

Interdisciplinary conference in summer 2005

Munich University

Sprache dialogisch denken – Handeln dialogisch verstehen
Think about language dialogically – Understand action dialogically

(English version of the German original, translated by Sixtus Kage)

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Marie-Cécile Bertau
(conference organizer and chairperson)

Introduction

The conference which is documented on the following pages reflects a multifaceted, reawakened interest in dialogicity as an essential feature of the human way of being and acting. Some cases in point are, above all, psychological (e.g., Hermans & Kempen 1993) and psycholinguistical approaches (Bertau 2004), which take the basics of the philosophy of dialogue (e.g., Buber) and of linguistics (e.g. Humboldt) as their starting point. This reawakened interest also led to the new translation of one of the seminal texts of the dialogical approach to language, Jakubinskij's 1923 article *O dialogičeskoj reči (About dialogical speech)* (German translation *Über die dialogische Rede*, cf. Ehlich & Meng 2004), which did, not least, exert a profound influence on Vygotsky's concept of the relation between word and thought (cf. Vygotsky 1934/1987, chap.7). The aim of the conference was to explore, starting from Jakubinskij's text, the fecundity of a dialogical approach to spoken and written language, both from the point of view of theoretical modelling (e.g. theory of alphabetical writing, language acquisition, theory of co-constructivism) and from a practical point of view (remedial programmes for language acquisition and literacy, didactics).

Since the topic of dialogicity is not only of linguistical interest, but – as illuminated by the above vistas – also of psycholinguistical and pedagogical interest, three academic disciplines co-operated in running this conference. They were joined by staff from the Deutsches Jugendinstitut (DJI e.V.) in Munich whose job is to plan and implement remedial programmes to assist language acquisition. The group was augmented by students of the above disciplines, who had prepared themselves by intensively studying the text in question. This was meant to enable a fecund exchange between different perspectives and a concrete examination of theoretical as well as practical aspects.

The following colleagues are to be mentioned:

Angelika Speck-Hamdan, educationalist, professor of school pedagogy and elementary school didactics (Munich University); among her areas of interest are acquisition of literacy, enabling education, intercultural learning and remedial training in language and writing.

Janette Friedrich, philosopher, staff scientist at the faculty of educational studies (Université de Genève); among her areas of interest are the epistemology of the social sciences and the philosophy

of consciousness, especially the theories of language and consciousness developed by Soviet and German linguists and psychologists in the 1920ies and 1930ies.

The task force of the DJI which includes *Karin Jampert, Kerstin Leuckefeld, Anne Zehnbauer, Petra Best and Andrea Sens*. This task force was commissioned by the BMBF with the development and implementation of programmes fostering language in preschoolers (see Jampert et al. 2006).

Marie-Cécile Bertau, psycholinguist, staff scientist at the institute of psycholinguistics (Munich University). Her interests include the relationship of speech and thinking, dialogicity, the relationship of literacy and orality, functional illiteracy, and the fostering of language.

The conference lasted two days. On the first day, Janette Friedrich ran a workshop dealing with: *The use and the function of the notion of dialogue in the Soviet discourse of the 1920ies, especially with Yakubinsky and Vygotsky*. On the second day, Marie-Cécile Bertau gave an impulse lecture, which was intended to serve as the starting point of an examination of the way psycholinguistics and pedagogy approach language: *A dialogical view for psycholinguistics*. This provided the basis for the discussion of remedial language training programmes with the help of concrete material.

The documentation presented here contains the text by Janette Friedrich as well as my own texts. Both texts revolve around Jakubinskij, refer to him very closely and lead away from him in different ways. In view of the fact that some colleagues and other interested readers do not understand German, the whole documentation is also presented in English. Above all, this aims at making Yakubinsky's text, which consists of 62 paragraphs in 4 chapters, at least partially accessible, since it has only been translated to German so far (a French translation is currently being prepared under the supervision of Sylvie Archaimbault, cf. Archaimbault 2000): Therefore, both texts documented here have an appendix containing excerpts from Jakubinskijs (1923/2004) *Über die dialogische Rede (About dialogical speech)*. In the English version, these excerpts are not real translations, but paraphrases of the German quotations, which remain to serve as the basis to refer to. The quotations within the texts are treated in the same way.

Finally, I would like to thank my colleagues for their interest in my approach to the dialogicity of language and also for their benevolent attempt to think language differently. The students deserve an equal measure of gratitude, because all the speaking and thinking would only be half as nice without their openness, their thirst for knowledge and critical questioning.

Marie-Cécile Bertau

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*Verwendung und Funktion des Dialogbegriffs im sowjetrussischen Diskurs der 1920er Jahre,
insbesondere bei Jakubinskij und Vygotskij.
The use and function of the notion of dialogue in the Soviet-Russian discourse of the 1920ies,
especially with Yakubinsky and Vygotsky*

(translated by Sixtus Kage)

Janette Friedrich

(Université de Genève)

Seminar on 24th June 2006

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1. Introduction: The motive and the historical context of the discussion

Two points are especially relevant to the Soviet-Russian approach to language. On the one hand, the special way of using the notions, especially that of „dialogue“; on the other hand, the “linguistic approach” to be found in Yakubinsky. Yakubinsky talks about a „purely linguistical approach to dialogue“. What this means to Yakubinsky is at the centre of this explanation. In order to put Yakubinsky’s text into a proper perspective, the context of the discussion in the Russia of the 1920ies is to be presented briefly. For this purpose, I mainly rely on the article by S. Romashko (2000), which excellently illuminates the historical background of the dialogue analysis proposed by Yakubinsky.

Yakubinsky's text appears in a 1923 collection entitled „Russian Speech“ (*Russkaja reč*), edited by Ščerba.¹ In the introduction, Ščerba contrasts the German tradition, which sees language in terms of a correspondence between word and thing, with the Russian conception, which equates language with living speech expressing „our Russian“ thinking and „our Russian feeling“. The interest in the relationship of words and things prevailing in the

¹ Lev Vladimirovič Ščerba (1880-1944): Soviet linguist and literary scholar, active in the fields of general linguistics and slavonic and romance languages. He studied with Baudoin de Courtenay. In his thesis about the Sorbian dialect (1915), Ščerba already advocated the contrast of monologue and dialogue, which he further developed in the following years (cf. Ivanova 2000: 118ff.).

German tradition is compared to language as a living action, which Russian linguists are interested in. This interest is nurtured by three sources: poetry, References, and theatre. In theatre in particular, language proves to be alive and creative. It creates actions, is at the same time action itself and breaks up the automatisms of everyday language. Here, language appears as a living activity.

As precursors of this thinking, interested in living speech, are to be mentioned: Vladimir Dal', who locates the source of language facts, above all, in conversations (where an anti-institutional notion of conversation is to be presupposed); as well as Alexander Potebnja, for whom the linguist's most important task is "to listen to speech"². It needs to be remarked that in the Russia of that time, the slavonic dialects were only spoken and not written; language could only be investigated by listening, by experiencing speech as a language created in the presence of the listener.

The written, institutionalized language of authorities and churches (the language of power), which mainly existed in monological form, is contrasted with dialect (the language of the people), conversation, the oral communication, and is discussed as a cultural value. Here lies the root of the contrast of monologue as an artificial form of language with dialogue as a living one advocated by Yakubinsky. The studies of dialogue carried out in the 1920ies are thus a continuation of the interest the Russian philology had in the living Russian language in the 19th century.

2. L.S. Jakubinskij *Über die dialogische Rede (About Dialogical Speech)* (1923/2004)

The text begins with three statements:

1) The starting point of every linguistical investigation ist the „diversity of speech“ („Vielgestaltigkeit der Rede“). *Language does thus not have a unified form*, but exists in many shapes such as poetry, prose, as common speech or as a scholarly lecture.³ When referring to Yakubinsky, Vygotsky mentions first of all this thought, which he regards as central: „In linguistics, this problem of the *variation in speech functions* has recently attracted a good deal of attention. It turns out that even from the linguist's perspective, language is not a single form of speech activity but a collection of varied speech functions.“ (Vygotsky, 1934/1987 p.270; emphasis in the original⁴). The variety of language, the fact that language consists of an ensemble of verbal functions is, in Yakubinsky's view, the real object of the linguist's research.

2) The question arises how language, structured in such a way, is to be studied. Yakubinsky regards *language as a phenomenon which is immediately subject to living perception* and thus privileges a kind of phenomenal empiricism. The object to be studied therefore has to be

² Vladimir I. Dal' (1801-1872), writer and linguist, author of a „Dictionary of the living Russian Language“ (1863-66), also built up a large collection of Russian proverbs (cf. Romashko, 2000). Alexander A. Potebnja (1835-1891): Russian philologist and theorist of language, who supported the historical school of linguistics according to Humboldt and Steinthal; Influence on Vygotskij. Cf. Naumova (2004).

³ The Russian term for „functional language shapes“ („funktionale sprachliche Gestalten“ in the German translation by Hommel & Mengl 2004) is *funkzional'noe mnogoobrazie retchi*. In the German translation of Vygotskij (1934/2002), the term is translated by „funktionale Vielfalt des Sprechens“ („functional diversity of speech“). I would like to point out that the word *obraz* in the Russian text hints at something like cristallization, both regarding the *process* and the *result*.

⁴ With this emphasis, Vygotsky refers to Yakubinsky's term which is translated as *functional diversity of speech* in this text.

available in its immediacy, so that it can be perceived by our sensory organs. In Yakubinsky's case, the perceived is living speech. The perceived is recorded, or just written down. So, the description of language directly refers to the perception made possible by the sense organs.

3) *Language always is a kind of human behaviour.* It needs to be emphasized that, for Yakubinsky, language is *not* prior to behaviour, it cannot be separated from behaviour. Language is a constitutive element of human behaviour and is always created anew by the “organism” (the human being) itself. If language is considered a kind of human behaviour, two conclusions are obvious: Language is psychologically and sociologically determined. Language is determined psychologically insofar as the speaker has a certain psyche. In some situations, he is influenced by emotional motives and states, in other situations he is influenced by rational ones. Here, Yakubinsky also distinguishes the normal and the pathological situation. The speaker's whole psychological state influences his speech. The sociological determination results from the speaker's living together with other human beings. Out of this, certain conditions of communication, and forms and purposes of communication arise for every speaker, which he takes into account while organizing his speaking.

2.1. The concept of functionality of speech

What does it mean to consider language functionally? What does Yakubinsky mean by functional study of language?

For Yakubinsky, this means, above all, to take the preconditions and purposes of an utterance into account. The notion of purpose, which is linked to language shapes by Yakubinsky, is not construed as the mental intention of a speaker, but socially. The typology which Yakubinsky suggests for the shapes of language builds, first of all, on the purposes of communication. It is a typology of functional shapes of language, which was standard practice in the linguistics of his time and which draws upon Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose works were available in the Russian language.

Apart from the distinction between poetry and prose, which Yakubinsky mainly discusses, Humboldt refers to, among others, common speech, scientific prose, and rhetorical speech (cf. Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, §7). Yakubinsky confirms Humboldt's distinction between poetry and prose, which is based upon the differences of their purposes, he criticises Humboldt, however, for “not having carried out this distinction sufficiently clearly and for not having added a linguistic analysis” („Differenzierung nicht hinreichend klar durchgeführt und nicht von einer sprachlichen Analyse begleitet“) (ibid., p.386). The differences between poetry and prose can, of course, be deduced from extra-lingual facts, prose possesses a different way of thinking and a different orientation of the mind than poetry. Yakubinsky nevertheless suggests to begin the analysis at the aspect of the peculiarities of language. These peculiarities of language show in the choice of words, in the grammatical forms used, in the syntactic linking of the words, and in the phonetic properties. According to Yakubinsky, the language shapes can be distinguished by their purposes (or: by their objectives) and by their linguistical means. Here, Yakubinsky privileges a purely linguistical approach.

By analyzing the purely linguistical means, Yakubinsky opposes Humboldt, for whom the specific connection between thought and language takes precedence in distinguishing language shapes. Yakubinsky's approach entails that every functional shape of language can be considered as a language of its own, which has its own conventions, i.e. a certain syntax, choice of words etc.

Yakubinsky's idea is expressed in the theses of the Prague Circle of Linguists in the following words: „Every functional language has a system of conventions (a system of rules) – the language in the proper sense, it is therefore wrong to identify a functional language with „language“ (*langue*) and another one with „speech“ (*parole*) (in Saussure's terminology)“ (*Thèses*, 1929, p.15). Language (*langue*) is thought about differently by Yakubinsky and the Prague Circle of Linguists. For Yakubinsky, there is not only *one* language (*one* system *langue*), but every shape of language possesses its own structure, its own *langue* having its own grammar. There are as many *langues* as there are language shapes. It is important here that the particular language conventions remain a structuring element for the different uses, so that language is not dissolved in speech.⁵ Language cannot be detached from its realization in speech, at the same time the analysis of the functional shapes of speech always contains an analysis of the structure of language.

This way of looking at language has, above all, an effect on the teaching of language: We are used to illustrate the peculiarities of the grammar of, e.g., the German language by using examples from various functional shapes (prose, poetry, everyday language etc.). Following Yakubinsky, these are incomparable entities, because each of them has its own “grammar”. Thus, the traditional division of linguistics into semantics, grammar, phonetics and forms of discourse would also have to be questioned.

Yakubinsky's way of discussing the functional shapes of language from a purely linguistical point of view entails a second consequence, which was mainly discussed by Vygotsky. Yakubinsky himself does not use the term inner speech. Vygotsky, however, relies on Yakubinsky's demonstration of the diversity of speech in order to introduce inner speech as a shape of speech of its own in the seventh chapter of *Thinking and Speech* (1934/1987). From this point of view, inner speech can be maintained to be a language shape of its own, alongside with poetry, prose, and everyday speech. Inner speech has some peculiarities which distinguish it from other functional shapes. This is in marked contrast to the behavioural view of inner speech (e.g. Watson).

The transition from the notion of function to the notion of form:

In paragraph 13⁶, Yakubinsky amends the the notion of function, which is connected to language shapes, by the notion of form. Both aspects are interlinked in the diversity of speech as conceived by Yakubinsky. Thus, Yakubinsky classifies language shapes firstly according to function and secondly according to form. The first classification is special in that it mainly relies on factors outside language, such as the purposefulness of the various language shapes. „Denn wenn wir Klassifikationen im Zweckbereich durchführen, grenzen wir in Wirklichkeit nicht sprachliche Phänomene ab, sondern den Einfluß dieser Phänomene, und wir können nicht sofort eine wenn auch grobe Projektion dieser Klassifizierung in den Bereich der Rede selbst vornehmen. Dagegen schlagen wir in unserem Falle, wenn wir von einer Klassifikation der *Formen der Rede* ausgehen, sofort eine Brücke vom Bereich der außersprachlichen Faktoren zu den sprachlichen Phänomenen [...]“ (ibid., p.393, emphasis added by J.F.). (Paraphrase: „For, if we classify by purpose, we do not delineate language phenomena, but the effects of these phenomena, so that a projection into the realm of speech cannot be done immediately. If we start by classifying *speech forms*, however, we build a bridge from extra-linguistical facts to language phenomena [...]“) In the following, Yakubinsky discusses dialogue and monologue as „forms of verbal utterance“.

⁵ For a more precise discussion, refer to Friedrich (2005).

⁶ Cf. the appendix.

2.2. The notion of dialogue

2.2.1. The reduction of the language factor in dialogue

As opposed to monologue (mediated mutual action), dialogue is characterized by Yakubinsky as an immediate mutual action. Regarding the meaning of “immediateness of dialogue”, Yakubinsky refers to the visual and auditive perception of the partner and its role in the semantization of speech (its influence on the constitution of communicated meaning). In particular, this means that the perception of tone and timbre of the speech, of its dynamics and intonation, as well as the perception of the speaker's mimics and gestures decisively influences the listener's comprehension. If these visual and auditive indications emanate from the listener, then they also act upon the speaker. The visual and auditive indications have “a common ‘source’ in the shape of a specific bodily state” (Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, p.398: “gemeinsame ‘Quelle’ in der Form einer bestimmten körperlichen Verfassung”).

As dialogue always proceeds via perception, this entails that tone, timbre, dynamics, intonation, gestures, and mimics play a decisive role in speech. All these phenomena are immediately perceptible in dialogue and, being immediately perceived, they influence the perception of the other's speech. Intonation can, e.g., modify the meaning of what is said. It is also possible to communicate by gestures and mimics alone, with a word occasionally thrown in. This is how the reduction of the language factor in dialogue comes about. Language factor, according to Yakubinsky, is something like the semantics of a word. If intonation modifies the meaning of what is said, the role of the semantic factor (the word's meaning itself) is reduced.

Yakubinsky's interest was to find out what happens when these phenomena, which accompany an utterance, occur. As dialogue is immediate, these factors are perceptible for the listener and determine the perception of the other's speech. Following Yakubinsky, the perception puts the listener into a certain attitude (“Einstellung”).⁷ Even more: An orientation is always realized in dialogue by this perception. The utterance is perceived on the basis of a certain attitude, which is produced by the factors perceived while listening. „Die allgemeine Wichtigkeit der Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Wahrnehmung der Rede als eines Faktors, der die Wichtigkeit der sprachlichen Reize verringert, zeigt sich in der dialogischen Rede im allgemeinen [...] viel deutlicher als in der monologischen Rede [...]“ (“The general importance of the fact that the perception of speech is dependent on a change of orientation⁸ generally shows itself in dialogical speech [...] more clearly than in monological speech [...]”) (ibid., p.418). That means, there are “language facts” (“sprachliche Fakten”) in a narrow sense – such as syntax, phonetics, and semantics – and there are constitutive language facts in a wider sense: tone, timbre, intonation etc. Thus, a problem arises for the notion of reference in language theory, which suggests that a word, regardless in which situation and in which way it is uttered, still „hits the target” which is meant.

This relativization of language factors in a narrow sense is also discussed by another theorist of language of that time. Karl Bühler occurs to me and his contribution to the development of phonology (cf. Friedrich, 2004).

⁷ Cf. appendix, §22.

⁸ For the sake of clarity (e.g., to avoid confusing coincidences of ‘perception’ and ‘apperception’), and acknowledging that every translation is an interpretation, we deliberately chose to translate „Apperzeption“ as *change of orientation*, since this is what actually happens *and* what matters to Yakubinsky.

2.2.2. Connecting piece: A notion of form following Bühler

In his *Theory of Language* (1934/1990), Bühler extensively discusses the results of the incipient science of phonology and makes a contribution to it. With the determination of phonemes, Bühler uses the notion of the “acoustic shapes of the sound images”. According to Bühler, the words of our language possess both a set of descriptive phonemic features and an acoustic shape (“Gesicht”, face). We are thus within the area of spoken language. The set of descriptive phonemic features is not sufficient to guarantee the necessary diacritical function during the formation of sounds (cf. Bühler, 1934/1990, p.320).

By “acoustic shape of the sound images”, Bühler means the modulation of articulation, the accent of the word, the intonation, which clearly contribute to the recognition of the sounds and which sometimes are the only means of recognizing. The „substantive” („stoffliche“) qualities of the words belong to the diacritically relevant elements of language. This claim, however, entails that the conventional conception of the form-substance-relationship, which prevails in phonology, has to be revised. „The phonologically imprinted, formed structure *ich* (I), which is distinguished clearly enough from all other words of the German language, resounds with the same phonological form from millions of mouths. It is only the vocal material, the auditory shape that individuates it, and that is the meaning of the answer *I* given by my visitor at the door: the phonematic impress, the linguistic formal factor in his *I* points out the vocal character to me, the questioner.“ (Bühler, 1934/1990, p.129)

The phonological side of the locutional forms remains the same for every word, independent of the speaker, because phonemes are abstractions and hence idealizations. The locutional form of a word does function diacritically on its own but requires, in certain situations, the substantive qualities of the word, the word accent, and the character of the voice. The locutional form of the word *ich* thus changes its function and points to the substantive qualities of the same word, which take over the diacritical function. So, the form causes a perception of the tonal peculiarity of the word, which results in the word's so-called individualization. The form refers to the substance in order to function. Bühler also demonstrates a reduction of the language factor in the practices of speech, in the immediate dialogue. The locutional form hands over its diacritical function to the substance (tone, timbre, dynamics). This orientation towards materiality shows a common feature in Yakubinsky's und Bühler's thought.⁹

It needs to be remarked that – as mentioned above – the role of the language factor (the locutional form) is reduced but does not disappear entirely. Without the locutional, form no reference to the substance of the sign could take place, and language would not work. Here, Vygotsky's discussion of inner speech (1934/1987), which relies heavily on Yakubinsky, should only be mentioned in passing: The language factor also remains here and does not dissolve despite all the abbreviation and condensation, but it works in a special way.

2.2.3. The naturalness of dialogue

In contrast to monologue, Yakubinsky points out the naturalness of dialogue. This naturalness can be taken as a theme in many ways. On the one hand, „naturalness“ is understood in the sense of reflexes. Dialogues are just voluntary acts, i.e. spontaneous, not reflected.¹⁰ The

⁹ See also Bühler's explanations (1934/1990, p.309ff.) as well as Friedrich (2004).

¹⁰ Cf. Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 400), §24, in the appendix. 20th century language theory is characterized by

utterances produced in dialogue often occur outside the control exerted by attention and consciousness. Dialogue presents itself like a living relationship with the world, it appears to be a quick succession of actions (action-reaction), which almost have a reflex-like character (Yakubinsky calls this a “language urge”) and which do not leave time for thought (reflection). In this context, Yakubinsky's claim that the social is closest to the biological in the language phenomenon of dialogue becomes comprehensible (cf. the dialogue of six drunken craftsmen in Dostoevsky, which is quoted by Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, p.398-399). On the other hand, this “naturalness” lies in the description of dialogue given by Yakubinsky. In dialogue, no act of speaking is closed, the speaker begins a sentence and waits for an interruption which can occur at any moment. The speed is high and while a speaker prepares an utterance he perceives the other's utterance at the same time. There often is no time left for the speaker to choose his words carefully, the speech possesses an elliptic character and is often characterized by a question-answer-play.

Monologue is, however, characterized as a complex voluntary act, in which the subject consciously turns to what he wants to express. The speaker ponders what to say, there can be a struggle of motives, there is a selection. „Monolog bedeutet nicht nur Adäquatheit der Ausdrucksmittel in bezug auf den jeweiligen psychischen Zustand, sondern er stellt auch die Anordnung, die Komposition der sprachlichen Einheiten als etwas Eigenständiges in den Vordergrund. Es kommt zu einer Bewertung der rein sprachlichen Beziehungen [...] Hierbei werden die sprachlichen Beziehungen zu Determinanten, zur Quelle von im Bewusstsein entstehenden Eindrücken mit Bezug auf sie selbst.“ (paraphrase: “Monologue does not only mean appropriateness of the means of expression with regard to the particular state of mind. It also lets the composition of the language come to the fore as something independent. The relationships within language are valued. [...] The relationships within language become the sources of impressions about language generated in consciousness”) (ibid.,p.407). Monologue is therefore characterized by a linguistic self-reflection and by a certain organization and structure, which provides it with the character of a piece of work. It is interesting to note that Yakubinsky uses the notion of the will, which occurs only rarely in the linguistics of his time, to distinguish between dialogue and monologue.

2.2.4. Conditions for dialogue

In the last chapters of his text, Yakubinsky deals with the conditions for dialogue (§§43-62). The idea of the so-called *Apperzeptionsmasse* (“conglomerate of orientation”) needs to be emphasized.¹¹ To enable communication, the conglomerates of orientation of the partners have to approach each other. One partner has to think about what the other talks about, in order to understand the other's speech. By elaborating the speech's *dependence on a change of orientation* („Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Rede“), Yakubinsky arrives at an almost fatalistic model of communication, which could also be named a negative model. For it is implied that in the case of conglomerates of orientation which are not similar enough, or which are even completely different, a communication could not take place. A positive model of communication would give priority to decoding, which presupposes only knowledge of the code and which therefore can abstract from the content of the psyche (the common conglomerate of orientation) of the partners.

rationalism; biology and biological aspects are rejected. Employing biological notions means narrowing the gap between human being and animal and the inclusion of non-rational components such as feelings.

¹¹ Cf. appendix, §43.

A further idea, which Yakubinsky developed in this connection, pertains to the so-called patterns of everyday life: „Unser tägliches Leben ist voll von Sich-Wiederholendem und Festgeprägtem; in der Gesamtheit unserer wechselseitigen Handlungen mit anderen Menschen gehört ein außerordentlich großer Teil zu den festgefügteten wechselseitigen Handlungen [...]“ (paraphrase: „Our daily life is full of the repetitive and the firmly established; within our interactions with other people, an extraordinarily big share belongs to the firmly established interactions.“) (ibid., p.419).¹² The patterns of everyday life correspond to certain, firmly established sentences, ways of using sentences, sentence patterns, “fossilized” words. Certain answers are so firmly embedded in certain everyday situations that they are produced automatically, without any thinking. In many social contexts there are firmly established linguistical patterns of exchange, in which words and sentences are used are used “unconsciously”. Here, the “naturalness” of dialogue shows itself again. The words and collocations used like that are not broken down and not grasped consciously. Rather, they work like a signal, like something which has been rehearsed.

Here, a cross-reference to Bühler is appropriate, who, in my view, discusses the same phenomenon in his explanation of the sympractical use of language. In this connection, Bühler investigates the so-called ellipsis problem and underlines that the abbreviations observed in ellipses are not at all unfinished sentences. The half sentence „Einen Schwarzen bitte“ („A black one please“), uttered in a Vienna Café, is practically sufficient speech. Bühler talks about language islands which emerge in mutual actions. It is not necessary to complete this groups of words to understand them. The examples put forward by Yakubinsky, such as the sentence „Hast du heute die Zeitung gekauft?“ (“Have you bought a newspaper today”), repeated every morning, work in a similiar way. They are firmly established sentences, the structure of the sentence is blurred, it works like a pattern.¹³

All these linguistical phenomena described by Yakubinsky can be subsumed under the notion of *sprachlicher Automatismus (language automatism)*. The eighth chapter of his book is dedicated to just this topic. Here, Yakubinsky emphasizes again that a theory of language cannot (paraphrase of the following quotation) “disregard those language activities which are neither complex nor characterized by exceptionality and with which language facts do not (fully) become the object of conscious attention. In the latter case language is used ‘unconsciously’, automatically.” („auch jene sprachliche Tätigkeit nicht außer Acht lassen [kann], die weder durch Kompliziertheit (d.h. Momente des Kampfes der Motive und der Auswahl) noch durch Ungewöhnlichkeit (des Sprechens oder der Wahrnehmung) gekennzeichnet ist und bei der die sprachlichen Fakten entweder nur ganz minimal oder überhaupt nicht bewußt werden und nicht Objekt der Aufmerksamkeit sind. In diesem letzten Falle gebrauchen wir die Rede gleichsam »unbewußt«, automatisch.“ (ibid., p.427)

If these sentences are produced without a so-called „language intention“, without language facts becoming conscious, without the sentence being broken down or completed, the „causes“ of their production cannot be located in the linguistical consciousness. Yakubinsky points to psychophysiological laws, which determine the use of language in these situations characterized by a lack of consciousness and attention. Thus, this lack of control locates dialogical speech outside any theory of intentional language. A cross-reference to Pierre Janet would seem to be appropriate here.

¹² Cf. appendix, §§44, 45.

¹³ See Jakubinskij (1923/2004) §45, see Bühler (1934/1990) §10 in part III.

3. Résumé

Yakubinsky's precise distinction between monologue and dialogue shows that these forms cannot be equated with each other. Dialogue cannot be explained by resorting to monologue, it is an independent and special phenomenon of speech. Retracing Yakubinsky's line of argument, it becomes evident that he points out two seemingly conflicting characteristics of dialogue. On the one hand, he talks about a diminishing role of the linguistic stimulus, to be precise: In the process of speaking, little attention is devoted to the actual language-like. On the other hand, he refers to certain language elements such as timbre, tone, intonation, and firmly established sentences, which are used by the speaker, so to speak, automatically and unconsciously. In my view, he thus proposes an extension of the notion of language. The functioning of language is not reduced to the intentional, conscious, reflected use of language by the speaker, which can typically be observed in monologue and, above all, written language, but it is also addressed as a process occurring quasi-naturally. There is no doubt that the naturalness of dialogue is a socialized one, as the patterns of speech used in everyday life are learned. Talking about language as a natural, automatic, or, in Yakubinsky's terms, simple act of the will, hints at the fact that language cannot merely be understood as an intentionally controlled action. Language is thus embedded into the living relationship which the speaker maintains with the world and with the Other and cannot be explained outside this relationship. The latter entails that the functioning of language cannot be deduced from itself and its characteristics, but only from the features which language shows and produces in this living relationship. A theory of *language* which wants to do justice to the *linguistical* phenomenon of dialogue has to extend its notion of language, or, to put it differently, cannot merely be conceived as a *theory* of language. The notion of language has to find its place in the conceptualization of the speaker's constantly renewed relationship with the world. The notions developed for this purpose will necessarily not be purely linguistic ones, but they will overlap with physiological, psychological and sociological notions, as is clearly shown by Yakubinsky's thoughts.

4. Appendix: Selected passages from Jakubinskij's *Über die dialogische Rede (About Dialogical Speech)* (1923/2004)

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 393), §13:

„Der Frage nach den Formen sprachlicher Äußerungen sind die folgenden Seiten meines Artikels gewidmet. Ich habe mich aus folgenden Gründen auf diese Frage konzentriert: Erstens, sie blieb bei der Diskussion des Faktums der Vielgestaltigkeit der sprachlichen Äußerungen in der letzten Zeit gleichsam im Schatten und war vom Moment des Zwecks verdeckt (das, was in der Terminologie des Moskauer Linguistenkreises mit »Funktionalität der Rede« bezeichnet wird); zweitens, die Klassifikation, die sich auf die Unterscheidung von Äußerungsformen gründet, muß aus methodologischen Gründen anderen vorangehen, besonders den zweckbezogenen. Denn wenn wir Klassifikationen im Zweckbereich durchführen, grenzen wir in Wirklichkeit nicht sprachliche Phänomene ab, sondern den Einfluß dieser Phänomene, und wir können nicht sofort eine wenn auch grobe Projektion dieser Klassifizierungen in den Bereich der Rede selbst vornehmen. Dagegen schlagen wir in unserem Falle, wenn wir von einer Klassifikation der Formen der Rede ausgehen, sofort eine Brücke vom Bereich der außersprachlichen Faktoren zu den sprachlichen Phänomenen und gewinnen die Möglichkeit, sofort z.B. über den Unterschied der Mitteilungsmittel dieser oder jener Unterart zu sprechen oder Monolog und Dialog als sprachliche Phänomene einander gegenüberzustellen.“

paraphrase: „The following passages are dedicated to language forms. I concentrated my discussion on this question for the following reasons: Firstly, this question was overshadowed while dealing with the diversity of language and was eclipsed by the element of purpose (which is called functionality of speech in the terminology of the Moscow Circle of Linguists); Secondly, for methodological reasons, the classification which is based on the distinctions of shapes of utterances has to precede the other classifications, especially those based on purpose. For, if we classify by purpose, we do not delineate language phenomena, but the effects of these phenomena, so that a projection into the realm of speech cannot be done immediately. If we start by classifying speech forms, however, we build a bridge from extra-linguistical facts to language phenomena and we are immediately enabled to talk about the differences of communicative means of this or that subgroup or to compare monologue and dialogue as language phenomena.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 399), §22:

„In Verbindung mit dem oben Gesagten über die Bedeutung von Ton und Timbre möchte ich folgende Bemerkung machen: Ton und Timbre der Rede des Sprechers zwingen uns bereits zu ihrem Beginn, eine bestimmte Position einzunehmen, uns in bestimmter Weise auf den Sprecher und seine Äußerung einzustellen; wir rezipieren seine Äußerung auf der Grundlage dieser »Einstellung«. Manchmal zwingen uns die ersten Worte durch ihren Ton, auf eine bestimmte Weise zuzuhören – feindselig oder voller Mitgefühl oder in einer anderen Richtung, das heißt, sie bedingen die Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Wahrnehmung, schaffen in uns einen Standpunkt, von welchem wir das Weitere sehen [...]“

paraphrase: „In connection with what is mentioned above about the significance of tone and timbre: the speaker's tone and timbre force the listener into a certain position to adapt to the speaker and his utterance. His utterance is received on the basis of this “attitude/setting”. Sometimes, the first words force us to listen in a special way – hostile or full of compassion or in a different direction, i.e. the perception is dependent on a change of orientation so that the first words create a point of view, from which everything that follows is seen.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 400), §24 (excerpt):

„Alle diese Überlegungen weisen darauf hin, daß eine Äußerung in der unmittelbaren sprachlichen Kommunikation unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen in stärkerem Maße als eine einfache Willenhandlung außerhalb der Kontrolle durch Bewußtsein und Aufmerksamkeit verläuft als eine Äußerung in der mittelbaren Kommunikation.“

paraphrase: „ All these reflections point to the conclusion that an utterance in the immediate linguistic communication is, all other things being equal, much less controlled by consciousness and attention than an utterance in mediated communication.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 417), §43 (excerpt):

„Die Apperzeptionsmasse des jeweiligen Gesprächspartners »besteht« zu Beginn des Gesprächs aus der ihm generell eigenen beständigen Apperzeptionsmasse, die durch die je momentane Apperzeption sowie durch die Wahrnehmung des Gesprächspartners und der

Umstände erweitert wird, außerdem aus einer gewissen mehr oder weniger konkreten Vorstellung über das Thema des Gesprächs, diese apperzeptionelle Ausgangsbasis des Dialogs wird darüber hinaus im Zusammenhang mit dem wahrgenommenen Inhalt der Beiträge des Gesprächspartners kompliziert und verändert; somit vollzieht sich jedes nachfolgende Sprechen auf dem Hintergrund der Apperzeptionsmasse, die letzten Endes durch den gerade wahrgenommenen Beitrag bestimmt wird.“

paraphrase: „The conglomerate of orientation of the respective partner ‘consists’ of his own, permanent conglomerate of orientation at the beginning of the conversation, which is modified by the perception of the other partner and the circumstances, furthermore, of a more or less concrete idea of the starting point of the conversation. This orientational starting point of the dialogue is modified and made more complex by taking the perceived content of the partner's contributions into account; Thus, every subsequent speaking takes place against the background of the conglomerate of orientation, which is determined by the contribution just perceived.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 418), §44:

„[...] das in der sprachlichen Kommunikation wirksame Moment der Entsprechung der Muster des Alltags und der Rede.“

paraphrase: „ ... the correspondence between patterns of everyday life and speech which is effective in linguistic communication ...”

as well as (1923/2004: 419), §45:

„Unser tägliches Leben ist voll von Sich-Wiederholendem und Festgeprägtem; in der Gesamtheit unserer wechselseitigen Handlungen mit anderen Menschen gehört ein außerordentlich großer Teil zu den festgefügteten wechselseitigen Handlungen [...]“

paraphrase: „Our daily life is full of the repetitive and the firmly established; within our interactions with other people, an extraordinarily big part belongs to the firmly established interactions.”

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*Eine dialogische Sichtweise für die Psycholinguistik
A dialogical perspective for psycholinguistics*

(translated by Sixtus Kage)

Marie-Cécile Bertau

(Munich University)

Lecture on 25 June 2006

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1. Preliminary remark

For a start, we need to ask: Why Yakubinsky, why do we start from this recently translated, but rather old text (1923)?

In my view, there is more to Yakubinsky's article than just historical interest. Something more which can be understood and reinterpreted psycholinguistically. I would like to sketch this in the following text. I proceed by naming certain aspects of Yakubinsky's text *About Dialogical Speech* (see Jakubinskij 1923/2004: *Über die dialogische Rede*) which is supposed to yield an answer to the question „Why Yakubinsky?“ Departing from there, I try to state the peculiarities of dialogue, which play an important role in the two areas of interest of this conference: language acquisition and the fostering of language.

2. Yakubinsky – or: about the disappearance of language

Among various, really fascinating aspects of Yakubinsky's text, one seems to be especially impressive: that the language-like can retreat, even disappear entirely in the communication. It is the linguist Yakubinsky, who attaches great value to a *linguistical* approach to language activity (§9), it is this very linguist, who shows, starting from such a position, how language disappears. What Yakubinsky points out is that and how, in which respects and under which conditions, „Sprachliches als solches“ („*the language-like as such*“), can recede.

This reveals a different understanding of „linguistics“ than usual. Even though Yakubinsky insists on the linguistical approach to language activity and is unwilling to give up this approach in favour of one starting with purposes (§13), he sees the linguistical form in connection with use and thus function. It is therefore not the case that there is a hypostatical system „language“, which is *subsequently* applied. Rather, language as language activity takes place all the time, and, as an occurrence, it appears to us in different forms. Or: As people being active by and while using language we use different forms to the extent that we are in different communicative situations and behave accordingly.

And: The situations do not dissolve the form – this would amount to the primacy of purposes, which Yakubinsky rejects. The language form remains the “strukturierendes Moment” („structuring moment“) for the needs to utter which manifest themselves in specific communication situations – even when it recedes.¹⁴ In my view, there is a parallel between Yakubinsky and a thought in Vygotsky's work, which is difficult to comprehend: After Vygotsky proposes the metaphor of evaporation for the transformation of speech into thought, he continues: „However, speech does not disappear in its internal form. [...] Inner speech is speech. It is thought that is connected with the word.“ (1934/1987, p.280).

3. Yakubinsky's forms

Yakubinsky talks about the language forms as arising from general mutual actions. Thus, some action has to be imagined as already happening, not as occurring subsequently. The forms are (§14): the immediate and the mediated forms, the dialogical and the monological form. This results in four basic forms, three of which are „sozial bedeutsamer und relativ weit verbreitet sind“ („more important socially and relatively widespread“). Yakubinsky is mainly concerned with the immediate dialogical form, he also calls it the „allgemeingültige Form“ („universally valid form“) (§25). Following the linguist Ščerba, Yakubinsky talks about the naturalness of dialogue (chap.4).¹⁵

This universally valid and natural status of dialogue and the extended treatment by Yakubinsky, which is thus legitimized, justifies the notion of dialogism. Dialogism could be a view of language as essentially dialogical – which corresponds to Ščerba's definition of language quoted by Yakubinsky at the beginning of the fourth chapter: „und daß die Sprache ihr wirkliches Sein nur im Dialog zutage treten läßt.“ (“and that language reveals its real existence only in dialogue”) (quoted in Yakubinsky 1923/2004, p.401). To describe the peculiarities of dialogue, then, means to describe language itself, to describe language actions. Dialogue becomes the paradigm for the understanding of language. I think that Yakubinsky also had this in mind.

I would like to delineate the peculiarities which Yakubinsky ascribes to dialogue by introducing some core notions. In §22, the notion of *Einstellung* (*setting, attitude*) appears first and is connected with the notion of *Apperzeptionsgebundenheit* (*dependence on a change of orientation*). *Einstellung* arises from the way a speaker talks immediately at the beginning of a speech which is seen or heard. The *Einstellung* provides a starting point from which the further parts of a speech are perceived and understood. *Einstellung* means perspective and aligns the one who understands the speech in a specific way.

¹⁴ „strukturierendes Moment“: cf. Friedrich 2005, p.40.

¹⁵ The passage which concludes § 29 and considers the social/culture – the biological/nature with regard to dialogue and monologue seems to be especially interesting. Cf. the appendix.

The manner of speaking also determines the *Apperzeptionsgebundenheit* of perception, which is the topic of chapter 6. Comprehension depends on the „Orientierung des Geistes“ (orientation of the mind). For Yakubinsky, the entire perception of somebody else's speech depends on this change of orientation of the mind, which is determined by the outward reality of language, previous inner and outer experience and by the content of our psyche at the time of perception. All this forms the *Apperzeptionsmasse* (the conglomerate of orientation), which is assimilated to the language stimulus coming from the speaker. Intriguingly, Yakubinsky is interested in the non-linguistic elements of this conglomerate of orientation (§36). In my view, this serves his basic tenet of the retreat of language in a dialogue. Dialogue in particular proves to be tied to the dependence on a change of orientation in that it takes advantage of this change of orientation.

It is worth noting here that the notions of *Einstellung* (attitude) and *Apperzeption* (change of orientation) cannot be conceived without the *Other* of the linguistic communication. For it is this Other who makes us assume an *Einstellung* (attitude), with whom we have a more or less extended agreement of the conglomerates of orientation (*Apperzeptionsmassen*), with whom we can only communicate with difficulty if the *Apperzeptionsmassen* (conglomerates of orientation) agree to a small extent or not at all (§39). It is this Other who knows “what it is all about”, who lets Yakubinsky say, following Polivanov: „Im Grunde bedarf alles, was wir sagen, eines Hörers, der versteht, `worum es geht““ (paraphrased: „Everything we say needs someone who knows what it is all about“), who makes it possible that we „talk in necessary hints“ (Jakubinskij 1923/2004, p.416). I would very much like to add: The impossibility to forge everything we mean to say into words leads to the necessary hints. Just because we cannot say everything, we need the Other, who understands, who goes beyond the „language facts“ he observes.

A second pair of notions to describe dialogue consists of *Unterbrechen* (interrupting) and *Erwidern* (replying). Contrary to the prevalent view of a rule-guided sequence of contributions, Yakubinsky identifies mutual interrupting as being characteristic of dialogue (§30). Replies primarily take place as mutual interruptions, one talks in anticipation of such interruptions. Dialogue is a structure of interruptions, not only formally, judged by its outward appearance, but also judged by its content: For everything which a speaker says is not closed but presupposes a continuation by the Other.¹⁶

The fundamental „Streben zum Dialog“ (striving for dialogue) needs to be added to the above moments of generality and naturalness. Precisely with rather monological forms, this striving shows itself in the interruption or the desire to interrupt (§26). And here lies a communicative (not: *cognitive*) explanation for inner speech: It is a reply which has been held back and can also be uttered in writing in the form of notes (§27).

4. Motives for the abbreviation phenomena in the dialogical form

The peculiarities of dialogue mentioned above are connected with abbreviation phenomena. These render the dialogical a special language form with specific linguistic features, where “linguistic” carries the meaning advocated by Yakubinsky. The role of the Other is to be emphasized again: The abbreviations work, because there is an apperceptively agreeing Other. The language form owes its existence to the dialogically oriented Other (also: the uninterested, the absent, the only imagined Other).

¹⁶ This could also be called dialogicity. In his speech „Über den Dualis“ (1827), the structure of replying was described by W. von Humboldt as fundamental to language. Humboldt was intensively referred to by the Russian linguistics around the turn of the 19th century to the 20th century. See, e.g., Romashko (2000) und Ivanova (2003).

The motives for the abbreviations are: the visual and auditive perception of the speaker (Chapter 3: the notion of Einstellung /attitude); the fundamental openness of dialogue, the interruptions and the necessary high speed (chapter 5); that comprehension is based on Apperzeption (change of orientation); the correspondence between patterns of everyday life and speech (Chapter 7); the automatism of dialogue (Chapter 8).

All these moments cause the „language stimulus“ to recede, both within an utterance by the speaker (§42) as in the perception by the comprehending listener (§33, § 35). In § 39, Yakubinsky even states explicitly that the mere presence of a language stimulus is not sufficient for perception and comprehension („das Vorhandensein eines sprachlichen Reizes ist nicht ausreichend“). This definitely applies to dialogue, whereas monologue and above all written monologue shows an increase of “the essentially linguistical” (§ 24) and therefore an increase of attention to “language facts”: language comes to the fore, its means have to be paid more attention to, both in production as in comprehension. This shift corresponds to what happens in the acquisition of written language. At the same time it becomes clear that this is not the normal case with language. The normal case would be speaking in necessary hints, forms of language activity in which language would not play the main role – precisely the dialogical forms.

5. The peculiarities of dialogue

Following Yakubinsky, it is plainly recognizable that a dialogue cannot be seen as a mere ordered sequence of turns. Within the notion of *turn-taking*, the *taking* is to be stressed: the change of contributions to a dialogue is less of a sequence and more of a *taking up*. Thus, the reference to what has been uttered and to what is expected as an utterance or interruption should be pointed out more strongly.

Moreover, relationships are realized within a dialogue, precisely by its turn-taking form. This applies to relationships of the communicating persons with each other and with their world, as far as they act towards the world together (origin: joint attention at the age of 0;9). Dialogue as a structured sequence is also closely connected with repetitions, especially during language acquisition. The repetition also creates the relationship and strenghtens it: What is common – the agreement in the conglomerates of orientation (Apperzeptionsmassen) in Yakubinsky’s terminology – can be built up, what has already been comprehended can be retraced, enlarged upon and also altered.

Dialogue is thus a form which visibly connects people and their voices, which relates them and orients them to each other. During acquisition, it is at first a form of diffuse content, i.e. it is mainly form, namely a rhythm, a structured sequence of incidents in time, which allocates roles to two persons which are endowed with different tasks and competencies for these events. Dialogue is a highly material, perceivable form in time, language can fit into. The acquisition of language starts this way: Meaning prevails over what is said, the „language facts“ are far in the background and the conglomerates of orientation (Apperzeptionsmassen) of mother and child (in the best case) agree well, just because the dialogical form is already available beforehand.¹⁷

¹⁷ For more details cf. Bertau (in press, 2007).

6. Ontogenesis

Outside the framework of Yakubinsky's thoughts, a glance at language acquisition leads to the central role of dialogue, both for the acquisition of the communicative-referential and for the acquisition of the cognitive-strategic language. With the help of two examples from the References, I would like to point out in which way dialogue supports and leads acquisition.¹⁸

In 1978, Ninio und Bruner observed the exchange of a mother-child-pair reading a picture book, in order to investigate the acquisition of naming. For the authors, the most impressive feature of the activity of naming is that it takes place within a structured sequence of interactions, which has "the texture of a dialogue" (1978, p.5 f.). This texture is learnt early, e.g. in the give-and-take game. This game shows the most important characteristics of dialogue: it assigns roles to the participants, the exchange has the structure of a turn-taking, the partners prompt and respond to each other. Ninio and Bruner call these and earlier forms „scaffolding dialogue“ (1978, p.3): contingent patterns of exchange between mother and child, in which the mother answers to child's gestures and vocalizations selectively and imitatively and in which the child, in turn, answers to the mother's (modelled) imitations. Importantly, the mother ascribes intentions to the child which the child will only later be able to express verbally. That means, the mother imputes abilities to her child which enable the child to take part in a dialogue, i.e. a structured and directed exchange. It is this imputation which takes the child into a dialogical relationship and subsequently enables it to become dialogical: intentionally directed towards the mother. Here, the important moments of development are the first social smile (ca. 8 weeks) and the joint attention or triangulation (ca. 0;9).¹⁹

While looking at a picture book, the child can draw upon these already established abilities („skills for dialogue“, p.6) and take part in the verbal exchange. For the acquisition of names for things, Ninio und Bruner (1978) conclude that it is the dialogical structure which teaches the child the names (p.13). The central element of learning to name is the child's ability to master the reciprocal rules of dialogue. Thus, reference does not primarily require mastering the relationship reference-referent. Rather, reference requires a comprehension of the social rules which govern dialogue: *here* the relationship reference-referent is realized.

Furthermore, something needs to be emphasized: naming occurs for the Other, with a view to the Other, not „in itself“, i.e. words are always to be thought of as coming from someone and being directed at someone, embedded in a structured relationship, which aligns the persons in a certain position with respect to each other, which constitutes persons in this relationship and which thereby also constitutes the persons' shared access to the world. The label-like orientation of the word towards the thing has to be given up in favour of a conception of addressivity, which rests on the dialogical activity. With regard to Yakubinsky it is to be said that the dialogical form is there before the linguistical stimulus appears. Then, the form supports the linguistical means like a scaffolding and provides them with a place and a linguistical shape

Thus, the term dialogicity does not refer to a property of language – as mentioned above – but to a basic form of reference which language is grafted on, which language comes into, which language is pulled into. Thus, dialogicity is not a property of language, but a precondition of language, which therefore always appears dialogical. Language is dialogical, it cannot be different, i.e. it cannot work, it cannot be used or be understood differently. Lexics, syntax and grammar are only

¹⁸ See appendix A for both examples.

¹⁹ I have described this more precisely in Bertau (2004a, b).

understandable as means, as means of acting dialogically. The degree of the Other's presence or absence lets these means appear more or less clear and therefore *autonomous*.

The naturalness of dialogue Yakubinsky talks about would thus be motivated by looking at the development. The different forms which language shows itself in, „the functional language forms“ („funktionale sprachliche Gestalten“), have their starting point in dialogue. This is why abbreviations are able to work, because language began that way: hardly present in the dialogical structure, then only at a few points, in the end ever more strongly present and more complex, until forms arise which, at the surface, do no longer appear to be dialogue, i.e., which seem to sever the ties to the Other, to the Other's perception and apperception. As soon as language recedes, the dialogical basic form reappears more clearly: the partners are oriented towards each other and are in an exchange.

What reveals itself here is: language is movement, from the non-linguistical to the linguistical *and* from the linguistical to the non-linguistical. Both directions of movement are to be considered, as shown by Yakubinsky. We are used to think in one direction and to judge as a development in one direction, e.g. when we investigate language acquisition. In this logic, language and language ability always show themselves as „more language“ until „language as such“ remains, e.g. in decontextualized written language. And this is taken to be the essence of language.

Following Yakubinsky, language could be thought to be beyond language. This would lead to a notion of language which does not contain the misleading, detached „as such“ but which would always connect language with the extra-lingual and which would, exactly because of that, allow linguistic shapes of this connection to be seen.

I obtain my second example from Wertsch (1980), who shows how the social dialogue is crucial to the acquisition of cognitive-strategic means. Again, it is the dialogical structure which supports the child in the execution of the exchange with the more competent adults and which *introduces* the child into concepts and strategies of culture. Wertsch talks about the „initial point of entry“, which is provided by the social dialogue with its unique cooperation with others. By taking part in the dialogue, the child shows the appropriate behaviour, even if the child does not yet understand how this behaviour fits into a coherent whole. What happens is that the child acts on a communicative level, because the child knows and masters the structure there. But the child's answers have a cognitive effect, since the whole purpose of the dialogue is to solve a problem. The connection of communicative and cognitive language clearly shows itself in these dialogues directed at achieving a solution. In them, phenomena of abbreviation manifest themselves, which exhibit parallels to the fragmentary form of dialogue described by Yakubinsky and inner speech as described by Vygotsky.²⁰

Since the aspect of cooperation is clearly visible, the element of common action known from the early forms of dialogue in Ninio and Bruner (1978) is plainly visible. Dialogues first exist as structured forms of directed, addressed exchange, which consist, above all, of acting in common (breast-feeding, changing a nappy, first games such as give-and-take). Hörmann (1976) coined the phrase of language as the continuation of acting by other means. Based on my explanations, I would like to alter this phrase to: language is the continuation of acting dialogically by other means. Therefore, language is dialogical itself, therefore it is amenable to abbreviation, but also highly detachable: in its most complex, decontextualized forms, language in fact appears to be in itself. But, following Hörmann (1976), it needs to be said that this detachment never fully succeeds. In our language, we remain connected with the basic dialogical form.

²⁰ Cf. appendix A, example 2.

7. Fostering language

At present, I can only sketch aspects of fostering language against this background. I would like to mention some important elements.

All in all:

Do not see dialogue as a mere means of conveying linguistic information („This is a ball“), where dialogue itself does not get much attention (except that the grown-up person „turns to the child“ and speaks clearly). Rather, dialogue should be seen as the supporting scaffolding for the development of various language forms which require their own different linguistic means. The fostering person can do this by disregarding her „natural attitude“ („natürliche Einstellung“²¹) towards dialogue and by consciously dealing with the dialogical form, taking the whole structure, the whole pattern into account. Then, she will also be an Other for the child.

Then:

Recognize and carry out the basic dialogical form of acting, graft systematic aspects of the acquisition of vocabulary and grammar onto it, however within functional language forms which are supported by a certain structure of addressivity. Do not overestimate the verbal-dialogical abilities of the child, do not underestimate the child's dialogical abilities. Start from there. Use different dialogical forms in the children's everyday life, which would also mean to differentiate between different partners (child-child, adult-child, adult-adult) and different numbers of partners (dyad, 4-5, all children) (level of the phenomena).

Identify functional language forms which children can (and should) know, train them and vary them in role plays. Let the children recognize, collect and re-enact these forms. This would proceed via persons in situations who would then enter into a linguistic exchange in a certain way. Here, a comparison of cultures could be made (metalevel).

Make yourself clear that the action of speaking is connected with „more or less language“; so do not expect and try to elicit a development where abbreviations are to be expected. Understand the manner of abbreviations and their conditions. Also understand the conditions under which language comes to the fore more strongly, to be precise, within oral communication. Expect and foster development *here* (storytelling, reports, retelling ...).

8. Conclusion

The above rests on thoughts which are partly new to me, or which are partly familiar, but recombine in new ways. It is familiar to me to ascribe a privileged position to dialogue when it comes to observing and understanding language. Yakubinsky's approach, which, in my view, is radically pragmatic, can lead us to a different notion of language, and especially to a different notion of the linguistic.

²¹ The term „natürliche Einstellung“ („natural attitude“) is borrowed from Schütz (1971), who applied it to the environment of everyday-life.

9. Appendix A: Examples from Ninio & Bruner (1978) and from Wertsch (1980)

Illustration 1: Ninio & Bruner (1978, p.6f.)

Mother: Look! (ATTENTIONAL VOCATIVE)
 Child: (Touches picture)
 M: What are those? (QUERY)
 C: (Vocalizes and smiles)
 M: Yes, they are rabbits. (FEEDBACK AND LABEL)
 C:(Vocalizes, smiles and looks up at mother)
 M: (Laughs) Yes, rabbit. (FEEDBACK AND LABEL)
 C: (Vocalizes, smiles)
 M: Yes (Laughs) (FEEDBACK)

Illustration 2: Wertsch (1980, p.156; it is *nota bene* Wertsch who is enumerating the turns from (1) to (12) thus underscoring a genetic development)

Initial segment of the first episode:

- (1) C: Oh. (C glances at the model of the puzzle, C looks at the pieces pile.) Oh, now where's this one go? (C picks up the black piece from the pieces pile, C looks at the copy puzzle, C looks at the pieces pile.)
- (2) M: Where does it go on this other one? (C puts the black piece which is in her hand back down in the pieces pile, C looks at the pieces pile.)
- (3) M: Look at the other truck and then you can tell. (C looks at the model puzzle, C glances at the pieces pile.)
- (4) C: Well ... (C looks at the copy puzzle, C looks at the model puzzle.)
- (5) C: I look at it.
- (6) C: Um, this other puzzle has a black one over there. (C points to the black piece in the model puzzle.)

Initial segment of a subsequent episode:

- (7) C: (C glances at the model of the puzzle, C looks at the copy puzzle, C picks up the orange piece from pieces pile.) Now where do you think the orange one goes?
- (8) M: Where does it go in the other truck? (C looks at the model puzzle.)
- (9) C: Right there. (C points to the orange piece in the model puzzle.) The orange one goes right there.

Initial segment of the next episode:

- (10) C: (C looks at the pieces pile, C picks up the yellow piece from the pieces pile, C looks at the copy puzzle.) Now how ... Now where ... Nos (C looks at the model puzzle.)
- (11) C: You ... you ... the yellow on that side goes ... One yellow one's right next there. (C points to yellow piece in the model puzzle, C looks at the yellow piece she is holding in her hand.)
- (12) M: Okay.

10. Appendix B: Selected passage from Jakubinskij's *Über die dialogische Rede* (1923/2004: 404f.), §29:

„Auf jeden Fall möchte ich bemerken, daß die Verwendung der Wörter »natürlich« und »künstlich« in Bezug auf Monolog und Dialog nur unter Vorbehalt möglich ist; sowohl der Monolog als auch der Dialog sind letzten Endes in gleicher Weise natürliche Erscheinungen dieser oder jener sozialen Ordnung, wie es die Ursachen, die zur Existenz des Monologs führen, und die Nebenbedingungen, die sein Auftreten ermöglichen, sind. Von der Natürlichkeit des Dialogs kann man vor allem in dem Sinne sprechen, daß er als Abfolge von Aktionen und Reaktionen denjenigen sozialen Fakten des wechselseitigen Handelns entspricht, in denen das Soziale dem Biologischen (Psycho-physiologischen) am nächsten kommt. Der Dialog ist zweifellos eine Erscheinung der Kultur, gleichzeitig aber ist er in stärkerem Maße als der Monolog eine Erscheinung der Natur.“

Paraphrase: „‘Natural’ and ‘artificial’ can only be applied to dialogue and monologue under the proviso that both dialogue and monologue are natural phenomena of the social order as are the causes and constraints that make monologue possible. Talking about the ‘naturalness’ of dialogue is justified by the fact that its sequence of actions and reactions corresponds to those social facts of mutual actions that are very similar to biological ones. Dialogue is a cultural phenomenon, but at the same time it is more of a natural phenomenon than monologue.“

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Appendix:
Core Notions from Jakubinskij (1923/2004) and their English Counterparts, which are used as
Paraphrases in the Present Document

allgemeine wechselseitige Handlungen – *general mutual actions*

Alltagsmuster – *patterns of everyday life*

Apperzeption – *change of orientation*

Apperzeptionsgebundenheit – *dependence on a change of orientation*

Apperzeptionsmasse – *conglomerate of orientation*

einfache Willenshandlung – *simple act of the will*

das eigentlich Sprachliche – *the essentially linguistic*

Einstellung – *setting, attitude*

festgefügte wechselseitige Handlung – *firmly established interaction*

funktionale sprachliche Gestalten – *functional language shapes*

funktionale Vielfalt des Sprechens – *functional diversity of speech*

Funktionalität der Rede – *functionality of speech*

mittelbare und unmittelbare Form – *mediated and immediate form*

mittelbare und unmittelbare wechselseitige Handlung – *mediated and immediate mutual actions*

Reduktion des sprachlichen Faktors – *reduction of the language factor*

sprachlicher Automatismus – *language automatism*

sprachliche Fakten – *language facts*

sprachliche Gestalt – *language shape*

Unmittelbarkeit des Dialogs – *immediateness of dialogue*

Vielgestaltigkeit der Rede – *diversity of speech*