|Ke, Changxia; Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian (1. October 2014): Alliances in the shadow of conflict. In: Economic Inquiry|
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Footnote:||First published online|
|Deposited On:||09. Dec 2014 07:33|
|Last Modified:||09. Dec 2014 07:33|