




Paper tiger? Chinese science and home bias in citations[☆]

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ABSTRACT

We investigate the phenomenon of home bias in scientific citations, where researchers disproportionately cite work from their own country. We develop a benchmark for expected citations based on the relative size of countries, defining home bias as deviations from this norm. Our findings reveal that China exhibits the largest home bias across all major countries and in nearly all scientific fields studied. This stands in contrast to the pattern of home bias for China's trade in goods and services, where China does not stand out from most industrialized countries. After adjusting citation counts for home bias, we demonstrate that China's apparent rise in citation rankings is overstated. Our adjusted ranking places China fourth globally, behind the US, the UK, and Germany, tempering the perception of China's scientific dominance.

1. Introduction

China has emerged as the leading global producer of scientific articles (Tollefson, 2018; Xie and Freeman, 2019), but does this surge correspond to an equivalent increase in the *quality* of scientific output? Citations are widely used to assess research quality, but this metric is known to come with important limitations (Teplitskiy et al., 2022; Aksnes et al., 2019). We highlight a novel source of bias in citations that is particularly relevant for cross-national comparisons: home bias, i.e., the tendency of researchers to excessively cite researchers from their own country.

One challenge in estimating the extent of home bias in citations is specifying a benchmark for the geographic distribution of citations that would be observed in a no-bias world. A country's rate of self-citations may appear large merely by virtue of the fact that large countries receive more citations than small countries. We contribute to the literature by providing a yardstick that allows us to systematically identify home bias in citations, building on the literature on home bias in international trade (Head and Mayer, 2014; Santamaría et al., 2023). Specifically, we construct a benchmark based on the number of citations one would expect to observe if citations were distributed solely according to the sizes of all citing and cited countries. We define home bias as the deviation of actual citations from this benchmark.¹

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¹ Earlier contributions in the literature include Correa et al. (2013), who define home bias as a deviation from the share of citations a country gives rather than receives and find no evidence of home bias for China based on a small sample of management papers. Fontana et al. (2019) employ a structural model to define home bias without explicitly incorporating benchmarks, documenting home bias in the U.S. and Europe for economics papers for the period 1985–2012.

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We find that China exhibits by far the largest home bias among all countries. This is not a recent phenomenon. While China's home bias has been steadily increasing over the past twenty years, Chinese citations were already strongly home biased in 2000, the start of our observation period. In addition, China's home bias is not driven by any particular research field. Rather, China exhibits the strongest home bias in 18 out of 20 broad scientific fields. We also compare China's home bias in citations to its home bias in trade. Only for the former is China's home bias not in line with that of other countries.

Finally, we find that home-bias has exaggerated the rise of China in science. While China ranks second behind the US in terms of raw citations, it falls back to the fourth position behind the US, the UK and Germany once we use our de-biased metric. Home-debiasing citation counts might be seen as especially informative if one believes that home citations are especially prone to reflect political or strategic considerations (e.g., citation echo chambers, institutional pressures, or ingratiating oneself with referees or editors) rather than the acknowledgment of scientists cumulatively building on the ideas contained in the articles they choose to cite.

2. Data description

We select cited articles from top international scientific journals published in the English language.² We classify a journal in this category if it belongs to the top decile of journals within a specific research field, based on both its Impact Factor (IF) and its Eigenfactor (EF), which we draw from Clarivate's *Journal Citation Report* (JCR). This definition yields a sample of 461 journals covering 20 broad fields in the physical sciences, engineering, and biomedical research.³

We consider all original publications in top journals that were published between 2000 and 2021, covering the period of China's rise in science. This yields a total number of 3.75 million articles. Table A.1 of the online appendix shows that 17% of these articles are in clinical medicine, 13% in chemistry, and 11% in engineering. We assign each article to one or more countries depending on the addresses that appear in the list of unique affiliations for each article. On average, an article is affiliated with 1.6 countries (median: 1; minimum: 1; maximum: 112). We assign a fraction of the article to a country based on the share of a country's addresses in all listed addresses.⁴

During this period, China's share of top journal articles increased from 1.1% to 25.8%. China experienced the most rapid increases in the fields of materials science (from 3.9% to 45.2%), computer science (from 2.4% to 42.5%), agricultural science (from 1.2% to 41.0%) and engineering (from 2.0% to 41.6%). By 2021, China had become the world's largest publisher of top journal articles in 7 out of our 20 research fields, while the United States remained the world's leading publisher in the other 13 fields.

To analyze citation patterns, we consider all articles in *Web of Science* published between 2000 and 2021 without restricting citing papers to top journals. However, since we want to link citations to countries, we remove citing articles lacking country information (0.3% of citations). This yields a total of 202,142,130 unique citations (i.e., citing-cited article pairs). On average, each article is cited 53.93 times (the median is 27). We assign all citing papers to countries based on their addresses using an identical procedure to that used to classify "top" cited journal articles. We aggregate citations to the country-pair-field level to generate a complete count of citations from a country to other countries using fractional counts, i.e., if $count_{pi}$ is the share of country i 's addresses in paper p , and $count_{rj}$ is the share of country j 's addresses in paper r that cites paper p , the bilateral citations of country j citing country i , $citations_{ij}$, are defined to be

$$citations_{ij} = \sum_p \sum_r count_{pi} \cdot count_{rj}.$$

Since articles are uniquely allocated to a research field based on the journal they are published in, we can construct the bilateral citation count separately for each field f (based on the field of the cited paper, not the citing paper), $citations_{fij}$.

3. Measuring home bias

Fig. 1 displays the share of home citations in a country's overall citations. China receives the largest share of their citations from China itself, 57.2%. The US also receives a large share of their citations from home, 37.1%. China and the US stand out: Other countries have a lower share of home citations, such as India with 26.8% and Iran with 24.8%. However, the US and China are also countries with a large scientific workforce. If Chinese researchers are heavily cited by other Chinese researchers, this may just reflect that there are a larger number of potential Chinese citers relative to citers from other countries. It would not be legitimate to interpret this mechanical effect of country size as reflecting the presence of "bias".

² One might object that our focus on English-language journals is perhaps inherently flattering to English-speaking countries. However, English is the *lingua franca* of international scientific communication, and the inclusion of journals published in other languages would certainly contribute to *increasing* home bias for countries—such as China—whose scientists frequently publish in domestic journals (He, 2003).

³ The *Web of Science* assigns articles published in journals that cover the spectrum of major scientific disciplines (such as *Science* or *Nature*) to a separate field called "Multidisciplinary".

⁴ Appendix A provides more details about data construction.




Fig. 1. Share of home citations.

Notes: This figure computes the raw share of home citations to top journal articles for each country/region, $\frac{citations_{ii}}{\sum_j citations_{ij}}$. It is based on the citations of articles in 20 research fields published in 461 top journals between 2000 and 2021. For the figure, we selected the 20 countries with the largest number of total publications.

We propose to measure home bias as deviations from a benchmark model, which we base on a “dartboard approach” by asking: How many citations would we expect country i to receive from country j , if world citations were distributed only according to the size of the citing and cited countries?⁵ Formally, we express this as:

$$citations_{ij}^{BM} := world_cites \times \overbrace{\frac{\sum_j citations_{ij}}{world_cites}}^I \times \overbrace{\frac{pubs_j}{\sum_j pubs_j}}^{II} \tag{1}$$

where i and j index the cited and citing countries, respectively, and $world_cites$ denotes the total citations in the world,

$$world_cites = \sum_i \sum_j citations_{ij},$$

and $pubs_j$ denote the total number of published articles of a country j .⁶

The benchmark citation flows in Eq. (1) distribute world citations according to the share of citations the cited country i received from the world (I); and the relative size of the potential citing country j as measured by its share of the world’s publications (II). The first share can be interpreted as a country’s overall research quality that the world agrees on and increases its probability to be cited by *everyone* (including itself)—an analog to a country’s overall production in structural gravity equations. The second share captures the potential of a country to cite *anyone* (including itself)—an analog to a country’s overall spending in structural gravity equations. We use publication shares to capture citing potential, as they best capture the unbiased capacity of the citing country to cite other papers.⁷

⁵ As we will show in Section 4, this expression mimics the expression for frictionless trade in the structural gravity equation commonly used in international trade.

⁶ Following the suggestion of one referee, we note that this expression simplifies to $citations_{ij}^{BM} = pubs_j \times \sum_j citations_{ij} / \sum_j pubs_j = pubs_j \times AvgCites_j$. To ensure that home citations do not bias average citations of country i , we computed them based on non-domestic citations in a robustness check in the online appendix. Figure B.3 shows that after this adjustment, China still has the largest home bias of all countries (in fact, its home bias is even larger), and Figure B.4 shows that the same is true when disaggregating the data by scientific fields.

⁷ We could also use citation shares rather than publication shares to capture the size of the citing country, but citation shares may be biased precisely for the reasons outlined in this study. In practice, we will show later that our conclusions are robust to using citation shares rather than publication shares to construct a no-bias benchmark.




Fig. 2. Home bias in citations.

Notes: This figure computes home bias for each country as defined in Eq. (2). It is based on the citations of articles in 20 research fields published in 461 top journals between 2000 and 2021. For the figure, we selected the 20 countries/regions with the largest number of total publications.

We now define country i 's home bias as deviations from both its potential to be cited around the world, and its potential to cite the world, i.e., as the deviation of its actual citation shares from the benchmark citation share:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{home_bias}_i &:= \frac{\text{citations}_{ii}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{ij}} - \frac{\text{citations}_{ii}^{BM}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{ij}} \\
 &= \frac{\text{citations}_{ii}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{ij}} - \frac{\text{pubs}_i}{\sum_j \text{pubs}_j}
 \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

4. Home bias across countries

4.1. Home bias in citations

In Fig. 2 we calculate the home bias across countries implied by Eq. (2). All countries in our sample exhibit home bias to some extent. However, China is a clear outlier with a home bias of 42.3%, followed by Iran (23.2%), and India (23.2%). The home bias of the US is on the larger side of the remaining countries, at 15.9%. In Fig. 3 we plot home bias over time, according to the publication year of the cited article. China's home bias was already large (at 28.5%) at the beginning of our sample period. However, it has been steadily increasing ever since, in contrast to the home bias in other countries, which has remained fairly stable over the entire time period.

In Table 1 we turn to regression analysis using field-specific and period-specific citation flows from all country pairs to estimate the difference between China's home bias and the home bias of other countries more rigorously. The regression framework also allows for more flexible control of other potential drivers of home bias. To this end, we first generalize the definition of home bias in Eq. (2) to encompass citation flows between any pair of countries ij (not just home citations), for any field f and any time period t ⁸:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{citation_bias}_{fijt} &:= \frac{\text{citations}_{fijt}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{fijt}} - \frac{\text{citations}_{fijt}^{BM}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{fijt}} \\
 &= \frac{\text{citations}_{fijt}}{\sum_j \text{citations}_{fijt}} - \frac{\text{pubs}_{fjt}}{\sum_j \text{pubs}_{fjt}}
 \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

⁸ We aggregate citations over four distinct time periods, $t \in \{2000-2005, 2006-2010, 2010-2015, 2015-2021\}$.




Fig. 3. Home bias in citations over time.

Notes: This figure computes home bias for each country/region as defined in Eq. (2), separately by cited article publication year. It is based on articles that were published in 461 top journals in 20 research fields during 2000–2018, and citations to those articles during 2000–2021, in order to ensure that each article has at least a 3-year window to be cited.

Regressing this variable on an indicator variable that indicates home citations allows us to estimate the average home bias across all countries, fields, and time, in β_H .⁹ We add another indicator variable that singles out home citations from China, to estimate whether the home bias from China is significantly different from that of other countries ($\beta_{H,Ch}$)¹⁰:

$$citation_bias_{fijt} = \beta_H \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i=j} + \beta_{H,Ch} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{i=j} \times China + X^1_{fjt} + X^2_{fjt} + X^3_{ij} + \varepsilon_{fijt} \tag{4}$$

where X^1_{fjt} , X^2_{fjt} , and X^3_{ij} denote field-citing country-year specific controls (or fixed effects in some specifications), field-cited country-year specific controls (or fixed effects in some specifications), and country-pair specific controls such as geographic and linguistic distance, respectively.

The regression has the advantage of allowing us to conduct additional robustness checks. For example, in column 2 we more flexibly control for the importance of the benchmark, $PubShare_{fjt} = \frac{pubs_{fjt}}{\sum_j pubs_{fjt}}$, by adding it to the right hand side of Eq. (4), and changing the dependent variable from citation bias to citation share.¹¹ For symmetry, we also control for the cited country's publication share, $PubShare_{fjt} = \frac{pubs_{fjt}}{\sum_j pubs_{fjt}}$.

In column 3, we add fixed effects (origin country, destination country, research field, and time period fixed effects), and examine whether China's large home bias can be attributed to its potentially remote geographic location or its linguistic differences from other major scientific countries. In an analog to gravity equations estimated in the trade literature (e.g., Head and Mayer 2014) we allow citation flows to vary according to the geographic distance between countries (using the log distance between the capitals of two countries) as well as linguistic proximity (as provided by Melitz and Toubal 2014). As in trade regressions, the coefficient on distance is negative, consistent with the idea that geographically-close countries tend to cite each other more, while the coefficient on linguistic proximity is positive, consistent with the idea that linguistically-close countries tend to cite each other more often. However, this does not attenuate the magnitude of China's home bias.

⁹ An observation in the data corresponds to a specific cited country/citing country/field/time period combination, for a total of $188 \times 187 \times 10 \times 4 = 2,812,480$ observations.

¹⁰ In an extended version of Eq. (4) we estimate the home bias separately for each country, as illustrated in Figure B.5 in the online appendix.

¹¹ Eq. (4) implicitly imposes a coefficient of 1 on the publication share.

Table 1
Home bias in citations for China compared to other countries.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	citation bias	citation share	citation share	citation share	citation share	citation share	citation share
Home indicator	0.034*** (0.003)	0.033*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)	0.034*** (0.003)	0.023*** (0.002)
Home indicator× China	0.266*** (0.002)	0.316*** (0.005)	0.294*** (0.006)	0.291*** (0.005)	0.294*** (0.007)	0.294*** (0.006)	0.294*** (0.006)
Citing country's publication share		0.520*** (0.036)	0.378*** (0.040)				
Cited country's publication share		0.017* (0.009)	0.001 (0.001)				
Citing country's citation share				0.501*** (0.019)	0.433*** (0.023)		
Cited country's citation share				0.014* (0.008)	0.002*** (0.001)		
ln(geographic distance)			-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.001*** (0.000)
Linguistic proximity			0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)
Origin country fixed effects			Yes		Yes		
Destination country fixed effects			Yes		Yes		
Scientific field fixed effects			Yes		Yes		
Period fixed effects			Yes		Yes		
Origin×field×period fixed effects						Yes	Yes
Destination×field×period fixed effects						Yes	Yes
Adjusted R ²	0.022	0.390	0.419	0.416	0.433	0.468	0.469
Observations	2,812,480	2,812,480	2,812,480	2,812,480	2,812,480	2,812,480	2,812,480

Note: All regressions are based on the citation data to articles published in 461 top journals in 20 fields during 2000 to 2021. The dependent variable in column 1, citation bias, is computed as in Eq. (3), $citations_{fijt} / \sum_j citations_{fijt} - pub_{fjt} / \sum_j pub_{fjt}$, where $citations_{fijt}$ refer to citations to journal articles of country i in field f from papers authored by researchers from country j during the period t , and $pub_{fjt} / \sum_j pub_{fjt}$ equals the publication share of the citing country j in field f during the period t . The dependent variable in columns 2-7 use only the first term in the expression, the citation share $citations_{fijt} / \sum_j citations_{fijt}$, as dependent variable. The home indicator is defined as $\mathbb{1}_{i=j}$ for all countries. The home indicator for China is defined as $\mathbb{1}_{i=j=China}$, i.e., an interaction term between the all countries home indicator and China. Linguistic proximity between countries is measured on the basis of the Ethnologue classification of language trees, which captures the degree of similarity between languages by examining their shared ancestry at the tree, branch, and sub-branch levels (Melitz and Toubal, 2014). Geographic distance measures the distance between capitals of two countries. The data set consists of 187 origin country by 188 destination country by 20 scientific fields by 4 time period combinations (2000–2005, 2006–2010, 2011–2015, 2016–2021) yielding a total of 2,812,480 observations. We set observations without citations to zero. Robust standard errors are two-way clustered at the origin and destination country levels (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01).

In columns 4 and 5 we use citation shares of the citing and cited country instead of publication shares as the benchmark.¹² Finally, in columns 6 and 7 we add origin by field by time period-specific fixed effects and destination by field by time period-specific fixed effects to absorb all country and field specific time trends in citation patterns. These fixed effects also capture the tendency for certain countries to specialize in particular scientific fields, and further allow these patterns to vary over time. In all specifications of Table 1, China's home bias is at least seven times as large as that of the average country, and the difference is always statistically significant at the 1% level.¹³

In Figure B.1 of the online appendix we ask whether the home bias of China and other countries is more pronounced in particular research fields. We compute the home bias for each country as given by Eq. (2) separately by research field. China's home bias is larger than that of all other countries in 18 out of 20 broad research fields.¹⁴

4.2. Home bias in goods and services

It has long been established that trade in goods and services exhibits home bias as well, where countries disproportionately engage in economic exchanges with neighboring nations or regions.¹⁵ How does the home bias in 'knowledge exports'—specifically, citations—compare to the home bias in trade? On one hand, one might anticipate knowledge flows to exhibit a smaller home bias

¹² More specifically, we use $CitShare_{fjt} = \sum_i citations_{fijt} / world_cites_{ft}$ and $CitShare_{fjt} = \sum_i citations_{fijt} / world_cites_{ft}$ as controls.

¹³ China's home bias is also the largest in magnitude across all countries, regardless of the specification. Results of regressions with home country interactions for all countries are available on request.

¹⁴ Iran in space science and Brazil in pharmacology are the only country-field combinations with larger home bias than China's. Other countries tend to be home biased in a single field, such as the case of India with geoscience. We implemented field-specific estimations of column 7 in Table 1 in regression form, and results are similar: China has a positive home bias in all fields that is statistically different from zero, but the magnitude of the home bias differs across fields, with the home bias being largest in Chemistry, Geoscience, and Materials Science, and smallest in Microbiology, Space Science, and Psychiatry/Psychology.

¹⁵ So well documented is this feature of international trade patterns that it features as one of "The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics" highlighted by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000).

than goods flows, since physical trade barriers such as transport cost and customs are irrelevant. On the other hand, past research has highlighted frictions in the diffusion of scientific knowledge (e.g., Qiu et al., 2025). Additionally, citations may serve not only as indicators of knowledge exchange but also fulfill ceremonial, political, or strategic roles. Such considerations may influence domestic citations relatively more than international citations. Thus, the relationship between home bias in trade and in citations remains an empirical question—one that we explore in the analysis below.

Our definition of the benchmark model for frictionless trade is derived from the structural gravity equation with zero trade cost (Head and Mayer, 2014, equation (2)). Benchmark exports from country i to country j are predicted to be:

$$exports_{ij}^{BM} = world_GDP \times \frac{GDP_i}{world_GDP} \times \frac{Spending_j}{world_GDP} \quad (5)$$

where a country's total production $GDP_i = \sum_j exports_{ij}$ and a country's total spending is $Spending_j = GDP_j + Imports_j - Exports_j$. This is very closely related to the logic applied in defining our citation benchmark: In a frictionless world, world production would be assigned to country i based on its production share, and its export to a specific country would be determined by that country's spending share.¹⁶

Rewriting this equation yields an expression for benchmark export shares:

$$\frac{exports_{ij}^{BM}}{GDP_i} = \frac{Spending_j}{world_GDP} \quad (6)$$

Then, we define country i 's home bias as the deviation of its actual export share from the benchmark export share:

$$\begin{aligned} home_bias_exports_i &:= \frac{exports_{ii}}{GDP_i} - \frac{exports_{ii}^{BM}}{GDP_i} \\ &= \frac{exports_{ii}}{GDP_i} - \frac{Spending_i}{world_GDP} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

where country i 's spending equals its GDP minus its net exports, $Spending_i = GDP_i - (exports_i - imports_i)$, and a country i 's exports to itself, $exports_{ii}$, i.e., domestic consumption, is the residual of a country's total production minus net exports to all other countries, $exports_{ii} = GDP_i - (\sum_{j \neq i} exports_{ij} - \sum_{j \neq i} imports_{ij})$.¹⁷ We use data on bilateral trade flows for 190 exporting countries and 250 importing countries between 2000 and 2021 from the United Nations *Comtrade* database and data on countries' GDP from the World Bank, averaging the data across time.

Fig. 4 compares the home bias in citations (y-axis) to the home bias in the exports of goods and services (x-axis). Similar to the patterns in citations and consistent with the literature in trade, all countries exhibit some form of home bias. However, unlike citations, no country stands out as having a particularly large home bias in trade. In particular, China's home bias in exports is among the lowest compared to other countries. While China's home bias in citations stands out as the largest across countries, China's home bias in exports does not.

These findings suggest that China's exceptionally large home bias in citations is driven by the Chinese scientific research environment. While uncovering the mechanisms that lead to home bias is beyond the scope of this article, a possible cause is the large degree of power-orientation in Chinese society. Power relationships have been shown to influence resource allocation to Chinese researchers (Jia et al., 2019). In the same vein, the selection of Fellows at the Chinese Academies of Sciences and Engineering reflects a culture of favor exchange (Fisman et al., 2018). Focusing on the field of nanotechnology, Tang et al. (2015) show that a higher rate of citing takes place within individual, institutional, and national networks in China, relative to other countries. These authors speculate that “the norms of interpersonal relationships (*guanxi*) in China may lead Chinese scholars to cite the work of their colleagues in the same institute, who they meet frequently, or leading scholars in their own country, who have an influence in proposal review and external evaluation for promotion” (p. 1930).¹⁸

5. Implications of home bias for rankings

Since home citations can be influenced by factors beyond scholarly merit, the inclusion of home citations may bias citation counts as a measure of a country's research achievements.¹⁹ This effect is particularly salient in countries with a large home bias, such as China, Iran and India. To correct for possibly inflated home citations and derive an adjusted citation measure that better reflects research quality, we suggest a revised citation count that adjusts the abnormally large number of home citations by using a country-specific debiasing factor δ_i , which is given by the ratio of benchmark home citations to actual home citations:

$$\delta_i := \frac{citations_{ii}^{BM}}{citations_{ii}}$$

¹⁶ Santamaría et al. (2023) define home bias in an analogous way.

¹⁷ Note that this tends to overestimate domestic trade, as one should only subtract the share of imported intermediate inputs used to produce export goods. As we do not have data on the latter, we also computed a version which yields a lower bound on domestic trade: $exports_{ii} = GDP_i - (\sum_{j \neq i} exports_{ij} - \sum_{j \neq i} reexports_{ij} - \sum_{j \neq i} reimports_{ij})$. This does not affect our finding: China's home bias in citations is the largest across all countries in the world, while China's home bias in exports is not.

¹⁸ Note that the rapid increase of the university sector in China over the past twenty years (Xie et al., 2014) is likely not a culprit for the patterns we document, since our benchmark account for the surge in Chinese scientific labor supply.

¹⁹ Appendix C provides a plausibility check for this conjecture by demonstrating that, for home-biased countries, home citations are less likely to be topically-related to the articles they cite, relative to non-home citations.




Fig. 4. Home bias in knowledge flows vs. trade flows.
 Notes: Home bias in citations (y-axis) is computed according to Eq. (2), and home bias in exports (x-axis) is computed in an analogous way according to Eq. (7).

Using the definition of benchmark citations from Eq. (1) we derive:

$$\delta_i = \frac{world_cites \times \frac{\sum_j citations_{ij}}{world_cites} \times \frac{pubs_i}{\sum_j pubs_j}}{citations_{ii}}$$

$$= \frac{\frac{pubs_i}{\sum_j pubs_j}}{\frac{citations_{ij}}{\sum_j citations_{ij}}}$$
(8)

Applying this country-specific debiasing discount factor δ_i to home citations yields our adjusted measure of aggregate citations to assess the research quality of a country:

$$citations_adjusted_i = \sum_{j \neq i} citations_{ij} + \delta_i \cdot citations_{ii}$$
(9)

We compare the rankings of countries with and without de-biasing adjustment in Fig. 5. The dark blue bars represent country rankings based on the total number of citations between 2000 and 2021. The US is first, with a total of over 81 million citations. China is second with 16.9 million citations, which is approximately one-fifth of the citations that US publications generate. Following are the UK (13.8 mn), Germany (12.2 mn), and Japan (9.8 mn).²⁰

The light blue bars in Fig. 5 reflect the ordering of countries when we use the adjusted citation counts as given by Eq. (9). The US retains its top position, even though a large share of citations received by US scientists is discounted. China, however, falls two ranks (from second to fourth behind Germany and the UK), while the ranking of other countries is largely unchanged.²¹

Economists would readily acknowledge that changes in bibliometric rankings carry no inherent implications for global welfare or the rate of scientific progress. Nonetheless, we highlight these shifts because national league tables hold significant sway over policymakers, and the increasing prominence of Chinese science is frequently framed in catastrophizing narratives, often using rankings or changes therein as the central evidence.²² Such narratives, in turn, have contributed to policies that approach the

²⁰ We also computed adjusted citations using country-field specific debiasing factors instead of country-specific debiasing factors. As this did not affect the country rankings at all, we decided not to show them in this paper.

²¹ In Figure B.6 of the online appendix we rank countries based on citations per paper rather than aggregate citations, which is one way of distinguishing between quantity (number of published papers) from quality (citations per published paper). The US also ranks first in citations per paper (with 71.4 citations per paper), whereas China falls behind to 14th place, as it receives far less citations per paper than the US (39.7 citations per paper). Our adjusted citation measure pushes China even further behind to the 20th rank (23.0 citations per paper).




Fig. 5. Adjusted rankings of countries/regions by total citations received.

Notes: This figure adjusted the rankings for each country/region by Eq. (9). This figure is based on articles that were published in 461 top journals in 20 research fields during 2000–2021, and citations to those articles during the same period.

introduction of additional barriers to international scientific collaboration or communication as desirable outcomes for science policy, with deleterious effects.²³ By tempering zero-sum rhetoric surrounding scientific competition, our adjusted rankings serve as a valuable anchor for policymakers, fostering more measured and judicious approaches to science policy.

6. Conclusion

China's recent emergence as the world's largest producer of scientific research (Tollefson, 2018; Zhou and Leydesdorff, 2006), with an attending dramatic rise in citations (Wagner et al., 2022), has led to an ongoing debate about the quality of research originating from the Middle Kingdom (Huang, 2018).

We investigate whether China's share of home citations is 'abnormal,' by comparing the geographic composition of Chinese citations to a no-bias benchmark. We find a large and increasing home bias in Chinese research that is almost twice as large as that of other countries, and prevalent across all fields of research. This stark home bias in citations contrasts with China's lower-than-average home bias in the export of goods and services.

Other scholars have documented the increase in publications originating from China, the citations received by these publications, as well as the high share of overall citations accounted by domestic Chinese researchers (Xie and Freeman, 2020; Baccini and Petrovich, 2023; Larivière et al., 2018). However, a country's rate of self-citation may appear large merely because the country itself is large (as measured by its share of the world's publications and pool of potential citers). We contribute to the literature by providing a yardstick that allows us to systematically quantify home bias in citations, building on similar approaches in the international trade literature.

This short article does not attempt to distinguish between mechanisms that could give rise to the differential patterns of home bias in citations we uncover, although this remains a valuable goal for future research in this area. In our mind, progress towards

²² A recent article in *The Economist* exemplifies this trend, titled "How worrying is the rapid rise of Chinese science?" (June 15, 2024).

²³ For instance, the "China Initiative", launched in November 2018, appears to have adversely affected both U.S. and Chinese scientists in roughly equal measure (Aghion et al., 2024; Flynn et al., 2024).

this goal will crucially depend on AI-driven advances in separating at scale “building on the shoulders of giants”-type citations from strategic or ceremonial citations, as well as collecting individual demographic data for citing and cited scientists, as in Qiu et al. (2025).

Home bias can distort rankings based on citation counts. We propose an adjusted citation measure that accounts for this type of bias, and find that the prominence of China in research is diminished when employing this method. While we only demonstrate the relevance of home bias for cross-country comparisons, the correction could also be applied to the assessment of articles, researchers, or institutions.

The counting exercise presented above may serve to temper the discourse surrounding China’s purported eclipse of the West, at least as far as scientific prowess is concerned. Should it emerge that the quality of Chinese scientific output still lags even as its quantity leaps ahead, there may be an opportunity to encourage Chinese leadership to recalibrate their emphasis from the latter to the former. Conversely, in the Western context, alleviating the existential dread of losing a scientific showdown with China could stimulate innovations in peer review processes and foster international collaboration, rather than contribute to emulating a potentially overstated Chinese model of “success”.

Declaration of competing interest

None.

Appendix A. Supplementary data

Supplementary material related to this article can be found online at <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104123>.

Data availability

Replication_Paper Tiger? Chinese Science and Home Bias in Citations (Replication Package) (Mendeley Data)

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