



## Münchener Beiträge zur Politikwissenschaft

herausgegeben vom  
Geschwister-Scholl-Institut  
für Politikwissenschaft

---

**2014**

Bastian Busshardt

### **Analysing the Remunicipalisation of Public Services in OECD Countries**

---

Bachelorarbeit bei  
Prof. Dr. Bernhard Zangl  
WS 2013/2014

## Table of Content

1. Introduction – 3
2. Definitions and object of investigation – 5
3. Current State of research and the value of typology of remunicipalisation – 7
4. Methodology – 11
5. The typology and its types -13
  - . Table 1 → Six types of remunicipalisation -14
  - Table 2 → Distribution of cases in property space - 15
  - Type 1 → Civic society campaigning and pressuring for remunicipalisation due to operational failures of private providers of public services -16
  - Type 2 → Municipal governments reacting to operation failure of private providers of public services -18
  - Type 3 → Civic society initiating and pressing ahead with remunicipalisation due to high prices for consumers and excessive profits of privates - 23
  - Type 4 → Municipal governments opting for remunicipalisation due to financial and efficiency considerations - 25
  - Type 5 → Civic society calling for and enforcing remunicipalisation as a mean to achieving ideological aims such as environmental protection - 29
  - Type 6 → Municipal governments pushing for remunicipalisation for ideological reasons such as socio-political considerations and environmental concerns - 32
6. Conclusion and summary of findings - 34
7. Bibliography- 36

## 1. Introduction

The remunicipalisation of public services in OECD states is the emerging practice of retrieving previously privatized and outsourced properties and services of public interest at the municipal level. This process can be understood as a countermovement to the paradigm of privatisation that had dominated the approach to public service delivery since the 1980's (Ambrosius, 2012, p. 85). However, the anticipated benefits of privatising public services, mainly a financial relief for municipalities in conjunction with a decrease of consumer prices and increase of service quality, were only achieved to a limited extent. (Libbe, 2013, p. 18-20). The increased awareness of privatisation related downsides and issues such as prices increases; technical failures and default of provision; and a lack of an public service ethos among private providers has placed the topic of remunicipalisation on the political agenda. The "backswing of the pendulum" (Wollmann,2013a, p. 2) and the proclaimed „renaissance of public economic activity“ (Dickertmann,2012, p. 307) is thus not surprising and has been well documented in numerous individual case studies.

Nevertheless, the current state of research into the topic of remunicipalisation of public services is far from being extensive or explicit with regards to the ascertainment of an empirical trend of remunicipalisation and an inquiry into the underlying causes and actors within the political system. Attempts to identify the causes (e.g financial opportunities) and the driving actors (e. g the municipal government or the individual citizens) have been case specific and detailed; confined to certain sectors of public services; and/or lack concision with regards to identifying the main causes. It is thus unanswered if, or to what extent, the cases of remunicipalisation of public services in OECD are essentially based on an analytically reducible, hence a simplified, number of common causes and actors that are pushing for remunicipalisation.

The primary aim of this paper will therefore be to investigate the possibility of the existence of such common causes and actors by establishing a descriptive, empirically based typology of remunicipalisation. The typology, by means of constructing and describing the types of remunicipalisation will therefore contribute towards the social-scientific understanding of remunicipalisation by analytically simplifying its complex and diverse reality. The functional reduction of the vast

amount of information, with reference to causes and actors, that is derivable from empirical examples of remunicipalisation, is therefore the main contribution of the typology and this paper. A subordinate aim of the typology will be to evaluate any possibly detected correlations between the dimension of “actor” and “cause”, thus utilizing it as a heuristic device for making careful assumptions about the underlying mechanisms that connect a certain reason, hence causes for remunicipalisation and the actor that perpetuates it.

The paper will be commenced with a brief, but necessary definition of “remunicipalisation” and “public services”, as those are the main objects of this investigation. In the following, an equally concise overview of the current state of research will be given and used to explain the necessity and value of this typology of remunicipalisation. Thirdly, the methodology used to construction he typology will be displayed with reference to the concept of “property space” developed by Barton and Lazarsfeld (cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 92-111). Most importantly, the descriptive typology of remunicipalisation and each of its six types will be displayed, explained and illustrated with empirical examples. Moreover, the description of each of the six type of remunicipalisation will entail a brief, therefore only preliminary, analysis into the underlying mechanisms, such as the relationship between the dimension of “cause” and “actor” that led to the existence of this type in the first place. Case studies will be employed throughout the entire paper in order to expose the underlying details that have been used to derive this simple, functional and concise typology of remunicipalisation.

## 2. Definitions and object of investigation

Defining the term “remunicipalisation”, thus specifying its constituent elements, is necessary to delimitate the phenomenon from others such as municipalisation or nationalisation. Moreover, a precise definition clarifies the object of investigation of the following typology, thus clearly stating its scope and purpose. Researchers have yet to agree on a dissociation from terms such as “insourcing” (Schaefer and Theuvsen, 2012, p. 11) or “social re-appropriation” (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 2). It remains unclear whether those terms are synonymous or actually label a different process. Schaefer and Theuvsen even argue that the lack of a clear definition is a main reason for the non-existence of generalizable empirical studies into the question whether a trend towards remunicipalisation exists or not (2012, p. 11).

I will employ a broad definition of remunicipalisation as the following typology seeks to establish a rather general, all-embracing description and analysis of remunicipalisation, thus capturing its diverse and heterogeneous nature. The typology might be criticised for being imprecise with regards to the object of investigation. On the other hand, it achieves a higher degree of generalizability, thus can be applied to current and upcoming cases of remunicipalisation that slightly differ in terms of the legal business entities of the public services or the exact methods of privatising and/or outsourcing the public services in the first place.

The common definitions will be reduced to the following, simple criteria: First, a transformation from private ownership of assets and provision services into municipal ownerships and direct municipal provision has had to occur (Hall, Lobina and Terhorst, 2013, p. 194; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 10-22). The transformation into a private, but municipally owned business entity (e.g GmbH or Ltd) would therefore be included in this broad definition of remunicipalisation, as the municipality has a de-facto, though not de-jure, control over the provision of the public service. Second, the respective property and/or service has had to be owned and/or provided by a municipality before its privatisation, hence the term “re”-municipalisation. (Lenk, Rottmann and Hesse, 2012, p. 164). A survey among 152 German municipalities, though not representative for municipalities in other OECD countries, finds that an overwhelming majority of municipalities agree with this rather straightforward definition (Institut für den öffentlichen Sektor e.V, 2011, p. 2). The so

called “insourcing” or “retransferring”, the process where a municipality takes a service back in-house, e.g. customer services or waste collection, that had always been controlled by the municipality, but executed in an operative sense by a private subcontractor, will also be subsumed under the term remunicipalisation. Others, however, contest this definition, arguing that the service had always been under control and responsibility of the municipality, therefore rendering the usage of the term “remunicipalisation” inappropriate. (Verbüchel, 2009, p. 3). The fact that such services, e.g. social housing management (Birch, 2011), IT-service (Ballard, 2012), waste disposal (Verbüchel, 2009,) have been retransferred to direct municipal control and operation due to the same reasons, e.g. economical considerations and operative failures, as the more definite cases of remunicipalisation, supports the method of treating all these cases as comparable enough to include them in the construction of the typology.

The second important definition regards the rather vague concept of a “public service”. Popular definitions are based on the idea of services that are of collective economic interest (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012 p. 6), hence delivering services or goods that are essential, but would be underprovided in a free market. Moreover, services and goods have a certain “public” concern to them if they generate positive or negative externalities for society (Weimar and Vining, 2005, pp. 91-97). The concept of natural monopolies, pertaining goods such as water delivery in a single water network, which do not allow for market competition, (Ramesh and Araal, 2010, p. 7) or politically and societally determined minimum standards such as access health care and sanitation, are also used to classify a good or service to be “public”. The European Commission’s definition summarizes that public services are “economic activities that the public authorities identify as being of particular importance to citizens and that would not be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) if there were no public intervention” (European Commission).

In line with the abovementioned focus on generalizability, the term “public services” will be interpreted broadly. This seems necessary as there is a perceived, conceptual difference of the public services between OECD countries (Wollman and Marcou, 2010, p. 1-4). Agreement prevails with regard to “local public services such as water supply, sewage disposal, energy supply, public transport, and waste collection and treatment” (Wollman and Marcou, 2010, p. 2). However, services such as social housing or public swimming pools could also be considered to be located

within the public domain (Bauer, 2012, p. 21-22). Limiting the typology by means of utilizing a strict, narrow definition of a public service would not fulfil the declared aim of constructing a broad, generalizable typology of remunicipalisation in OECD countries. Moreover, it is legitimately claimed that no objective criteria of a public service exist, but that the establishment of such is based on the formation of the political will within each society (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 6; Menger and Müller-Kirschenbauer, 2012, p. 54). The bottom line being, that every case of remunicipalisation will be included in the typology, in which the municipal government and or/the civic society regain control over a service that they claim, according to their own definition, to be of public nature and collective concern. The typology, in this regard, thus remains strictly empirical and does not make an indirect normative judgment about what constitutes a public service through excluding arguably ambiguous cases such as the remunicipalisation of the culture and tourism service in Rome (European Union-EPSU, 2008, p. 50-51). Any case will be included as long as arguments and justifications are based on the notion of common goods and/or public interests. It is likely, that this requirement coincides with the second criteria for the usage of the term “remunicipalisation”, as stated above, since a service that once had been municipal was probably so because society had ascribed a public concern to it.

### **3. Current state of research and the value of a typology of remunicipalisation**

The social scientific endeavour of describing and analysing the remunicipalisation of public services is in its early stages. Libbe asserts that topic has merely been discussed for 5 years (2013, p. 18). This doesn't surprise seeing that most instances of remunicipalisation have been carried out within the new century. Thus even the empirical evidence supporting the claim of a trend towards remunicipalisation has been highly inconclusive until very recently. Currently, trends towards remunicipalisation, hence, a lasting development, can be identified in several OECD countries within different public service sectors. “In Germany, there has been a major expansion of direct municipal provision of public services (...) most striking in the energy sector” (Hall, 2012, p. 4 ). Additionally, the waste management sector in Germany is becoming increasingly re-municipalised (Bauer, 2010, p. 74;

Verbücheln, 2009, Libbe, 2013), though it is pointed out that the number of cases have increased in this sector, but not to the extent justifying a “trend” (Source Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 25). Following the development are the water and wastewater sector in France (Hall, 2012, p. 25; Höffler, 2013, p. 77-78). Moreover, previously outsourced services such as waste collection and community housing management within municipalities in the UK are also being re-municipalized (Wollman, 2013b, p. 44-45). Despite the abovementioned sector confined examples of trends, researchers can and do not claim a service and country overlapping “trend” of remunicipalisation. Libbe, a leading researcher of remunicipalisation in Germany, agrees that there is no “thorough overview” (cited in Berlo and Wagner, 2013, p.6).

The current state of research into the causes and actors of remunicipalisation can only be described as even more fragmented and incomplete. Case studies of remunicipalisation exist for the water provision in Hamilton (Ohnmeg, and Grant,2008), Paris (Pigeon, 2012b), Grenoble (Hall and Lobina, 2001) and Potsdam (Hachfeld, 2008); waste disposal in Bergkamen (Schäfer, 2012); assets such as the electricity grid in German municipalities (Taschner, 2013, p. 173-181); and other public services such as social housing in the UK (Birch, 2011; Ballard, 2012). These and other studies often include an analysis into the causes of remunicipalisation; the role of actors such as trade unions, the civil society and local municipal governments; different outcomes for the state and consumers; and the legal framework, but are limited to a one or very few cases within a specific sector. A few studies attempt to make generalized statements on the common causes and actors of remunicipalisation and name a vast variety of reasons such as efficiency and costs, public service objectives such as accessibility, high transaction cost for monitoring of private providers, a desire for revenue from profits, employment considerations, desire for municipal control (Hall, 2012; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012).

However, the studies, and thus the current state of knowledge, are unsatisfactory in three main regards. The typology will attempt to eradicate the following weaknesses and therefore advance the research into the novel phenomenon of remunicipalisation in three corresponding ways:

First, the limited number of cases used to derive conclusions about remunicipalisation and the focus on specific sectors inherently limits the

generalizability of the conclusions. One must note, that the numerous individual case studies are valuable, and can serve as a first theoretical conjecture about the underlying causes and actors. Moreover, they will serve as secondary sources and thus ease the laborious construction of such an elaborate typology. Including all well-known and another diverse range of cases from as many OECD countries and sectors as possible, will therefore provide a more generalizable, all-embracing description and analysis of remunicipalisation than previous papers.

Second, studies deriving common causes of remunicipalisation from individual cases (Hall, 2012; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2013) do not aspire to analytically merge similar causes, but rather resort to simply listing and describing them one by one. This great attention to detail inherently renders the current summative descriptions of remunicipalisation to be unclear and non-functional. A potential theory of remunicipalisation, which this paper does not seek to establish, will have to reduce the number of property values, hence the categories, in order to remain functional and of analytical value for later empirical research. Later empirical research on e.g. the degree of success of remunicipalisation, will have to resort to suitable, and manageable categories and types, in order to evaluate e.g. why some cases of remunicipalisation might be more successful than others. This typology of remunicipalisation, conceiving of it as an intermediate step between the empirical analysis of individual case studies and the development of a corresponding, generalizable theory (Kelle, 1999, p. 76), will seek to aggregate and reduce the dimension of “actor” and “cause”, making it as simplistic and concise as possible. It does therefore primarily fulfil the descriptive purpose of structuring a complex societal and political reality through the principle of reduction of information as demanded by methodologists employing and utilizing typologies (Kelle, 1999, p. 42-43 and 74; Sodeur 1974, p.24-27).

Third, the abovementioned studies do not describe or analyse the relationship between the dimension of “cause” and “actor” of remunicipalisation. They accurately list and describe many causes, but fail to analyse how certain actors might push and perpetuate remunicipalisation for their own, very specific gains and agendas. Attempts to analyse this relationship can be found in analysis of the civic society in Germany (Taschner, 2013) and the usage of cross-subsidization between public service sectors by local governments (Höffler et al, p. 81-82), but remain either superficial or case- and sector specific, and are thus isolated in the sense that they

are not embedded in a complete framework or theory which includes all possible actors and sectors. Hence, a lack of comparative analysis can be noted. A recently published book on remunicipalisation of water services summarizes that “discussions of remunicipalisation have been energetic but anecdotal, with little understanding of the commonalities between various experiments and no clear research methodologies (...)” (McDonald, 2012, p. 9). The following typology will therefore fill this gap by means of creating an empirically based, but simplified, exhaustive common property space of the dimensions “actor” and “cause” which allows for a grouping of cases and an analysis into the similarities and differences between certain cases, hence the establishment of descriptive “types” of remunicipalisation. In addition, any possible correlation between the two dimension of “actor” and “cause”, can be evaluated assuming that the relationship is not random, but causal to some extent. Already Weber emphasized the importance of understanding these inner relationships in the process of conceiving a relevant typology with a high information content (Kelle, 1999, p. 45-47). The typology, in addition to the descriptive purpose, will therefore also be of heuristic value in regards to understanding the relationship between the cause for remunicipalisation and the actor who pushes it. Certain common characteristics of the cases within one type can be compared with the same characteristics of cases in another type, thus hinting at the existence of confounding variables impacting the classification of cases into a certain type (Soduer, 1974, p. 29; Kelle, 1999, p. 109). Thus, the paper will not only establish, hence describe, the types of remunicipalisation, but also aspire to make careful assumptions why certain types can be found in the first place, thou this aim is clearly secondary seeing the limited scope of this paper. The description of empirical types itself will be of primary concern.

#### 4. Methodology

The methodology used in the construction of the typology will have to be in accordance with both its descriptive and heuristic aims, though the structuring and reduction of information is clearly the primary goal of this typology. The methodology for the construction of the typology is based on the rather simple, but effective approach by Barton and Larzarsfeld which utilizes the concept of property space to derive and visualize types (McKinney, 1970, p. 257-258; Kelle, 1999, p. 92-111). The following steps have been undertaken in order to establish this descriptive typology of remunicipalisation:

1. In a first step, two relevant dimensions of the phenomenon of remunicipalisation, the “cause” and the “actors”, were chosen. These two dimensions were not chosen randomly or purely empirically, hence through a first, superficial analysis of the individual cases, but were instead based on the current state of research. Comparing sector specific case studies of remunicipalisation one notices that the aims and reasons behind the decision for remunicipalisation are diverse and contentious. The dimension of “cause” therefore constitutes a relevant property, which’s structuring, description and analysis is essential for the overall understanding of the phenomenon of remunicipalisation. This also applies to the dimension of “actors”. The pre-existing state of knowledge on remunicipalisation thus therefore predetermines the scope of the typology.
2. In a second step, a suitable quantity of cases of remunicipalisation of public services from OECD countries were selected. The case selection did not aim at obtaining a representative sample. Any detected distribution of elements (cases) within the property space, which will be used to make careful assumptions about the preferences of certain actors in relation to a certain cause, will therefore only hint at possible correlation. Selecting cases was rather done with a focus on including a diverse number of cases. This has been done, as the declared aim of this typology is to provide a general, simplified description of the phenomena of remunicipalisation. The types

constructed are therefore supposed to represent all possible forms of remunicipalisation that exist in reality.

3. Third, the cases of remunicipalisation were compared and contrasted with reference to the property “cause” and “actor”. All possible variations of the property, hence the concrete nominal value, were recorded. New cases were analysed until no new variation of the property “cause” or “actor” could be found. The method of comparing and contrasting case until no new knowledge is derived from the analysis of further cases, hence the arrival at a point of saturation, is inspired by Gerhard (cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 123). In the end, this resulted in the analysis of 30 cases of remunicipalisation. This method of case selection and analysis is therefore the best possible estimate, though no guarantee, of uncovering all possible variations of the property “cause” and “actor”, thus the construction of an exhaustive property space that represents the diversity of different remunicipalisation cases. The concept of the property space is of advantage as its construction is systematic and transparent.
  
4. The property space, hence all possible combinations of variations of the properties “cause” and “actor”, also referred to as parameter values, was then simplified and condensed through the mode of “reduction” (Barton and Lazarsfeld cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 100-107). The great number of different underlying causes of remunicipalisation, if not merged, would lead to dozens of groups, hence types of remunicipalisation. This would be in opposition to the prescribed aim of reducing complexity. An example of the inherent trade-off between functional reduction and the empirical precision can be found in the description and analysis of Type 4 in this paper. In the end, the property “cause” was reduced to three nominal categories: operative failures; economic and financial considerations; and ideological aims. The property “actor” was reduced to “the citizens and the civic society” on the one hand and “the municipal government and administration” on the other. Obviously, the relationship between the two is not dichotomous as they lack mutual exclusivity. There is the theoretical possibility that both actors strive and push

for remunicipalisation simultaneously. In practice however, it seems that it is rather one, while the other is either inactive or even opposed. Moreover, the declared goal of reducing complexity is better met when operationalizing the property of “actor” as only having two possible variations. The focus is on simplicity and functionality rather than precision and complexity.

## 5. The typology and its types

The typology constructed will be displayed employing the concept of property space. The individual six types will be described using illustrative, best fit empirical case studies which will be analysed in regards to the relationship between the “cause” and the “actor” of remunicipalisation, thus making careful assumptions of how and why these types, hence the combination of parameter values, have come to exist in reality.

**Table 1: Six types of remunicipalisation**

Cause/ Actor	<b>Citizens and Civic Society</b>	<b>Municipal government and administration</b>
<b>Operative failure</b>	<b>Type 1:</b> Significant technical failure. Citizen pushing for remunicipalisation due to governments’ inactivity. Operative failure significant enough to be made public and taken on by the media.	<b>Type 2:</b> Significant technical failures and inability of private provider through insolvency. Government acting as safety net to ensure provision of essential service.
<b>Economic</b>	<b>Type 3:</b> Citizens and Consumers reacting to price rises and private profits. Role of corruption.	<b>Type 4:</b> Government reacting to price rises and private profits. Government also using efficient public provision to reduce cost for municipal budget and to using public ownership of services and assets to extract profit for municipal budget.
<b>Ideological</b>	<b>Type 5:</b> Highly organized citizen initiatives motivated through environmental gains of remunicipalisation, use of renewable energy. Use of referendum to enforce against will of government. Examples confined to energy sector.	<b>Type 6:</b> Government promoting local, high quality employment and renewable energy.

**Table 2: Distribution of cases in property space**

Cause/ Actor	<b>Citizens and Civic Society</b>	<b>Municipal government and administration</b>
<b>Operative failure</b>	<b>Type 1</b> Hamilton (Water),	<b>Type 2:</b> Wales (Public Health); Umkirch (Energy); Atlanta (Water), London (Public Transport), Antalya (Water)
<b>Economic</b>	<b>Type 3:</b> Bordeaux (Water); Grenoble (Water);	<b>Type 4:</b> Paris (Water); Berkamen (Waste disposal); Düren (Street lighting); Samur (Public Transport), Nürnberg (Public Spaces and Parks), Hannover (Public Buildings and related services) Sheffield+Islington (Council (Community Housing); Somerset (IT Services) Landkreis Böblingen+ Lüneburg (Waste management), Saarbrücken (Waste and Water), Münsterland (Electricity); Budapest (Hungary); Pecs (Hungary); Potsdam (Water);
<b>Ideological</b>	<b>Type 5:</b> Boulder (Energy), Hamburg (Energy); Berlin (Energy), (Schönau) (Energy)	<b>Type 6:</b> Kiel (Public Transport); Rome (Culture and Tourism), Tübingen (Energy), Ledove (Waste disposal)

## **Type 1: Civic society campaigning and pressuring for remunicipalisation due to operational failures of private providers of public services**

This type is defined through the actor, the civic society, pushing for remunicipalisation in response to operational failures in the provision of a service. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine citizens and public service users pressuring the municipal government into remunicipalisation as a mean of securing an adequate provision and delivery of the public service. However, of all the cases analysed, only one fits this type: the remunicipalisation of the public service of water provision in Hamilton, Canada. The case will be illustrated in the following to explain the circumstances that had to occur in order for the civic society to become as heavily involved in the process of remunicipalisation.

The service had originally been privatized as a mean of cutting cost for the municipality of Hamilton and to attract private funding and investment into the water and sewage infrastructure (Pigeon, 2012b, p. 77). However, a serious number of technical failures and problems contested the idea that the private provider was capable of handling the water and sewage network according to the municipalities' expectations. PUMC, the private water company, reduced staff and operated at "maximum environmental dangerous thresholds" (Hoath cited in Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. 484), thus demonstrating that a focus on shareholder value and profit can lead to significant negative externalities. As a result, the chemical pollution levels in Hamilton's harbour increased and the number of sewage spills rose significantly (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 78). Employees complained about "unreliable and out-dated equipment, deterioration of the plant conditions, health and safety concerns to employees and the public" (Hoath cited in Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. 484). The by far most dangerous and costly failure was a historically unique spill of raw sewage water which affected the entire area and necessitated the evacuation of a hospital (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 78).

The involvement of the civic society was essentially triggered by the refusal of the municipal government to engage in remunicipalisation or somehow solve the problem in a different manner. This type is therefore in stark contrast to the cases in Type 2, where the municipal governments and authorities were able to rectify the technical and operative failures of private providers without the public pressure them into doing so. The public-private partnership contract with PUMC phased out in

2004 and thus provided an opportunity for the government and the council to reconsider. However, the senior city officials proposed the renewal of the contract based on the exact same arguments, such as a greater efficiency and expertise, as during the initial privatisation. The city council then voted to renew the contract and launch a new tendering process (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 80). The subsequent publics' dissatisfaction, which peaked with the disruption and direct action against a city council meeting (Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. 487) was only the beginning and was followed by the mobilization of citizens, non-governmental organizations and trade unions. The "Hamilton Water Watch Committee", which unified representatives from numerous environmental NGO's, experts and concerned citizens was founded as direct result. The initiative, after unsuccessfully urging the council to revote on the issue, then pursued the strategy of pressing for a strict tendering process. They collected data and evaluated the municipal liabilities under a public-private provision, (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 81). Summarizing, the initiative is credited with "putting pressure on the city to consider costs and liabilities seriously", thus having "contributed to making the tender economically unattractive for private operators" (Piegon, M. 2012a, p. 83). The water and sewage provision was re-municipalized shortly after the unsuccessful tendering process. (Ohmeng and Grant, 2008, p. p. 488).

The remunicipalisation of water provision in Hamilton therefore reveals that citizens and consumers do not accept a continuation of such drastic technical failures of the services and thus pressure to municipal government into re-municipalising. Two conditions for the involvement of citizens can be derived with regards to this case. First of all, the technical difficulties and failures of the private provider need to be serious and spectacular enough, such as the sewage spill in Hamilton, in order to be covered in media and thus create a suitable degree of salience of the issue within the public debate. Second, the involvement of citizens and consumers in Hamilton was only possible due to the perceived inability of the municipal government to present a suitable solution to the problem. The Hamilton Water Watch Council would not have been founded if the council had opted for remunicipalisation after the out-phasing of the concession contract. The divergent viewpoints between elected representatives and individual citizens, though it is unclear of how many exactly, are thus what separates this case from the cases in Type 2.

## **Type 2: Municipal governments reacting to operation failure of private providers of public services**

These cases have in common, are thus empirically typified, through the fact that remunicipalisation was mainly caused by an operational failure in the provision of the public service by a private provider, which was recognized by the local authority and municipality and de-facto forced it to regain control in order to prevent significant harm or disruption of essential services. This type can be found across different sectors of public services such as Water Provision (Atlanta), Public Transport (London), Health Care (Wales) and Electricity grids (Umkirch). The remunicipalisation of water services in Atlanta and the cancelling and insourcing of maintenance and electronic systems of the London Tube, will serve as empirical, representative cases in order to better describe and illustrate this type, show inner homogeneity of the type and, secondly, analyse the relationship between the dimensions of cause and actor, thus explain why significant operational failures are likely to be encountered by the local governments and authorities rather than through engagement of the civic society as in Type 1.

The city of Atlanta originally privatized the fresh water provision and the waste water treatment due to financial constraints, such as many other US cities in the 1990's. United Water was responsible for the operation, management and maintenance of both fresh and sewage water supply and infrastructure. The city of Atlanta and the public, though initially saving money, eventually faced a series of operational failures that led to the mutually agreed ending of the contract. United Water was assessed to be slow and unresponsive with regards to fixing broken pipes and numerous water main breaks (Jehl, 2003), had to issue water boiling alerts, only managed to install less than 10 % of the newly required water meters, (Ohmeng and Grant, 2009, p. 12) and last but not least, run an inefficient and faulty billing system that resulted in considerable financial losses (Remunicipalisation Tracker, 2008). United Water presented an equally dire performance in other US cities, such as Camden, New Jersey. An average of 45 % of water was lost due to leaking pipes; independent auditors were incapable of locating the assets that United Water was supposed to maintain according to the contracts, and the ones located were in a nearly in-operational and derelict state; and missing and incomplete data

on customers resulted in considerable losses for both Suez and the municipality (Hall, Lobina, p. 4). Last but not least, the private providers handling of emergencies regarding the provision in Atlanta was “consistently and habitually inadequate and potentially hazardous” (Food and Water Watch, 2008, p. 14). The remunicipalisation of the water provision in Atlanta, in the end, resulted in a considerably more expensive system, with estimates for infrastructure repairs being in the billions. (Jehl, 2003). Nevertheless, the city’s commissioner of watershed management concluded that “I think we’ve learned enough to know that we’d prefer to see the city in charge of that destiny” (Jehl, 2003). Hence, despite being burdened by considerable cost, the municipal government decided to re-municipalize in order to rectify the failures of United Water and secure the unobstructed provision of water. The drawbacks of having to invest public funds, instead of relying on private investment through private provision as originally intended, were acceptable in comparison to the clearly inadequate quality of service. This case is thus clearly different from those in Type 4, in which the municipality actually financially profited from remunicipalisation.

The city of London had also opted for private sector participation, in form of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), in the hope of reducing the maintenance cost of the tube network and an electronic ticketing system. However, it became clear that they were equally incapable of providing the desired services. Tubelines, a private provider, after being months behind schedule, eventually declared bankruptcy (Hall, 2012, p. 22). Tramlink, an electronic ticket service provider, refused to cooperate with a new ticketing system that would have increased the number of passengers, but not the monetary profit for the company (EPSU, 2012), thus showing the inability to act on behalf of an public service ethos and the creation of positive externality for society such as reduced emissions due to an increased use of public transport. The authorities finally decided to terminate the contract with Tramlink after two failures of the ticketing system, “affecting hundreds of thousands of passengers for hours”, had occurred. The secretary of state for transport concluded that the “failure let down Tube travellers, London Underground and taxpayers” (United Kingdom-House of Commons, 2008, p.3). In the end, it was the conservative major of London himself, Boris Johnson, who argued and pushed for an insourcing of these services (United Kingdom-House of Commons, 2008; Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 53-54). One must note, that the decision to re- municipalise was clearly non-ideological. It had been the labour party who had originally pushed for privatization (Halmer und

Hauenschild, 2012, p. 53). This and the fact that a conservative major and his local authorities were responsible for remunicipalisation, shows that the ideological boundaries between left and right politicians with regards to privatisation (Newman and Clarke, 2009 p. 3), were crossed in light of drastic operational failure of an service, as the tube, that is cherished and which's value is one of fulfilling a public interest. This type of remunicipalisation is thus, in contrast to Type 5 and 6, non-ideological and rather independent of party politics and public management ideologies. In both cases, the municipalities had to intervene in to prevent greater, considerable disruption to services and public goods such as water and transport, that are, if not a basic human necessity, of vital importance to the functioning of complex, urban societies. The municipal governments played the leading role, thus constituting this type of remunicipalisation, for several reasons.

First of all, the municipal governments, being democratically elected on behalf of the citizens and voters, have the inherent responsibility to assure, or at least strive for the fulfilment of what has been coined the "public interest". Without engaging in the theoretical, contentious debate of what actually constitutes and how to derive the public interest, as this would deviate from the focus of this paper, it can be assumed that public services are of interest to the wider public and not only to certain fractions, groups of citizens or individual consumers. They are so, as stated earlier, per definition and have been regarded as such by societies in contemporary democracies for a long time. Public utilities and services have been important instrument for the development of the modern welfare state since the nineteenth century (Wollman and Marcou, 2010, p 5). The fact that the provision of public services is necessary, though this is obviously open to political deliberation within societies (Newman and Clarke, 2009, p. 2), is thus currently agreed upon. The discussion revolving around privatisation and remunicipalisation is thus fundamentally concerned with the question of how these services are best provided and not if they should be provided. The rise of the "New Public Management" in the 1980's and the search for alternative service delivery (Ohnmeg and Grant, 2008 ,p. 476) does therefore not detach the state from its fundamental responsibility of ensuring that these services are somehow provided, be it through public or private operations. The concept of the "enabling state" (orig.: "Gewährleistungsstaat"), seeking to overcome the dualism between state and market (Concalves, 2008 p. 4-5), is based on such reasoning, thus illustrating the reasons for involvement of the

municipal government, and argues that “one of the main purposes of the Enabling State is to guarantee the existence and supply-in an adequate extent and throughout the territory, of those services of general economic interest” [Concalves, 2008, p. 8 ). This concept can also be applied to the municipal level (Trapp, 2004, p. 9-11), especially in federalist systems, where local governments have considerable responsibilities. The municipality, if not functioning as the provider of the public services due to the previous privatisation, takes on the role of “ensuring or guaranteeing that market operation and companies’ performance develop in accordance with certain previously defined aims and objectives (of public interest)” (Concalves, 2008, p. 6). It might be debateable to what extent other aims, such as the desire for local employment as described in Type 6, have to be guaranteed by the state. However, it is clear, that the local municipality in Atlanta could only guarantee an adequate, sanitary provision of water to its citizens through operating the water utilities itself, and that it was mandated by its electorate to do so seeing the public value of fulfilling basic human needs such as clean and sanitary drinking water. The bankruptcy of the maintenance provider Metronet in London or the insolvency of a subsidiary of Suez that was operating the water utilities in Antalya, Turkey (Hall, Lobina and Coral, 2010, p. 7), show that the municipality is literally forced to act as a safety net in case of private failure, as it can’t risk the complete non-provision of an essential public service. Conceiving the government to be the leading institution within the state, also on the municipal level, therefore explains why the government and the ruling political parties cannot tolerate significant failures and disruptions of public services. Doing so would fundamentally undermine their legitimacy and self-conception as representatives of citizens and their electorate. Local governments and democratic political parties, independent of their political ideology, can therefore normally be expected to react to significant private failure with swift solutions, such as e.g. remunicipalisation, thus constituting this empirically constructed type of remunicipalisation.

Secondly, local municipalities are expected to be the dominant actor of “operative failure remunicipalisation” as they have the advantage of superior knowledge in comparison to the civic society. Local municipalities, in their role as a guarantor, perform monitoring and conduct inquiries into the quality of privatized and outsourced services (Trapp, 2004, p. 10-13). They are thus first aware of potential problems with the private provision of services, such as the increased presence of

multi-resistant germs in Welsh hospitals that had outsourced cleaning services (Hall, 2012, p. 23). Such information does eventually become public. It does, however, take time for the issue to reach a degree of salience in the media that is sufficient to trigger and uphold civic engagement and actions for remunicipalisation or other countermeasures. Some aspects of the failure of the PPP in London, such as the failure of the ticketing system “Oyster Card”, are within the domain of the visible for the consumer and the civic society. An extensive, long term failure, combined with the inactivity of the local municipality, which clearly wasn’t the case with the cases studied, could therefore also theoretically trigger protests, petitioning and other forms of public participation by the civic society, as described in Type 1. On the contrary, other failures, such as the incapability of Metronet to maintain the tube system or the slow, but dangerous deterioration of health standards in Welsh hospitals have rather long term effects and are intangible to most of the public. The upcoming bankruptcy, hence failure, of the Metronet had been anticipated by authorities months in advance as the company had tried to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the PPP contract (EPSU, 20012, p. 4-5) once the lack of congruency between public and private expectations had become apparent (William,2010, p. 6-9). This thus gave the authorities the chance of considering the possibility of remunicipalisation well in advance. Moreover, the technical and professional knowledge required to judge to what extent remunicipalisation is suitable to counter the failure of private providers, is obviously most often located with the actor responsible for monitoring, hence the municipal government and therefore not as accessible to the wider public.

Summarizing, municipal governments, as elected representatives, do fulfil their responsibility of acting on behalf of the public interest through re-municipalising essential services, which’s default of provision do have or would have created significant disturbance for society that are beyond an decrease in individual economic utility and consumer satisfaction. The clear majority of cases where operative failures have been the main cause for remunicipalisation are handled by the municipal government directly, hence constitute Type 2, rather than evoking the involvement of citizen initiatives as in Type 1.

### **Type 3: Civic society initiating and pressing ahead with remunicipalisation due to high prices for consumers and excessive profits of privates**

This type of remunicipalisation is based on cases where high prices for consumers and profits for privates, hence economic considerations, are essentially the cause for remunicipalisation. It differs from type 4, through the fact that remunicipalisation was mainly initiated, perpetuated, and sometimes even decided, by an extensive involvement of the civic society, and partially by politicians from opposition parties. Citizen's initiatives thus managed to transform the privatisation related problems of high consumer prices into a salient issue. The presence of the issue within the mass media and the public deliberation revolving around the advantages of municipal provision of the public service are key determinants for the decision in favour of remunicipalisation. The case of water provision and sanitation services in Grenoble, France, will exemplify and illustrate this type and serve as case studies to analyse why the civic society, rather than the municipal government itself, was key to the process.

Grenoble was the first French city to re-municipalise its water and sanitation provision after 25 years of experiencing very high water prices. (Hall, Lobina and Terhorst, 2013, p. 197). The local audit court estimated the total excess cost for citizens and consumers to be roughly 1,000 million for the period of private provision between 1989 and 2014 (Hall and Lobina, 2001, p. 7). The private contractor COGESE used dubious water price indexing techniques, later declared illegal by the courts, and manipulated their accounting, incurring debts on paper, while actually distributing dividends to its shareholder. Moreover, the company subcontracted services to another subcontractor of its parent Company Suez at extremely high prices, thus extracting profits (Hall and Lobina, 2001, p. 7-8). The practices are a particular extreme example of perceived fraudulency, and have therefore, besides causing high water prices, also triggered the high degree of public outcry and opposition towards this private provider. This could be a potentially explanation for why the civic society was as involved, hence making it a Type 3 case, while it wasn't in the remunicipalisation of water services in Paris, belonging to Type 4 and explained later, where the private provider refrained from illegal practices. The city council, hence the municipal government, had renegotiated terms and conditions of the contract with COGESE in 1996, but had only managed to achieve minor, and

ironically, even partially less favourable outcomes for consumers and the municipality (Source B, p. 8). The failure of the municipal government to act on behalf of its citizens therefore explains that “the crucial push for a real remunicipalisation in the end came from a citizen’s initiative and was accompanied by further court decisions” (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 5). The initiative “Eau Secour”, besides raising public awareness through analysing and publicising the legal and illegal practices of COGESE, is credited with causing the change of opinion in the city council who eventually opted for remunicipalisation of the services in March 2000. The strong involvement of the civic society in the process of remunicipalisation can be tracked back to its involvement in the initial privatisation, where environmental and citizen groups had already campaigned for public and against private provision of the service (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 4-5).

Another reason for the emergence and perpetuation of such a successful citizen’s movement can be derived from the presence of extensive corruption among elected representatives of the municipality. The former major of Grenoble, who had personally negotiated the original privatisation contracts in 1989, was found to have accepted bribes from representatives of Suez in form of free flights, an apartment in Paris and financial aid for his election campaign. He was sentenced to imprisonment and large fines (Hachfeld, 2008, p. 4-5). This rather noteworthy case of corruption had two effects: First of all, it enhanced awareness of the situation of the private provision and the related issues, as it clearly made for a stirring story in the media and within the public debate. Secondly, it directly delegitimized the municipal government, thus lowering trust in the representative elements of the municipal democracy in Grenoble. The successful participation of the public in this case, can thus be interpreted as a corrective within the political system. Notably, corruption and the accompanied public outcry was not an issue in the Type 4 cases of Paris and Potsdam, which both had no significant public participation from the civic society during the process of remunicipalisation. The remunicipalisation in Grenoble, being representative of Type 3, therefore hints at the fact that certain intervening, thus necessary, though not sufficient, conditions may determine if the civic society or the local municipality, as in Type 4, are reacting to overcharging and excessive private profits. The typology, in this case, proves to be suitable framework for a preliminary investigation into why certain cases fall into certain types, in addition to the main purpose of describing and structuring the phenomena of remunicipalisation. Further

research, such as comparative study between Type 3 and Type 4 cases, obviously employing new empirical examples, could expatiate the assumption that variables such as corrupt politicians significantly influence the degree of the civic engagement in the process of remunicipalisation. Summarizing, the above mentioned case of Grenoble demonstrates that citizens can, and have become involved in countering high prices and private profits, though the number of cases fitting this type is significantly lower in comparison to the Type 4. Factors such as media coverage and dissatisfaction with corrupt officials have triggered and perpetuated the involvement of ordinary citizens.

#### **Type 4: Municipal governments opting for remunicipalisation due to financial and efficiency considerations**

This type is characterized by a municipal government, as the actor, promoting and implementing remunicipalisation due to the municipals ability to provide the public service in a more cost-efficient manner in comparison to the private provider. Remunicipalisation is thus a rational choice that maximises the economic utility of consumers and the municipality. The savings from a more cost-efficient public provision of the goods and services are then used to consolidate and reduce pressure on the municipal budget or to lower tariffs and prices for consumers. This is possible as the public ownership and provision of public services, especially concerning natural monopolies such as water, can be more cost effective in comparison to private, and profit orientated companies. These cases are a direct countermotion to the process of materially privatizing or outsourcing a public service for the same goal. Two decades of experiences with the privatization of public services contest the claim that markets and private providers are naturally more efficient than state owned providers (Warner, 2010, p. 37; Wollman,2013b, p. 48; Wollmann and Marcou,2010, p. 255; Hachfeld,2008, p. 1). While this is true for sectors such as telecommunication (Ambrious, 2012, p. 102), it clearly isn't with regards to all cases and sectors, as this type of remunicipalisation will demonstrate. In the following, some "typical" cases used to derive this type of remunicipalisation will be described. Moreover, the cases will illuminate how municipal governments, though also re-municipalising to reduce prices on behalf of the consumers, also

have their own agenda of securing surpluses from public utilities as a source of income.

The remunicipalisation of water services in Paris exemplifies how a municipal government can be capable of operating more cost efficient than a private provider, thus achieving a reduction in tariffs for consumers. The citizens of Paris had been provided with drinking water by a subsidiary of Veolia, Eau de Paris, and a subsidiary of Suez, Eau et Force-Parisienne des Euax, for over 25 years at the point of remunicipalisation in January 2010 (Valdovins, 2012 p. 111). During that time, the water prices had increased by 265 %, with the inflation only rising by 70.5 % in the same period. An audit concluded that “the satisfactory service does not justify such as high cost” (Pigeon,2012b p. 27). This type of remunicipalisation is thus demarcated from cases in Type 1, as there is no operative failure, but actually satisfactory service in terms of the quality of the product and/or service. The private provider’s inability to provide the lowest possible cost for consumers, which had been the proclaimed aim of privatisation of these services, can result from a focus on shareholder value, hence the necessity to extract profit, and/or imperfect market situations. In the case of Paris, Veolia itself admitted that Eaux de Paris was a “very profitable company” (Pigeon, 2012b, p. 27). Eventually, the provision under a newly created, publicly owned utility resulted in a reduction of operation cost of € 35 million during the first year, which was then quickly passed onto the consumers through an 8 % reduction of water tariffs (Piegeon, 2012b, p. 34). The savings for consumers have been estimated to total 76 million for the period of 2011 to 2015 (Le strat, no date). The citizens of Paris, in contrast to Type 3 cases, were not actively involved in the process of remunicipalisation through campaigning (Piegeon, 2012b, p. 37). The articulation and enforcement of the benefits of a public provision of water had been one of the main campaign manifestos of the major Delanoe and his left-wing coalition. After coming to power, his administration immediately established a special unit that dealt with policing and monitoring of private providers of public services (Le strat, no date). Overall, the “strong commitment of Parisian public authorities” is an excellent example of how municipal governments can foster the reclaiming of public services on behalf of the citizens interest, such as a reduction in prices for basic goods such as water, thus fulfilling the proscribed of representing and serving their electorates and the general public’s interests.

The remunicipalisation of electricity grids in Münsterland, Germany, demonstrates that municipalities also buy back and operate infrastructure in order to generate an extra source of income. In 2013, the municipalities of Münsterland, after 5 years of preparation, founded a municipal owned grid company, which sought to buy back the electricity grid from RWE, a multinational company, in order to profit from the utilization charges imposed on electricity providers, thus securing a “slice of the electricity cake” (Klaus, 2013). This process, thus this type of remunicipalisation in general, is catalysed by the fact that municipalities have accumulated a significant amount of debt, thus making it necessary to strive for additional sources of incomes apart from traditional forms such as taxation (Menger and Müller-Kirchenbauer, 2012 p. 55) . It is therefore, first of all, the responsible bureaucrats and representatives of local municipalities that investigate this option, rather than the public itself. The municipalities, being public institutions, have the advantage of access to borrowing at a lower cost than their private competitors (Klaus, 2013). The gains of a regular income from charges can therefore outweighs the financial obligations, such as interest payments for borrowing used to finance the initial remunicipalisation of the service or asset (Menger and Müller-Kirchenbauer, 2012, p. 55). While it is too early to judge the success of the long term endeavour of extracting profits from the re-municipalized electricity grid in the Münsterland municipalities, one must recognize the legitimate criticism of this type of remunicipalisation. Hall rightfully points to the examples of the Baden-Württemberg’s, a federal state in Germany, repurchasing of the electricity supplier EnBW. In this case, though it did not directly concern a municipality, the profits from the company were supposed to allow for a reduction of regular taxes. However, the planned compulsory shut down of nuclear energy plants will drastically affect the profitability of EnBW (Hall, 2012, p. 7). The ability to secure profit from a public, entrepreneurial involvement in the public service market, is thus questionable but also understandable from the perspective of a local municipal government

The rather insignificant, therefore less politicized insourcing of certain previously outsourced tasks pertaining public services and the local administration such as IT, gardening of public parks, or community housing management, is also a form of remunicipalisation that allows municipalities to cut spending and/or utilize its financial resources alternatively. In Somerset, UK, the municipal government and administration decided to dissolve a joint venture with IBM, which was supposed to

deliver relevant IT services with total savings of up to 192 million over ten years. In the end, the joint-venture had to be bailed out due to significant losses, and thus parts of it are in the process of being taken back in-house as a means of cost reduction for the municipality (Ballard, 2012). In a similar manner, the council housing management in Sheffield and Islington, UK, has been taken back in-house as “we could make some savings in the long run, which meant more funding would be available” (Birch, 2011). Remunicipalisation has also been a successful tool for reducing operation and maintenance cost of public buildings and infrastructure in Hannover, Germany (Schrade, 2013, p. 110- 117). Small-scale remunicipalisation, similar to more notable and far-reaching cases such as in Paris, is therefore also possible through the fact that the private providers and sub-contractors are sometimes inefficient and more costly, thus providing a considerable financial opportunity for the municipality.

The typology can be criticized with reference to the construction of type 4. The abovementioned cases of remunicipalisation differ significantly in their cause in comparison to Type 1+ 2 and 5+6, where ideological and operational failure were the main reasons. The necessity for heterogeneity between Type 4 and the others with regards to the variable cause, is thus given (Sodeur, 1974, p. 119). However, one may contest a sufficient homogeneity of the property values, hence the different causes, within Type 4. On the one hand, the abovementioned examples show that some municipalities use remunicipalisation to consolidate their budget either through an extraction of profits, which had been transferred to private shareholders while in private hands, or through reducing cost of municipally financed task and services. On the other hand, some municipalities, as in Paris, directly transfer the monetary benefits of public provision to the consumer through lowering prices and tariffs. Nevertheless, these somewhat different motivations, hence causes for remunicipalisation, have been merged, thus treated as one due to the following considerations.

The primary objective of this descriptive typology is the reduction of a complex reality, thus structuring the phenomena of remunicipalisation in a simple and analytical highly functional manner. Expanding the property space would have been contrary to this aim. Barton and Larzarsfeld explicitly support such a reduction of the property space as it eases the analysis of the relationship between the dimensions (cited in Kelle, 1999, p 101), hence the causes and actors of remunicipalisation in

this typology. Indeed, the underlying motivation of the municipalities are similar after all. Both, the consumer price reduction and the income generation, in the end, are in favour of the municipal government and thus explain why a municipal government would push for remunicipalisation. Lowering of consumer prices, or a better quality service, benefits the citizens in a direct and quick manner. This, as in the example of Paris, is inherently in the interest of accountable political parties and the corresponding ministers and bureaucrats as it provides them with political capital for re-election. This is especially valid if remunicipalisation and lowering of prices, as in Paris, has been a declared goal during election campaigns. Moreover, the revenues from public service utilities, or a reduction of the cost of the provision of a public service, can also be used to lower taxes, or to cross-finance other public services. Empirical evidence from Germany suggest that municipalities indeed use the surpluses from public service utilities, mostly regarding electricity and waste disposal, to cross-finance other services such as Public transport, which usually operate with a deficit (Menges and Müller-Kirchenbauer, 2012 p. 54-55). The remunicipalisation of waste collection in Bergkamen, Germany, underlines that municipalities can simultaneously lower consumer prices and derive profit from the public service utility. Waste collection charges were lowered by 12 %, street cleaning by 25 %, and water cost remained unchanged, (Schäfer, 2012, p. 76) while the municipality extracts a yearly profit of € 3 million due to remunicipalisation (Hall, 2012, p. 13). The underlying cause, the possibility of a more cost-efficient provision of the public service through public hands, is thus equal for all the cases of this type of remunicipalisation. Municipalities then have the choice to utilize the financial benefits for the purpose they determine to be of greatest value for citizens in the long and or short run. All sorts of economic and financial benefits, as a cause, are thus what constitutes this type of remunicipalisation.

#### **Type 5 Civic society calling for and enforcing remunicipalisation as a mean to achieving ideological aims such as environmental protection.**

This type is characterized through a strong participation of the civic society, non-governmental organisations and trade unions in the process of re-municipalising public services and infrastructure as a mean of achieving aims that can be classified

to be mainly ideological. The main example is environmental protection. They differ significantly from Type 3 and 4 as the causes for remunicipalisation are non-economical and sometimes even accompanied by considerable financial risks in comparison to the continued provision through a private provider. The impact of citizen initiatives on the repurchasing of electricity grids in Hamburg and Berlin will illustrate this type and, secondly, provide a first explanation into why citizens are likely to utilize remunicipalisation as a mean of achieving ideological aims such as climate protection and the declared energy transformation.

The case of Berlin and Hamburg, though Berlin was unsuccessful in the end, exemplify how citizen initiatives are able to politicise the perceived issue of private ownership and public service delivery, promote its discussion within the public sphere, and attempt to enforce remunicipalisation against the will of the municipal government by means of direct democratic instruments such as binding referenda. The desire to utilize the electricity grids and the public utility as a mean of producing renewable energy, thus combating climate change and supporting the energy transformation in Germany, was especially outstanding. In Berlin, the aims of the civic initiative “Berliner Energietisch”, was to provide a “democratic, ecological, and socially minded provision with energy” (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 34). The main aim of the publicly owned electricity utility would have been to provide electricity, long distance heating, etc. to the citizens of Berlin using only renewable energy sources (Berliner Energietisch, 2013; Landesabstimmungsleiter Berlin, 2013, p.3-4 ). The initiative “Unser Hamburg-unser Netz”, which had promoted and initiated the successful, binding referendum on the question of re-municipalising the electricity grid in Hamburg, also emphasized the importance of public ownership of the local electricity grid as a mean of developing the usage of renewable energies and thus protecting the climate (Unser Hamburg-Unser Netz, 2013; Menges and Müller-Kirschenbauer, p. 59)

The significant role of the civic society and the usage of direct-democratic instruments, such as referenda, is essentially a reaction to the municipal government’s inactivity and opposition with regards to the usage of remunicipalisation, hence the possibilities of a public provision of an service, as a method of achieving ideological aims such as the fostering of renewable energy and climate protection. In Berlin the ruling government, a coalition of conservatives (CDU) and social democrats (SPD), openly opposed the idea of remunicipalisation

and thus, campaigned for a No-vote in the referendum. Both parties opposed on the grounds of “great financial risks to the tax payers” (Zykla, 2013). The idea of re-municipalising the electricity grid was also opposed by Hamburgs ministry of finance, which warned of the unforeseeable financial risk associated with the purchase price of € 2 billion. Moreover, the major of Hamburg criticized that the remunicipalisation of the electricity grid would not increase the use of renewables or foster environmental protection in any other way. (Rickens and Kwasniewski, 2013 ). For further critique of using remunicipalisation to achieve energy transition related goals see Hansen and Grau (2013, p. 140-150) and Schroer (2013).

This type of remunicipalisation is thus based on the divergent views of citizens on the one hand, who accepted certain economic risk in exchange for an increased environmental effort within their community, and the municipal government on the other, which is opposed to the idea. The public’s empathize on ideological aims, rather than economic considerations, is most visible in the case of Boulder, where environmentally concerned citizens voted to raise their own taxes to finance a multi-million dollar feasibility study into the suitability of remunicipalisation as a mean of fulfilling the town’s environmental goals (Cardwell, 2013). These cases are thus clearly distinct from those in Type 1 and 3. Without judging the validity of the arguments surrounding the possible benefits of the repurchasing of electricity grids in general, the marginal result of the referendum in Hamburg, where 50.9 % of all participants voted for remunicipalisation (Uken,2013), and the referendum in Berlin, where 83 % of participants voted for the remunicipalisation but narrowly failed to the quorum of 25 % (Wahlen Berlin, 2013), verify that the public’s opinion on this type of remunicipalisation is divided, but sometimes also contrary to the opinion of elected representatives.

This type of remunicipalisation therefore underlines the argument of the importance of direct democratic elements and public participation when it comes to deriving and implementing the public will of a society. Comparing the ratio of of cases between Type 3 and Type 4 and between Type 5 and Type 6, one notices that the civic society, when speaking out for remunicipalisation, was predominantly concerned with pursuing environmental aims, whereas municipal governments often pushed for remunicipalisation for economic considerations and financial gains. The distribution of elements, hence cases, within the property space, therefore hints at an existence of a systematic relationship. The fact that all four cases of this type

concern the energy sector, indicates the issue of climate change and energy transformation is contemporarily important within the civic society. The typology is mainly descriptive and is used for structuring and gaining an overview over the phenomena of remunicipalisation. Cases were therefore not selected on the basis of being representative for the entire basic population of remunicipalisation case. This suspected systematic relationship would need to be analysed in a more focused, probably also country specific study using a representative sample of cases. Summarizing, this type of remunicipalisation is well consolidated in an empirical sense, as it is based on a well-known and nationwide discussed cases of remunicipalisation.

#### **Type 6: Municipal governments pushing for remunicipalisation for ideological reasons such as socio-political considerations and environmental concerns**

Municipal governments and administrations also use remunicipalisation, thus the regained influence over the provision of the public service, as a method of perusing goals that are primarily of ideological and socio-political nature. Providing secure and long-term jobs with high standards of employment can be a key motivation for municipalities to consider regaining control over of their public services. The state is still considered to be a very good employer in comparison to the private sector, although this image has been damaged due to deteriorating standards and an increased use of flexible and short-term contracts (Schneider, 2013, p. 148-160). Nevertheless, this type of remunicipalisation can be described as a countermovement to the reduction of workforces in the public service sector, that had occurred in many OECD countries after the privatisation of the public services (Schmidt, 2013, p.16-17). The Remunicipalisation of the public transport in Kiel, Germany, and the touristic and cultural services in Rome, Italy, will illustrate this type with regards to employment considerations. Moreover, the remunicipalisation of the public utility in Tübingen, Germany, shows that the facilitation of environmental goals, as most visible in Type 5, can also be a main agenda for some local administrations and the elected representatives.

Public services such as the public transport system in Kiel, do not only provide services that are essential for the functioning of modern societies, but also

provide an opportunity for the municipal government to control and safeguard employment. Local politicians and parties, such as a left coalition in Kiel, remunicipalised in order to sustain approximately 600 jobs that had been under threat due to continued delivery of a private provider (Halmer and Hauenschild, 2012, p. 52). The ruling “SPD”, the social democrats, declared that „ the decision of the town-hall has secured the future of the KVG and all of its employees” (SPD-Kiel, 2010). Other left parties, such as “Die Linke”, though not part of the governing coalition, emphasized that remunicipalisation was “without an alternative” and that a raising of the income of the KVG, hence most likely a rise in ticket prices, should be considered before discussing any possible reduction of labour costs (Linksfraktion-Kiel, 2009). They thus prioritize the importance of good employment conditions within state owned companies over economic efficiency considerations in the delivery of the service to the public. It is at this point, where municipalities have to consider possible conflicting goals with regards to Type 4, and thus make a conscious decision over the priorities of public service delivery.

The municipalities experience with the outsourcing of cultural services in Rome had also been negative in regards to the employment conditions. The municipality, as a result of precarious employment conditions and redundancies of workers due to restructuring of the private provider, (European Union- EPSU, 2008, p. 50), therefore utilized remunicipalisation as a method of not only securing better quality service, but also to provide stable, local employment. The publicly owned company Zetema was set up and eventually won most of the tendering for major cultural related services in public museums, etc. The formerly privately employed workers were transferred to the public company which “could offer them better employment contracts and put them on a proper job and pay grading system” (European Union, EPSU, p. 51).

The remunicipalisation of the electricity grid in Tübingen provides evidence that local governments also consider and perpetuate remunicipalisation due to environmental concerns. The city of Tübingen repurchased numerous electricity grids from neighbouring municipalities in order to foster the use of renewable energies (Holtgrave, 2009, p. 7). The mayor Boris Palmer, member of the “Bündnis90-Die Grünen”, declared that purchasing the electricity grids would provide the publicly owned utility with a direct access to the electricity consumer (Baguette, 2013, p.4). In this case, the local government became involved due to its

programmatic and ideological preferences. The major, being member of a party with a focus on environmental goals, therefore re-municipalised on behalf of his electorate and thus a majority of citizens. The congruency of aims and preferences between elected representatives and the citizens is thus what separates this case from Type 5 cases of remunicipalisation.

## **6. Conclusion and summary of findings**

The investigation into the process of remunicipalisation of public services in OECD countries has depicted the existence of various underlying causes and a varying degree of involvement of citizens and municipal governments. Constructing an analytically reduced property space of the dimensions “cause” and “actor”, has been the main contribution of the descriptive typology and this paper. The differences and similarities between individual cases of remunicipalisation, once a complex and rather unclear reality, can now be described in a simplified and functional manner through conceiving of six distinct and heterogeneous types of remunicipalisation:

Type 1 and 2 both have their origin in operative and technical failures of private providers. These types of remunicipalisation reflect the inability of some of the private providers to deliver the promised services with a certain degree of quality. The engagement of citizens has been confined to one case, as the majority of municipal governments fulfil their responsibility of ensuring the provision of basic goods and services through swift remunicipalisation in the case of private sector failure. Type 3 and 4 remunicipalisation are defined by the economic and financial benefits of public ownership. These benefits can occur in form of reduced prices for consumers and also lead to an additional source of income for the municipality. In Type 3, citizens have been involved in counter steering against high prices and private profits, a process potentially fostered by the presence of corruption among elected representatives. The majority of cases constitute Type 4 as municipal governments are attracted to the possibility of extracting profits from public companies and infrastructures and/or re-municipalise to minimise the cost of municipally funded services. Ideological motives are at the core of Type 5 and 6. Redirecting public service provision towards the inclusion of ecological considerations has been identified as a main motive of citizen initiatives in type 5.

Opposing political aims and agendas of citizens and local governments have been shown to result in the use of direct democratic elements such as referenda. Moreover, municipalities have been found to safe-guard and provide employment and to foster environmental friendly energy production and provision, thus forming Type 6.

The scope and limitations of the abovementioned findings have to be acknowledged in addition. First of all, the property values of the dimension of “cause” of remunicipalisation, hence operative failure, economic and ideological, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Some cases of remunicipalisation are based on two or more compatible causes, such as in the case of Hamburg, in which economic benefits were considered in addition to ecological motives. One should therefore note that the typology and the cases illustrated present an idealized, best-fit version of reality. This inherent trade-off was considered and weighted against the functional usefulness of the typology. Second, the case studies employed in the construction of the typology are not representative of all instances of remunicipalisation of public services in OECD countries as they were selected on the basis of acquiring a diverse and contrasting causes and actors. Observations based on the distribution of cases are therefore only preliminary and necessitate further research.

Overall, the method of employing a typology has been highly successful in “structuring an abundance of explorative material” (Mayring cited in Kelle, 1999, p. 44). The Common causes of remunicipalisation of public services in OECD countries have been reduced and summarized to be operative failures of private providers; economic and financial considerations; and ideological motives. The main actors have been identified to be the citizens and civic society, and the municipal governments and administrations. Their relationship is marked by agreement in most cases, but also by dissension, especially in regards to Type 5 and the associated environmental agendas of remunicipalisation. This paper, employing a total of thirty cases, is thus the most elaborate study of remunicipalisation so far and is valuable due to its descriptive and highly concise depicting of remunicipalisation in form of a typology.

## 7. Bibliography

AMBROSIUS, G. (2012) Paradigmen öffentlichen Wirtschaftens in historischer Perspektive. In SCHAEFER, C. and THEUVSEN, L. (eds.) *Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft: Bestandsaufnahmen, Kontexte, Perspektiven*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

BAGUETTE, A. (2013). Chancen und Risiken der Rekommunalisierung. [Online] In *Sparkassen-Forum Kommunale Kunden*. Hörstel-Riesenbeck, 17th April 2013. Available from: [https://www.ksk-steinfurt.de/pdf/firmenkunden/kaemmerertagung\\_rekommunalisierung.pdf](https://www.ksk-steinfurt.de/pdf/firmenkunden/kaemmerertagung_rekommunalisierung.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].

BALLARD, M (2012) Somerset Council to bring Southwest One services back in house. *ComputerWeekly.com* [Online]. 02<sup>nd</sup> March 2012. Available from <http://www.computerweekly.com/news/2240142323/Somerset-Council-to-bring-Southwest-One-services-back-in-house>. [ Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

BAUER, H. (2012) Von der Privatisierung zur Rekommunalisierung. In: BAUER, H., BÜCHNER, H. and HAJASCH, L. (eds.). *Rekommunalisierung öffentlicher Daseinsvorsorge*. Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam. [ Online] Available from [http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/5806/pdf/kwi\\_schriften06.pdf](http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/5806/pdf/kwi_schriften06.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

BERLINER ENERGIETISCH (2013) *Sieben gute Gründe* [Online] Available from: <http://www.berliner-energetisch.net/argumente/7-gute-gruende-deutsch-und-tuerkisch> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

BERLO, K. and WAGNER, O. (2013). Stadtwerke-Neugründungen und Rekommunalisierungen. Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie [Online]. Available at [http://wupperinst.org/uploads/tx\\_wupperinst/Stadtwerke\\_Sondierungsstudie.pdf](http://wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wupperinst/Stadtwerke_Sondierungsstudie.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

BIRCH, J. (2011) Up in arms: are we facing the death of the Almo ?. *The Guardian* [Online] 3<sup>rd</sup> November 2011. Available from: <http://www.theguardian.com/housing-network/2011/nov/03/up-in-arms-facing-death-of-almo>. [Accessed 12<sup>th</sup> January 2012]-

CARDWELL, D. (2013) Cities weigh taking over from private utilities. *The New York Times* [Online] 13<sup>th</sup> March 2013. Available from: [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-environment/cities-weigh-taking-electricity-business-from-private-utilities.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/business/energy-environment/cities-weigh-taking-electricity-business-from-private-utilities.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

DICKERTMANN, D. (2012) „Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft“ auf dem Prüfstand: Erste Zwischenergebnisse. In SCHAEFER, C. and THEUVSEN, L. (eds.) *Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft: Bestandsaufnahmen, Kontexte, Perspektiven*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

- EPSU (2012). *UK: remunicipalising transport PPPs* [Online] Available from: <http://epsu.org/a/8729> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013) *Services of general economic interest (public services)* [Online] Available from: [http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state\\_aid/overview/public\\_services\\_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/public_services_en.html). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- EUROPEAN UNION, EPSU (EUROPEAN FEDERATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE UNIONS) (2008). Reform of Public Service: What role for social dialog. Brussels. [Online] Available at [http://www.ccre.org/docs/publication\\_reform\\_public\\_services\\_en.pdf](http://www.ccre.org/docs/publication_reform_public_services_en.pdf) [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].
- FOOD & WATER WATCH (2008). Faulty Pipes- Why Public Funding-Not Privatisation is the Answer for U.S. Water Systems. Washington DC: Food and Water Watch. [Online] Available at <http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/reports/faulty-pipes/>. [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- GONCALVES, P. (2008). The Enabling State and the Market. [Online] *First Meeting of Public Law Professors*, Coimbra University, January 2008 [Online]. Available at: [http://www.pedrocostagoncalves.eu/PDF/the\\_enabling\\_state.pdf](http://www.pedrocostagoncalves.eu/PDF/the_enabling_state.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].
- HACHFELD, D. (2008) The Remunicipalisation of Water-Some Reflections on the Cases of Potsdam and Grenoble. In *The Public-Alternatives to Privatisation*. Saarbrücken, 1<sup>st</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> August 2008. Saarbrücken. [Available Online at: <http://berliner-wassertisch.net/assets/files/PDF-Dokumente/David%20Hachfeld%20-%20The%20Remunicipalisation%20of%20Water%20-%20Potsdam%20andG.pdf>]. [accessed 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].
- HALL, D. (2012) *Re-municipalising municipal services in Europe*. Public Service International Research Unit, University of Greenwich.
- HALL, D. and LOBINA, E. (2001) Private to Public: International lessons of water remunicipalisation Grenoble, France. [Online] In *Awra Conference Dundee*, 6<sup>th</sup> to 8<sup>th</sup> August 2001. Available at [http://www.epoc.uni-bremen.de/publications/pup2001/files2001/Hall\\_Grenoble.PDF](http://www.epoc.uni-bremen.de/publications/pup2001/files2001/Hall_Grenoble.PDF). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- HALL, D., LOBINA, E. and TERHORST, P. (2013) Re-municipalisation in the early twenty-first century: water in France and Energy in Germany. *International Review of Applied Economics*. [Online] Talyer Francis Online 27 (2). Available from <http://tandfonline.com> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].
- HALL, D., LOBINA, E. and CORAL, V. (2010) Replacing failed private water contracts. [Online] In: *Public Services International Research Unit Seminar*. Jakarta, 20<sup>th</sup> January 2010. Available at <http://www.psiu.org/reports/replacing-failed-private-water-contracts>. [Accessed on 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].

- HALMER, S. and HAUENSCHILD, B. (2012) *(Re-) Kommunalisierung öffentlicher Dienstleistungen in der EU*. [Online] Österreichische Gesellschaft für Politikberatung und Politikentwicklung. Available at [http://www.politikberatung.or.at/uploads/media/\\_Re-\\_Kommunalisierung-oeffentlicher-Dienstleistungen-in-der-EU\\_02.pdf](http://www.politikberatung.or.at/uploads/media/_Re-_Kommunalisierung-oeffentlicher-Dienstleistungen-in-der-EU_02.pdf) [accessed 12.01.2014]
- HANSEN, T. GRAU, P. (2013) Ein kritischer Blick auf Rekommunalisierungsprojekte in der Energiewirtschaft. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.
- HOLTGRAVE, H (2009) *Dokumentation von Rekommunalisierungsprojektion*. [Online] August 2009. Available from: [http://mario-krueger.com/cms/upload/PDF/2009\\_08\\_09\\_Rekommunalisierung\\_DEW\\_Gesamtfassung\\_Doku.pdf](http://mario-krueger.com/cms/upload/PDF/2009_08_09_Rekommunalisierung_DEW_Gesamtfassung_Doku.pdf) [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014].
- HÖFFLER, F. et al (2013). Rekommunalisierung: Renaissance öffentlicher Unternehmen. *Wirtschaftsdienst* [Online] Springer Link 93 (2). p. 71-86. Available from <http://link.springer.com>. [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- INSTITUT FÜR DEN ÖFFENTLICHEN SEKTOR E.V. (2011). *Rekommunalisierung in der Energieversorgung*. Public Governance. Available from [http://www.publicgovernance.de/docs/PG\\_Rekommunalisierung\\_in\\_der\\_Energieversorgung.pdf](http://www.publicgovernance.de/docs/PG_Rekommunalisierung_in_der_Energieversorgung.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- JEHL, D. (2003). As Cities move to privatize Water, steps back. *The New York Times* [Online] 10<sup>th</sup> February. Available from <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/10/us/as-cities-move-to-privatize-water-atlanta-steps-back.html>. Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- KELLE, U. (1999). *Vom Einzelfall zum Typus*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- KLAUS, M. (2013) *Münster Stromrebell am Ziel* [Online] Available from <http://kopo.de/blog/2013/03/21/munsterlander-stromrebell-am-ziel/> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- LENK, T., ROTTMANN, O. and HESSE, M. (2012) Finanzwissenschaftliche Dimensionen von Rekommunalisierung am Beispiel der deutschen Trinkwasserversorgung. In SCHAEFER, C. and THEUVSEN, L. (eds.) *Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft: Bestandsaufnahmen, Kontexte, Perspektiven*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- LESTRAT, A. (No Date) *The remunicipalisation of Paris' water supply service*. [Online] Available from <https://research.ncl.ac.uk/media/sites/researchwebsites/gobacit/Anne%20Le%20Strat.pdf>. [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]
- LIBBE, J. (2013) Rekommunalisierung in Deutschland. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.
- LINKSFRAKTION-KIEL (2009) Rekommunalisierung der KVG ohne Alternative [Online] Available from <http://www.linksfraktion-kiel.de/nc/presse/aktuell/detail/archiv/2009/januar/zurueck/archiv->

9351c07ad8/artikel/rekommunalisierung-der-kvg-ohne-alternative/ [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

MCDONALD, D. (2012). Remunicipalisation Works. In PIEGEON, M et al (eds.) *Remunicipalisation. Putting Water Back into Public Hands*. [Online] Amsterdam: Transnational Institut. Available at [http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation\\_book\\_final\\_for\\_web\\_0.pdf](http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation_book_final_for_web_0.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January]

MCKINNEY (1970) Sociological Theory and the Process of Typification. In MCKINNEY, J. and TIRYAKIN, E. (eds) *Theoretical Sociology Perspectives and Developments*.

MENGES, R. and MÜLLER-KIRCHENBAUER, J. (2012). Rekommunalisierung versus Neukonzessionierung der Energieversorgung. *Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft*. [Online], 36 (1). p. 51-67. Available from [www.link.springer.com](http://www.link.springer.com) [accessed: 12th January 2014].

NEWMAN, J. and CLARKE, J. (2009) *Publics, Politics & Power*. London: SAGE.

LANDESABSTIMMUNGSLEITERIN BERLIN (2013). *Amtliche Informationen zum Volksentscheid über die Rekommunalisierung der Berliner Energieversorgung* [Online] Available from: [https://www.wahlen-berlin.de/abstimmungen/VE2013\\_NEnergie/Brosch%C3%BCre\\_Energie.pdf](https://www.wahlen-berlin.de/abstimmungen/VE2013_NEnergie/Brosch%C3%BCre_Energie.pdf). [Accessed: 12th January 2014]

OHMENG, F. and GRANT, J. (2008). When markets fail to deliver: An examination of the privatization and de-privatization of water and wastewater services delivery in Hamilton, Canada. *Canadian Public Administration* [Online] Wiley Online Library 51 (3). p. 475-499 Available from: <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com> [Accessed: 12th January 2014]

OHMENG, F. and Grant, J. (2009) Has the Bubble Finally Burst ? An Examination of the Failure of Privatization of Water Services Deliver in Atlanta (U.S.A.) and Hamilton (Canada). In *Annual Meeting of Canadian Political Science Association*. May 2009, Carleton University. Unpublished.

PIGEON, M. (2012a). Who takes the risk ? Water remunicipalisation in Hamilton, Canada. In PIGEON, M et al (eds.) *Remunicipalisation. Putting Water Back into Public Hands*. [Online] Amsterdam: Transnational Institut. Available at [http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation\\_book\\_final\\_for\\_web\\_0.pdf](http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation_book_final_for_web_0.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January]

PIGEON, M. (2012b). Une eau publique pour Paris. In PIGEON, M et al (eds.) *Remunicipalisation. Putting Water Back into Public Hands*. [Online] Amsterdam: Transnational Institut. Available at [http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation\\_book\\_final\\_for\\_web\\_0.pdf](http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/download/remunicipalisation_book_final_for_web_0.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January]

RAMESH, M. and ARAAL JR, E (2010). Reasserting the role of the state in public services. In RAMESH, M., ARAAL JR, E. and WU,X (eds.) *Reasserting the Public in Public Services*. Hooboken: Taylor and Francis.

REMUNICIPALISATION TRACKER. (2008). *Atlanta*. [Online] Available from: <http://www.remunicipalisation.org/cases#Atlanta>. [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

RICKENS, C. and KWASNIEWSKI (2013) Rückkauf der Hamburger Energienetze: “Vertrauen Sie Ihrem Bürgermeister” *Spiegel* [Online] 16th September 2013. Available from <http://www.spiegel.de/wirtschaft/soziales/olaf-scholz-ueber-den-rueckkauf-der-hamburger-energienetze-a-921150.html> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

SCHAEFER, C. and THEUVSEN, L. (2012). Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft: Fakt oder Fiktion?. In SCHAEFER, C. and THEUVSEN, L. (eds.) *Renaissance öffentlicher Wirtschaft: Bestandsaufnahmen, Kontexte, Perspektiven*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

SCHÄFER, R. (2012) Rekommunalisierung-Fallstricke in der Praxis. In: BAUER, H., BÜCHNER, H. and HAJASCH, L. (eds.). *Rekommunalisierung öffentlicher Daseinsvorsorge*. Potsdam: Universitätsverlag Potsdam. [ Online] Available from [http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/5806/pdf/kwi\\_schriften06.pdf](http://opus.kobv.de/ubp/volltexte/2012/5806/pdf/kwi_schriften06.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

SCHMIDTZ, C. (2013) The Employment Effects of Privatizing Public Utilities in OECD Countries. *Public Management Review* [Online] Tandfonline. Available from <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14719037.2013.792379#.UtKfwPTuJx8> [ Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

SCHNEIDER, C. (2013) Gute Arbeit im Öffentlichen Dienst. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

SCHRADE, M. (2013) Rekommunalisierung in der Landeshauptstadt Hannover. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

SCHROER, S. (2011) *Städte sollten keine Energienetze kaufen* in Standpunkt-Hamburgisches WeltWirtschaftsInsitut [Online] Available at <http://www.kpv-nrw.de/2977-staedte-sollten-keine-energienetze-kaufen.html> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

SODEUR, W. ( 1974) *Empirische Verfahren zur Klassifikation*. Stuttgart: B.G. Teubner.

SPD-KIEL (2010) Rekommunalisierung der KVG erhält Arbeitsplätze. [Online] Available from <http://www.spd-net-sh.de/kiel/ratsfraktion/index.php?mod=article&op=show&nr=8440&query=> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

TASCHNER, S. (2013) Die Bedeutung von NGO's und lokalen Bündnissen für die Entwicklung von Rekommunalisierungsprojekten. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

TRAPP, J. (2004). Gemeinwohlsicherung als Herausforderung- kommunale Steuerungspotential in der "Gewährleistungskommune". [Online] In: *Tagung „Stand und Perspektiven der politikwissenschaftlichen Verwaltungsforschung“*. 23th to 25th of September 2004. Available at [http://homepages.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Joerg.Bogumil/Downloads/Tagung/TagungSept04\\_Trapp.pdf](http://homepages.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/Joerg.Bogumil/Downloads/Tagung/TagungSept04_Trapp.pdf) [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

UKEN, M. (2013) Noch haben die Hamburger ihr Netz nicht. *Zeit* [Online] 23th September 2013. Available at <http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-09/rueckkauf-netze-volksentscheid>. [Accessed 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

UNITED KINGDOM. HOUSE OF COMMONS, TRANSPORT COMMITTEE. (2008) *The London Underground and the Public-Private Partnership agreements*. London: Stationery Office.

UNSER HAMBURG-UNSER NETZ (2013) *Weil es sich lohnt !* [Online] Available from <http://unser-netz-hamburg.de/weil-es-sich-lohnt-3/> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

VALDOVINOS, J. (2012). The remunicipalization of Parisian water services: new challenges for local authorities and policy implications. *Water International* [Online] *Tandfonline* 37 (2) p. 107-120. Available from <http://tanfonline.com> [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

VERBÜCHELN, M. (2009) *Rückübertragung operativer Dienstleistungen durch Kommunen am Beispiel der Abfallwirtschaft*. Berlin: Difu-Papers.

WAHLEN BERLIN (2013). *Ergebnis des Volksentscheids* [Online] Available from [https://www.wahlen-berlin.de/abstimmungen/VE2013\\_NEnergie/Ergebnisprozent.asp?sel1=6052&sel2=0798](https://www.wahlen-berlin.de/abstimmungen/VE2013_NEnergie/Ergebnisprozent.asp?sel1=6052&sel2=0798)

WARNER, M (2010) Reversing privatization, rebalancing government reform. In RAMESH, M., ARAAL JR, E. and WU, X (eds.) *Reasserting the Public in Public Services*. Hoboken: Taylor and Francis.

WEIMAR, D. and VINING, A. (2005) *Policy Analysis-Concepts and Practice*. New Jersey: Pearson Education

WILLIAMS, T. (2010) Analysis of the London Underground PPP Failure. [Online] In *Engineering Project Organizations Conference* South Lake Tahoe, 4<sup>th</sup> to 7<sup>th</sup> November 2010. EPOS. Available at: [http://academiceventplanner.com/EPOC2010/Papers/EPOC\\_2010\\_Williams.pdf](http://academiceventplanner.com/EPOC2010/Papers/EPOC_2010_Williams.pdf). [Accessed: 12<sup>th</sup> January 2014]

WOLLMANN, H. (2013a) Öffentlicher Dienstleistungen zwischen öffentlich/munizipalem und privatem Sektor. In KRONAUER, M. and SIEBEL, W. (eds.). *Stadtgesellschaft*. Frankfurt, Campus.

WOLLMAN, H. (2013b) Rekommunalisierung ein europäischen Nachbarländer. In MATECKI, C. and SCHULTERN, T. (eds.) *Zurück zur öffentlichen Hand*. Hamburg: VSA Verlag.

WOLLMANN, H. and MARCOU, G. (2010) Introduction. In: WOLLMANN, H. and MARCOU, G. (eds.) *The Provision of Public Services in Europe*.

ZYLKA, R. (2013) SPD und CDU gegen Volksentscheid. *Berliner Zeitung* [Online] 18<sup>th</sup> August 2013. Available at <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/energetisch-spd-und-cdu-gegen-volksentscheid,10809148,24134468.html>. [Accessed: 12th January 2014]