|Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus (2014): Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment. In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 35, No. 5: pp. 350-356|
This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics
Economics > Chairs > Chair of Dynamic Economic Theory (closed)
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||28. Nov 2014 13:36|
|Last Modified:||28. Nov 2014 14:05|