
Abstract
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained.
Item Type: | Paper |
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Keywords: | limited liability, piece rates, risk aversion, risk-incentives trade-off |
Faculties: | Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance |
Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
JEL Classification: | D01, D82, J3, M5 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13351-9 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 13351 |
Date Deposited: | 10. Jul 2012, 13:09 |
Last Modified: | 04. Nov 2020, 12:53 |