, social, economic and cultural exclusion of the Albanians followed. War broke out between the Yugoslav army, Serbian paramilitary forces and the Kosovo Albanian Liberation Army (UÇK). In February 1999, the so-called Rambouillet negotiations supported by international states began. These talks aimed to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict by proposing a peace agreement that included granting substantial autonomy to Kosovo while keeping it as part of Serbia, along with provisions for NATO peacekeeping forces in the region. The peace negotiations failed and on March 24th, 1999, NATO launched military air strikes (Vetter, 1999, 566).

3.3.3. Suitability of Selected Cases

A comparative analysis of the circumstances in Rwanda and Kosovo with the risk factors identified by Reike and Bellamy and the Harff definition (see 3.2.2) reveals that the two situations are comparable.

In both cases, economic instability and political failure led to increased violence: in Rwanda, the conflict escalated due to political crises and the colonial history with Belgium; in Kosovo, the Kosovo Albanians were deprived of autonomy despite being the majority (1). Ideological divisions intensified the violence: in Rwanda, Belgian colonial policies fueled hatred between Hutu and Tutsi; in Kosovo, the Serbian government exploited the ethnic division (2). A history of previous atrocities, such as the massacres in Rwanda and the ethnic conflicts in Kosovo, contributed to the escalation (3). The failure of the Rambouillet-Agreement and the rejection of power-sharing in Rwanda exacerbated the conflicts (4, 5). Both states suffered from low legitimacy, with Rwanda weakened by ethnic tensions and Kosovo by the disintegration of Yugoslavia (6). Finally, in both cases, authoritarian leadership legitimised ethnic violence (7).

In Rwanda, genocide was perpetrated by the Hutu government in 1994 through targeted massacres of Tutsis, which clearly meets Harff's definition of genocide as the destruction of an ethnic, political or politicised group (Harff, 2003, 58). In Kosovo, the Serbian government under Milošević also carried out the targeted destruction and expulsion of an ethnic group through systematic expulsions, massacres and ethnic cleansing against the Kosovo Albanians. These actions are comparable.

3.4. Approach and Expected Results

The initial stage of the study involves an examination of the New York Times' coverage of both cases in the media. At the time of the events under analysis (1994, 1999), the New York Times was a mainstream media outlet (Kenix, 2011, 105).

The term 'mainstream media' is used to describe a particular type of media outlet that is dominant, widely distributed, and commercially oriented. These media outlets tend to reflect the perspectives and interests of the social majority or ruling elites and are often well-funded and able to reach a large audience (Kenix, 2011, 105; Rauch, 2016, 758).

The analysis of mainstream media avoids the analytical deficit that the media reports represent a certain political colouring. Diverse types of publications about the New York Times are included in the analysis, as this allows for the capture of diverse discourses, perspectives and analytical approaches.[3]

The starting point for the coverage analysis of the Rwanda case is the shooting down of the plane on April 6th, 1994. This starting point is appropriate because it is regarded as the immediate trigger for the genocide in Rwanda (Des Forges, 1999, 6). The final point of analysis is dated April 21st, 1994, at which point there was a 'window of opportunity to deploy a force offering success did exist [because the] political leaders of the violence were still susceptible to international influence' (Feil, 1998, 20). The first article analysed is from April 7th, 1994, and the last from April 22nd, 1994. Our own research has shown that articles in the New York Times regularly report on the previous day. Thus, reports on the events of April 21st, 1994, are still included in the analysis. A total of 28 newspaper articles are analysed for the case of Rwanda.[4]

The Račak massacre of January 15th ,1999 is defined as the starting point for the Kosovo case. It is considered a key event because it drew the world's attention to the conflict situation. The

[3] Student access to the Nexis platform was used to select the articles. It can be filtered by the newspaper 'The New York Times' and by dates (start and end points defined in each case). In addition, the archive ('Times Machine') is used because the page numbers and dates stated in Nexis are not complete and correct. Additionally, the layouts are easier to follow.

[4] A comprehensive index of all New York Times articles subjected to analysis for the Rwanda case study can be found in ANNEX A.

end point of the analysis is March 24th, 1999, because this is the date on which the U.S.-led NATO intervention began and the decision to intervene was made (NATO, 2024; VOA, 2024).

The Kosovo conflict endured for a longer period of time than the Rwandan genocide. It is therefore impractical to analyse all newspaper articles from the beforementioned starting point in Kosovo to the military intervention, given the considerable volume of material. Instead, the analysis will concentrate on a number of selected key events. This approach allows proceeding from the initial stages of the decision to intervene militarily to the set endpoint, presented in clearly defined phases. It enables a direct comparison with the analysis of the Rwanda case. All the articles published in the New York Times on January 16th, 1999, and in the three days that followed (*Phase 1*) were included in the analysis.

The negotiations for the so-called Rambouillet-Agreement played a central role in the 1999 Kosovo conflict. The aim was to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Negotiations began on February 6th, 1999, were suspended on February 23rd, 1999, and resumed on March 15th, 1999.

For the purpose of the analysis, all articles published in the New York Times on February 7th, 1999, and in the following three days were taken into account (*Phase 2*), as well as those published on February 24th, 1999, and in the following three days (*Phase 3*) and those published on March 16th, 1999, and in the following three days (*Phase 4*).

The articles dealing with the Rambouillet negotiations, and their critique do not - at first sight - seem to deal directly with the question of military intervention. Nevertheless, conclusions about the pros and cons of intervention can be drawn from these reports, since the assessment of the negotiations and their chances of success is closely linked to the question of whether military intervention seems necessary.

The final phase (*Phase 5*) includes articles from March 20th to March 23rd, 1999, the three days immediately preceding the decision to launch military intervention on March 24th, 1999. This selection allows a focused analysis of the coverage during the critical final phase of the diplomatic efforts. A total of 49 newspaper articles from the New York Times are analysed for the Kosovo case.[5]

[5] A comprehensive index of all New York Times articles subjected to analysis for the Kosovo case study can be found in ANNEX B.

After analysing the framing of the articles,[6] an in-depth examination of the political discourse for each case follows.

The University of California's *The American Presidency Project* provides access to a wide range of documents. All available documents in the following categories are analysed: *Interviews*, Letters, Press *Conferences*, *Speeches and Remarks*, *Saturday Weekly Addresses* and *Statements*.[7]

In both cases, the time of research is set to be ten days longer than the coverage analysis in order to analyse possible justifications for the decision in terms of previously used frames. For the Kosovo conflict, the time is set from January 15th to April 2nd, 1999. For Rwanda, the period is April 6th to April 30th, 1994.

The Clinton Presidential Library and Museum also provides press releases.

For the case of Rwanda, the 'Radio Address on the Situation in Rwanda' is available, and for the case of Kosovo, the 1999 annual 'State of the Union Address' of the U.S. President is analysed.

The primary sources provide insight into the public statements and positions held by President Clinton and his administration, offering a comprehensive overview of the political discourse that unfolded parallel to media coverage.[8] They are analysed within the same framework as the newspaper articles. It is not necessary to divide the Kosovo process into phases, as the limited availability of documents makes it crucial to be able to follow the process through the above mentioned phases (see above).

The results of the media coverage analysis are compared with those of the discourse analysis. If the frames identified in the coverage can be found in the political discourse, this indicates that the media coverage may have had an influence on the executive.

Finally, the results of the Rwanda case will be compared with those of the Kosovo case.

[6] An example is given in ANNEX E.

[7] The filter is set to the categories 'Presidential' and 'specific document type'. Subsequently, the year is filtered, and the documents are selected using the keyword 'Rwanda' for 1994 and 'Kosovo' for 1999.

[8] A separate list of the documents analysed can be found in ANNEX C for Rwanda and in ANNEX D for Kosovo.

If the hypothesis (see 3.1) is correct, then in the case of Rwanda the same contra-frames should dominate both media coverage and political discourse. This could explain the U.S. government's decision not to intervene. In the case of Kosovo, on the other hand, the same pro-frames should prevail, which would support the U.S. decision to intervene militarily.

4. Operationalisation

In order to facilitate a systematic analysis, specific subcategories were defined with the objective of capturing both pro and contra frames. All subcategories are considered to be of an equivalent nature.

The corresponding frame categories are as follows:

These can be assigned to the pro-frames and the contra-frames based on their form in the analysed texts and can show an influence on the reader in more than one way.

Layout: Headings and graphics.

Numbers: Any mention of numbers, data, resources, or costs.

Word(s): Utilisation words and metaphors.

Description: Visual descriptions and stereotypes.

Special: Striking linguistic elements that cannot be assigned to any other category.

Special Frame Categories:

Categories that are specifically adapted to conspicuous features in the content of the articles and can be summarised due to their multiple occurrences.

Appeal/Blame (Pro): A direct or indirect request for assistance or an appeal may justify the necessity for intervention.

Victim Description (Pro): A detailed description of victims is presented to encourage a positive attitude towards intervention.

Western Victims(Contra): Emphasising the suffering or harm faced by Western nationals as a result of the conflict, suggesting the need for caution or avoiding involvement.

Possibility of Peace (Contra): Emphasising peaceful alternatives to military intervention.

Powerless (Contra): Emphasising the powerlessness of international actors or institutions can underline the hopelessness of intervention.

Focus on the Own Nationals (Contra): Highlighting the priority of protecting one's own citizens or interests, often justifying non-intervention by focusing on national concerns (only applied to the Rwanda Analysis).

4.1. Case Study: Rwanda

4.1.1. Quantitative Results of Coverage Analysis (Rwanda)

Table 1

Article	Numbers	Appeal & Blame	Word(s)/ Fight for indipendence	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / No peace possible/ Crime against Humanity	Victim Description	Total	Numerbs / Ressources	Powerless	Word	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / Stereotype	Focus on nationals and Foreigners	Western victim / Threat	Sentence structure	Peace possible	Total	Article
1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	3	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	7	1
2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	5	2	0	3	0	1	0	1	2	0	2	0	0	11	2
3	3	0	2	0	1	0	1	3	2	12	5	2	3	0	0	0	0	6	11	4	0	1	32	3
4	5	1	1	0	2	0	1	4	1	15	7	5	2	1	2	0	0	6	11	4	2	0	40	4
5	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	12	1	0	0	21	5
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	7	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	4	0	0	13	6
7 (1)	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2	6	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	2	0	0	13	7 (1)
7 (2)	8	1	5	1	0	0	1	0	0	16	3	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	10	7 (2)
7 (3)	4	0	7	0	0	0	2	7	1	21	8	0	2	0	2	0	0	4	10	2	0	1	29	7 (3)
7 (4)	2	0	4	0	0	0	2	8	1	17	9	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	10	0	0	1	26	7 (4)
8	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
8 (1)	1	3	6	3	0	0	2	5	0	20	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	7	8 (1)
9	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	4	1	0	0	0	0	1	2	5	1	0	0	14	9
10	2	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	6	2	0	4	1	2	1	1	4	3	2	0	0	20	10
11	9	7	3	1	1	1	2	11	0	35	2	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	3	0	2	13	11
12	3	6	4	0	2	0	1	3	0	19	0	6	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	10	12
13	7	3	7	0	0	0	0	5	4	26	1	0	1	0	2	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	7	13
14	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	7	14
15	4	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	8	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	15
16	6	3	3	0	1	0	1	1	0	15	2	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	7	16
17	6	4	2	1	0	1	0	1	0	15	4	0	2	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	0	1	14	17
18	3	0	3	0	1	0	1	0	0	8	5	0	1	1	0	0	1	6	0	1	1	0	16	18
19	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	5	19
20	3	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	1	8	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	20
21	3	2	4	2	0	0	1	1	1	14	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	8	21
22	0	8	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	15	7	1	7	0	1	0	0	1	0	3	0	2	22	22
23	9	1	6	0	1	0	1	1	0	19	6	3	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	14	23
24	3	2	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	13	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	24
Total	90	43	74	13	13	4	23	55	15	330	89	25	37	8	27	1	16	41	73	34	3	18	372	Total

The numbers on the left of the table correspond to the articles in ANNEX A. Each article is clearly identified by a corresponding number.

4.1.2. Qualitative Coverage Analysis (Rwanda)

The total number of detected contra-frames is 372, while the number of pro-frames is 330. The number of contra-frames exceeds that of pro-frames by 12.7 %. This suggests the presence of a bias against military intervention.

Layout Of the 14 articles with contra-frame headlines, 23 have contra-frame graphics. In contrast, while 19 articles feature pro-frame headlines, these are accompanied by only ten pro-frame graphics. This discrepancy demonstrates that contra-frames are presented in a visually more compelling manner, thereby emphasising potential risks and negative aspects more strongly. This occurs despite the occasional suggestion to the contrary in the headlines. Additionally, particular sentence structures are employed, such as the mention of Western victims before Rwandan victims (McFadden, 1994, April 10), which is also regarded as a contra-frame.

Numbers There are 89 contra-frames and 90 pro-frames, indicating that numerous examples highlight high mortality rates and significant numbers of victims. At the same time, the substantial number of contra-frames raises the question of whether the risks and costs of m This high number of contra-frames raises the question of whether the risks and costs are really justified by the benefits of military intervention. Quoted statements such as that '20,40,60,000 military forces' (Sciolino, 1994, April 14) would be required and that 'no [UN member state] [...] is willing to risk the lives of its troops' (Sciolino, 1994, April 14). provide an answer by emphasising the practical and moral concerns that militate against military intervention.

Appeal/Blame and *Powerless* The categories comprise 43 and 25 frames, respectively. The moral imperative of Western readers is appealed to by the use of printing criticism or the inclusion of quotations such as: 'Only with the help of the free world will Burundi, Rwanda and other struggling African nations inch toward a place in a peaceful global order' (Wharton Jr., 1994, April 9).

Such appeals for action are frequently presented as unattainable, underscoring the limited capacity of international workers on the ground. Illustrative examples include the use of phrases such as 'helplessly', 'tried' and statements by aid workers, such as 'You want to hold back those people […] but you have your blue beret and there’s no respect for it' (Lorch, 1994, April 15). Readers may question the purpose of such missions when their own troops have been trying to help without significant progress. This can increase frustration and a sense of

powerlessness. Additionally, it can increase the opposition to humanitarian military intervention.

Word(s) Overall, the analysis shows that 37 words represent contra-frames and 74 words pro-frames. There are five metaphors, one of which is a contra-frame. Here, the pro-frames clearly predominate. Words such as 'bloodshed' (Wharton Jr., 1994, April 9) emphasise the human suffering in Rwanda and call for intervention. On the other hand, the word 'chaos' stands out because it can be interpreted in either direction. It was used 14 times. It gives the impression that there are no clear structures or responsibilities, and that the violence is uncontrolled and unpredictable. This can emphasise the need for intervention, but it can also make the conflict appear chaotic and unsolvable. A phrase such as 'the United Nations troops have stood by helplessly' (Lorch, 1994, April 20) gives the reader this sense of powerlessness. For this reason, this example is also categorised as '*Powerless*'.

Description Of the 97 visual descriptions, 41 are a contra-frame. This means that there more are pro-frames (56). An example is: 'As night fell, screams could be heard coming from a church compound where more than 2,000 Rwandans had taken refuge. A short time later, after the sound of machine-gun fire, the screaming stopped' (Lorch, 1994, April 14). The precise descriptions focus on human suffering and the urgency of intervention. This could persuade the reader to consider military intervention necessary.

The articles analysed contain 32 stereotypes such as 'small and troubled central African countries' (Lewis, 1994, April 7). Such labels reinforce a stereotypical image of Africa as a continent of small, unstable and conflict-ridden states. The reader is to be convinced that conditions of violence and conflict are widespread and are intrinsic to Africa. The responsibility is shifted to the African continent, making any obligation to act (humanitarian military intervention) on the part of international powers appear unfounded.

Victim Description and *Western Victims* In total, Rwandan victims are described in detail 15 times. The Rwandan victims and the way they died are described in very specific terms. For example, the article ‘Tribes Battle for Rwandan Capital; New Massacres Reported’ (1994) states that '1,200 men, women and children [were] shot and hacked to death'.

34 times there are reports of threatening situations or explicit threats against international forces. One example is found in a report that speaks of 'distrust for [international soldiers]' and describes specific situations in which Western soldiers are exposed to extreme danger. A

diplomat is quoted: 'There were cases when French citizens were only saved from death when they showed their French passports' (Riding, 1994, April 11). This emphasises that international intervention may be met with resistance, increasing the risks of such action.

Possibility of Peace There are 18 cases in this category. This could raise readers' hopes for a diplomatic solution and present the conflict in a less confrontational light, possibly questioning the need for military intervention. Examples are the mentioning of 'the peace agreement' and 'the ceasefire'. Additionally, one article states that the Rwandan rebels have agreed to negotiate. A quote from New Zealand's representative to the UN Council in the article 'Anarchy Rules Rwanda's Capital And Drunken Soldiers Roam City' (1994) describes such event as 'the first encouraging development' (Lorch, 1994, April 14). This could mislead readers into thinking that no outside military intervention is necessary.

Focus on the Own Nationals There are a total of 73 frames in this category. It is particularly striking that 14 articles with 36 contra-frames focus on the rescue operations of Western states for their own citizens and other foreigners. Eight articles focus on the rescue and safety of Americans, with a total of 41 frames. The suffering of the Rwandan people is relegated to the background. This contributes to a contra-framing that emphasises the local dimension of the conflict and obscures global responsibility.

The coverage evolves from the first reports of the plane crash (Lewis, 1994, April 7) to a sustained focus on the rescue of Americans and other foreigners in Rwanda (see above). Later, the focus shifts more to the endangerment of Western aid workers, with concrete descriptions of the dangers the soldiers face (see above). A possible intervention is mentioned, but one article stresses that ' there is no political will' (Sciolino, 1994, April 14). Instead, the focus is on the U.S. rescue mission: 'The U.S. is likely to provide noncombat assistance for the rescue operation' (Schmidt, 1994, April 9), which emphasises a civilian approach and seems to rule out the option of military intervention.

Special There are eight contra-frames and 13 pro-frames. Pro Frames therefore also predominate in this category. Examples of frames analysed that have been categorised as '*Special' (Pro*) are statements in the article 'RWANDAN REBELS PUSH INTO CAPITAL' (1994) which indirectly blame the colonial powers for the genocidal situation in Rwanda (Schmidt, 1994, April 13). The reader could infer from this that the West is 'partly responsible' and that something must be done.

An example of the opposite side (‘*Special’* (*Contra*)) can be seen in the article ‘The Massacres in Rwanda: Hope Is Also a Victim’ (1994), in the cited statement by David Rawson, the United States Ambassador to Rwanda: 'If you get into a stalemate and trench warfare, where the country is completely exhausted and anarchy reigns in the countryside then we may have taken a step back to Somalia' (Lorch, 1994, April 21). This statement portrays Rwanda as hopeless. An intervention could end up like the Somalia operation in the past, which ended with many unnecessary deaths of American soldiers and was very badly received by the American people

4.1.3. Quantitative Results of the Discourse Analysis (Rwanda)

Table 2

Total	Numbers	Appeal & Blame	Word(s) / Fight for independence	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / No peace possible / Crime against Humanity	Victim Description	Total	Numbers / Resources	Powerless	Word	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / Stereotype	Focus on nationals and foreigners	Western Victims	Peace possible	Total
Ruanda Interview	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
									0													
Letter	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	9
									0													
Remarks 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	6
Remarks 2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5
Remarks 3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	5
Remarks Total	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	4	3	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	16
Statements	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
									0													
Radio Adress	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	4
									0													
Total	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	2	0	6	5	0	0	0	1	15	0	3	32

The numbers in the table correspond to the documents in ANNEX C. Each article is clearly identifiable by a corresponding number.

4.1.4. Qualitative Discourse Analysis (Rwanda)

The discourse analysis uses the same frame categories as the coverage analysis, with the exception of '*Layout*'. However, the discourse analysis is sorted by document type, as there are significantly fewer documents overall. Seven documents were analysed: an *Interview*, a *Letter*, three *Remarks*, a *Statement*, a *Radio Address* and a *Press Conference*.[9] This means that fewer frames were analysed overall, and some of the frame categories that play a role in the coverage analysis cannot be identified in the discourse analysis (see *table 2*). In total, ten pro-frames and 32 contra-frames were identified. There is a clear tendency against military intervention.

Interviews Clinton's 'Interview with Journalists on South Africa' of April 20th, 1994, contains three frames: two contra-frames of the category '*Special*' and one pro-frame of the category '*Word(s)*'. Clinton says that he is aware of the situation in Rwanda, 'what occupies our headlines'. But he adds: 'It's not on CNN at night, so people don't talk about it.' This statement seems to be an excuse for missing action: If an issue is not on nightly television and does not receive enough attention, it seems to lose importance. Clinton also states: '[...] the U.S. should work with countries that are trying to make good things happen [...]'. This statement sounds like an indirect reproach to conflicting parties in Rwanda for showing no interest in a lasting peace. Overall, there is a clear tendency towards non-intervention.

Letters The 'Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Evacuation of United States Citizens From Rwanda and Burundi' of April 12th, 1994 contains nine contra-frames and one pro-frame. Seven of these contra-frames belong to the category *'Focus on the Own Nationals'*. Clinton emphasises the protection and rescue of American citizens with statements such as 'U.S. military forces [are] in position to conduct possible noncombat evacuation operations of U.S. citizens'. The term 'noncombatant' (contra-frame category *'Word(s)*') also signals that active military intervention is deliberately excluded. The suffering of the Rwandan people seems to be of no importance in this background. In addition, Clinton thanks Congress for its support 'to protect American citizens', thus increasing the focus on national interests.

Remarks The three documents contain 16 contra-frames and one pro-frame. The pro-frame is derived from Clinton's statement that the situation in Rwanda is a 'tragic situation' (Clinton,

[9] No Press Conferences or Weekly Addresses were held during the relevant time period under analysis. Some documents were filed under multiple categories in the database but were only taken into account once for the analysis presented here.

1994, April 9), which emphasises the gravity of the situation. This is particularly noticeable because in the other remarks Clinton only speaks of a 'situation' (Clinton, 1994, April 8) or a 'very difficult situation' (Clinton, 1994, April 10), which sounds less dramatic. The contra-frames become visible through Clinton's phrasing such as 'Let me say just a brief word [...] about Rwanda' (Clinton, 1994, April 9), which gives the impression that he does not really want to go into detail on the topic. After this remark, the focus is always on the rescue of American citizens, which reinforces this impression. This distracts attention from the need for full-scale military intervention.

Statements The 'Statement on the Death of Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi' of April 7th, 1994, contains fewer contra-frames than pro-frames (1:3). Clinton refers to the situation in Rwanda as 'troubled countries', giving the impression that such crises are normal in certain regions of the world. This weakening choice of words could relegate military intervention to the background and weaken the sense of urgency for intervention. On the other hand, three pro-frames can be identified in the category *'Word(s)*' through the choice of the words 'bloodshed', 'horrified' and 'tragic'. These terms illustrate the enormous humanitarian suffering in Rwanda and could sway the recipient of the message in favour of military intervention.

Radio Address The frames in the 'Radio Address on the Situation in Rwanda' of April 30th, 1994, are balanced (4:4). On the contra-frame side, the category *'possibility of peace'* dominates, with terms such as 'ceasefire', 'negotiations' and 'lasting peace'. These expressions weaken the need for military intervention by emphasising a peaceful solution and presenting it as possible. On the pro-frame side, the four terms 'horrors', 'mass killings' and 'pain and suffering' are categorised as *'word(s)*'. This choice of words highlights the extreme humanitarian suffering in Rwanda and could suggest an urgency for military intervention.

At the beginning of the crisis, the focus is on condolences and calls for an end to violence (Clinton, 1994, April 7). The focus quickly shifts to the rescue of Americans and Westerners, which continues until the rescue mission is completed. After that, the interest in Rwanda declined decisively. In particular, at the end of the period, Clinton expresses his gratitude for the successful rescue of the Americans. This was the only time Rwanda was mentioned at all in his speeches. Overall, there are few documents on the situation in Rwanda, which underlines the low priority and importance of the issue in American foreign policy.

4.1.5. Comparison of the Rwanda Analysis

The alignment of the news coverage analysis (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.2) and the discourse analysis (see 4.1.3 and 4.1.4) shows that in both analysis there are more contra-frames than pro-frames, with a clear negative attitude towards military intervention. Furthermore, identical frames are found in both analysis, indicating a similar content.

An important point is the different data base: the first analysis is based on 28 articles, while the second only includes seven documents. This difference could influence the frequency and depth of the frames identified. It should therefore be noted that a larger number of articles tends to allow for a wider range of topics and a more differentiated analysis of the frames.

The choice of words (category *'Word(s)'*) in both analysis shows striking parallels. The term 'chaos' from the news coverage and the term 'difficult situation' from the discourse analysis indicate a confusing situation. The term 'bloodshed' also appears in both analyses, indicating a similar content and emphasising the brutality of the situation. In addition, the term 'troubled countries' is used in the news coverage, a term that is adopted in detail by Clinton in the discourse analysis.

Another important aspect concerns the category '*Numbers*'. While numerous pro-frames are mentioned in the news coverage which do not appear in the discourse analysis, both analysis find specific figures on the number of American citizens in Rwanda and the resources allocated to the rescue of Americans and foreigners. These figures illustrate the strategic importance of the rescue operations and are a central element in both discourses, underlining the importance of these interventions.

Both analysis also address the *'Possibility of Peace'*, referring to the possibility of ceasefires and negotiations. This emphasises the possibility of a peaceful solution to the crisis.

In summary, despite the different size of the data sets (28 articles vs. seven documents), there are many topical and linguistic overlaps between the coverage and the discourse analysis. Particularly striking is the common position on military intervention and the strong focus on the rescue of nationals.

4.2. Case Study: Kosovo

4.2.1. Quantitative Results of Coverage Analysis (Kosovo)

Table 3

Article	Numbers	Appeal & Blame	Word(s) / Fight for independence	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / No peace possible / Crime against Humanity	Victim Description	TOTAL	Numbers / Resources	Powerless	Word	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description	Western Victims	Peace possible	Total	Article
1	7	3	2	0	1	0	1	1	0	15	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	6	1
2	0	12	5	0	0	1	1	0	0	19	2	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	6	2
3	5	2	3	2	2	0	1	15	2	32	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	3	3
4	3	7	9	4	1	0	1	4	0	29	1	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	4
5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	5
6	5	1	3	0	0	0	1	0	2	12	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3	6
7	1	6	11	3	2	0	1	3	0	27	0	7	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	9	7
Total	21	31	33	9	6	1	6	23	4	134	3	14	0	6	5	0	1	0	3	3	35	Total
8	4	3	11	1	0	0	1	2		22	2	3	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	3	11	8
9	2	2	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	10	1	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	6	9
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	6	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	12	10
11	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	11
12	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	3	12
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	5	13
Total	7	6	20	2	0	0	2	2	0	39	5	15	1	1	7	1	4	0	0	4	38	Total
14	1	3	2	4	0	0	1	0	0	11	0	6	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	8	14
15	1	0	0	3	2	0	1	8	2	17	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	15
16	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	6	0	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	3	7	16
17	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	3	9	17
18	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	4	0	7	3	3	0	10	1	0	1	0	0	0	18	18
Total	3	3	4	13	2	1	3	14	2	45	4	11	5	12	5	0	2	0	0	6	45	Total
19	2	2	2	5	1	0	0	6	2	20	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	4	19
20	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	2	0	8	0	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	6	11	20
21	3	0	1	3	1	0	1	4	0	13	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	21
22	1	0	4	0	0	0	1	3	4	13	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	22
23	3	0	3	5	2	0	1	3	0	17	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	23
24	4	0	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	12	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	24
25	2	2	2	0	0	0	1	4	0	11	7	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	13	25
26	0	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	6	26
27	2	1	1	4	1	0	1	3	0	13	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	6	27
Total	18	5	19	27	5	0	6	26	6	112	10	5	8	10	5	0	3	0	0	13	54	Total
28	2	15	5	2	0	0	1	1	1	27	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	28
29	8	1	0	0	1	0	1	3	1	15	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	29
30	6	1	1	1	0	0	1	3	1	14	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	30
31	0	5	5	2	1	3	1	1	1	19	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	31
32	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	5	1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	6	32
33	3	1	2	1	1	2	1	8	1	20	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	33
34	5	11	8	0	0	1	1	3	2	31	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	34
35	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2	35
36	1	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	5	9	36
37	12	0	5	1	1	2	1	9	1	32	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	37
38	3	1	2	2	0	1	0	1	0	10	3	3	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	1	12	38
39	3	3	0	4	0	0	1	0	2	13	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	39
40	8	0	2		0	0	1	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	40
41	2	0	4	1	0	0	1	0	0	8	6	3	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	17	41
42	2	3	10	4	0	0	0	4	0	23	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	3	7	42
43	2	1	3	3	0	0	1	1	0	11	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	43
44	1	5	3	0	0	3	1	2	0	15	3	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	10	44
45	1	5	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	11	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2	6	45
46	7	6	1	0	2	0	1	7	4	28	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	46
47	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	3	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	0	1	8	47
48	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	3	0	1	0	0	0	6	48
Total	68	70	59	27	6	13	15	45	14	317	25	11	13	17	21	0	6	0	0	18	111	Total
Total	117	115	135	78	19	15	32	110	26	647	47	56	27	46	43	1	16	0	3	44	283	Total

The numbers on the left of the table correspond to the articles in ANNEX B. Each article is clearly identified by a corresponding number.

4.2.2. Qualitative Coverage Analysis (Kosovo)

The analysis shows a total of 647 pro-frames and 283 contra-frames, indicating a clear trend of 128.6 % more pro-frames in favour of military intervention. This tendency could encourage an urge of action attitude in the reader.

Layout The initial observation shows that 32 headlines present a pro-frame, yet only 20 graphics offer support for this position. In contrast, there are only 16 contra-frames among the headlines, but 43 graphics that reinforce this perspective. The result is noteworthy, given that pro-frames are more than twice as common overall, yet visual elements such as graphics tend to support contra-frames. This could indicate a deliberate emphasis on risks and negative aspects by using visual design.

Numbers 117 pro-frames and 47 contra-frames were assigned to this category. This shows a clear focus on pro-military framing. Expressions such as 'tens of thousands of civilians' (Perlez, 1999, March 21; The New York Times, 1999, March 22) having to flee or '40,000 Serbian troops' (Whitney, 1999, March 20) and '300 tanks' (New York Times, 1999, March 21) on the move symbolise the scale of threat to many innocent people. The word 'civilian', which can also be assigned to the category *'Victim Description'*, underlines this. This information could suggest the importance of military intervention to the reader.

At the same time, the reader's attention is drawn to possible risks with references to the fact that 'bombing' could 'worsen relations with Russia' (Gall, 1999, March 18; Gall, 1999, March 23) and possibly 'cause civilian casualties' (Perlez, 1999, March 23). These might lead the reader to reconsider a military response. However, as demonstrated, the contra-frames represent the viewpoint of a minority and are, to some extent, undermined by an assessment of the potential consequences of missing action (Gall, 1999, March 20).

Appeal/Blame and *Powerless* The articles contain a total of 115 pro-frames and 56 contra-frames in the categories. The pro-military intervention framing is evident in this context. The statement that the Yugoslav and Serbian president 'Mr. Milosevic […] tends to rule from crisis to crisis' (Gall, 1999, February 24) can be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, it illustrates the need to stop him, which could justify military intervention. On the other hand, it highlights

a kind of 'lack of power': Regardless of NATO's efforts, human suffering could continue elsewhere, which could make intervention seem inefficient or a waste of resources.

Ten articles stress that Mr Milosevic has repeatedly broken agreements and commitments, particularly to NATO countries and to Kosovo. This focus on his violations portrays other states as incapable of action and could lead the reader to believe that Milosevic must be controlled and prevented from further rule-breaking.

Word(s) A total of 135 pro-frames and 27 contra-frames were identified. Pro-frames include words such as 'human tragedy' (Whitney, 1999, March 23), 'humanitarian concerns' (The New York Times, 1999, February 24), 'beyond humanitarian concerns' (Perlez, 1999, March 21). The repeated emphasis on the 'independence' sought by the Kosovo Albanians is striking (in 24 articles). The examples given are intended to arouse the reader's sympathy and awareness of the prevailing injustice.

However, some terms are ambivalent, such as the metaphor of 'fruitless talks' (Perlez, 1999, February 8). On the pro-framework side, it could suggest that negotiations are not effective and that more needs to be done than just 'talking'. At the same time, it could also be interpreted as an indication of the 'lack of power' of the Western powers in bringing about an effective solution (category '*Powerless*').

Description There are 110 pro-frames and no contra-frames. Visual descriptions such as 'As dusk fell, fire broke out [...] blazing fiercely against the darkening sky. Bright flashes of light showed through the smoke as mortars were fired and hit with a heavy thud moments later' (Whitney, 1999, March 16) can foster positive attitudes towards military intervention and generate emotional support.

Victim Description and *Western Victims* While there are 26 instances of precise victim descriptions, there are only three instances of international soldiers and aid workers being mentioned as victims.

An example on the contra-frame page is: 'unidentified gunmen' deliberately targeted' [the monitoring mission's employees]' (Perlez, 1999, January 17). This statement emphasises the risk to which third country soldiers and aid workers are exposed. On the other hand, there are detailed descriptions of the victims on the ground, such as ' Some of the dead were found with their eyes gouged out or heads smashed in, and one man lay decapitated in the courtyard of his

compound. The victims included one young woman and a 12-year-old boy. Many were older men, including one who was 70' (Perlez, 1999, January 18). This detailed description could evoke empathy and compassion for the victims in the reader and underlines the urgency of military intervention.

Possibility of Peace 44 contra-frames are identified, including statements such as 'Mr. Milosevic has shown a pattern of backing down at the last minute' (Gall, 1999, March 22) and 'If [the Serbs] would agree […] then it would be difficult to justify bombing them' (Whitney, 1999, March 17). The first statement reinforces the hope that negotiations will suffice, since Milosevic often withdrawals at the last minute. The second stresses that it would be difficult to justify air strikes if the Serbs surrender. The mention that the Kosovo Albanians have already signed the peace treaty could also create the impression that not much is missing for a peace agreement (Whitney, 1999, March 23). These statements support the view that military intervention is not yet necessary.

From *phase 1* to *phase 5*, there is a development from initial approval to a more differentiated view to a firm decision.

In *Phase 1*, the pro-frame argument is dominant in eight articles, with 134 instances, in comparison to the contra-frame argument, which features in only 35 instances. This considerable majority reflects the initial perception that military intervention not only is necessary but also justified.

In *Phase 2*, there are 39 pro-frames and 38 contra-frames. In the context of the early Rambouillet negotiations, the coverage appears to emphasise the hope for a diplomatic solution (see above).

In *Phase 3* there are 45 pro-frames and 45 contra-frames. This indicates a more intense discussion of the Rambouillet-Agreement. During the pauses in the negotiations, the coverage seems to have been characterised by confidence that the parties would eventually reach an agreement (see above).

In *Phase 4*, there are 112 pro-frames and 54 contra-frames. This development is indicative of mounting frustration with the stalled negotiations. The assertion that the negotiations are 'likely to end in failure' (The New York Times, 1999, March 18) indicates the growing perception that a diplomatic solution is unlikely. Instead, the necessity of military intervention was asserted.

The Serbian president was increasingly depicted in the articles as an adversary who derided the West, particularly 'Washington' (Erlanger, 1999), which was portrayed in the coverage as intolerable for Western readers.

In *phase 5*, the number of pro-frames increased extremely to 317, while the number of contra-frames rose slightly to 111. This considerable expansion in the number of pro-arguments demonstrates that the military intervention was now presented as the sole remaining option for achieving the desired objective.

4.2.3. Quantitative Results of the Discourse Analysis (Kosovo)

Table 4

Total	Numbers	Appeal & Blame	Word(s) / Fight for independence	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description / No peace possible / Crime against Humanity	Victim Description	Total	Numbers / Resources	Powerless	Word	Special	Graphic	Metaphor	Heading	Description	Western Victims	Peace possible	Total
Interview 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Interview 2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Interview 3	12	0	17	2	0	0	0	8	0	39	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Interview Total	12	0	18	2	0	0	0	8	0	40	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	7
Letter 1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Letter 2	2	0	5	3	0	1	0	0	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Letter Total	2	0	5	3	0	1	0	0	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
News Conf 1	0	0	9	4	0	0	0	3	0	16	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	5
News Conf 2	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
News Conf 3	0	0	10	4	0	1	0	3	0	18	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	8
News Conf 4	7	0	10	10	0	2	0	4	2	35	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	2	6
News Conf total	7	0	29	21	0	3	0	11	2	73	1	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	15	21
Adress to the Nation	5	0	8	5	0	1	0	2	3	24	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	6
Remarks 1	4	0	4	3	0	0	0	2	1	14	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	3
Remarks 2	4	0	10	5	0	0	0	4	2	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Remarks 3	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Remarks 4	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Remarks 5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Remarks 6	6	0	10	5	0	0	0	3	3	27	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Remarks Total	22	0	38	18	0	1	0	13	9	101	8	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	7	18
Weakly Adress 1	2	0	5	6	0	0	0	1	0	14	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	7
Weakly Adress 2	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	1	3	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Weakly Adress Total	2	0	9	9	0	0	0	2	3	25	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	5	7
Statement 1	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Statement 2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
Statement 3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Statement 4	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Statement 5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Statements Total	0	0	7	4	0	0	0	0	1	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	10
Press Release 1	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Press Release 2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Press Release 3	1	0	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Press Release 4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Press Release 5	3	0	7	2	0	0	0	1	5	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Press Release 6	5	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	1	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Press Release 7	3	0	8	2	0	0	0	1	3	17	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Press Release 8	2	0	1	2	0	0	0	2	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Press Release 9	1	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Press Release 10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Press Release 11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
Press Release 12	17	0	12	0	0	0	0	3	1	33	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
Press Release Total	32	0	43	15	0	0	0	8	11	109	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	21
State of the Union Adress	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Insgesamt Total	82	0	159	78	0	6	0	44	30	399	29	0	3	10	0	0	0	0	0	49	91

The numbers in the table correspond to the documents in ANNEX D. Each article is clearly identifiable by a corresponding number.

4.2.4. Qualitative Discourse Analysis (Kosovo)

In the discourse analysis, the same frame categories are employed as in the coverage analysis, with the exception of '*Layout*'. In contrast to the discourse analysis of Rwanda, the analysis of Kosovo is structured according to frame categories due to the large number of documents. The analysis encompasses three *Interviews*, two *Letters*, four *News Conferences*, one *Address to the Nation*, six *Remarks*, two *Weekly Addresses*, five *Statements*, twelve *Press Releases* and the *State of the Union Address*, amounting to 36 documents.

A total of 399 pro-frames and 91 contra-frames were identified, indicating a clear positive trend in favour of military intervention.

Numbers A total of 82 pro-frames and 29 contra-frames were analysed. This is a clear majority of pro-frames. Figures such as '40,000 soldiers or troops' (in ten documents), 'tens of thousands' of refugees (in six documents), '300 tanks' and 'a quarter of a million [refugees]' (each in three documents) illustrate the enormous scale of the crisis. In addition, Clinton speaks of 'hundreds of thousands' of 'defenceless people' being displaced and of people being 'killed by the thousands' (Clinton & Rather, 1999; Clinton, 1999, January 25). They underline the urgency of military intervention to contain the crisis and prevent further suffering.

Appeal/Blame and Powerless The categories lack the presence of frames. One potential explanation for this is that Clinton is disinclined to portray his own administration as ineffective.

Word(s) In total, there are 159 instances of pro-frames and three instances of contra-frames. The use of terms such as '(ethnic) aggression' (Clinton & Rather, 1999), 'humanitarian crisis' (in four documents), 'humanitarian disaster' (Clinton & D'Alema, 1999; Clinton, 1999, March 19) and 'crimes against humanity' (Schwarz et al., 1999) serves to emphasise the gravity of the humanitarian situation. In particular, the repeated use of the term 'ethnic cleansing' (see 3.2.2) serves to emphasise the moral imperative to intervene with the help of military. The metaphor 'the Kosovo region is a tinderbox that could ignite a wider European war' (Clinton, 1999, March 24) illustrates the urgency of immediate military action, as the extent of the crisis is becoming increasingly threatening and escalation would result in far-reaching consequences and greater risks.

Description A total of 44 pro-frames and no contra-frames were identified. The phrase 'house after house after house and village after village after village' (Clinton & Rather, 1999) is illustrative of the extensive devastation that has occurred on the ground. The assertion that the Serbian president was 'pretending to negotiate for peace' (Clinton, 1999, April 1) underscores a negative scenario of diplomatic efforts. These accounts underscore the imperative for military intervention.

Victim Description and *Western Victims* There are 30 pro-frames and no contra-frames. Terms such as 'innocent civilians' (Clinton, 1999, March 26) and 'innocent men, women and children' (Clinton, 1999, March 19; Clinton, 1999, March 27) describe the innocence and vulnerability of the victims. The phrase 'I would hate to think that we'd have to see a lot of other little children die' (Clinton, 1999, March 19) describes the suffering of children in particular. The statement 'U.S. and other NATO pilots will be in harm's way […] but we must weigh those risks against the risks of inaction ' (Clinton, 1999, March 19) describes the risks to Western soldiers (contra-frame *'Numbers'*), but emphasises that the risks of inaction are greater.

Possibility of Peace This category appears 49 times, making up 53.9 % of the contra-frames. Positive statements about the peace agreement and its negotiations, such as 'we now call on both sides to make the tough decisions that are necessary' (Clinton & Chirac, 1999), as well as mentions of the Kosovo Albanians' acceptance of the peace agreement (in 14 documents), fuel hope for a successful diplomatic solution.

Special In total, there are 78 pro-frames and ten contra-frames. One focus of the contra-frames is the 'threat' of military intervention. Statements such as 'we came with the threat of force and it worked' (Clinton & D'Alema, 1999) were made. These statements emphasise that the threat of military intervention has worked in the past and is sufficient.

Another important point is the statement by Clinton: 'We were serious in Bosnia' (Clinton, 1999, March 19), which indicates that this time it is not an empty threat, which is seen as a pro-frame because it underlines NATO's determination.

In addition, 16 documents emphasise that the Serbs have taken away the 'self-government' and 'autonomy' of the Kosovo Albanians and demand that these rights be restored to the Kosovo Albanians, which is also seen as a pro-frame. This narrative promotes the idea that the Kosovo Albanians have been treated unfairly and that military intervention is justified.

Another pro-frame finding is the statements stressing that Milosevic has repeatedly committed 'violations of agreements and commitments' (in seven documents). These repeated violations suggest that enough time has passed for diplomatic solutions and that military intervention becomes necessary.

Clinton's reference to media reports: 'One of our major papers yesterday ran a gripping picture on the front page of a whole line of refugees moving out' (Clinton & Chirac, 1999) underlines the urgency of the situation.

An analysis of Clinton's statements during the Kosovo crisis reveals that pro-frames are pervasive throughout, although a shift can be observed. When contra-frames do emerge, they tend to be in relation to the prospect of a diplomatic solution, as shown by the *'Peace Possible'* framing. At the outset of the negotiations, in the interview conducted on February 25th, 1999 (during the recess in proceedings), one '*Peace Possible'* frame and no pro-frame were observed. On March 15th (upon the resumption of negotiations), the number of '*Peace Possible'* frames increased to two, while one pro-frame remained. Following the commencement of NATO air strikes on March 31st, pro-frames became the dominant frame (39 pro-frames and three contra-frames), which may indicate a firm commitment to intervene.

4.2.5. Comparison of the Kosovo Analyses

A comparison of the coverage analysis with the discourse analysis shows that both analyses identify more pro-frames than contra-frames and contain many identically used frames.

In both analyses, '*Numbers*' are a dominant pro-frame factor. The same information and phrases are often used, such as '40,000' soldiers or troops, '300 tanks' and 'tens of thousands'.

Pro-frames also predominate in the choice of words (category *'Word(s)*'), with both analysis frequently mentioning 'humanitarian crisis', 'tragedy' and 'concern'. Similarly, both analysis emphasise that 'civilians' are portrayed as innocent victims. It is also mentioned that the Kosovo Albanians are fighting for their 'independence' (coverage) and need to regain their 'autonomy' and 'self-government' (discourse).

In both analysis, visual descriptions (pro-frame '*Description*') are used to emphasise the 'horror' of the situation. There are only pro-frames and no contra-frames.

Pro-frames also dominate in the categories of victim descriptions ('*Victim Description'* and *'Western Victims'*). Both analysis note detailed descriptions of victims, especially children, among Kosovo Albanians.

Risks and dangers are addressed as contra-frames in the Coverage. Clinton also addresses them but emphasises that they are outweighed by the risks of non-intervention. The need to weigh up the risks of military intervention is also addressed in the coverage.

The category *'Possibility of Peace'* is present in both analysis. The hope for a diplomatic solution is mentioned. Both analysis repeatedly emphasise that the Kosovo Albanians have already signed the peace agreement. This as first step towards peace. Both analysis refer to the fact that the Serbian President has repeatedly violated agreements and commitments, giving the impression that it is now necessary to put him in his place.

The two analysis demonstrate a discernible proclivity towards pro-frames, which predominantly accentuate the imperative and necessity of intervention, whereas contra-frames predominantly emphasise the prospect of a peaceful resolution and the potential risks associated with military intervention.

5. Comparison of Cases

The analysis of the Rwanda case demonstrates that the majority of contra-frames identified in the coverage correspond with those present in the political discourse. This lends support to the hypothesis that when there is political uncertainty about humanitarian military intervention, the U.S. government's decision is shaped by negative framing, which in this case leads to a decision against intervention. In contrast, the case of the Kosovo war shows that the predominantly pro-frames in the news coverage correlate with those in the political discourse. This supports the hypothesis that when there is political uncertainty about humanitarian military intervention, the U.S. government's decision to intervene is shaped by positive framing.

Analysis of Clinton's statements on the two conflicts show that politicians take media coverage into account when making decisions. In the case of Rwanda (1994), Clinton noted that the U.S. media, particularly CNN, gave little coverage to the genocide on the evening news, which he partly used as an excuse for the U.S. government's hesitant political action. In contrast, in the case of the Kosovo war (1999), Clinton explicitly referred to the media's coverage of the crisis, particularly the headlines and images of refugees, which documented the scale of the disaster

and increased public pressure on the U.S. government to intervene with military. These two examples illustrate how political decision-making is shaped by the way in which the media present events and the frames they establish.

One interesting difference between the two cases is the different amount of material for analysis. The Rwanda case, which was predominantly framed in the media and in political discourse against military intervention, offers significantly less material for analysis. In contrast, the analysis of the Kosovo case had to be limited due to the large number of articles. This difference in the amount of data available is in itself a form of framing, reflecting a different evaluation and perception of the two conflicts. It also shows that in both cases the coverage significantly contains more frames (both pro and contra frames) than the respective political discourse. This may indicate that politicians are deliberately adopting a selection of the frames presented in the media.

6. Results & Future Perspectives

The findings demonstrate the capacity of the media to shape political discourse and, moreover, to influence the formation of public opinion. In the context of media pluralism, it is imperative to conduct further research into the diverse influences of the media on foreign policy decision-making processes, with a particular focus on humanitarian military intervention.

A number of additional factors may exert influence upon the political decision regarding military intervention. However, these have not been taken into account in the present paper. This is primarily due to the focus on the liberal approach, which primarily considers the internal actors who can influence the state's decision-making process. Other pertinent factors, such as the duration of the conflict, geographical considerations, the self-interest of the political elite, and lessons from past experiences, have not been taken into account. Moreover, the media represent only one of numerous internal actors.

A promising avenue for future research would be to examine the presidency of the Clinton administration in the context of military interventions. Such an approach would also permit the external factor of 'lessons learned from the past' and the chronology of international events to be taken into account. This perspective could provide valuable insights into the extent to which historical experiences and international dynamics influenced political decisions.

Additionally, it would be beneficial to revisit the question posed by Livingston and Eachus (see 1.2). Their study is closely related to the aspects examined here, and a comprehensive analysis that considers all relevant factors, rather than in isolation, would be advantageous.

A more detailed analysis of the New York Times articles would undoubtedly prove beneficial. In order to make more precise statements about their influence, it would be necessary to undertake a differentiated consideration of the different types of articles. In this study, the frames were also given equal weight. Subsequent studies might examine whether distinct frame types exert disparate effects on political decision-making. Moreover, the selection of frames in this study is open to subjective interpretation. The implementation of a standardised method would facilitate the replication of results and enhance the reliability of the analysis. It would be recommended to conduct a thorough investigation into the possibility, as mentioned in the results, that politicians adopt a selection of frames.

A further limitation of this study is that no quantitative statements can be made regarding the relative strength of the influence of the media in comparison to other domestic factors. This study is constrained to establishing the presence of a media influence, without pinpointing its extent or impact on the political decision-making process.

Nonetheless, this work is a successful and important step in proving that media can shape foreign policy decisions. The work focuses on printed media such as the New York Times, but at the same time it can inspire future studies that might deal with the influence of e-media and social media. Especially nowadays, social media platforms such as Instagram and TikTok are playing an important role in reporting. In particular by spreading fake news, but also by reporting on events that have actually taken place. Reporting via social media is usually even faster than via conventional news services and should therefore be investigated further.

All in all, this work demonstrates the inherent challenges of making ‘the right’ political decision in the context of a dynamic interplay between pro- and contra-frames. Clinton's words illustrate this point:

'It is easy to say, 'Never [A]gain,' but much harder to make it so. Promising too much can be as cruel as caring too little. But difficulties, dangers, and costs are not an argument for doing nothing. When we are faced with deliberate, organized campaigns to murder whole peoples or expel them from their land, the care of victims is important but not enough. We should work to end the violence' (Clinton, 1999).

7. Literature

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ANNEX A

This list is intended to visualise all the articles used in the Rwanda analysis. They are not arranged chronologically, but according to the numbers assigned to each articles for identification purposes. These numbers are essential for referencing the articles in *table 1* presenting the quantitative results of the analysed frames.

The numbering does not follow a specific order, as it reflects the order in which the articles were analysed during the quantitative frame analysis, for various reasons. However, this order does not affect the results of the analysis, as all frames have the same weight. In addition, although the dates of the articles were taken into account in the qualitative analysis process, this is reflected in the study itself rather than in this list.

Article	Citation
1	Lewis, P. (1994, April 7). 2 African Leaders Die, U.N. Says; Rocket May Have Downed Plane. *The New York Times*, 1, 10.
2	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 8). Troops Rampage in Rwanda; Dead Said to Include Premier. *The New York Times*, 1, 2.
3	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 9). TERROR CONVULSES RWANDAN CAPITAL AS TRIBES BATTLE. *The New York Times*, 1, 6.
4	McFadden, Robert D. (1994, April 10). WESTERN TROOPS ARRIVE IN RWANDA TO AID FOREIGNERS. *The New York Times*, 1, 6.
5	Pear, R. (1994, April 10). U.S. Envoy in Rwanda Decides on Overland Convoy to Evacuate Americans. *The New York Times*, 6.
6	The New York Times. (1994, April 10). Rwanda Update. (Summary)[10]. *The New York Times,* 6.

[10] Special type of article summarising the conflict.

7(1)	Riding, A. (1994, April 11). STRIFE IN RWANDA: FRANCE AND BELGIUM; France and Belgium Send Troops To Rescue but Not to Intervene. *The New York Times*, 12.
7(2)	Lewis, P. (1994, April 11). STRIFE IN RWANDA: FRANCE AND BELGIUM; France and Belgium Send Troops To Rescue but Not to Intervene. *The New York Times*, 12.
7(3)	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 11). STRIFE IN RWANDA: THE FIGHTING; Deaths in Rwanda Fighting Said to Be 20,000 or More. *The New York Times*, 12.
7(4)	Lorch, D. (1994, April 11). STRIFE IN RWANDA: EVACUATION; American Evacuees Describe Horrors Faced by Rwandans. (Chronology)[11]. *The New York Times*, 1, 13.
8	The New York Times. (1994, April 12). Havoc in Rwanda. (Caption)[12]. *The New York Times*, 1, 6.
8(1)	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 12). Refugee Missionaries From Rwanda Speak of Their Terror, Grief and Guilt. *The New York Times*, 1, 6.
9	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 12). Rwandan Rebels Reported Closing In on Capital. *The New York Times*, 6.
10	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 13). RWANDAN REBELS PUSH INTO CAPITAL. *The New York Times*, 1, 8.
11	Lorch, D. (1994, April 14). Anarchy Rules Rwanda's Capital And Drunken Soldiers Roam City. *The New York Times*, 1, 12.
12	Lorch, D. (1994, April 15). U.N. in Rwanda Says It Is Powerless to Halt the Violence. *The New York Times*, 3.
13	AP. (1994, April 16). Tribes Battle for Rwandan Capital; New Massacres Reported. *The New York Times*, 5.

[11] Special type of article describing the chronology of the conflict.

[12] Only a caption in addition to Article 8(1).

14	AP. (1994, April 17). U.N. Flies Food and Medicine Into Rwanda. *The New York Times*, 5.
15	AP. (1994, April 19). Massacres Spreading in Rwanda. *The New York Times*, 3.
16	Lorch, D. (1994, April 20). Rwanda Forces Shell Stadium Full of Refugees. *The New York Times*, 8.
17	Lewis, P. (1994, April 22). Security Council Votes to Cut Rwanda Peacekeeping Force. *The New York Times*, 1, 8.
18	Gray, J. (1994, April 9). 2 Nations Joined by Common History of Genocide. *The New York Times*, 6.
19	Schmidt, W. E. (1994, April 16). Rwanda Puzzle: Is Uganda Taking Sides? *The New York Times*, 6.
20	Greenhouse, S. (1994, April 20). One Rwandan's Escape: Days Hiding in a Ceiling, a Bribe and a Barricade. *The New York Times*, 8.
21	The New York Times. (1994, April 10). Double Tragedy in Africa. (Editorial)[13]. *The New York Times*, 18.
22	Sciolino, E. (1994, April 14). For West, Rwanda Is Not Worth the Political Candle. (News Analysis)[14]. *The New York Times*, 3.
23	Lorch, D. (1994, April 21). The Massacres in Rwanda: Hope Is Also a Victim. (News Analysis)[15]. *The New York Times*, 1, 3.
24	Wharton Jr., C. R. (1994, April 9). The Nightmare in Central Africa. (Op-Ed)[16]. *The New York Times*, 21.

[13] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

[14] Special type of article that goes into more detail.

[15] Special type of article that goes into more detail.

[16] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

ANNEX B

This list is intended to visualise all the articles used in the Kosovo analysis. They are not arranged chronologically, but according to the numbers assigned to each article for identification purposes. These numbers are essential for referencing the articles in *table 3* presenting the quantitative results of the analysed frames.

The numbering does not follow a specific order, as it reflects the order in which the articles were analysed during the quantitative frame analysis, for various reasons. However, this order does not affect the results of the analysis, as all frames have the same weight. In addition, although the dates of the articles were taken into account in the qualitative analysis process, this is reflected in the study itself rather than in this list.

Article	Citation
Phase 1	
1	AP. (1999, January 16).Serbs Said to Kill 15 Kosovo Rebels; Monitor Wounded. *The New York Times*, 3.
2	Perlez, J. (1999, January 17). U.S. Weights Ist Reaction To Massacre In Kosovo. *The New York Times*, 6.
3	AP. (1999, January 17). Multilated Kosovo Bodies Found After Serb Attack. *The New York Times*, 1, 6.
4	Perlez, J. (1999, January 18). NATO Presses Milosevic After Massacre but Doesn't Plan Raids. *The New York Times*, 6.
5	The New York Times. (1999, January 19). NATO Postpones Trip to Belgrade. *The New York Times*, 8.

6	AP. (1999, January 19). Fightin Roars On in Kosovo Despite NATO Plea for Halt .*The New York Times,* 8.
7	Perlez, J. (1999, January 19). DEFIANT YUGOSLAV ORDERS EXPLUSION OF U.S. DIPLOMAT. *The New York Times*, 1, 8.
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8	Perlez, J. (1999, February 7). Delayed by Serbian Maneuvering, Kosovo Talks Begin. *The New York Times*, 16.
9	Perlez, J. (1999, February 8). Kosovo Talks Offering Limited Autonomy. *The New York Times*, 6.
10	Perlez, J. (1999, February 9). As Kosovo Talks Continue, NATO Troops Plan Lags Badly. *The New York Times*, 6.
11	Perlez, J. (1999, February 10). Uncertainty About Delegates Clouds Kosovo Talks. *The New York Times*, 3.
12	The New York Times. (1999, February 10). Serbs Say They Will Release 40 Villagers' Bodies. *The New York Times*, 3.
13	Perlez, J. (1999, February 11). Trickiest Divides Are Among Big Powers at Kosovo Talks. *The New York Times*, 8.
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14	Erlanger, S. (1999, February 24). Serb View: A Victory. (News Analysis)[17]. *The New York Times*, 10.
15	Gall, C. (1999, February 24). Serbs and Rebels Trade Missile Fire for the Second Day in a Row. *The New York Times*, 10.

[17] Special type of article that goes into more detail.

16	The New York Times. (1999, February 24). Peace on Hold in Kosovo. (Editorial)[18]. *The New York Times*, 20.
17	Perlez, J. (1999, February 24). Kosovo Albanians, in Reversal, Say They Will Sign Peace Pact. *The New York Times*, 1, 10.
18	Steel, R. (1999, February 25). Playing Broker Has Its Pitfalls. (Op-Ed)[19]. *The New York Times*, 27.
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19[20]	The New York Times. (1999, March 16). In Kosovo, War as Part of Daily Life. (Caption)[21]. *The New York Times*, 1, 10. Gall, C. (1999, March 16). For Villages Of Kosovo, War Is Part Of Daily Life. *The New York Times*, 1, 10.
20	Whitney, C. R. (1999, March 16). Ethnic Albanians Move to Accept Kosovo Pact. *New York Times*, 8.
21	Whitney C. R. (1999, March 17). Serbs Reinforce Kosovo Forces, Clouding Talks. *The New York Times*, 1, 8.
22	Gall, C. (1999, March 18). Serbs's Killing of 40 Albanians Ruled a Crime Against Humanity. *The New York Times*, 13.
23	Whitney, C. R. (1999, March 18). Kosovo Talks Near End as Serbs Build Up. *The New York Times*, 12.
24	The New York Times. (1999, March 18). Kosovo Brinkmanship. (Editorial)[22]. *The New York Times*, 24.

[18] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

[19] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

[20] Two articles belong together.

[21] Separate Caption.

[22] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

25	Perlez, J. (1999, March 19). Doubts on NATO Air Raids As the Talks on Kosovo End. *The New York Times*, 1, 9.
26	Gall, C. (1999, March 19). It's NATO Peacekeepers, Not Bombs, Irking Serbs. *The New York Times*, 9.
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28	Lewis, A. (1999, March 20). Abroad at Home; In Credibility Gulch. (Op-Ed)[23]. *The New York Times,* 15.
29	Gall, C. (1999, March 20). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN KOSOVO; New Floods of Refugees Are on the Move. *The New York Times*, 6.
30	Whitney, C. R. (1999, March 20). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN PARIS; Monitors and Embassy Staff Told to Leave Yugoslavia. *The New York Times*, 6.
31	Broder, J. M. (1999, March 20). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; Clinton Says Force Is Needed to Halt Kosovo Bloodshed. *The New York Times,* 1, 6.
32	Myers, S. L. (1999, March 20). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE STRATEGY; NATO Plan Calls for Widening Strikes on Air Defenses and Heavy Weapons. *The New York Times*, 6.
33	Perlez, J. (1999, March 21). KOSOVO SITUATION WORSENS AS SERBS PRESS OFFENSIVE. *The New York Times*, 1, 17.
34	New York Times. (1999, March 21). March 14-20; Bombing Threatened. *The New York Times*, 2.

[23] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

35	Gall, C. (1999, March 21). Fears Deepens as Monitors Quit Kosovo. *The New York Times*, 16.
36	Perlez, J. (1999, March 22). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; MILOSEVIC TO GET ONE'LAST CHANCE' TO AVOID BOMBING. *The New York Times*, 1, 11.
37	Gall, C. (1999, March 22). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN KOSOVO; Serbs Burn the Birthplace Of the Albanian's Revolt. *The New York Times*, 10.
38	Erlanger, S. (1999, March 22). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: NEWS ANALYSIS; Holbrooke: Last Chip? (News Analysis)[24]. *The New York Times*, 1, 10.
39	Whitney, C. R. (1999, March 22). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE ALLIANCE; NATO Said to Move Toward Approving Bomb Attacks on Elite Serbian Units. *The New York Times*, 10.
40	The New York Times. (1999, March 22). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Kosovo's Year: Diplomacy and Death. (Chronology)[25]. *The New York Times*, 10.
41	O'Hanlon, M. (1999, March 23). Should Serbia Be Scared? (Op-Ed)[26]. *The New York Times*, 23.
42	Erlanger, S. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE OVERVIEW; U.S. ISSUES APPEAL TO SERBS TO HALT ATTACK IN KOSOVO. *The New York Times*, 1, 10.
43	Whitney, C. R. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: THE ALLIANCE; NATO Allows Chief to Order Air Strikes Against Serbs. *The New York Times,* 10.

[24] Special type of article that goes into more detail.

[25] Special type of article describing the chronology of the conflict.

[26] Special type of article 'Editorial'.

44	Perlez, J. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: NEWS ANALYSIS; U.S. Options: Unpalatable. (News Analysis). *The New York Times*, 1, 11.
45	Gordon, M. R. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN RUSSIA; Moscow Opposes Air Raids, but Is Miffed at Serbs. *The New York Times*, 11.
46	Gall, C. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: IN KOSOVO; Top Ethnic Albanian Rebel Asks NATO to Start Strikes. *The New York Times*, 10.
47	Schmitt, E. (1999, March 23). CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: CONGRESS; Senators Clash Over U.S. Role In a NATO Bombing Campaign. *The New York Times*, 11.
48	Fabrikant, G. (1999, March 23). 2 Huge Cable TV Companies To Unite in $53 Billion Deal. *The New York Times*, 1, 40.

ANNEX C

This list is intended to visualise all the documents used in the Rwanda analysis. They are not arranged chronologically, but according to the numbers assigned to each document for identification purposes. These numbers are essential for referencing the documents in *table 2* presenting the quantitative results of the analysed frames.

The numbering does not follow a specific order, as it reflects the order in which the documents were analysed during the quantitative frame analysis, for various reasons. However, this order does not affect the results of the analysis, as all frames have the same weight. In addition, although the dates of the documents were taken into account in the qualitative analysis process, this is reflected in the study itself rather than in this list.

Document	Citation
Interview	Clinton, W. J., & Journalists. (1994, April 20). Interview With Journalists on South Africa. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-journalists-south-africa.
Letter	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 12). Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Evacuation of United States Citizens From Rwanda and Burundi. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-the-evacuation-united-states-citizens-from-rwanda-and-burundi.
Remarks	
1	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 8). Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters in Minneapolis. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-and-exchange-with-reporters-minneapolis.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 9). The President's Radio Address. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-radio-address-582.

3	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 10). Remarks on Bosnia and an Exchange with Reporters. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-bosnia-and-exchange-with-reporters.
Statement	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 7). Statement on the Deaths of Leaders of Rwanda and Burundi. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-deaths-leaders-rwanda-and-burundi.
Radio Address	Clinton, W. J. (1994, April 30). Radio Address on the Situation in Rwanda. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/radio-address-the-situation-rwanda.

ANNEX D

This list is intended to visualise all the documents used in the Kosovo analysis. They are not arranged chronologically, but according to the numbers assigned to each document for identification purposes. These numbers are essential for referencing the documents in *table 4* presenting the quantitative results of the analysed frames.

The numbering does not follow a specific order, as it reflects the order in which the documents were analysed during the quantitative frame analysis, for various reasons. However, this order does not affect the results of the analysis, as all frames have the same weight. In addition, although the dates of the documents were taken into account in the qualitative analysis process, this is reflected in the study itself rather than in this list.

Document	Citation
Interviews	
1	Clinton, W. J. & Langhart Cohen, J. (1999, February 25). Interview With Janet Langhart Cohen of the Armed Forces Television Network. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-janet-langhart-cohen-the-armed-forces-television-network.
2	Clinton, W. J. & Jackson, M. (1999, March 15). Interview With Michael Jackson of KRLA Radio. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-michael-jackson-krla-radio.
3	Clinton, W. J. & Rather, D. (1999, March 31). Interview With Dan Rather of CBS News. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-dan-rather-cbs-news-0.
Letters	
1	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 19). Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on the Deployment of Military Forces for Stabilization of Areas of the

	Former. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-reporting-the-deployment-military-forces-for-stabilization-2.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 26). Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/letter-congressional-leaders-reporting-airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-the-federal.
News Conferences	
1	Clinton, W. J. & Chirac, J. (1999, February 19). The President's News Conference With President Jacques Chirac of France. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-president-jacques-chirac-france.
2	Clinton, W. J. & Rawlings, J. J. (1999, February 24). The President's News Conference With President Jerry John Rawlings of Ghana. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-president-jerry-john-rawlings-ghana.
3	Clinton, W. J. & D'Alema, M. (1999, March 5). The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema of Italy. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-with-prime-minister-massimo-dalema-italy.
4	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 19). The President's News Conference. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-news-conference-1059.
Address to the Nation	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 24). Address to the Nation on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and

	Montenegro). *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-the-federal-republic-yugoslavia.
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1	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 22). Remarks on the Situation in Kosovo. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-situation-kosovo.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 24). Remarks Announcing Against Serbian Targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-the-federal-republic-yugoslavia.
3	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 25). Remarks on Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets and an Exchange With Reporters. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-and-exchange-with-reporters.
4	Clinton, W. J. (1999, April 2). Remarks on the National Economy and Kosovar Refugees and an Exchange With Reporters. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-national-economy-and-kosovar-refugees-and-exchange-with-reporters.
5	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 28). Remarks on the NATO Airstrikes Against Serbian Targets and an Exchange With Reporters. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-nato-airstrikes-against-serbian-targets-and-exchange-with-reporters.
6	Clinton, W. J. (1999, April 1). Remarks to the Military Community at Norfolk Naval Station. *The American Presidency Project*.

	https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-the-military-community-norfolk-naval-station.
Weekly Addresses	
1	Clinton, W. J. (1999, February 13). The President's Radio Address. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-radio-address-87.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 27). The President's Radio Address. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/the-presidents-radio-address-82.
Statements	
1	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 16). Statement on the Situation in Kosovo. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-situation-kosovo.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1999, February 23). Statement on the Kosovo Peace Talks. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-kosovo-peace-talks.
3	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 11). Statement on House Action To Support Use of United States Armed Forces in Kosovo. *The American Presidency Project*. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-house-action-support-use-united-states-armed-forces-kosovo.
4	Clinton W. J. (1999, March 27). Statement on the Rescue of a United States Pilot in Serbia. *The American Presidency Project.*

	https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-the-rescue-united-states-pilot-serbia.
5	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 30). Statement on a Serbian Proposal To Settle the Situation in Kosovo. *The American Presidency Project.* https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-serbian-proposal-settle-the-situation-kosovo.
Press Releases	
1	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 16). *STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
2	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 25). *MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
3	Clinton, W. J. (1999, February 13). *10:06 A.M. EST* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
4	Clinton, W. J. (1999, February 23). *STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
5	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 16). *VIDEOTAPED REMARKS BY THEPRESIDENT TO THE SERBIAN PEOPLE the Roosevelt Room* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.

6	Clinton, W. J. (1999, January 16). *REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE SITUATION IN KOSOVO The South Lawn* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
7	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 24). *STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON KOSOVO* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
8	Berger, S. (1999, March 25). *PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
9	Gore, A. A. (1999, March 29). *STATEMENT BY VICE PRESIDENT GORE* [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
10	Clinton, W. J. (1999, March 31). MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
11	Office of the Press Secretary. (1999, April 2). FACT SHEET U.S. Humanitarian Relief Efforts for Kosovar Albanians [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.
12	Schwarz, E., Taft, J., Babbitt, H. & McDuffie, J. (1999, April 2). PRESS BRIEFING [Press release]. https://www.clintonlibrary.gov/sites/default/files/documents/kosovo-press-1999.pdf.

ANNEX E

TERROR CONVULSES RWANDAN CAPITAL AS TRIBES BATTLE

word

stereotype is created

TERROR CONVULSES RWANDAN CAPITAL AS TRIBES BATTLE

in Capitals

The New York Times

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By WILLIAM E. SCHMIDT, Special to The New York Times

Dateline: NAIROBI, Kenya, Saturday, April 9

Body

stereotype

After a second day of tribal bloodletting in ***Rwanda***'s capital, Kigali, French military aircraft landed early this morning to help secure the airport for evacuation of foreigners trapped in the city, where the death toll was estimated to be in the thousands.

focus on own nationals (western)

word

French officials at the United Nations said Friday that three aircraft had successfully landed at Kigali's airport in what is believed to the vanguard of an international effort this weekend to evacuate the hundreds of Belgian and French nationals living there as well as diplomats and foreign aid workers.

focus on western nationals

Senior United Nations officials said that Belgium is likely to send in additional troops this weekend to help organize or oversee the evacuation. They also said that the United States is likely to provide noncombat assistance for the rescue operation -- probably communications and logistics experts. The Security Council, they said, is likely to meet today to review the situation in ***Rwanda***.

focus on saving western nationals

Rival tribal factions waged vicious street battles Friday for control of the city, reports from ***Rwanda*** said. The death toll of civilians, Government ministers and soldiers -- including at least 10 United Nations peacekeeping troops -- was estimated to be in the thousands.

numbers

western victims

A French Foreign Ministry statement issued in Paris today said the decision to send troops had been taken "in the face of the spread and the worsening of the violence in Kigali."

The aim was "to provide the security necessary for a possible evacuation of the French nationals," the statement said. It gave no information how many soldiers would be involved nor any other details.

focus on own nationals

With Kigali virtually cut off from the outside world, save for radio links and a few working telephone lines, the United States, Belgium and France discussed steps to begin evacuating their citizens, trapped since the fighting plunged the city into chaos Wednesday night.

focus on own nationals