|Konrad, Kai A.; Kovenock, Dan (2009): Multi-battle contests. In: Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 66, No. 1: pp. 256-274|
We study equilibrium in a multistage race in which players compete in a sequence of simultaneous move component contests. Players may win a prize for winning each component contest, as well as a prize for winning the overall race. Each component contest is an all-pay auction with complete information. We characterize the unique subgame perfect equilibrium analytically and demonstrate that it exhibits endogenous uncertainty. Even a large lead by one player does not fully discourage the other player, and each feasible state is reached with positive probability in equilibrium (pervasiveness). Expected effort in the component contests may be non-monotonic in the closeness of the race and realized individual effort may exceed the value of the prize by a factor that is proportional to the maximum number of stage victories required. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|JEL Classification:||D72, D74|
|Deposited On:||08. Dec 2014 14:59|
|Last Modified:||08. Dec 2014 14:59|