Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios
Succession rules and leadership rents.
WZB Discussion Paper, SP II 2005-13
Volltext auf 'Open Access LMU' nicht verfügbar.
Leaders compensate supporters not just for performing their duties but also in
order to preempt an overthrow by the same supporters. We show how
succession rules affect the power of leaders relative to supporters as well as the
resources expended on possible succession struggles. We compare two
regimes of leadership succession: the conclave regime and the divide-et-impera
regime which differ with respect to the role of supporters of the previous leader
once the new leader takes power. The leadership rent is higher and supporters
receive a lower compensation in the divide-et-impera regime, as supporters
have to fight harder for succession to avoid the grim outcome of loss. Leaders,
then, would like to induce the divide-et-impera regime even when every
supporter has veto power over his leadership.