|Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A. (2008): Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. In: Management Science, Vol. 54, No. 5: pp. 969-981|
Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R & D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival. © 2008 INFORMS.
|Keywords:||Contests; Fragmented property rights; Hold-up; Inventing around; Patents; R and D, Research and development management; Uncertainty analysis, Patents and inventions|
Economics > Chairs > MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||08. Dec 2014 15:29|
|Last Modified:||08. Dec 2014 15:29|