Logo
EnglishCookie löschen - von nun an wird die Spracheinstellung Ihres Browsers verwendet.
Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios (1. Oktober 2005): The market for protection and the origin of the state. CESifo Working Papers
Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.

Abstract

We examine a stark setting in which security or protection can be provided by self-governing groups or by for-profit entrepreneurs (kings, kleptocrats, or mafia dons). Though self-governance is best for the population, it faces problems of long-term viability. Typically, in providing security the equilibrium market structure involves competing lords, a condition that leads to a tragedy of coercion: all the savings from the provision of collective protection are dissipated and welfare can be as low as, or even lower than, in the absence of the state