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Leitgeb, Hannes (2012): Metacognition and Indicative Conditionals: A Precis. In: Beran, Michael; Brandl, Johannes; Perner, Josef; Proust, Joëlle (eds.) : Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 252-266
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This chapter defends the thesis that accepting an indicative conditional is a metacognitive process that is not metarepresentational. The argument that we give in favour of this thesis is based on (1) the suppositional theory of conditionals, (2) David Lewis’ triviality result on probabilities of conditionals, and (3) Joelle Proust’s account of metacognition. The chapter ends with a list of open questions that we aim to turn to in a more comprehensive study of metacognition and conditionals.