|Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel (2014): Climate Policy Negotiations with Incomplete Information. In: Economica, Vol. 81, No. 322: pp. 244-256|
We analyse bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behaviour reduces the gains from global cooperation and that, in turn, this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements. © 2014 The London School of Economics and Political Science.
|Keywords:||bargaining; environmental management; environmental policy; international agreement; probability|
Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||08. Dec 2014 12:33|
|Last Modified:||08. Dec 2014 13:47|