|Englmaier, Florian; Reisinger, Markus (2014): Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment. In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 35, No. 5: pp. 350-356|
This paper analyzes a model in which owners of competing firms can hire biased managers for strategic reasons. We show that independent of the mode of competition, that is, price or quantities, owners hire aggressive managers. This result contrasts with the classic literature on strategic delegation. Copyright Â© 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Economics > Chairs
Economics > Chairs > Seminar for Organizational Economics
|Subjects:||300 Social sciences > 330 Economics|
|Deposited On:||16. Dec 2014 09:17|
|Last Modified:||16. Dec 2014 09:17|