**Münchener Beiträge
zur Politikwissenschaft**

2015

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**‚Export of Terror'
Why foreign fighters in Syria
and Iraq come more often from
some countries oft he Arab
League than from others**

Masterarbeit bei
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SoSe 2015

Contents

1 Introduction

The ongoing civil war in Syria and Iraq attracts thousands of individuals from all over the world (Burken 2015). Most of these foreign fighters are young Sunni Muslim men in their twenties with a *jihadist* motivation (Barrett 2014a: 16). But also Shiites, Christians, Kurds and adventure seekers of different nature are pulled to the war zone (Spencer 2015; Hilgers/Hensgen 2014). Teenagers can be found as well as elderly (Barrett 2014a: 16); also an increasing number of women and girls travels to the war zone in Syria and Iraq (Freytas-Tamura 2015), either to fight (Yücel 2015) or to marry a fighter (Saltman/Smith 2015). Most of the foreign fighters join radical Islamic insurgent groups affiliated to global *jihad* (Hegghammer 2014b: 6). Although the numbers of foreign fighters from Europe and former soviet-union states increase, the largest proportion originates from the Arab World (Neumann 2015). While some Arab countries (Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia or Jordan) *export*[1] great numbers of foreign fighters in comparison to their population, others are not reported to export any (Comoros; Djibouti) or only comparatively small numbers (Mauretania; Sudan; United Arab Emirates; Egypt; Algeria). Again other countries rank in the middle (e.g. Somalia; Qatar; Kuwait). By comparing socio-economic-, systemic-, political- and practical conditions in 15 Sunni Arab countries, I try to find an explanaton for the widely differing numbers of foreign fighters from the respective states.

The upshot of my exploratory study is – perhaps not surprisingly – that there is no single condition that explains the noticable differences between the countries of my sample as regarding the export of foreign fighters. Most interestingly is that the combination of a modern market system, education and easy accessibility to the conflict zone seems to foster the export of fighters. Moreover, the findings show that poor and underdeveloped countries export the smallest numbers. Other conditions are apparently less important, but may still be relevant in combination with others. Suprisingly Sharia law can in combination with other conditions – contribute to the outcome 'no export of foreign fighters'.

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[1] I use of the term "export" to describe the flow of foreign fighters from a country to Syria and Iraq. This is not meant to imply that the country actively and on purpose *exports* fighters in the usual sense of the term.

1.1   Research Question

My research question is: ***What are the conditions in states of the Arab League that lead – by themselve or in combination – to a higher or lower number of Muslim foreign fighters from the respective states in Syria and Iraq?***

Based on the general assumption that the causes of radicalization are the same for individuals living under more or less the same social and political circumstances, I assume that structural differences between the Arab States affect the probability with which individuals living in these states may be expected to join an armed group in the conflict zone of Syria and Iraq. Moreover, I assume, that an explanation for the grossly diverging numbers of foreign fighters from the respective states can be found by comparing countries that seem to export few or none with other countries that became a mayor recruitment pool for insurgent groups in the conflict zone. In my analysis I shall focus solely on foreign fighters that (a) come from Sunni majority Arab states and (b) go to Syria and Iraq. My goal is to identify the sufficient and necessary conditions for the outcome – i.e. a comparatively high number of foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq. My goal is not to give a comprehensive analysis of the causes of the phenomenon of foreign fighters or of the causes of radicalization and terrorism in general. I merely analyse the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq coming from states of the Arab League and their proportionally higher or lower numbers when compared with the population size of the respective countries. Strictly speaking, the findings will, therefore, only apply to states of a similar type. If one would, for example, include western states, that export foreign fighters, conditions that represent aspects of integration or the situation of the Muslim minorities would probably be more relevant (Matthijs/Zahid 2013; Vidino/Brandon 2012). And if one thinks of Russia and China, their policies towards regional Muslim minorities (e.g. the Chechens and the Uigurs) would seem to be very relevant (Drennan 2015; TSG IntelBrief 2014). Still, I hope that my findings may help to gain a deeper insight into the phenomen of foreign fighters and the causes of radicalization.

1.2 Methodological Approach

The approach of this research paper is an inductive comparative case study. I compare structural conditions in states of the Arab League and the practical possibilities to become a foreign fighter that prevail in these states. By comparing structural conditions in different countries, I hope to find patterns that can be generalized and may explain the specific phenomenon in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, this research paper is explorative. Prior to my analysis, assumptions existed regarding the different variables, yet their importance and their reciprocal effects were not known. Therefore the analysis includes a wide range of variables, in order to not leave aside relevant conditions for the export of foreign fighters. The analysis does not focus on individual choices of single foreign fighters and their way to Syria and Iraq, but on the statistical effect of higher or lower numbers of fighters when compared with the size of the population of the respective countries. If one takes a look on the phenomenon at a global scale, one will find one striking similarity: All countries that export high numbers of foreign fighters have a Sunni Muslim population. Either they are historically Sunni majority or minority countries, or a Sunni population exists due to immigration. But not all countries with a Sunni population do export fighters. By using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), I want to identify conditions and combinations of conditions that are related to the export of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq. Arab League states with a Sunni majority are chosen as cases. In the QCA-Analysis the conditions are represented by the x-variables. They are divided into four categories: socio-economic; systemic; political and practical and derive from general theories and assumptions about the causes of terrorism as well as from research findings and practical assumptions regarding the accessibility of the conflict zone. The phenomenon of interest, the export of foreign fighters, will be refered as "the outcome" and be represented by the y-variable of the QCA-Analysis (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 20).

1.2.1 Two Basic Assumptions

There are two basic assumptions underlying my analysis:

1. Equal circumstances result in more or less equal outcomes.

2. There are at least two necessary conditions for an individual to become a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq: The individual must have (i) the intention and (ii) the practical possibilities to become a foreign fighter.

The first assumption

Research on the radicalization of Islamic terrorists shows that radicalization processes are fostered by general social factors (socio-economic situation, state system and grievances about certain policies), by personal and psychological conditions and by the general dynamics of groups (Sageman/Atran/Davis/Ginges 2009: 5-13; Vidino 2012). Since Islamic terrorists and Muslim foreign fighters converge under the banner of global *jihad*, the same may be assumed to hold good for foreign fighters (Bymann/Shapiro 2014: 5ff.; Hegghammer 2011b: 55). In a joint study about foreign fighters of whom some became terrorists, Ciluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp describe, the close connections between foreign fighters, insurgent groups and international terrorist organizations (Ciluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010). Lamya Kaddor, comes to similar conclusions in her popular book „*Zum Töten bereit. Warum deutsche Jugendliche in den Dschihad ziehen.*" (Kaddor 2015). I take it, therefore, that the radicalization processes of individuals that eventual decide to get involved in violent *jihad* – whether by becoming a terrorist at home or a foreign fighter – are by and large the same and built on the same foundation of grievances, feelings of not belonging and a shared Muslim identity (Sagemann 2009: 15-24; Ginges 2009: 76). I argue that individuals, living under the same circumstances and conditions will, with great probability, take similar decisions in similar situations. This does not mean, that there are no exceptions. Single foreign fighters that joined ISIL came from the most unexpected countries like Japan, Chile or South Korea (Barrett 2014a: 13; Chosun Media 2015; Burken 2015). An important condition for the export of Muslim foreign fighters, the existence of a Muslim community, is (almost) not fulfilled and the corresponding variable is close to zero. Personal and psychological conditions play, in fact, an important role to explain the phenomenon of foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, I maintain that these conditions are closely correlated with the conditions of the environment in which an individual lives. The psychological mindset of an individual, living in a different environment and under different circumstances, would most likely lead to a different

outcome. The French sociologist Èmile Durkheim compared 1897 suicide rates in different societies. His groundbreaking sociological study revealed the influence of societal environment on suicide rates (Durkheim 1897). Committing suicide is a decision undeniable connected to the psyche of an individual, his personal experiences and well-being. I assume that the same counts for the – often suicidal – decision to become a foreign fighter.

The second assumption

An individual must have the intention to become a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq and the practical possibilities to do so.[2] The structural conditions that I study are connected to one of these two necessary conditions or to both. They may, if they prove to be relevant, either constitute necessary, sufficient, or part of a sufficient conditions related to the intentions of individuals or to the practical possibilities. Some conditions are intermediary and relate to both.

The **Socio-economic conditions** *(well-being; recruitment pool; education)* in a country can influence the intentions of individuals to become foreign fighters. They are measured with indicators of human development, poverty, age structures and unemployment and education.

The **systemic conditions** (*economic system*; *democracy*; *Islam*) are also related to the intentions of an individual. They take into account indicators of market freedom, international trade, political and civil freedoms and to the role states are based on Islam and Sharia law.

The **political conditions** (*grievances*; *counterterrorism*) are split. While the variable *grievances* influences the intention of an individual to become a foreign fighter, the variable *counterterrorism* (including legislative efforts to stop the flow of foreign fighters, de-radicalization programs, the surveillance of mosques, and the promotion of peace) influences both, intentions and the practical possibilities.

The **practical conditions** [*alternatives*; *networks*; *accessibility*] also relate to intentions and possibilities. While *accessibility* relates to the practical possibility of becoming a foreign

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[2] One could add the knowledge of an individual that becoming a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq is possible and yet another necessary condition. I leave this aside, and assume that due to widespread information on how to make it to Syria and Iraq on jihadist web-pages; and because of the media attention of the topic (Klausen 2014; Berger/Strathearn 2013) objective accessibility and subjective knowledge coincide. Moreover, insurgent groups that recruit foreign fighters leave no doubt that foreign fighter are welcome (Tufft 2014).

fighter in Syria and Iraq, the variable *networks* also relates to intentions. The existence of networks between domestic terrorist organizations and insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq may facilitate access to the conflict zone by means of organizational and financial assistance (Levitt 2009), but they also can influence intentions by the promotion of *jihad* in Syria and Iraq (Reidy 2015). The variable *alternatives* relates to different options of a committed *jihadist* to get engaged (to go to Syria/Iraq or or to some other region of conflict, or to join a *jihadist* organization at home). Unlike socio-economic and systemic conditions the existence of alternatives does not influence the radicalization process. The variable measures competing offers of *jihadi* activity for an already radicalized individual.

Fig. 1: Analysed Conditions of the Outcome "*foreign fighter*"

The aim of this research is, to find the combination of conditions, seen in fig. 1, that lead to the outcome – export of foreign fighters or not. Thereby I assume, that the solution must regard to both: (1) Intentions of individuals to become foreign fighters and (2) the practical possibility to enter Syria/Iraq.

1.3 Definition of a Foreign Fighter

A defining characteristic of a foreign fighter is, that he is a foreigner in the country where he fights; i.e. that he does not hold the citizenship of that country (Malet 2013: 9). David Malet distinguishes foreign fighters from soldiers, mercenaries, and from employees of private

security firms. Unlike combatants of these types, a foreign fighter does not have the mandate of a state. Neither is he sent to fight abroad by his home country, nor does he act with the permission of the state where he takes action. Malet also characterizes foreign fighters as volunteers who are not primarily motivated by financial gain (Malet 2013: 9). Thomas Hegghammer builds up on the definition of Malet. He defines a foreign fighter "as an agent, who (1) has joined – and operates within the confines of – an insurgency, (2) who lacks citizenship to the conflict state or kinship links to its warring factions, (3) who lacks affiliation to an official military organization, and (4) who is unpaid." (Hegghammer 2011b: 57f.). Because of these criteria, Hegghammer´s definition excludes transnational terrorists (1), members of the diaspora coming back to fight in their country of origin, (2) soldiers (3) and mercenaries.

The data on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, used in this paper, do not indicate which insurgent groups foreign fighters join. I assume, though, that most foreign fighters join Sunni *jihadi* groups like the *Islamic State in Syria and the Levant* (ISIL) nowadays known as the '*Islamic State*' (IS) or the *Al-Qaeda* (AQ) affiliate, *Jabhat Al-Nusrah* (JAN) (also known as *Al-Nusrah Front* (ANF)) and *Ahrar Al-Sham* (Barrett 2014a: 6; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 2014: 1). Hegghammer´s criteria (1) and (4) are difficult to apply accurately to the case of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Insurgent groups like ISIL or *Jabhat Al-Nusrah* that attract great numbers of foreign fighters are closely connected to international and transnational terrorism or even defined as terrorist organizations (Department of State 2012; Huryyiet Daily News 2014; UN Security Council 2014). ISIL repeatedly calls for terrorist attacks outside the combat zone and takes responsibility for them.[3] The *Khorasan Group* working in cooperation with *Jabhat Al-Nusrah*, is reported to be the planning wing for international terrorist operations of *Al-Qaeda* in Syria (Lund 2014). The research project 'Mapping Militant Organizations' by the Stanford University identifies close ties between *Al-Qaeda*, *Jabhat Al-Nusrah* and the international AQ-branch, identified as the *Khorasan Group* (Mapping Militant Organizations 2012-14). Pay as a motivation is another criterion that seems difficult to apply to foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova argue that the relative

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[3] ISIL calls for Attacks against the West and Arab „unbelievers" in the 8th issue of its Magazine *Dabiq* 2015. Translated and put into context by 'The MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism threat Monitor' (MEMRI 2015) took responsibility for the attack on a museum in Tunis, even though over terrorist organizations also claimed responsible (Kirkpatrick 2015).

pay of skilled and unskilled individuals for participation in terrorist organizations, in comparison to the relative pay in the legal sector, can have an influence in the decision making of an individual to join a terrorist group (Krueger/Maleckova 2003: 122). This may also apply to the phenomenon of foreign fighters. Jessica Stern, a lecturer at Harvard University and policy consultant on terrorism, lists money as a motivational benefit for foreign fighters joining ISIL. She refers to the term "five-star jihad", made up by the British ISIL fighter Ifthekar Jaman, describing his 'high life' at the battlefield in Syria (Stern/Berger 2015a). Following a NBC Interview of King Abdallah of Jordan, ISIL pays foreign fighters a wage of 1000$ a month (nbcnews 2014). Aaron Zelin described – in a conference on ISIL and foreign fighters of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy – the "five-star jihad" as follows: "In Syria, for example, many foreigners have lived in villas with pools and ones that have a video game room." (Zelin 2015a). Studies and News indicate, that money is not the only benefit that may count as pay (Githens-Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014). An increase of Palestinian suicide bombers was reported, after Iraq (by than under the rule of Saddam Hussein) increased the payments to their left behind families (Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 31). Other non-ideological benefits are the prospect of marriage (Stern/Berger 2015a), with a sponsored honeymoon, as Russia Today states (Russia today 2015), or loot as a way of payment (Malet 2013: 17). Even though, ideology is the dominant factor for individuals to go to Syria and Iraq, pay and a risk-benefit calculation also seem to pose relevant.

The foreign fighters from the countries that were chosen as research cases are predominantly Sunni Muslims. Although it is theoretically possible, that the data includes some Shia, Christians or Secularists, I assume that the main group is Sunni Muslim. There are no reports of foreign fighters with a different religious background from one of the countries chosen as cases in Syria and Iraq. Even though, most foreign fighters are Muslims, the degree to which religion is a motivation to join an insurgency in Syria or Iraq may differ. Foreign Fighters whose main motivation is to help the "Syrian Revolution" or to stop atrocities by regime forces are likely to be found in the ranks of more moderate main stream insurgent groups like the *Free Syrian Army* (FSA)[4] (Zelin 2013a: 2). Fighters whose motivation is primarily based

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[4] There are conflicting reports on foreign fighters joining the FSA. Reports, media coverage and statements by the insurgent group indicate that the group accepts foreign fighters (AFP 2012), others claim the

on religious believes, preferably join more extremist *jihadi* groups, like ISIS or JAN. Allthough in both cases, grievance concerning atrocities by the Syrian Regime poses as a motivating factor (MAITIC 2014: 1f.).

I will not make use of a definition of foreign fighters that defines them as Muslims. The figures on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq used in this research paper give no evidence on their religious background. Nevertheless, Islam is a prominent factor for understanding the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Only countries with a predominantly Sunni population were selected as cases for this study and, in any case, my research question can be addressed by a definition of foreign fighters that does not inlcude their religious background. Still, through the selection of the cases, the analysis focusses on Muslim foreign fighters.

The definition for foreign fighter used in my study is this:

> *An individual, not affiliated to a military organization, who joins, a non-state insurgent group in a country where he lacks citizenship or habitual residence.*

2   *Foreign Fighters in World Politics & Science*

Despite the fact that the phenomenon of foreign fighters in world politics is not new, the subject is understudied (Hegghammer 2011a). David Malet – author of the first historical comparative analysis of foreign fighters – traces the phenomenon back to the Greeks War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire in 1820 and the 1836 Texas War of Independence (Malet 2014). The phenomenon of Muslim foreign fighter mobilization in greater numbers, began with the Afghanistan war (1979-89). Both subjects, foreign fighters in general and Muslim foreign fighters in particular, have not found much attention. Hegghammer argues that this is because foreign fighters are "an intermediary actor category lost between local insurgents, on the one hand, and international terrorists, on the other" (Hegghammer 2014a). The increased involvement of foreign fighters in the civil war in Syria since its beginning 2011 did not only put the topic on the agenda of governments around the world, but also led to an increased scientific interest in the subject. Reports, case studies and analyses have been published lately on different issues of the subject. Even though, comparative studies of the

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opposite (Letsch 2014). It is to assume that the FSA, as an umbrella organization, does not have a constrained foreign fighter policy and/or that their policy changed with the events of the conflict.

backgrounds and the biographies of foreign fighters from different regions exist, there is a lack of a comparative study of the countries of origin of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Given this background, the aim of my study is not to analyze the biographies of foreign fighters but the environment in which they lived before they traveled to Syria and Iraq.

2.1   State of the Art

In this section I shall, firstly, give a synopsis of the state of the art on the subjekt. Secondly, I explain which findings of earlier research are important with regard to my research question, and, thirdly, I shall explain why research may be valuable addition to previous studies.

Origins of the Phenomenon & the History of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Important research on the subject has been undertaken by David Malet who compared cases of foreign fighter involvement in internal conflicts throughout history and Thomas Hegghammer who focused on Muslim fighters. Both conclude that foreign fighters are a unique category of actors, operating in a conflict zone where they lack citizenship. They are neither soldiers, mercenaries, insurgents, nor international terrorists (Malet 2013: 9; Hegghammer 2011b: 58). While the definitions of foreign fighters in Malet's and Hegghammer's work is new, the phenomenon is not. It saw a peak at the beginning of the 20th century with foreign fighters on both sides in the Spanish Civil War (Jackson 1994; Othen 2008). A main motivation for becoming a foreign fighter was and still is ideology (Hegghammer 2011b: 58). David Malet illustrates similarities of transnational foreign fighter recruitment by comparing cases of foreign fighters and recruitment mechanisms from the Communist International as well as from international violent Islamic organizations. He claims that while in the first half of the 20th century most foreign fighters were communist, the majority of foreign fighters today are Muslims (Malet 2010: 97ff.). Still, there are cases of non-Muslim foreign fighters in contemporary conflicts. Foreign fighters join non-Islamic insurgencies in the Middle East or other theaters of war and conflict. For instance, Tanja Nijmeier, a Dutch student joined the Columbian FARC guerilla (Obermaier 2010). Foreign fighters are also reported to operate in the Ukrainian conflict. In spite of many differences, the phenomena of foreign fighters in Ukraine and in Syria and Iraq show similarities. In both cases, many fighters come from regions (Russia, the former Soviet Union/Arab States, Muslim countries) that are linked by

language, religion or ethnic kinship to the conflict zone. Also, both conflicts attract smaller numbers of individuals with no direct link to the conflict zone. For instance, Brazilian and French foreign fighters joint insurgent groups in the Ukraine (novorossia today 2014). In the Middle East, the Syrian and the Iraqi regime also rely on foreign fighters, of which some are affiliated with terrorist groups such as the PFLP or *Hezbollah* (Zelin 2013a: 1). Kurdish, Christian, and Shia militias are reported to welcome foreign fighters (Spencer 2015; Zelin 2013a; Sullivan 2014; Hilger/Hensgen 2014; Chasmar 2014). The by far greatest number of foreign fighters joins radical Islamic insurgencies affiliated with global *jihad* (Barrett 2014a: 6; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 2014: 1). Hegghammer links the subject of foreign fighters closely to the subject of global *jihad* and refers to the term Muslim foreign fighters, describing the phenomenon as a violent offshoot of a new pan-Islamism (Hegghammer 2011b: 57). *jihadist* organizations (e.g. AL-Qaeda; ISIL) see the Syrian and other conflicts in Muslim areas as a field of opportunity for their '*jihadist* struggle' (Barrett 2014c). The trend of Muslim foreign fighters started with the "Arab Afghan" mobilization during the Soviet Union´s war against an Afghan insurgency in 1979-1989 (Hegghammer 2011b; Brown 2011). It created a significant movement of up to 20.000 foreign fighters (lowest estimates: 5.000) rooted in a globalized Pan-Islamic community (Hegghammer 2011b: 56ff., 61). Exile members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, Syria and Iraq, Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia and the funding and promoting of pan-Islamism by Saudi Arabia plus geo-political conditions are seen as backbones of this pan-Islamic movement (Hegghammer 2011b: 56ff.; Chosky/Chosky 2015). Hegghammer maintains, comparable with Martha Crenshaw's rationalistic explanation of the causes of terrorism (Crenshaw 1981) [5], that limited possibilities to influence domestic politics, drove Islamists to an international level (Hegghammer 2011b: 57). However, it is questionable whether this fits the current situation in Syria and Iraq. The leading exporter of foreign fighters is Tunisia, where *Ennahda*, an Islamic party with roots in the Muslim Brotherhood is a leading political party. Before losing the national parliamentary elections in October 2014 *Ennahda* constituted the Tunisian government (Gall 2014). During their government great numbers of Tunisians left the country to fight in Syria and Iraq (MEE 2014; Barrett 2014a). In contrast to the Tunisian *Ennahda*,

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[5] Crenshaw argues that a lack of possibilities of political participation, and thus to achieve political aims by peacefull means, causes terror (Crenshaw 1981).

that remains a strong political force, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was ousted, even earlier, from government by a military coup and the group was criminalized (El-Sherif 2014). However, Egypt did export fewer foreign fighters than Tunisia (Neumann 2015; Barrett 2014a). Up to now, the Gulf States (e.g. Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait) are reported to support radical Islamic organizations, even though there is no evidence for direct support of ISIL or JAN (Boghardt 2014a; Boghardt 2014b; Becker 2014). If not by direct support for such groups, the international spreading of orthodox Islam by Saudi Arabia creates a breeding ground for radical Islamists (Chosky/Chosky 2015; Stemmann 2005). The Afghan insurgency and their foreign fellowmen were intensively supported by the United States and several Arab states, esp. Saudi Arabia (Hegghammer 2011b: 57; Akbarzadeh/Baxter 2008: 98f.). Vahid Brown describes the Afghan *jihad* not as a global *jihad* between the *dar al-Islam* ('House of peace', i.e. the, territory of the *Ummah* the worldwide Muslim community) and the *dar al-Charb* ('House of War', i.e. non-Muslim countries or states thought to be hostile to Muslims). Instead, he defines the Afghan *jihad* as a regional conflict restricted to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, its internationalization through foreign fighters, strengthened those Islamic fractions that saw the *jihad* as an individual duty for all Muslims on a global scale; i.e. a fight not limited to Afghanistan but also addressing rulers in Muslim States. The very Muslim States that supported the *jihad* in Afghanistan faced violent backlashes, once the fighters came back home (Brown 2011: 230-235). The global *jihad* is a product of competition between independent Islamic elites and Muslim state elites – aiming to advance their stance as defenders of Islam by funding foreign fighters in Afghanistan (Hegghammer 2011b: 57; Brown 2011). While foreign fighters enjoyed state support in the 1980´s, today most states in the Middle East see them as threat; at least since the rapid success of ISIL. Whatsoever, this attitude was not consistent since the beginning of the conflict. The strategies towards Syria by some Arab States, mainly the Gulf States Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait – states that support the Syrian opposition and are reported to have kept their eyes shut to the issue of foreign fighters at the beginning of the conflict - seem similar to the elite competition mentioned by Hegghammer. Esp. Saudi Arabia, where the Wahabi Islam[6] – an orthodox interpretation of Islam close to ISIL´s – is a state religion, sees itself as a regional Islamic power and the protector of Sunni interests (Weinberg 2013). The legitimation of the Saudi Monarchy relies

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[6] Wahabi Islam: A puritanic literally Interpretation of Islam (Stanley 2005).

strongly on their role as protectors of the holy sides in Mecca and Medina and their role as promoter of orthodox Islam. Irrespective of Mecca and Medina and of the fact that Saudi Arabia is an international recognized state (and ally of the US) that spreads its Wahabi doctrine by different means than ISIL, *Al-Qaeda* or *Jabhat Al-Nusrah*, there is a lot in common between the Saudi Monarchy and the Islamic Caliphate, esp. the hostile attitude towards Shiite Iran (Alfoneh 2013). While *Fatwas* (religious orders of Islamic scholars) were issued by Saudi clerics forbidding to go to Syria, other clerics issued fatwas calling for the death of Assad on Television (McGregor 2012). It is a difficult task to draw a clear line between Saudi policies (or the policies of Qatar and Kuwait) that are more supportive of *jihad* and foreign fighters and those that are more adversive. Still, one can assume, that due to its Islamic legitimacy and the power of clerics, the Saudi government (that strongly benefits from its ties to the west) is under pressure from more radical Islamists. It does not openly support foreign fighters, as it did in the 1980's and even took strong action against ISIL and foreign fighters. Still, its policies at the beginning of the conflict remain intransparent and it is not unreasonable to belief that the Saudi policy towards foreign fighters was inconsistent. Indeed inconsistent state policies towards the Syrian opposition and to foreign fighters seem to be a relevant factor for the different numbers of foreign fighters that come from the different states.

The "Arab Afghan" mobilization led to a "Blow-Back" effect in countries to which foreign fighters returned. Others went on to conflict zones in Bosnia, Somalia or Yemen (Brown 2011: 93-99; Sela/Fitchette 2014: 56-83; Barak/Cohen 2014: 12-17). Some former foreign fighters became *jihad*-inspired terrorist (Zuijdewijn 2014). The best known example is Osama Bin Laden and his terror network *Al-Qaeda* (Steinberg 2011; Pohly/Duran 2001; Brown 2011: 89-92). A similar 'Blowback-effect' by the current foreign fighters leaving for Syria and Iraq is feared by their countries of origin, esp. in Europe, with growing numbers of European citizens leaving to fight in Syria and Iraq (Lynch 2013; Byman/Shapiro 2013). Foreign fighters do not only pose a danger by filling the ranks of terror organizations after the conflict but also have an influence on the conflict itself. By receiving media attention and by posing a threat to the governments of their home countries, they globalize local conflicts and strengthen an international *jihad* narrative (Ciluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 2). Hegghammer states that increased numbers of foreign fighters in Iraq, after the American invasion, led to an

increase of sectarian violence (Hegghammer 2011b: 53). Christine Bakke did research on the influence of foreign fighters on indigenous conflicts. She argues that though domestic opposition can benefit from foreign fighters, as they strengthen their military weight, they often harm the opposition by imposing new agendas, a new definition of the fight and how it should be done (Bakke 2014).

Aaron Zelin sees foreign fighters as a factor leading to an Islamic radicalization of the Syrian opposition. Firstly, because they shift the balance on the ground away from secular groups towards radical Islamic groups. Secondly by spreading their ideology through *dawa* sessions (proselytism) (Zelin 2013b). For ISIL, toppling Assad is not the main topic of importance. Their main preoccupation is the building of an Islamic Caliphate (Leggiero 2015). The reported cooperation between the Assad Regime and ISIL supports this conjectur (Barnard 2015). The non-Islamic Syrian mainstream opposition accuses foreign fighters of taking over the Syrian Revolution and of imposing their ideology on Syrian soil (Letsch 2014). Malet describes foreign fighters in Iraq, after the US-led intervention 2003, as being more idealistic and ideology driven than their domestic counterparts. While the Iraqi insurgency – before the outbreak of the Syrian conflict and its spill over to Iraq – consisted only to 10 percent of foreign fighters, 90 percent of suicide missions were committed by them. The will to become a martyr can be seen as a mayor motivation (Malet 2014: 35). Reports about would-be-suicide-bombers, who are angry about the nepotism within the ISIL where those who are without influential friends in the ISIL establishment were put down on the waiting list for suicide attacks (Paraszczuk 2015).

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Richard Barrett from the Soufan Group and Peter Neumann from ICSR, did research on the numbers of foreign fighters in Syria by their origin. My study relies on their estimations. The ICSR-Report estimates the number of foreign fighters in Syria of above 20.000 from over 60 countries (Neumann 2015). More recent estimates refer to more than 80 countries (Burke 2015). The phenomenon of foreign fighters leaving for the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq is not limited to the Muslim world, but also includes "Western" countries (Neumann 2015; Byman/Shapiro 2014; Barrett 2014a; MSC 2015: 38). Following Barrett, the most common age of a foreign fighter is 18-29 years (Barrett 2014a: 16). Other studies, focused on foreign fighters from specific regions and

countries, also indicate the common age to be in the twenties (Weggemans, Bakker/Grol 2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014; Maher 2013; MAITIC 2014). Atran, Davis, Sageman and Ginges published a case study on Islamic terrorist cells in Europe and came to the conclusion that individuals radicalize and get recruited for terrorist organization through closed circles or radicalization bubbles (Atran/Davis, Sageman/Ginges 2009). Barrett and further researchers stress the importance of social media (esp. Twitter and Facebook) for the recruitment of foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a: 7; Klausen 2014; Berger/Strathearn 2013). Hegghammer, furthermore, analyzes the considerations of western foreign fighters regarding the decision to go to foreign *jihad* battlefields or to engage in *jihad* at their countries of origin (Hegghammer 2013). I shall not deal with those who join terrorist groups at home but focus on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Nevertheless, other proposals to engage in *jihad*, are a relevant factor. There is evidence of competition between local and global *jihadi* players. An explanation for the relative small number of Algerian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is partly seen in the refusal of *Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb* (AQIM) to join rebels in Syria. AQIM argues that there are already enough open battles in Algeria and Mali and fighters needed (MAITIC 2014: 53). Prior to the Syrian conflict and the rise of the phenomenon, *Al-Qaeda* discouraged Western foreign fighters to go to Yemen in its magazine *Inspire*. They would be welcomed in Yemen but more welcomed to commit terrorist attacks in their home countries (Mendelsohn 2011: 201). This certainly is not the case with ISIL. The group runs a well-developed internet recruitment machine to attract foreign fighters (Klausen 2014; Berger/Strathearn 2013; Callimachi 2015).

Motivations of foreign fighters: Motivations and profiles of foreign fighters are in the focus of current research. Unfortunately, most authors conclude that there is no clear pattern of profiles for foreign fighters. Cilluffo, Cozzens and Ranstorp e.g. write: "No single pathway to becoming a foreign fighter, nor […] a static profile of the fighters themselves. Ideology, social circumstances, adventure-seeking, political grievance, and so on. All appear to impact individuals´ choices in this regard." (Cilluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 38). Other researchers are in line with this statement (Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014; Maher 2013; MAITIC 2014). Still, there are some foreign fighter profiles that appear more often than others in their biographies and may give us a clue of what to look for. An idea of the structural conditions in a country that create an environment which fosters the export of

foreign fighters. Barrett maintains that, even though, motivation for becoming a foreign fighter in Syria and Iraq may vary, the *jihadist* narrative is most common. Most foreign fighters join radical Islamic groups (Barrett 2014a; Neumann 2015; MAITIC 2014). In a report for the *United States Institute for Peace,* Colonel John Venhaus addresses the question, "Why youth join Al-Qaeda?". He emphasizes that the biographies of individuals joining *Al-Qaeda* show dissimilarities regarding their social-economic profile. While some were unemployed, others were not and had 'normal' lives before joining a terrorist organization (Venhaus 2010: 4). In general, Venhaus maintains that individuals joining *Al-Qaeda* show no sign of psychological disorder and often do not come from a strongly religious background. He differentiates four types of characters that are eager to join *Al-Qaeda*: 1. The *Revenge Seeker* looks for an outlet for his frustration, perceives himself as a victim of society and wants to take revenge. 2. The *Status Seeker* sees *Al-Qaeda* as a possibility to gain a social status that he otherwisewoud not achieve in a regular course of life. 3. The *Identity Seeker* looks for a place of belonging and his place in society. 4. The *Thrill Seeker* sees *Al-Qaeda* as an opportunity for a great adventure (cf. Venhaus 2010: 4-11).

Comparative case studies on specific countries of origin of foreign fighters are mostly based on the biographies of foreign fighters and their socio-economic background as well as on states policies towards the subject. Similar are studies that attempt to give profiles of foreign fighters. They give valuable information on the motivation and the socio-economic background of foreign fighters, as well as to state abilities and willingness to stop them. Weggemans, Bakker, and Grol analyzed the radicalization process of five Dutch foreign fighters. They conducted interviews with friends and people close to them and created examplary stories of two fictional average Dutch individual. They depict a Dutch foreign fighter as a social, economic and educational marginalized youngster with troubles, searching for a purpose in life (Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014). Contrary to this, Maher, who focused on British foreign fighters, found that on average they have a higher education level (Maher 2013). A study on North American foreign fighters, also shows that they "typically do not come from poverty stricken neighborhoods but are usually middle-class" (Noonan/Khalil 2014: 69).

Foreign fighters from the Arab World: A joint study by Aaron Zelin, Evan Kohlmann and Laith al-Khouri did research on foreign fighters from the four top 'exporters` of the Arab World (Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan), using a sample of 'martyred', i.e. dead foreign fighters in Syria (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013: 3ff.). While drawing on biographies, his explanation focuses on political developments in those countries (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013). He does not compare the high ranking 'exporter' countries with other in the region that do not export many fighters. Their findings suggest that a lack of capabilities to stop the flow of foreign fighters in post Arab Spring states explains the high number of Tunisian and Libyan foreign fighters. Some of those were active in pro-democracy movements and/or the Libyan civil war before they went to Syria (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013: 1-6). The most comprehensive study on foreign fighters from the Arab World in Syria and Iraq, comes from *The Meir Amit Center for Intelligence and Terrorism* (MAITIC 2014). Again, the biographies of a sample of killed foreign fighters are analyzed. Unlike Zelin´s research, the MAITIC study also deals with those countries that do not export significant numbers of foreign fighters. It analyses states policies towards the subject and focusses on recent political developments. Furthermore the socio-economic background of foreign fighters, their way to Syria and Iraq and the groups they join are ascertained through an analysis of their biographies.

The study comes to several findings: Like other studies, it stresses that the fighters mostly join the *Jabhat Al-Nusrah* or ISISL; only few go into more moderate groups. Arab foreign fighters constitute the backbone of ANF and ISIL. The reasons for becoming a foreign fighter are religious, sectarian (hate for Shia), opposition to Assad or identification with victims of Assad, the quest for socio-economic status, and the desire for adventure. There a different profiles of Arab foreign fighters. Some are hard core Salafist and veteran fighters whereas others are first time fighters without combat experience (MAITIC 2014: 2). Some come from the urban middle class (e.g. Egypt) others from marginalized rural areas (e.g. Tunisia). They travel for themselves or with the help of Salafist organizations (MAITIC 2014: 2f.). At the beginning of the conflict, some Arab states tolerated the flow of foreign fighters as a mean to overthrow Assad (MAITIC 2014).

Resumeé: State of the Art

The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not new in world politics. Similarities of different occurences of the phenomenon are that foreign fighters are mostly motivated by ideologies with an international outreach, be it Communism or Islamism. The phenomenon of Muslim foreign fighter recruitment saw a peak with the Afghan *jihad* and nowadays with the crisis in Syria and Iraq. Some patterns are reoccuring. In both cases the policies of Muslim states were not consistently hostile to foreign fighters. The Afghan *jihad* produced blow-backs, such as an increase in international terrorism. First signs for such blow-back effects can also be seen nowadays. In Syria and Iraq, foreign fighters come from all over the world but predominantly from Arab countries. Their motivation is in most cases based on the Islamic faith and they preffarably join radical Islamic insurgent groups. There are no clear profiles of foreign fighters, but it is mainly a youth phenomenon that often attracts students and middle class people from urban areas as well as marginalized rural populations. Often detected underlying motivation of foreign fighters are identity crisises and the search for a place of belonging.

2.2   Purpose of this study

Comparative studies focus mostly on the biographies of foreign fighters and on state policies. Case studies focus on single countries that export larger numbers of foreign fighters [e.g. the case of Tunisia (Githens-Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014). Still missing is a comprehensive approach, comparing the various conditions that can lead to the export of foreign fighters in countries that export many and countries that export only few or none. The purpose of my study is to analyze the environment, the policies and the practical possibilities to go to Syria and Iraq in the countries of the Arab League from which foreign fighters originate. The aim is to identify single conditions or combinations of single conditions that make the export of foreign fighters either more or less likely.

3   Foreign Fighters: Cases, Outcomes, and Conditions

3.1   The Cases: Arab League States

The selected cases for this research are the states of the Arab league with some exceptions that are listed below. Foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq originate from over 80 different countries (Ackermann 2014). The largest proportion comes from Middle Eastern countries. Followed by Europe and the former Soviet Union (Neumann 2015). The predominantly Sunni states of the Arab League are chosen as study cases for two reasons: (i) To avoid a selection bias (the cases are not handpicked by the author). (ii) These states export the majority of foreign fighters.

Countries with a minority Sunni population (Oman, Bahrein, Lebanon) were omitted, simply because the focus of my research is on Sunni Muslims becoming foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq and the data I use from the reports of Barrett and ICSR give no information about the specific religious backgrounds of the fighters.

Unfortunately, Barrett and ICSR also do not give precise definitions of a foreign fighter. The definition I use in my study excludes organized military groups. Since, there are reports of *Hezbollah* and *Houthi* combatants fighting alongside Regime forces (Sullivan 2014; Solomon 2013) the cases of Lebanon and Yemen were excluded from the analysis. An organized military force that, reportedly sent combatants to Syria, such as the *Hezbollah* or the *Houthi´s* is not known to exist in other Arab States.

The Palestine territories as a non-state member of the Arab league was omitted due to a lack of reliable data.

Selected countries: Algeria, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauretania, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates.   .

Omitted members of the Arab League: Bahrein, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Yemen, and   "The   State   of   Palestine".

3.2 The Outcome: Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq

My figures of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq come from two sources: A report from Richard Barrett of *The Soufan Group* (TSG), published in June 2014 and a report from Peter Neumann by the International Center for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR) from January 2015. The figures of foreign fighters were updated in the preparation of the UN-Security Council Resolution 2178 in September 2014 and were produced in collaboration with the Munich Security Conference. ICSR also served as an external advisor in the making of the Anti-Foreign-Fighter UN-Resolution 2178 (Neumann 2015). The ICSR-Report of 2015 does not include countries, from which less than five foreign fighters originate from, but lists them in another report, published in December 2013. Both reports present the figures as 'conflict totals' – i.e. all foreign fighters that went to Syria since the beginning of the conflict in 2011 – and it seems appropriate to add the missing figures of the ICSR-Report from 2013 to the data used in this research.

Fig 2: Figures of foreign fighters[7]

Cases	TSG	ICSR	Per 100.000
Tunisia	3000	3000	28
Jordan	ff reported	1500	23
Libya	ff reported	600	10
Saudi Arabia	2500	2500	9
Morocco	1500	1500	5
Kuwait	ff reported	70	2
Qatar	ff reported	15	1
Somalia	ff reported	70	1
Algeria	200	200	0,5
Egypt	ff reported	360	0,4
UAE	ff reported	100	0,2
Sudan	ff reported	15	0,2
Mauretania	ff reported	2	0,1
Djibouti	none	0	0
Comoros	none	0	0

The figures are cross checked with the *Soufan Group Report* for discrepancies, assuming that the figures of the more recent ICSR-Report may be higher and should certainly not be

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[7] ff reported: Foreing fighters are reported but no numbers given.

significantly lower. In any case, both reports only give estimates, due to the nature of the subject. ICSR explicitely warns "counting foreign fighters is no exact science." (Neumann 2015).

Following the ICSR-Report from 2013 that worked with the same methodology as the Report from 2015 the sources of the figures include "media reports about foreign fighters in English, Arabic and several other languages (from both sides of the conflict); government estimates; and statements about foreign fighters by *jihadist* groups, typically published in extremist online forums and on social media." (ICSR 2013). The figures published in the ICSR-Report 2015 refer to the second half of 2014. The reports used for this research paper (ICSR-Report 2013 and 2015; Soufan Group Report 2014 by Richard Barrett) only refer to foreign fighters in Syria. Still, I believe, that they provide a reliable basis for this study. With the spill-over of the Syrian conflict to Iraq, resp. the fusing of the Syrian and the Iraqi conflict in January 2014 and with the proclamation of an Islamic Caliphate stretching through Syria and Iraq by ISIL in June 2014, it is hard to assess where foreign fighters are situated. Those who initially arrive in Syria may travel to different fronts in Syria as well as in Iraq. Even though the data are not very precise and many details remain unclear, I believe that they are a valuable and basically reliable source for a comparative analysis. The numbers of foreign fighters from the selected countries differ significantly, and surely they can be used for an exploratory approach to analyze differences between these countries. After all, it is not the absolute number of foreign fighters but the difference between them that matters with regard to my research question.

Why Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq?[8]

The conflict zone in Syria and Iraq is "'the jihad of the moment' ... It now serves as the latest combat safari tour destination of choice for would-be mujahedeen, eclipsing Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia" (Zelin 2013a: 2). There are several reasons why Syria became the most attractive battlefield for *jihadists* from all over the world. One striking reason for the is

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[8] Compared with Afghanistan in the 1980's, foreign fighters in Syria receive little support by governments. While foreign fighters in the first Afghan *jihad* relied on the support of governments and intelligence agencies from the west and the Arab world (Rashid 2001; Akbarzadeh/Baxter 2008: 96), most governments are (at least most recently) concerned about the flow of foreign fighters and eager to stop it (UN-Security Council 2014).

the location of the conflict zone. Situated in the center of the Middle East and with a border to Turkey the region is comparatively easy to reach (Barrett 2014a: 23). Another reason is the Islamic theology which inspires insurgent groups. Syria is situated in the ancient Islamic *bilad al-Shams* (Land of Al-Sham=the sun). *Al-Sham* consists of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine and is mentioned in the *Quran* and in several *hadiths* with special regard to the day of judgement which, according to the *hadiths*, is supposed to take place, in *Al-Sham* at the eve of a mayor battle of Muslim against disbelievers (Karouny 2014; Onley 2014). Moreover, *jihadi* foreign fighters compare their travel to Syria and Iraq as doing *hijra* (emmigration. reffering to Prophet Mohammed's return to Mecca and thus as an essentially religious act, as a way of spiritual homecoming (Stern/Berger 2015b). With the proclamation of an Islamic Caliphate comprising Syria and Iraq, the allegedly theological obligation to go to Syria and/or Iraq is met by the practical possibility to actually live in an Islamic Caliphate. The notion of building and living in a "real state", probably seems more attractive, than hiding in the mountain area between Pakistan and Afghanistan with the risk of drone strikes (Yousafzai 2012).[9] A more practical reason, why this research paper focusses on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is the existing data. For the case of Syria and Iraq, more reliable data can be found, than for the cases of Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen.

3.3   Conditions: Explaining the Export of Foreign Fighters

The aim of my study is to identify structural conditions that foster the export of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq from states of the Arab league. The aim is not to identify causes of transnational, international or domestic terrorism or civil conflict in general. Nevertheless, the two subjects are obviously connected and theories on the causes of radicalization, terrorism, and political violence are relevant and will be taken into account.

3.3.1   *Necessary & Sufficient Conditions*

As laid out before, I assume that there are two logical and absolut necessary conditions: The intentions of individuals to go to Syria and Iraq and the practical possibilities to do so. A

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[9] Al-Qaeda saw the Caliphate as a utopia while ISIL tries to establish it in reality (Fink/Sugg 2015).

necessary condition must be fullfilled whenever, the outcome occurs. The other way around, if a necessary condition is not fullfilled, the outcome must not occur. A sufficient condition always leads to the outcome, but the outcome can also occur if a certain sufficient condition is not given. If this is the case, another sufficient condition must lead to the outcome. This research is based on various indicators that only describe reality to a certain degree. Moreover, other indicators that can have an effect on the export of foreign fighters are left aside. Therefore, in what follows I shall call necessary and sufficient conditions, conditions that explain an outcome with a defined probability, not with absolut certainty. Moreover, a combination of conditions can constitute a sufficient conditions. I will refer to these as complex sufficient conditions.

The following analysis identifies eleven conditions that are assumed to have an effect on the export of foreign fighters. These eleven conditions fall under four categories: (1) Socio-economic, (2) systemic, (3) political, and (4) practical conditions. I shall now explain the theoretical background of the conditions that I use in my analysis. Other more specific conditions that may also seem relevant for the export of foreign fighters were omitted in order to reach significant findings by means of an QCA-Analysis, which works better with a smaller number of conditions (Wagemann/Schneider 2007: 22).

Data & Sources

The data on country related structural conditions (unemployment rates, poverty rates, economic development) are taken from indices of the World Bank or independent research institutions like the *Institute for Economics and Peace* and the *Fund for Peace*. The data for each specific indicator are taken from the same source for all cases. Missing data for some indicators are taken from other sources. The conditions will be further operationalized in chapter 4.1. Some conditions like *accessibility* or the existence of *networks* are specified and assessed on the basis of qualitative research as indicated again in chapter 4.1.

3.3.2 Socio-economic Conditions

Socio-economic conditions can have an important effect on the export of foreign fighters. From the many socio-economic conditions that can or cannot influence the export of foreign fighters, three will be taken into account by my analysis: (i) The *well-being* of a country as

measured by the *Human Development Index* (HDI) and its poverty rate, (ii) *Education* measured by median years of school and university enrollment; (iii) The *Recruitment Pool* for Muslim fighters; a youth bulge combined with a lack of prospects. Studies on foreign fighters going to Syria and Iraq often focus on the socio-economic background of foreign fighters; their income and their educational level (Cilluffo/Cozzens/Ranstorp 2010: 38; MAITIC 2014). While some studies find no specific socio-economic profile of foreign fighters (Venhaus 2010), others come to different findings in different countries (Noonan/Khalil 2014; Weggemans/Bakker/Grol 2014; Maher 2013). My findings suggest that socio-economic conditions have an important effect on the export of foreign fighters. Indeed, higher levels of *education* seem to constitute a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. *Well-being* does also effect the export of foreign fighters, but the other way round: All combinations of conditions that were identified as sufficient to explain the outcome "no export of foreign fighters" included the negated condition well-being. Underdevelopement and higher poverty rates contibute to a lesser export of foreign fighters.

Well-being: Many studies address the question whether poverty causes terrorism. Some focus on the national level of overall poverty (e.g. Piazza 2006 & 2011; Abadie 2004). Other focus on the specific socio-economic situation of terrorists and their supporters (Tessler 2007; Blair/Fair/Malhotra/Shapira 2012; Krueger/Maelckova 2002). My findings suggest, that irrespective of whether poverty correlates with terrorism or not, it does correlate with the export of foreign fighters. The condition is included most complex sufficient conditions leading to the outcome, and states that are underdeveloped and share higher poverty rates, are more likely to export no foreign fighters. If the export of foreign fighters is understood as a result of Islamic radicalization that is caused by the same conditions that also cause terrorism, my findings contradict the "rooted in poverty view", esp. if poor countries where terrorism is high as a part of civil war (e.g. Somalia) are excluded. The "rooted in poverty view" suggests, that low socio-economic development correlates with an increase of terrorism. Arguing that in countries with a poor economic situation, opportunity cost to become a terrorist are low (Freytag/Krüger/Meierrieks/Schneider 2011). Other studies do not generally deny a correlation between poverty and terrorism but combine poverty with other conditions. Daniel

Meierrieks and Michael Mousseau findings suggest that urban, not rural, poverty increases the support of terrorist organizations (Meierrieks 2012; cf. Mousseau 2015). My own research does not address this latter question, because in order to keep the number of conditions sufficiently low for the sake of a QCA-Analysis urbanization was was not taken into account. Anyhow, several studies, regarding the socio-economic situation of terrorists, foreign fighters and support for radical Islamism are in line with my findings. Studies on the background of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq often state that those who embark are not the poorest (MAITIC 2014; Noonan/Khalil 2014: 69). Robbins Tessler who conducted surveys in Algeria and Jordan, finds that approval of terrorism is slightly higher by individuals living under better economic circumstances (Tessler 2007). A case study on the support for terrorist organizations in Pakistan shows, that support for terrorism is greatest in the middle class and lowest among the urban poor (Blair/Fair/Malhotra/Shapira 2012). My findings suggest that, likewise terrorism, the phenomenon of foreign fighters is not caused by poverty und underdevelopment. Rather I find that better off countries export more foreign fighters, if other conditions are given.

Education: A lack of education is often stated by politicians as a main cause of terrorism. Tony Blair states that "Terrorism can only be defeated by education" (UN-WebTV 2013), and the phenomenon arrises "when young people in corrupt countries have no education or opportunity", following Barack Obama (Dale 2015). This assumption makes it easier for politicians, to take a normative stance on the subject and to degrade terrorists as uneducated people. Moreover, the solution seems be at hand – spread education. Unfortunatly, the opposite seems to be true. The findings suggest that better education – measured by median years of schooling and university enrollment – is a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. I argue, that the better the education, the greater the expectations (Cramer 2010) and consequently the frustration if expectations are not met in reality. Barrett stresses that it´s not the poor illiterate youth who become foreign fighters, but literate (esp. literate in the use of social media) youth who share a feeling of not belonging (Barrett 2014c). An examplanary case for this situation poses Muhammad A.[10]. The author

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[10] Name changed.

met Muhammed during an exchange semester in Cairo. Muhammed is a well educated accountant with a job. Yet, there only few job opportunities for accountants in Egypt and there are many young and educated accountants. As a consequence Muhammed's salary is rather modest. Speeking about his situation and his wishes for his future, he strongly complained about this situation. Aged 26 he lived at his parents place and could not afford to get married and to look for a better employment. He stressed how much he misses a woman in his life but that he couldn´t afford it as his salary was very low. He also complained that his salary is inadequate given his skills and academic accomplishments. Asked why he does not look for a girlfriend (something difficult but not totally impossible in Egypt, if one keeps a low profile in doing so) he addmitted that he was confused about that question. On the one hand, he kept to traditional values and said that it would be an embarressment for his family, if he did; on the other hand he complained about these very values and even addmitted that he was jealous for westerners stances towards the issue of dating. Another reason for his frustration was his relationship with his father which mirrors the relationship between youngsters and repressive regimes throughout the Middle East. He spoke about clashing with his father, a retired army officer, and complained that he – a person of great respect to him – did not show the right understanding for his situation. He could not even mention criticism concerning the underlying causes of his situation as his father was very authoritarian and conservative (yet secular). Overall, Muhammed remained confused about the direction of his life and the values he should endorse and live by. If one scrolls down on his facebook profile, one can see his confusion transmitting into political and religious terms. There is a development from posts about his daily life (about his philosophies about life, love and success) towards a more critical and confused stance and eventually posts showing admiration for strong Arab political figures, and later *jihadism*. Even though the posts showed admiration there were none of directly support or link to particular groups. The posts generally endorsed values of independency and men that confront the west and autocrats. They did not justify atrocities done by *jihadists* and some were even critical towards ISIL and *Al-Qaeda*. Nevertheless, it is interesting, that the number of posts of this kind increased, with the ongoing civil war in Syria and successes by Islamic insurgencies (some posts had references to the Syrian conflict).

Muhammeds situation is, to some extend, similar to the situation of many men that age, the author met in Egypt. Two character types identified by Venhaus and other researcher (Louis 2009: 125ff.; Venhaus 2010) are exemplified by Muhammed's case – even though Muhammed did not become a terrorist but only flirted with some features of international *jihadism*: First, his expectations of what he would deserve, due to his academic background and his willingness to work, were not met by reality. Second, he was confused about his values and was intensively searching for answers and a place of belonging (Venhaus 2010: 4-10). Studies on the biographies of foreign fighters show that many students and academics join insurgencies in Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014; Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013). Christopher Cramer stresses this point by arguing, that it is mostly the better educated that join insurgencies, not only in the Arab World but in other regions as well (Cramer 2010: 17). In addition, "more educated people from privileged backgrounds are more likely to participate in politics, probably in part because political involvement requires some minimum level of interest, expertise, commitment to issues and effort, all of which are more likely if people are educated enough and prosperous enough to concern with more than economic subsistence (Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 144). Krueger and Maleckova argue that better opportunities – e.g. in the job market – provided by terrorist organizations can pose as an alternative if legal opportunities are rare. Therefore the better educated can be motivated to join terrorist organization if they believe that they offer opportunities for leadership positions. Hamas e.g. would deliberately select suicide bombers from among the more educated as these are the better skilled (Krueger/Maleckova 2002: 122).

Recruitment Pool: The condition *recruitment pool* relates to the percentage of unemployed youth ages 15-24 of the overall population. It includes indicators of a youth bulge and the lack of prospects in a country. Societies with a large share of young unemployed bear a potential for violent conflict (Cotright/Lopez 2007: 255; Beehner 2007; Heinsohn 2006). Still, some qualifications are necessary with regard to this condition. To begin with, also individuals not represented in unemployment rates, may experience their situation and life chances as bleak and frustrating. Take the high percentage of lowly paid cap drivers with academic diplomas in Egypt. The probability to be unemployed for academics in

Egypt is higher than for none academics; on average, it takes five years to find a job after receiving a university degree (Loveluck 2012: 3-13). Hence, the actual recruitment pool for foreign fighters in Egypt may be significantly higher then unemployment rates suggest. More generally, due to a lack of reliable data, the condition *recruitment pool* can only be operationalized in a rather rough way. In any case, my analysis does not identify the recruitment pool as a necessary condition. It contributes to the export of foreign fighters in only one sufficient combination of conditions, and the absence of a recruitment pool shows up only in one sufficient condition for the outcome "no export of foreign fighters". The QCA-Analysis calculates scores comparatively in relation to other included cases. If one takes a look on the total numbers of unemployed youth, a rather big recruitment pool exists in almost all cases (Qatar sticks out). A recruitment pool might, thus count as a relevant condition, even though, relative differences between the case come not out as highly relevant. Cramer argues, that unemployment is not the significant condition leading to violent conflicts, but gains importance in combination only with other conditions like "political grievances at discrimination" and "sectarian mobilisation by political leaders" (Cramer 2010: 18f.). Evidence from the civil war in Sierra Leone shows that rebel groups recruited their members from "urban drop-outs' of whom many possesed secondary education and even regular jobs but found themselves in a conflict with the elder generation, in which they felt disclosed from "decent working opportunities, and wives, all of which were controlled by older men." (Cramer 2010: 22). Cramer concludes:

> „that people's experience of labour markets often plays an important role in their participation in violence. This is so for intimate partner violence, for participation in gangs that (often but to varying degrees) use violence, for joining in pogroms, and for taking part in insurgencies and civil wars (indeed, possibly also for taking part in international armed conflict too)" (Cramer 2010: 24).

In my view, the lack of prospects youth in the Middle East faces, is not only connected to their opportunities on the job market but to an overall lack of prospects to proceed in life regarding work, marriage and the founding of a family and the social status. All three parts are connected. "Sexual relationships are only approved and remain legitimate in the Middle East withhin the institution of marriage. This means that delayed marriage [...] can put a

moratorium on intimate life" (Dhillon 2008). With high wedding costs and the tradition that the groom financially provides for the bride, income and, therefore, employment are essential to get married and to found a family. Family and work are also strongly connected to the social status of individuals. Given high unemployment rates in the Middle East, the median age of first marriage rises (Dhillon 2008), esp. the better eaducted are affected. While the poor work to survive (Dhillon 2008; Heinsohn 2006), academics often wait for years to find an adequate job and rely in this time on their parents (Dhillon 2008; Loveluck 2012: 3-13), without work and thus without the possibilities to marry and to improve their social status. One could also argue in a Freudian sense that a repressed sex-drive, leads to supplementing actions and eventually to violence. *jihadist* insurgent groups offer a great opportunity for not only supplementing action but also offer work, marriage and social status in real terms. The prospect of pay and loot, work and social status as a heroic fighter and the prospect of marriage and even a promiscuitive sexlife with slaves (MEMRI 2014), seem to meet the demands of many. Bleak life prospects are also mentioned with regard to Tunisia, where young men perceive themselves as facing "la mort, la mort et la mort". Death by staying in Tunisia and being without gainful employment or purpose" (Githens-Mazer/Serrano/Dalrymple 2014).

3.3.3 Systemic Conditions

My analysis takes account of three systemic conditions: (i) the *economic system*, (ii) the *political system*, (iii) the *role of sharia law* in the constitutional legal order. The condition *economic system* was identified as a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters.

Economic System: My findings suggest, that a globalized modern market system – measured by the percentage of international trade, scores on how well contracts are enforced and on economic freedom is a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. This confirms Michael Mousseau's view that "values and beliefs associated with mixed economies of developing countries in a globalizing world" are causes for terror (Mousseau 2002: 5). The 'mixed economies' of many developing countries incorporate liberal and democratic values and clientilistic elements as well as authoritarian values (Mousseau 2002: 6) that clash with

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each other (Mousseau 2002: 6). Here, one can refer to Muhammed, who found himself in confusion (whether to get a secret girlfriend as he would personally benefit from it or to stick to traditional values held high by his family). Mousseau defines several key differences between the two systems. In clientilistic economies parties cooperate on the basis of trust, reinforced by gift giving and privilege. Violations are punished by breaking relationships. That favors patrons and accordingly a hierachy of patronage. The linkages in clientilistic economies are based on kinship, be it ethnic, familiar or religious (Mousseau 2002: 10). In contrast, market economies are based on the enforcement of contracts that do not imply obligations on parties that are not explicitly listed. The self-interest in negotiating contracts is thereby socially approved (Mousseau 2002: 10f.). This "self-interest" is seen in clientilistic societies as selfish, and as a sign of cultural and moralical deterioration (Mousseau 2002: 15). Hence, it is not a modern market system by itself that causes terror, but the clash of this system with a system based on clientelistic values. This clash occurs in developing countries where both system, and the values they implement coexist and thus clash (Mousseau 2002: 26-29). This can lead to identity crisises and the feeling of not belonging, that are repeatedly mentioned to be the underlying motivations of foreign fighters (Venhaus 2010; Louis 2009: 125ff.; Barrett 2014c).

Another factor related to a market economy is that it can lead, if not accompanied by a system of social security, to a lack of personal security (Krieger/Meierrieks 2015). While in clientelistic societies, the membership in a family or a clan provides a security net and opportunities to proceed in life; in developed market economies the state typically takes over these social responsibilities. Thus, with tight job markets and weak or inexisting social security institutions, a country may end up with large groups of young people who find it hard to make their way. Moreover, one could argue, that clientelistic societies will, naturally fall into crisis, if growing populations meet limited ressources. While capitalistic market systems rely on economic growth, clientelistic societies depend on limited resources the patron can share with his clients (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91-110). Take as an example the traditional head of a family in rural Upper Egypt. In accordance with the predominant values of manhood, a man's social status rises if he has a lot of sons. As the patron of his family, he is supposed to support his sons (and relations) with jobs in his business or with land. Job

opportunities in one's business and land, however are limited and in many cases insufficient to provide for all those involved an economic basis

Democracy: The political system of a country can have an influence on the number of foreign fighters a country exports. Contrary to the claim that a lack of possibilities for political participation leads to terrorism (Crenshaw 1981), my findings suggest that political freedoms influences the export in the opposite direction. Indeed, the condition *democracy* is a part of a number of (complex) sufficient conditions that yield the outcome "high export of foreign fighters". And the negated condition *democracy* is part of a number of (complex) sufficient conditions that yield the outcome "low export of foreign fighters". Democratic or partly democratic systems can lead in combination with other conditions to the export of foreign fighters, whereas more authoritarian systems can lead in combination with other factors to no export. Nevertheless, the leading exporters of foreign fighters include democratic states (Tunisia) and authoritarian regimes (Saudi Arabia) and the political system by itself neither constitutes a necessary nor a sufficient condition.

Rational apporaches to explain the causes of terrorism, tend to define it as a mean to achieve polical aims, that can not be achieved otherwise (Crenshaw 1981; Özdamar 2008; Sandler 2014). With regard to ISIL in Iraq and Syria this hypothis can be applied easily. The success of ISIL can be explained – not only by their ideological appeal – but also as it is a force that fights successfully Shiites Regimes and empowers Sunni populations that were annilihated by governemnts composed of Shia and Alawites (Barrett 2014b: 8). Moreover, ISIL made itpossible for *Baathist* strongmen to regain political power (Barrett 2014b: 18-21). This may explain, why a Sunni Iraqi or Syrian joins the group. But it does not explain why Tunisians, Algerians or Saudis become foreign fighters. One possible rationalistic explanation, refers to the political regimes, in which a potential foreign fighter lives in. If he can not achieve his aims by peaceful means, he may go to Syria and Iraq instead, in the words of ISIL and the JAN, to do *Hijra* – the migration from "apostate" dictatorships to Islamic territory (Barrett 2014b: 42; Ali 2014; Alone 2004: 255). Democracies in which Islamic factions participate, would then, export less foreign fighters. This hypothesis can be rebuted, however, with reference to Tunisia and Morocco. In Tunisia the moderate Islamic Ennahda party won the

first elections and *Ansar al-Shariah* – a group with ties to ISIL and *Al-Qaeda* (Mapping Militant Organizations 2015), could use its new won freedoms to recruit foreign fighters, before it was declared a terrorist organization (Zelin/Kohlmann/al-Khouri 2013). Also, ISIL and *Al-Qaeda* assert repeatedly their reluctance and ideological antipathy to use democratic means to achieve their goals as they see it as heresy (Gause 2005). Moreover the ouster of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, was brandmarkt by Zawahiri as evidence for the failure of political Islam by democratic means (Yousssef 2013).

My findings are in line with research conducted by James Piazza. Piazza suggests, that new democracies are more exposed to the risk of terrorism, whereas established dictatorships are less exposed (Piazza 2013). Young democracies tend to be more fragile, as they need to develop and establish functioning institutions; moreover, their political and social benefits need time to be realized and to become visible (Piazza 2013: 247ff.). With regard the selected cases, one can see that democracies are situated on both ends of the spectrum. The newly established Tunisian democracy exported more than 3000 foreign fighters, whereas the Comoros, a more established democracy, exported none.

Islam: Cultural approaches focus on cultural factors that produce terrorist (Louis 2009). Indeed, *Al-Qaeda*, ISIL or Boko Haram[11] present themselves as enemies of 'the West'. They do not only see their legitimacy rooted in the Islamic faith, but conceive of their actions as obligatory and necessary to live a righteous Islamic life. Their actions are seen as a duty to god and and as a response to gods call to *jihad*.[12] This suggests that Huntingtons conception of a clash of civilization holds true (Huntington 1999). Islamic fighters from all over the world join in Syria and Iraq to establish a Caliphate and eventually to conquer the World.

The condition *Islam* is specified by the degree to which Sharia law is incorporated in the constitutional and judicial system of a country. Following Huntington, one would intuitively assume, that the more shariah law is incorporated the more Muslims become foreign fighters. Saudi Arabia may seem to support this assumption. The state is build on an alliance of

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[11] The name Boko Haram, means: Western Education is sinfull.
[12] [Citation from the speech of ISIL leader Abu Bakr Al-Bagdadi: "Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of performing hijrah (emigration) to the Islamic State, then let him do so, because hijrah to the land of Islam is obligatory," (cited from Russia Today12).

Wahabi clerics and the House of Al-Saud (Commins 2006) and ranks high in the export of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq and to Afghanistan and other *jihadist* battlefield in the past (Hegghammer 2011b: 61). Due to its Wahabi ideology, the Saudi state, does not only rank high in exporting foreign fighters but also in the export of orthodox Islamic believes through state sponsored Universities, Mosques schools and kindergartens (Commins 2015: 158-178). The clash of cultures is described by Ralph Ghadban as an Islamic concept, because the *Quran* stresses the difference between the 'House of Peace' (*Dar al-Salam*) – the Islamic world – and the 'House of War' (*Dar al-Charb*) – the non Islamic World – which is important for the Saudi-Wahabi understanding of Islam and also for ISIL´s and *Al-Qaeda´s* (Fink/Sugg 2015).

My findings are, therefore contraintuitive. They suggest that less Islamic states export more foreign fighters and this is in need of explanation. Now, many foreign fighters have not been raised in strict conservative or traditional Muslim families (Barret 2014b: 9). And they are often described as being unsure about their identies and as persons looking for a belonging (Barrett 2014c; Venhaus 2010; Louis 2009: 125ff.). I maintain that countries where *shariah* law has long been established as a matter of local Islamic traditions and thouroughly informs social life export less foreign fighters (with the exception of Saudi Arabia[13]) than countries where *sharia* law plays a lesser role. Many Muslim foreign fighters may be properly described, as 'born again' Muslims that share a radical desire for a consolidated world view and identity. Also religious converts often lean towards more orthodox interpretations of their faith.[14] Salafism and Wahabism were reformist movements with roots in the time of the pan-Arabic renaissance (*Al-Nahda*) from the 18th to the 20th centuries. Unlike other movements, such as Pan-Arabism, both saw the reason of the crisis in the Arab World – esp. with regard to its relationship to dominant western powers – in a failure of Muslims to truly keep to their Islamic faith. Their answer to the crisis relies on a purit interpretation of a proper Islamic life, as literally described in the *Quran* and the *Hadithes*, and in an attempt to get rid of established traditions in the Muslim world – and of course of western concepts (Stanley 2005).

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[13] Even if the Saudi State system, as I believe, is connected to the export of foreign fighters, it is not to say, that the Saudi youth differs to other Middle Eastern youths with regard to an identity crisis (Faruqi 2010).
[14] This assumption refers not only to Muslims who become radicalized, but also to traditional catholics turned pure evangelists (e.g. in Brazil) or American born Jewish settlers in the Palestine territories (Feldmann 2013).

3.3.4   Political Conditions

Grievances: It seems obvious that the condition *grievances* is relevant for the phenomena of terrorism and thus foreign fighters. Piazza argues that protection of the integrity of humans – respect for human rights – reduces terrorism (Piazza 2010)[15] and the same may be expected for foreign fighters. My findings, however, provide no evidence for the assumption that grievances by themselve have an effect on the number of exported foreign fighters from a particular country. Indeed, it rather seems that the absence of grievances is significant to explain the export of foreign fighters. The findings stress the difference of foreign fighters and terrorists. One could assume, that domestic grievances – such are taken as indicators for the analyzed condition – may lead to an increase of domestic terrorism but not to the export of foreign fighters. The answer may lie in a more explicit definition of grievances. While, as Piazza suggest domestic grievances increase terrorism, 'internationalized' group grievances could increase the export of foreign fighters. Even if, they come from identification with supressed members of the group (e.g. the Muslim *Ummah*) abroad and not from personal experiences (Canter 2009:10f.). This assumptions is stressed by the motive of foreign fighters to help the Syrian Sunnis in their fight against the Alawite government. In a different study, Piazza finds that failed states promote transnational terrorism. He suggests, that citizens from failed states are more likely to commit transnational terrorist attacks (Piazza 2008). Assuming that transnational terrorists are slightly closer to foreign fighters than domestic terrorists, this again seems contradictive to the findings, esp. as the condition grievances is made out of indicators from the *Fragile State Index*. A possible explanation could be that domestic and transnational terrorist groups compete with insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq for potential fighters. If one visualizes the scores from the *Fragile State Index*, the scores from the *Terrorism Index* and the number of foreign fighters by a popultion of 100.000, one can see that grievances and alternatives coincidence. Out of Libya, the countries with most grievances and terrorism do not rank high in the export of foreign fighters.

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[15] Piazza also maintains that the number of terrorist attacks increases with the number of extrajudicial killings by the government, but not with torture, oppression of freedom of speech, and political imprisonment (Piazza/Walsh 2010).

Fig. 3: Grievances in comparision to foreign fighters by country

Counterterrorism: The condition *counterterrorism* represents the extent to which countries take measures to counter terrorism, foreign fighters and their radicalization, as well as the consistency of national policies towards the Syrian insurgency and foreign fighters in particular. Indicators used for the condition counterterrorism are de-radicalization programms by states and the surveilance and control of mosques and imams by governments. My findings suggest, that Inconsistent policies and unsufficient means to counter foreign fighters and radicalization can lead to increased export of foreign fighters if other more crucial conditions are fulfilled as well. From the seven highest export countries (Tunisia; Jordan; Libya; Saudi Arabia; Morocco; Kuwait; Qatar) only Jordanian and Moroccan state policies were identified as consistent. On the other side, the UAE and Algeria, two cases were other conditions that lead to the export of foreign fighters exist (to different degrees) export only low numbers because of effective and strict measures to tackle the issue (US State Department 2013; MAITIC 2014; Racelma 2013). Countries with inconsistent counterterrorism policies were either influential Gulf States, post Arab Spring States or the failed Somali state. Tunisia illustrates the effect of mosque control and surveilance in combination with inconsistent policies on radicalization and foreign fighters. With the events of the Arab Spring radical preachers, mostly from AST (a group affiliated with ISIL and *Al-Qaeda*) became active in a great percentage of mosques in the country. Anne Wolf describes mosques as "key locations

for AST members and other radical Islamists to operate and spread their views, esp. as imams." (Wolf 2014). Alaya Allani, a Tunisian professor specialized in Tunisian Islamism, observed that numerous Islamic associations were founded with money from Qatar and private donors from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, maintaining that "the main reason why these associations had a lot of money is because they were recruiting fighters to Syria." (Alaya Allani citation and source from Reidy 2015). From 2013-2014 the Tunisian government regained control of the majority of Tunisian mosques (Reidy 2015). As the conflict is still ongoing, little research exists on states attitude towards foreign fighters in Syria. Therefore, unfortunate, only little reliable information exists about the issue. Moreover, there are conflicting statements and accusations by officials from different states. While the inconsistency of Egyptian and Libyan policies towards the flow of foreign fighters are well known, Saudi Arabian, Qatari and Kuwaiti policies are more difficult to assess.[16]

3.3.5 Practical Conditions

Networks: Smuggeling of foreign fighters from their countries of origin to Syria and Iraq and their local recruitment rely on networks of domestic organizations with insurgent groups in the conflict zone.[17] Insurgent groups that operate in Syria and Iraq maintain houses in transit countries (esp. Turkey), close to the Syrian border to smuggel foreign fighters into the conflict zone (BBC News 2013a). My findings show, that networks of domestic organizations with Syrian/Iraqi groups can have an effect on the number of foreign fighters. However, they are not a necessary condition. Radical islamic insurgent groups (esp. ISIL) also recruit their fighters intensively via the internet (Carter/Maher/Neumann 2014) and use networks to bring them from neighboring countries into Syria and Iraq (Letsch 2015). Aaron Zelin finds that the largest "foreign recruitment networks" exist in Saudi Arabia, Libya and Tunisia (Zelin 2013b). These three countries were also identified as harbouring strong networks in my analysis. Following my analysis, other strong networks exist in Morocco, Somalia, Algeria and Egypt. My operationalization did only partly include networks that are actively recruiting foreign fighter for Syria and Iraq and also counted affiliations of terrorist

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[16] For a more detailed argument in which sense states policies may be assessed as inconsistent see chap. 4.1.4 'Operationalization: Political Conditions – Counterterrorism'.

[17] Further one could add, networks in eventual transit countries that are left aside in this research.

organizations with Syrian and Iraqi insurgent groups and friendly contacts between them, that may not lead to the transfer of foreign fighters.

Alternatives: There is only little empirical research addressing the decision making processes of commited *jihadists*, whether to take violent action in the domestic or in the international arena. In a study confined to European foreign fighters in Syria, Hegghammer finds that individuals' commited to the path of *jihad* preferably join insurgent groups abroad rather than to engage in terrorist attacks at home. Hegghammer concedes, though, that his findings might not fit Middle Eastern countries with strong terrorist organizations and active insurgency groups (Hegghammer 2013). Evidence of AQIM, calling youth not to join Syrian insurgencies instead of fighting in North Africa, suggest that Islamic insurgency groups and terrorist organizations compete for foreign fighters (Watanabe 2015; MAITIC 2014). I take it that Syria and Iraq are prefered destination of jihadists (Zelin 2013a: 2; Neumann 2015).

My findings show, that alternatives can have an effect on the number of foreign fighters leaving a country to go to Syria and Iraq. The condition *alternatives* is included in some of the (complex) sufficient conditions leading to the export of foreign fighters. Still, Tunisia and Libya, two leading exporters also provide splendid opportunities for *jihad*. Therefore I argue that allthough *alternatives* play a role, its relevance gets smaller if the pool of potential foreign fighters increases.

Accessibility: The condition *accessibility* reflects the simple truth that an individual needs to be able to get to Syria and Iraq in order to become a foreign fighter in that region. The condition as specified in my analysis, however, does not include foreign fighters that enter transit countries by illegal means and than cross into Syria or Iraq. Although foreign fighters and terrorist are certainly not actors that only use legal means, I assume that the export of foreign fighters increases, if the opportunity costs of traveling are low, because of easy (legal) access. Most studies confirm that the majority of foreign fighters are not *jihadist* veterans but first time fighters, and it seems reasonable to assume, that many of them, lack the skills and connections which are necessary to bypass border controlls without being caught by the authorities. Also media reports and studies on the topic emphasize that a reason for the

dramtical increase of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq is due to the good accessibility of the region (Barrett 2014a: 23). The condition *accessibility* has been identified as the most significant necessary condition. It is included in all sufficient combinations of conditions that lead to the export of foreign fighters, as well as negated accessibility is included in all sufficient combinations of conditions leading to no export of foreign fighters.[18]

4   The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)

This research aims to identify the conditions that lead to the export of Muslim fighters to Syria and Iraq. The figures on foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq used in this analysis do not indicate their motivation and religious believes, as said before, most foreign fighters join radical Islamic insurgencies. The aim is to find structural social conditions that lead to the export of foreign fighters or combinations of such conditions. In order to identify combinations of conditions, I use a *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA). The method was introduced by Charles Ragin in 1989 and later modified by him in several ways (Ragin 1989, 2000 & 2006). QCA-Analyses include a variation of several different methods grouped in the QCA-Method family (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 20). The conditions that can lead to the export of fighters are heterogeneous. At least two necessary conditions need to be fulfilled. One regarding to the intention of an individual and one to his practical possibilities. This is not to say that only two conditions will provide a satisfying explanation. Given the range of possible conditions that could increase or decrease the export of foreign fighters and their diverse occurrence in the cases (15 States of the Arab League) there is a wide range of combinations that can explain the phenomenon. A QCA-analysis has the advantage to organize   complexity   and   to   combines   qualitative   and   quantitative   research (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 20). Qualitative research and the researchers knowledge contributes to the analysis, esp. in a comparative cross country analysis, where the different cases are structural different and thus difficult to analyze by means of statistics only (Trueb 2012). Another argument for the method is the small number of cases (I compare 15 countries) that precludes a statistical analyisis. Schneider and Wagemann put the minimum number of cases for a meaningful statistical analysis on 50 (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 25).

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[18] Odd cases will be discussed in chap. 4.4 – ‚Interpretation of the Cases in the Light of the Findings'.

The QCA-analysis serves to find the necessary conditions as well as combinations of necessary and sufficient conditions that explain the phenomenon. In a QCA the single conditions are dependent on each other. Together, they can have an outcome, as the cases and the conditions are put into context (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 14f.). If a country scores a high outcome when a certain condition is not fulfilled, the latter is, strictly speaking, not a necessary condition. A sufficient condition leads to the outcome − the export of foreign fighters, whenever the condition is fulfilled. There can be cases, however, in which the outcome occurs even though a sufficient condition is not fulfilled, because there can be more than one sufficient condition (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 32).

Fuzzy-set QCA

From the several QCA methods, I chose a Fuzzy-Set QCA (fsQCA), a program for QCA analysis on the basis of Boolean algebra (Ragin 2006). In a fuzzy-set analysis, the figures are calibrated into a spectrum, ranging from 0.0 − 1.0 (Ragin 2008: 30). The scores indicate the grade of membership of the conditions as well as the grade of membership of the outcome. A full membership scores 1 and a full non-membership scores 0 (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 184). Hence, gradations of membership are possible (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 177). As an example I use the outcome "foreign fighters". Tunisia exports 28 foreign fighters of a population of 100.000; Jordan exports 23. The calibrated values of both have a QCA score of 1 and are fully in the target set, i.e. they share a full membership. Kuwait export two foreign fighters per 100.000 and has a score of 0.62, i.e. they are "more in than out of the target set" (Trueb 2012: 6). Qatar, that exports 1 foreign fighter per 100.000, scores [0.49] and is defined as "more out than in the target set" (Trueb 2012: 6). Djibouti and the Comoros, from where no foreign fighters are reported, are scored [0.02] and are fully out of the target set. The cross over point is [0.5]. Values above it are more in the target set, i.e. more full members. Values beneath it are more out of the target set, i.e. full non-members (Trueb 2012: 7). The score of a variable also includes a theoretical assumption. The higher the score, the higher the outcome. A high score for X^2 would mean, that the researcher assumes, that X^2 leads to the outcome.

4.1 Operationalization

In this chapter I will first describe the methods used to operationalize the raw data into *conditions*, necessary for the fsQCA-Analysis. Afterwards I will expose the operationalization and the theoretical assumptions of each condition in detail.

4.1.1 Calibration & the creation of Indices

Calibration means the process of scaling the raw data into figures useful for a Fuzzy-set analysis. The figures are situated, as stated previously, on a scale from $0 - 1$, regarding their membership status (Ragin 2008: 9). There are two ways of calibration. In the first, I use fsQCA to transform the figures of the raw data in fuzzy-set scores. This happens via an algorithm of the program. I use the first and third quartile and the median as cut-off points, defining the borders between the different levels of membership. For almost all of the final conditions, of which some are made by the creation of indices, I used the quartiles and the median.

The median measures the location of values in the center of a list of different values. The first and third quartile measure the location of value in the first and last quarter of a value in a list of different values. They describe the reality of single cases more explicit than the average, as they leave out cases that are far from the average. Most cases are calibrated with the use of median and quartiles. Exceptions are indicated.

The second way is to set the fuzzy-set scores by theoretical assumptions; i.e. ordering the conditions of cases on a spectrum from 0-1. The condition "Islam" and several sub-components of conditions are not determined through calibration. The values of the variable "Islam" and of some sub-components, used for the creation of indices, were given by theoretical assumptions on the basis of qualitative research and were not taken from data banks. For other sub-components I also do not used quartiles and the median, but set the cut-off points following theoretical assumptions.

For the creation of indices conditions, I used logical AND, logical OR or the average of previously calibrated sub-components. Logical AND creates a condition, by aggregating sub-components on the basis of the minimum membership score of each variable in one case

(Trueb 2012: 9). Logical AND is, thus, the more stricter parameter. A country needs a high mempership score in all sub-components, in order to score high (Trueb 2012: 9). Logical OR creates a variable, by aggregating sub-components on the basis of the smallest score of the sub-components in a case (Trueb 2012: 9). Logical AND sets the crossbar high for a country to reach full-membership; logical OR sets it lower. The choice for a type of index creation is based on theoretical assumptions (Trueb 2012: 9f.).

In cases, where a discrepancy between sub-components exists, due to missing information in one sub-component or fluctuation of values during the time of the conflict, I chose the average. E.g. the condition *counterterrorism* is created by the aggregation of the sub-components consistency of government policies and De-radicalization campaigns & mosque surveilance. Some cases score high in de-radicalization but low in consistency. Efforts to stop the flow of foreign fighters exist, but it is not clear whether they were implemented due to inconsistent policies throughout the conflict in Syria. In a QCA-Analysis, 0.5 scores are ignored, as they do not fit on one side of the membership scale. The analyst has to change these scores either to 0,49 or to 0,51, refering to his knowledge of the case. Changes will be presented in the footnotes. In calibrating the conditions, I follow substantive assumptions as to whether the respective conditions lead to the outcome or not. My working assumptions will be explained in the following operationalization. Three conditions (*Islam, alternatives, counterterrorism*) are assumed to lead to "no export of foreign fighters". Therefore, a full-membership 1 in Islam, for exapmple, means that a case is a fully secular state.

I will depict each calibration formula in order to guarantee scientific traceability.

4.1.2   Operationalization: Socio-economic Conditions

Well-Being [WELL]

The condition *well-being* specifies the development and the poverty levels of the selected countries.

Hypothesis: The better off a country is the more foreign fighters are exported.

The condition is created by an aggregation of the UN-Human Development Index (HDI) scores of 2013 and the percentage of the population living beneath 1,25$ a day. The HDI is a

summary value of aggregated indicators about "key dimensions of human development", such as "a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living" (UN-DP 2014).[19] The figures of both sub-components were calibrated using the first and third quartile and the median and scores with a value of 0,5 have been changed.[20]

compute: hdi = calibrate(hdi,0.79919,0.717,0.48739)
compute: pov = calibrate(pov,0,2,19.3)

I chose *logical OR* to aggregate the sub-components poverty and HDI into the condition well-being. Thereby the highest score of each case is selected. The HDI is assumed to be more significant than poverty, as it includes indicators of poverty. The sub-component poverty was used to include cases where the calibrated scores of the HDI are higher than the scores for poverty. The assumption is, that in these cases, (e.g. Djibouti, Morocco) the relative well-being of a country is lesser, even if poverty does not surpass the HDI. Since my assumption is, that low poverty and a high HDI lead to the export of foreign fighters, a full membership of the sub-component HDI means that the HDI is high in reality, while a full membership in poverty means, that poverty does not exist in that country.

Education [EDU]

The condition *education* specifies the educational level in the selected countries.

Hypothesis: The higher the level of education in a country the more foreign fighters are exported.

The condition is an index aggregated by merging the sub-components mean years of schooling in 2012 and the percentage of tertiary enrollment of the school age population of 2012 (UN-DP 2014).

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[19] The poverty rate of Algeria is taken from a different source (United Nations 2010). The reference years for the figures range from 2002-2010. Inacuraccy due to the span of time of 8 years, are to be composed through the aggregation with the HDI. Figures for poverty rates (beneath 1,25$) in Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are not available. Further research did not give evidence that people in these countries live below the poverty line of 1,25$; even though relative poverty exists. E.g. Saudi Arabia (France 24 2011).

[20] The HDI score of Algeria was changed from 0.5 to 0.49, because of its high poverty rates.

The sub-components were calibrated using the quartiles and the median:

compute: school = calibrate(school,8.153,6.477,3.789)
compute: uni = calibrate(uni,33,15.5,11.5)

To aggregate the sub-components into the condition *education*, I used logical OR. I assume, reffering to Venhaus, that a motivation of becoming a foreign fighter is the feeling that one does not get what one deserves and that one is a victim of society (Venhaus 2010: 8ff.) The better the education, the greater the expectations (Cramer 2010) and consequently the frustration if expectations are not met. Studies show that many students join insurgencies in Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014). Christopher Cramer stresses this notion by arguing, that it is mostly the better educated that join insurgencies. Not only in the Arab World but in other regions as well (Cramer 2010: 17). I assume, that feinted expectation of university students and absolvents are only slightely different from those without an university degree but with a longer during education. One can even imagine, that more median years of schooling in combination with smaller university enrollment numbers lead to frustration and thus to an increased export of foreign fighters (Cramer 2010: 16ff.). Therefore, I use logical OR, to aggregate the condition by the highest scores.

Recruitment Pool [RECRUIT]

The condition *recruitment pool* specifies how many *potential* foreign fighters exist in each country. A potential foreign fighter is defined – only for this condition – as an unemployed individual aged 15-24. I recognize, that this definition does not enfold all potential foreign fighters. The measurement was chosen due to a lack of data on unemployed populations aged 18-30; the average age of foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a, p.16). I argue, that the condition still can help as an apporach to measure the trend in a country.

Hypothesis: The greater the recruitment pool the more foreign fighters are exported.

I calculated the percentage of unemployed youth ages 15-24 of the total population. The percentage of youth unemployment rely on World Bank figures from 2010 (World Bank 2015). The World Bank figures do not show the percentage of unemployed youth of the total

population, but only the unemployment rates of youth.[21] Figures on age groups were taken from the United Nations Department of Economics and social Affairs. They also refer to estimates from 2010 (UN-DESA 2012).

The figures on youth unemployment and the figures of age groups were calculated to identify the percentage of unemployed youth of the total population. This figure was calibrated using the quartiles and the median:

compute: recruit = calibrate(recruit,5.785,4.36,2.785)

4.1.3   Operationalization: Systemic Conditions

Economic System [ECON]

The condition *economic system* specifies how 'modern' the market system of a country is. The condition was included following the thesis of Michael Mousseau that terrorism is caused by the clash of a modern market system values with values based on clientelistic economic system (Mousseau 2002).

Hypothesis: The more modern and globalized a market system in a clientelistic society is, the more foreign fighters are exported.

Mousseau sees the social value of contracts, enforcable by law, as a factor based in a modern market system (Mousseau 2002: 10f.). The World Bank gives scores on how efficient the judicial system of a country enforces contracts (World Bank Group 2015). The scores are assessed "by following the evolution of a commercial sale dispute over the quality of goods and tracking the time, cost and number of procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit until payment is received." (World Bank Group 2015). Further indicators that constitute a modern market economy are its economic freedom [scores from the heritage foundation (Heritage Foundation 2015)] and the grade of globalization [measured by international trade as percentage of the GDP (UN-DP 2014)]. Increased international trade requires some changes in the domestic economic system, as one has to deal with international

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[21] Unemployment rates for Djibouti were not available from the World Bank and were added from another source that published the overall unemployment rates of Djibouti and assumed that youth unemployment is much higher (African Economic Outlook 2012). Hence, I took the unemployment rate (54%) and estimated the youth unemployment rate to be at 60%.

partners, who are not part of the clientelistic system. The scores of `economic freedom´ are made out of four indicators by the heritage foundation: "Rule of Law"; "Limited Government"; "Regulatory Efficiency"; "Open Markets" (Heritage Foundation 2015).

The figures of the condition are created by aggregating the sub-components: `economic freedom`; `international trade as percentage of the GDP`; `enforcing contracts`. The figures were calibrated using median and quartiles:

compute: ecofree = calibrate(ecofree,62.3,57.5,51.085)
compute: contract = calibrate(contract,56.295,52.52,42.225)
compute: trade = calibrate(trade,101.537,86.591,50.1962)

For the index creation, I used logical OR, assuming that the highest factor is sufficient to constitute a modern market economy.[22]

Political System: Democracy [DEM]

The condition *democracy* (fsQCA shortcut dem) measures the level of political and civil freedoms in a country in the time span from 2011-2014.

Hypothesis: The more democratic a country is the more foreign fighters are exported.

The figures are taken from the *Democracy Index of Freedom House* (Freedom House 2015). Because of wide changes of the Freedom House scores between 2011-2014, caused by the events of the Arab Spring, I took the average of the scores of these years and calibrated them using quartiles and the median:[23]

compute: dem = calibrate(dem,4,5.5,5.9375)

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[22] Djiboutis score of economic freedom was changed to 0.49. Djibouti scored low in the other sub-components, thus this adjustment seems legitimate.

[23] Qatar, Djibouti, Algeria, Mauretania and Jordans score were changed to 0,49. All scored 5.5 (Freedom House definition "Not Free") in the original Index.

Islam [NOISLAM]

The condition *Islam* specifies the degree to which a states judicial system is based on Sharia law or secularism. A full-membership of the condition is the case of a fully secular state.

Hypothesis: The more secular a state is the more foreign fighters are exported.

I categorized the cases into four groups:

Fig. 4: Islam in the Constitution	
Secular state	1
PS	0,66
PS/CS + Hadd Penalties[24] (regional or for selected crimes)	0,33
Absolut sharia state	0

The categorization is orientated on the judicial country profiles, by the US Library of Congress (Library of US Congress 2015).

The only fully secular state is Tunisia; PS refers to countries where Sharia law applies to personal statue issues: Jordan; Morocco; Kuwait; Algeria; Egypt; Djibouti; PS/CS refers to countries, where Sharia Law is apllied in personal statue issues and for some criminal cases. Hadd penalties can exist regional or for specific crimes only: Libya[25]; Comoros; Qatar; UAE; Absolut Sharia States, where Sharia law is applied for the personal statute and all crimes are: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Mauretania and Somalia.[26]

The sources for the categorization will be found in table form in the bibliography.

4.1.4   Operationalization: Political Conditions

Grievances [GRIEV]

The condition *grievances* specifies the level of grievance in a country.

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[24] *Hadd* Penalties are for crimes against god and are punished follwing Quran and Hadithes. E.g. decapitating, stoning, cruzification, amputations (Johnson/Sergie 2014).

[25] Libyas criminal penal code does not include Sharia. But the country is de facto parted into at least two parts, where one part is held by Islamists applying Sharia law.

[26] Likewise Libya, Somalias penal codes does only apply Sharia law for issues of the personal statue. Nevertheless, due to the lack of government and the territory hold by radical Islamic groups, I take it to be an asbolut sharia state.

Hypothesis: The more grievances Muslim citizens have the more foreign fighters are exported.

The figures for the condition were taken from the *Fragile State Index* "The Fragile States Index is based on the twelve primary social, economic and political indicators of the CAST methodology, developed by The Fund for Peace." (Fragile State Index 2015). I calibrated the sum of the indicators "group grievance", "human flight", "uneven development", "legitimacy of the state", "public services", "human rights" and "security apparatus" with quartiles and the median.

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compute: griev = calibrate(griev,52.3,47.4,43.35)

Counterterrorism [NOCT]

The condition *counterterrorism* specifies the extent of measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters, their radicalization and financing and the consistency of these policies. A full-membership means that a country lacks consistent counterterrorism policies.

Hypothesis: The less efforts in counterterrorism a country consistently undertakes, the more foreign fighters are exported.

I recognize that this condition is double sided. Efforts in counterterrorism and de-radicalization can also be a sign for a higher level of radicalization and terrorism in a country. The condition does not specify government capacities of counterterrorism. Figures on the numbers of security forces outside the military force, and their effectivnes are hard to get.

The conditon counterterroism is aggregated by the use of two sub-components. One sub-component is the consistency/inconsistency of a country´s anti-foreign fighters policy over time; the other is an estimated value of state campaigns to decrease radicalization and to prevent the proliferation of radical terror organizations and insurgent groups. It includes de-radicalization campaigns by the government, the surveilance of mosques and the promotion of peace. In 2011-2013 some governments supported the flow of foreign fighters or accepted it. Some states changed their policies with increasing numbers of foreign fighters joining radical Islamic groups like ISIL and with the sudden advances of these very groups. Other Arab states experienced regime changes with the events following the Arab Spring. Such changes,

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as happened in Tunisia or Egypt, affected the policy towards the Syrian opposition and/or the flow of foreign fighters to the conflict zone. Pressure from the United States to adopt and implement the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 is also a possible explanation for changes to stricter laws and policies by some governments. Following the UN Resolution many Arab states implemented laws to criminalize foreign fighters and to stop them from going to Syria and Iraq (Drennan 2014). All cases, as members of the Arab League, officially recognized a threat posed by ISIL in the second half of 2014 (Noueihed/Fahmy 2014; UN-Security Council 2014). This is not to say, that means of counterterrorism are applied in all states equal.

In order to merge the sub-components inconsistency and policies I use the average. Inconsistent states are valued binominal [Inconsistent: 1; consistent: 0].

Counterterrorism policies scores are created by the addition of scores coming from state categorization:

Fig. 5:   State Policies

CT: State Policies	
[A] *Absolute mosque control by the state*	2
[A] *Surveilance of mosques*	1,5
[A] *Existence of Imans who preache against a violent Islam*	1
[B] *Politicians and religious institutions promote a peacefull Islam*	1
[B] *Awarness campaigns; Promotion of peace*	0,5
[C] *Re-Radicalization and Re-integration campaigns in prison*	0,5

The scores are orientated on the counterterrorism country profiles of the US-State Department 2013 (US-State Department 2013). They are created by the following procedure: Each case is assigned two one of the scores of the categorization [A], [B] and [C] or zero. The scores are afterwards summed.

In the following I will make an argument for the categorization of each particular case into inconsistent and consistent states.

Inconsistent: States that once supported (or at least are reported to do so) the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq or that let it willingly happen: Saudi Arabia; Qatar; Kuwait; Egypt; Tunisia; Libya; Somalia.

Saudi Arabia condemned the Assad Regime and supports the Syrian opposition with arms, political and religious backup since the beginning of the conflict (Schanzer 2012) *The Meir Amit Center for Intelligence and Terrorism'* suggests 2013 that Saudi Arabia supports the Syrian opposition not only with weapons and arms, but also with foreign fighters (MAITIC 2014: 82). Following Zelin, the Saudi government did not deter its citizens from going to Syria before 2014 (Zelin 2014a: 14) In 2014 the Saudi government designated ISIL and the *Al-Nusrah Front* as terrorist organizations and gave their citizens 15 days to return or to face prison. Since February 2014 joining insurgencies overseas is forbidden by royal decree and can be punished by 20 years of prison (Al-Jazeera 2014b). Saudi Arabia is a member of the ANTI-ISIL coalition and even contributes with airstrikes (Drennan 2014).

Qatar also was an early country to condem the Assad regime and to openly side with rebel forces in Syria. Likewise Saudi Arabia it supported the Syrian opposition with arms, money and political and religious aid and legitimation (MAITIC 2014: 91). Even though the Qatari government denies it, the country is often claimed to support radical Islamic groups in Syria and Iraq. The country is said to act as a middleman between Libya and Syrian Rebels to support the Syrian insurgency (Abouzeid 2013). The country officially condemns radical Islamic insurgent groups and is a member of the ANTI-ISIL coalition (Drennan 2014).

Like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, *Kuwait* also condemned strongly the Assad regime and supported Syrian rebel forces. Following the MAITIC-report, Kuwait allowed its citizens to support Syrian insurgent groups with donations and to join them as a foreign fighter. However, state officials deny this claim (MAITIC 2014: 90f.). The country is also a member of the ANTI-ISIL coalition and imposed a law banning the financing of ISIL in (Drennan 2014).

Egypt and *Tunisia* also fall into category [1]. In difference to the previous three Gulf States, the inconsistency towards the issue is due to government changes. At the beginning of the conflict in Syria, both countries were governed by Islamic parties that came to power through

the events of the Arab Spring. Their governments were not stable and preoccupied with domestic turmoil. Even though the governing Egyptian *Muslim Brotherhood* (through its *Freedom and Justice Party*) and the Tunisian *Ennahda* differ in their profiles and their sense for democracy, both governments shared sympathy for the Syrian uprising. The *Ennahda* Government is said to not have prevented the flow of Tunisian foreign fighters to Syria. Pressure from families, whose relatives went to Syria and criticism of the Tunisian Media led to first steps to stop the flow of foreign fighters. (MAITIC: 45f.). With the change of the Tunisian government and greater numbers of Tunisians joining insurgency groups in Syria and Iraq (or Libya), the Tunisian govenrment nowadays sees the phenomenon as a threat and takes measures (Reidy 2015). While *Ennahda* support for foreign fighters going to Syria, is a subject of discussion, the Egyptian Government under the reign of the *Muslim Brotherhood* openly supported their citizens to go to Syria. In July 2013 a senior Egyptian official stated that Egyptians were free to join insurgencies in Syria. The policy was changed after the ouster of Mursi (MAITIC 2014: 65). The new Egyptian military Regime sees Islamic terrorists and Insurgent groups (it also counts the *Muslim Brotherhood* as such) as a menace and takes action against them in Egypt as well as in Libya (Gearan 2014).

Likewise Egypt and Tunisia, *Libya´s* policies towards its citizens leaving for Syria and Iraq can also be explained with the turmoil of the civil war and the ouster of the Ghaddafi Regime. The Libyan government had neither the will nor the means to prevent foreign fighters going to Syria. In February 2013 the Libyan foreign Minister stated that the government could not stop Libyan citizens to go to Syria (MAITIC 2014: 32). At least some officials allowed or even sent arms and foreign fighters through Turkey or Northern Lebanon to Syria (Abouzeid 2013). Even if the official Libyan policy may have changed, the capabilities of the government to stop the flow of foreign fighters are restricted by the situation in the country.

The case of *Somalia* is also classified as inconsistent [1]. Somalia counts as a failed state where the government does only control a third of its capital (Dickinson 2010). Hence consistency in Somalian State policies seems irrelevant. But with a government incapable of controlling its capital, we may safely assume that actions to prevent its citizens from going to Syria are weak, however the official policy look like.

Inconsistent: States where no policies (official or unofficial) are reported in favor of foreign fighters and the Syrian insurgencies: Algeria; Jordan; Comoros; Djibouti; Sudan; UAE; Mauretania; Morocco.

4.1.5   Operationalization: Practical Conditions

Networks [NET]

The condition *networks* measures the existence of networks between domestic terrorist organisation and insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq. Networks can increase the intention to go to Syria and Iraq, with domestic organizations propageting the *jihad* in Syria (Wolf 2014) as well as increase the possibilities of individuals to get to Syria and Iraq, as I assume that they developed capabilities of smuggeling, connections and can offer organizational and financial help for those ready to go (Zelin 2013b; Wolf 2014).

Hypothesis: The more networks exist in a country the more foreign fighters are exported.

The condition consists of two sub-components. One indicates whether domestic terrorist organizations exist that have relationships or are affiliated with ISIL or *Al-Qaeda* (*Al-Qaeda* as umbrella organization, including the Syrian *Al-Nusrah Front*). The project "Mapping Militant Organizations" by the Stanford University maps the relationship between regional and international terrorist organizations and insurgent groups (Mapping Militant Organizations 2015). I scored every case, in which organizations connected to insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq exist with a 1. I restrained from a more explicit scale, as information of their activeness, numbers and their efforts to recruit and sent fighters to Syria and Iraq are difficult to measure and would probably lack accuracy. I recognize that further organizations and networks exists but argue that more qualitative research could lead to false assumptions, as information about groups can be misleading due to their different representation in media reports.

Fig. 6: Terrororganization with ties to Syria & Iraq.

Cases	Organizations
tunisia	AST
libya	ASL, LIFG, ISIL
morocco	GICM
somalia	Al-Shabat
algeria	AQIM, Jund Al-Khalifa (joined ISIL)
yemen	AQAP, ASY
egypt	Al-Jama´a Al-Islamiya, EJI, Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis (joined ISIL)
mauretania	AQIM

For shortcuts see Appendix.

The other sub-component is the number of foreign fighters that joined the (by then) *Al-Qaeda* affiliate ISI (or AQI: *Al-Qaeda Iraq*), the antesecessor organization of ISIL, revealed in the Sinjar documents. The Sinjar documents are records of 700 foreign fighters in Iraq. They were secured by the US military and revealed detailed information on the backgrounds and origins of foreign fighters (Fishman/Felter 2007). I argue, that the figures can be taken as an indicator for existing networks and connections between the countries of origin and ISI and *Al-Qaeda* that might still exists. I used the total number of foreign fighters from the Sinjar documents, arguing that the more fighters joined Iraqi insurgent groups, the more connections exist. The cross over point to calibrate the Sinjar-figures was given by the author, as median and quartiles did not give an appropriate picture of the situation as the foreign fighters listed came from a small number of cases only.

compute: sinjar = calibrate(sinjar,100,10,0)

I use the average for the creation of an index due to the alternative approaches of score creation (terrorist organization: binominal; Sinjar: calibrated).

The conditions *networks* and *alternatives* are connected. If sophisticated terrorist or insurgent groups exist in a country, it is to assume that they not only pose as a network to smuggel foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq but also as an alternative that could motivate to stay. Nevertheless, I assume that it is appropriate to use both as they include different components.

Alternatives [NOALTER]

The condition *alternatives* refers to options other than to go to Syria and Iraq, for dedicated future *jihadists*. Full membership means that no alternative exist in a case. I assume that alternative areas of action for dedicated *jihadists* compete with insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq for foreign fighters.

Hypothesis: The less alternatives are available the more foreign fighters are exported.

Alternative areas of action for dedicated *jihadists* can be domestic terrorist organizations or insurgencies and terrorist organization in other *jihadi* battlefields. The condition consists of two sub-components: Terror and insurgencies. The sub-component of terror is given by the calibrated scores of the *Global Terrorism Index* 2014. The index measures acts of terror (Terrorism Index 2014).

The figures are calibrated using the quartiles and the median:

compute: terror = calibrate(terror,0.165,2.11,5.645)

The sub-component insurgencies is an estimation of alternatives in the cases itself or in bordering states. Alternative battlefields, that are geographically closer to a case than Syria but do not share a border with it were put aside.

The scores for the sub-component follow a categorization (Fig. 6) relying on research by the author and then calibrated using quartiles and the median.

compute: insur = calibrate(insur,0.1,0.4,0.8)

Fig. 7: Details on the classification of cases, regarding alternatives

Value	Insurgency
1	Civil war or close to civil war, with populated territory hold by insurgent groups.
0,8	Influential insurgencies exist but do not hold important populated areas. They mostly operate in rural areas or clandestine. The State has the upper hand.
0,6	Lawless territory at the periphery of the state where terrorist groups, training camps and insurgencies exist- mostly in deserted and mountainious areas bordering a troubled neighbour.
0,4	The country shares a porous border with a country at civil war.
0,2	The country is situated in an area where insurgencies occur repeatedly (mostly a save haven) and have limited influence without holding any territory of importance.
0	No insurgency at all.

Legitimation of the categorization:

[1]: Libya, Somalia

Libya is considered a failed state in the middle of a civil war. The revolutionary militas fighting former dictator Ghaddafi could not be disarmed or controlled by the new central gouvernment (Engel 2014: 4ff.). The situation worsened. Today – next to smaller factions, militias and groups – two mayor factions fight each other over the control and direction of the post-revolutionary country, whereby each established an own parliament. At the shore in the west, the *Islamic Libyan Dawn* holds the capital Tripoli, while the east (Tobruk) is controlled by nationalists. Other Islamic insurgencies control Benghazi (Ansar al Sharia) (Stephen 2014) and Derna (ISIL) (Al-Jazeera 2015b). Libya is seen by ISIL as a perfect opportunity to put the food in the door in North Africa (Winter 2015: 5) ISIL operates training camps in Libya (nbcnews 2014).

Somalia is in a state of civil war, since the toppeling of former dictator Siad Barre in 1991. While some comparatively stable independent or semi-independent provinces exist (Somaliland and Puntland) the rest of the country and the capital Mogadishu remains contested by African Union forces, the national army, various militias and the *Al-Qaeda* franchise *Al-Shabab* (Höhne 2014).

[0,8]:		Algeria, Egypt, Sudan

Algeria and Egypt are not in a state of civil war but both struggle with long established domestic terrorist organizations and insurgencies. In both cases, remote and marginalized regions exist where insurgent groups find safe heavens and an operational area. The *Egyptian Islamic Jihad* (EIJ), responsible for the killing of former president Anwar as-Sadat in 1981 and the infamous Luxor attack in 1997, has a long and violent history in Egypt (Sullivan/Jones 2008: 67-71). During the Mursi government, the organization went into politics and cooperated with the governing *Freedom and Justice Party* of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (BBC news 2013). With the ouster of Mursi, both groups were declared terrorist organizations again. Since then, the number of terrorist attacks in Egypt increased, as one can see following the news. In the Sinai insurgent groups and terrorist organizations find an operational area and became, with the events of the Egyptian Revolution, more and more activ. The strongest Islamic player – the group *Ansar bait al-Maqdis* that recently affiliated with ISIL (Mapping Militant Organizations 2015) – waged an open insurgency against Egyptian security forces leading to over 100 causalities (even though, most are reported to be Islamists) (Schleifer 2014). Since the civil war (1991-2002) the Algerian government is challenged by various terrorist organization. The mayor *jihadi* insurgent group is the *Al-Qaeda* franchise *Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb* (AQIM). It has its origins in the *Armed Islamic Group* (GIA). The GIA continued attacking the Algerian government till 2004. After government crackdowns on the group, its leftovers formed the *Salafist Group for preaching and Combat*, that became AQIM in 2003 (Laub 2015). AQIM operates as an insurgent group throughout the Sahel zone. It gained greater importance when it allied with Tuareg rebels, conquering the northern provinces of Mali (Tran 2013; Lacher 2012). AQIM called North African *jihadist* to refuse to go to Syria, as fighters are needed in the region as well (MAITIC 2014: 53).

Sudan has a long history of civil conflict. These can be described as a struggle between the Arab central government and different ethnic opposition forces in the periphery (Burr/Collins 2003: 28f.). Most conflict zones in Sudan are at its border regions (Darfur, South Sudan [till its independence]), Abyei. Its border Regions to the west and to the south are in a state of civil war (Crisis Group Report 2015).

[0,6]:		Tunisia, Mauretania

Tunisia and Mauretania, share porous borders with countries, where insurgent groups operate or wage war. Both cases have porous border areas, outside of the reach of the state. Tunisias border area to Libya lacks strong state control (Crisis Group report 2013). ISIL and *Al-Qaeda* are said to operate training camps in the countries' south, close to the Libyan border (MAITIC 2014: 34ff.). Training camps situated in Libya are said to be close to the Tunisian border (Ben Said 2015). Further, small Islamic insurgencies, affiliated with Al-Qaeda operate in the Chambi Mountain area at the Algerian border (Zelin 2015b).

Mauretania lies within the operational zone of AQIM. The desert country shares porous borders with Algeria and Mali. In 2012 AQIM and a local Islamist group (*Ansar Dine*) allied with Tuareg rebels (MNLA) and overrun the north of Mali leading to a French intervention that drove the Islamists out (Tran 2013; Lacher 2012). The Sahel zone, with its deserted and porous borders is a region of widly criminal activity, esp. smuggeling and traficking of arms, humans and drugs and due to its landscape hard to control (Lacher 2012; Boukhars 2012). Terrorist groups and insurgencies find a safe haven in the region that became famous for kidnappings (Boukhars 2012; Thurston 2012), esp. with the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya, smuggeling of arms increased intensively (Boukhars 2012).

[0,4]:		Saudi Arabia, Djibouti

Saudi Arabia and Djibouti have border countries at civil war (Saudi Arabia: Yemen; Djibouti: Somalia) but spill over effects are not reported. In fact, Djibouti borders with the self-declared independent state of Somali-land that is compared with the rest of the Somalia stable (Böhm 2013). The border between Djibouti and Somalia remains porous but the country hosts US military sites and gains assistance and support from the US-Army (United States Department of State 2013). Saudi Arabia borders Yemen to the south. The country is involved in the civil war in Yemen by airstrikes and spents lots of military resources to secure its border (Carey 2015). There are reports of clashes between Saudi security forces and Shiite Houthi rebels (Al-Jazeera 2015a). Still, there are no reports identifying safe heavens for *jihadists* in Saudi Arabia.

[0,2]:   Morocco, Jordan

Morocco and Jordan are situated in a region, where insurgent groups and terrorist organization exist. Morocco is situated in the operational zone of AQIM and is officially at war (Truce since 1991) with the *frente Polisario* in the Western Sahara. Half of Jordan's population is made up of Palestinian refugee (Auswärtiges Amt 2015). Even though they have the Jordanian citizenship by now, many still live in Palestinian refugee camps.[27] Jordan drove out militant Palestinian organizations, such as the PLO and the PFLP at the beginning of the 1970s in a civil war, reffered as Black September by these very organizations (CFR 2005) (Global Security 2015). Even though, both countries are situated in regions, traditional barring several alternative fields of violent *jihadist* activity, I value them low, in relation to the other cases.

[0]:   Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Comoros

Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and the Comoros have the most peacefull neighborhood of all cases. (Esp. the Comoros that are located in the Indian Ocean.)

Accessibility [ACCESS]

The condition accessibility refers to the practical possibilities to enter the conflict zone from each case. I argue that without any possibility to travel to Syria and Iraq from a specific country, the number of foreign fighters from that country is zero.

Hypothesis: The higher the accessibility the more foreign fighters are exported.

I assume, that the easier it is to enter Syria or Iraq from a particular country, the more individuals with the will to become foreign fighters that exist in a country, will actually go to Syria and Iraq. Even though, the condition does not give a complete picture of the ways and possibilities to enter the conflict zone. It only captures foreign fighters who traveled to a neighboring country legally and then crossed into Syria and Iraq. The focus is on visa regulations to neighboring countries and on the estimated opportunities to cross from these into Syria and Iraq. Passport falsification and clandestine transit via smugglers to neighboring countries or the direct route by seaway are excluded.

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[27] Refugee camps transformed to normal quaters of the cities. The term refers to its legal status.

The measure of the condition accessibility was created by the following procedure:

In a first step, I created *access* values for every neighboring country to Syria and Iraq – i.e. transit countries. The *access* value combines different estimated values regarding the possibilities to enter the country by legal means (i.e. how easy the entry is from a practical point of view, wether a visa is required and not) and the possibilities to move on to Syria and Iraq from a transit-country. The estimated values for the way from a transit country to the conflict zone include the states policies and attitude to the Syrian opposition and ISIL in particular and whether the country borders territories that are held by opposition groups that welcome foreign fighters. Further, I multiply the different values to calculate the specific *access* value. If a transit country is also a listed case I multiply, in addition, only the values regarding the entry Syria and Iraq from there and list them seperatly [7. Accessibility without visa]

Fig. 8: Calculation of the accessibility via different transit-countries

Best Choice	Turkey	Lebanon	Jordan	Iran	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Israel
1. State is an active part in the ANTI-ISIL coalition 0,25: very active; 0,5: active; 0,75: troubled; 1: no member	0,75	0,5	0,25	0	0,5	0,5	0,5
2. State is a declared enemy of the Syrian opposition = 0	1	1	1	0	1	1	0
3. Border on enemy- (0,25); combated- (0,5); controlled territory (1)	1	0,5	0,5	0	0,25	0,5	0,5
4. Visa costs if 1	1	1	1	0	1	0	0
5. Visa costs if Visa 0	0,5	0,5	0,5	0	0,1	0,1	0
6. State is a listed case	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
7. Accessibility without visa	0	0	0,125	0	0,125	0,25	0
Outcome	0,375	0,125	0,0625	0	0,01875	0	0

The outcome shows the estimated accessibility possibilities through every transit country. In a second step I compared all possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq from each case. I assume that a

future foreign fighter will allways choose the easiest way to enter the conflict zone; i.e. the transit-country or the direct access with the highest value.

As a matter of space, entry possibilities via visa, direct access and the best choice values are shown in fig. 8: 'Possibilities to enter' visible in the Appendix.

The 'Best Choice' scores are calibrated, using quartiles and median:

compute: access = calibrate(access,0.3125,0.125,0)

Justification for estimation of the values

State as a declared enemy of the Syrian opposition [2] (Fig. 8):

I assume that the transit of foreign fighters through a country is more difficult or near to impossible, if a transit-country is hostile towards the Syrian opposition. Hostile states are thought to combat the flow of foreign fighters more intensively as they consider them enemies. I give a hostile state the value 0 and a state, not generally hostile towards the Syrian opposition the value 1. The state might still be hostile to parts of the Syrian opposition. Only states that were consistent in their policies towards the Syrian opposition during the whole time of the conflict are valued with a 0.

By this, I omitt Israel and Iran as possible transit countries. Israel and Iran may have little in common but their hostile position towards radical Sunni insurgencies in Syria and Iraq. Israel´s attitude towards radical Islamism is well known. The border area with Syria, the Golan Heights are Syrian territory occupied by Israel since 1967. The area is highly militarized and surveiled by the Israeli defense forces (IDF) (Guzman 2013). The border between Israel and Syria is composed by a demilitarized zone, under the controll of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF 2013). There are conflicting reports of Israeli involvement in the Syrian civil war, esp. regarding Israelian ties with the Druze (Samaha 2015). Still, I assume, given the hostile position of Islamic Insurgencies towards Israel, that the country is the most unlikely transit country to Syria.

Irans position towards the Syrian opposition is hostile. The Shiite country is a strong ally of the Syrian and the Iraqi Regime and sees esp. Sunni insurgencies as a menace to Shiite or

Alawite populations in the region. Iranians joined Shiite warring factions in Syria and Iraq – often with the support of their state (Chasmar 2014). Sunni insurgencies see Iran as an enemy. Because of the Iranian support for the Syrian Regime or because of religious motives. As the cases inlcude only Sunni majority states, I assume that Iran constitutes a unlikely transit country to the war zone. Both possible transit countries are valued with a zero regarding 0 (Fig. 7). Thus the accessibility to reach Syria and Iraq from one of the cases is assumed to be zero. I recognize, that there may be possibilities to enter the conflict zone via Israel and Iran, by ways not recognized in this estimation, but assume that the chances to do so are comparatively lower.

Anti ISIL-Coalition [1] (Fig. 8):

The component Anti-ISIL Coalition is included to incorporate qualitative assumptions on the eagerness of transit countries to actually stop the flow of foreign fighters. The issue of foreign fighters is connected to the fight against ISIL. ISIL relies on foreign fighters (Barrett 2014b). I assume that countries, actively involved in the fight against ISIL, will take stricter steps to stop their flow into the conflict zone. Thus the countries role in the Anti-ISIL coalition can serve as an indicator for the countries eagerness to stopp the flow of foreign fighters. I incorporated time as a factor, regarding the transit-countries activeness in the Anti-ISIL coalition, by taking into account changes during the time-span of the conflict. Turkey claimed various times, to be strongly committed to the fight against ISIL (Beki 2014) and may have strengthend their border controll recently (Barrett 2014b), but were critizised for letting it happen and not showing great ambitiouns to contribute to the Anti-ISIL coalition in the past (Demirtaş 2014). Turkey is classified as a troubled member of the Anti-ISIL coalition. The Turkish policy towards the Syrian opposition and ISIL is generated by domestic policies and its regional ambitions and goals. Predominantely the aim to overthrow Assad and the hostile relationship with the Kurdish PKK and their Syrian affiliate YPG (Khodr 2015). While ties between Ankara and Damascus were close before the conflict, Turkey changed its positions and put its efforts towards the fall of the Syrian Regime (Phillips 2012). It supports the FSA and let them use Turkish territory as a retrat zone (MAITIC 2014; Barrett 2014a). Given its closeness to the conflict zone and given reports, that Turkey is the transit-country of choice

for foreign fighters (Barrett 2014a), the country is a crucial member of the Anti-ISIL coalition, yet, not a reliable one.

Lebanon, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are classified as active members of the Anti-ISIL coalition. Saudi Arabia contributes with air-strikes against ISIL; Kuwait created a task force to ban the financing of ISIL (Drenann 2014) and the Lebanese Army is engaged in fighting ANF and ISIL militans on its porous border with Syria (Saad/Gladstone 2014). Nevertheless, they are not classified as very active. In the case of Lebanon this is due its neutral stance at the beginning of the conflict and the lack of efficient border control (Al-Abd 2014). With a history of civil war and tensions between its different ethnic and religious groups, there are conflicting tendencies in the different Lebanese communities.

Saudi Arbia and Kuwait take action against ISIL. Saudi Arabias airforce attacked ISIL targets and the country builds a security wall on its border with Syria (Spencer 2015). Kuwait hosts Canadian fighter jets and army personal that fly attacks on ISIL targets (Brewster 2014). Still, their policies towards radical Sunni insurgencies were inconsistent (also see chapter 4.1.1 – 'Operationalization: Political Conditions') at the beginning of the conflict (MAITIC 2014: 90f.).

Jordan is classified as a very active country in the Anti-ISIL coalition. The country contributes by Air Strikes and tightend its border controlls with the success of ISIL and an increased flow of foreign fighters (Oddone 2014). There are no conflicting reports on Jordan's government committment to fight ISIL and to stop the flow of foreign fighters.

Border on territory hold by insurgent groups [3] (Fig. 8):

Borderlines with territory hold by insurgent groups are included, as an indicator for the possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq and to arrive at an insurgent group. I differentiate between three types of territory. Territory hold by insurgent groups, combatted territory and borders to enemy territory (i.e. territory hold by government forces or by groups hostile to Sunni foreign fighters). I compared maps, indicating the territory hold by insurgent groups from two sources to determine border territory types.

Visa costs [4 & 5] (Fig. 9):

"Visa costs if visa is 1": No visa is needed.

"Visa costs if visa is 0": Visa is needed. I value countries were visa´s can be applied by extra costs – money deposition; paper work, background checks (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) with 0,5. Countries where visa are quasi impossible to obtain (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait) are valued with 0.1.

The sources for visa costs and territory hold by insurgent groups will be listed in the bibliography.

4.2 QCA-Analysis

As said before, the QCA-Analysis is used in order to identify necessary conditions and combinations of conditions that can explain the export of foreign fighters. There is a slight difference in necessary and sufficient conditions in reality and those identified by the QCA-Analysis. While I assume that absolut necessary conditions do exist (See. Chapter: 1.4 Underlying Assumptions), those identified by QCA reflect reality and "make theoretical and empirical sense" (Legewie 2013). Still, they are not a one-to-one reflection of reality.

4.2.1 Analysis of the Necessary Conditions

In the following, define the QCA terms *coverage* and *consistency*. Than I present the finding regarding necessary conditions and discuss three conditions I identified as necessary or close to necessary. We have a necessary condition, if the condition always occurs when the outcome does, but does not necessarily always lead to the outcome. Identified single necessary conditions are: *Accessibility* (access), *economic system* (econ) and *education* (edu).

Coverage & Consistency: The QCA-Analysis calculates two sorts of scores: Consistency-scores and Coverage-scores. *Consistency* specifies the grade of corelation of a condition with the outcome; i.e. how consistent the empirical data contributes to the outcome (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 212). *Coverage* specifies the degree of relevance of a condition. A conditions, with a high consistency may pose necessary, but never the less not striking, if it

emergece also in other cases with a negative outcome (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 98). Schneider and Wageman define a condition as necessary, when its consistency is above 0,9 (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 213). The analysis of the necessary condition results in the following findings:

**Results: Necessary Conditions (Fig.10) & Necessary Conditions (negated) (Fig.11)**

Conditions	Consistency	Coverage		Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
well	0.759124	0.664962		well	0.322628	0.307799
recruit	0.569343	0.523490		recruit	0.528467	0.479470
edu	0.872993	0.620976		edu	0.221898	0.283054
econ	0.905109	0.601942		econ	0.154745	0.225532
dem	0.556204	0.584356		dem	0.592701	0.478774
noislam	0.620438	0.642965		noislam	0.543066	0.443385
griev	0.389781	0.347656		griev	0.661314	0.618852
noct	0.637226	0.571335		noct	0.434307	0.404212
net	0.632117	0.711586		net	0.516788	0.397084
noalter	0.516058	0.474178		noalter	0.551095	0.500331
access	0.913869	0.874302		access	0.270073	0.235969

To check for false assumptions regarding the effect of conditions, I also analyzed whether there are neccessesary conditions that lead to the negated outcome. Three conditions were identified, the absence of which is more significant: Democracy, grievances and alternatives. The consistency scores for democracy were slightly different for a negated and a positive outcome, as relative democratic states are among the exporters of foreign fighters and among the none-exporters. Even though, the condition can contribute as part of a complex sufficient condition. The higher consistency of the negated condition grievances stresses that grievances can with greater probability explain why countries do not export foreign fighters.

Findings: Necessary Conditions

Fig. 12: Accessibility; Fig. 13: Economic System; Fig. 14: Education


Two necessary conditions with scores above 0,9 emerge: *accessibility* (access) and *economic system* (econ). Furthermore, the conditions *education* (edu) comes very close (0,87). The high consistency and coverage of *accesibility* gives evidence for a strong correlation between the accessibility of Syria and Iraq and the export of foreign fighters. To count as a necessary condition, all scores need to be situated under the diagonal (Schneider & Wagemann 2007: 32). One can see in the graphic X/Y-plot that most cases are situated close and mostly under the diagonal. Exceptions are the United Arab Emirates and Somalia. I argue that the accessibility of the conflict zone is a highly important condition for the flow of foreign fighters – esp. due to its coverage of 0,87. Still, as the exceptions UAE and Somalia show, the accessibility can not count as the only factor that contributes to a high export of foreign fighters from a country. If this were the case, Somalia would export less and the UAE would export more foreign fighters. Qualitative research on these cases seems necessary to find factors or adjustments of conditions, not captured in the Fuzzy-scores.

The *economic system* (econ) is a necessary condition for the export of foreign fighters. In comparision to accessibility it lacks a high coverage (coverage: 0,61), as one can see at the cases far from the diagonal. The findings indicate, that the existence of a modern market economy in a

66

country is necessary to for the export of foreign fighters. It is not a sufficient condition, as modern market economies exist in countries that only export small numbers of foreign fighters or none. Again, Somalia is an exception and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4.4 ‚*Interpretation of the Cases in the Light of the Findings'*.

Education (edu) shortly misses the criteria for a necessary condition. Nevertheless, its high consistency score gives reason for a more detailed examination. As seen in the graph, countries with a poor educational level do not export foreign fighters – with, again the exceptions of Somalia and Morocco – and are clustered at the lower left corner of the graph. While poor education seems to decrease the export of foreign fighters in most countries, the opposite does not count for countries with a better educational level – these are clustered at the right side, but throughout the scale of high or low export of foreign fighters. The findings show that a high level of education does not lead to the export of foreign fighters in the same way as low education leads to a negative outcome – i.e. no export. This assumption is stressed, by the comparison of coverage and consistency of the condition with the coverage and consistency of the negated condition with the negated outcome (I.e. no education leads to no export). The analysis of the negated necessary condition education (~edu) assigned to a negative outcome (~ff) scores a consistency of 0.55 and thus does not count as a necessary condition. Though, its coverage of 0.84 is higher than the coverage of the positive condition (edu; coverage: 0,62) assigned to a positive outcome (ff).

Combinations of Necessary Conditions

Necessary conditions can also be part of further necessary conditions that include others as well. Ragin states that necessary conditions including various single conditions only are valid, if they only include other necessary conditions (Ragin 2010: 211).

Fig. 15: Combination of necessary conditions

Combination of Necessary Conditions	Consistency	Coverage
edu+econ	0.934307	0.537364
edu+access	0.932847	0.628319
edu+econ	0.934307	0.537364
econ+access	0.929927	0.608405
edu+econ+access	0.935766	0.537752

As one can see, the consistency scores of the necessary conditions that include other necessary conditions, are slightly higher than those of single necessary conditions. This is evidence for a cumulative effect of the different conditions.

Visualization of the Necessary Conditions (Fig. 16)

A visualtization of the necessary conditions *accessibility*, *economic system* and the quasi necessary condition *education* illustrates the findings.

The graph shows – as did the findings – that most countries, that export foreign fighters rank high in terms of education, have a modern market system and share good possibilities to travel to Syria and Iraq. The graph strenghtens the importance of accessibility to the conflict zone. In difference to the previous findings, it makes exemptions visible, taking into account all three necessary and quasi necessary conditions. While Somalia – as the findings indicated – sticks out with a higher export of foreign fighters coinciding with a diminishing low education and a more or less not existing modern market economy, the cases of the United Arab Emirates (and to a lesser extend the case of Algeria) stick out as countries exporting less foreign fighters than the findings would let one assume. The UAE scores high in both, education and economic system. The score for accessibility is similar to Qatars score. Still, the UAE exports fewer foreign fighters than Qatar. While the previous analysis of the necessary conditions identified single conditions posing relevant for the export of foreign fighters and threw a glance on cases sticking out as exemptions, a further analysis is required to identify the sufficient conditions and combinations of such.

4.2.2   Analysis of the Sufficient Conditions

The complex sufficient conditions are analyzed with the use of a Fuzzy-Set Truth Table Algorithm. Further I have conducted a Fuzzy-set analysis of the conditions leading to a positive and to a negative outcome, i.e. to the export of foreign fighters (ff) and to no export of foreign fighters (~ff) in order to identify the combination of conditions, sufficient to explain why some countries export more foreign fighters than others.

Truth Table & Logical Remainders

In a first step a Truth Table is created including all logically possible combinations between the conditions (Legewie 2013). The *Truth Table* does not only include combinations of conditions that occur in cases, existing in reality but also logically logical remainders – i.e. logically possible conditions that do not exist in the empiric data. The number of its rows of possible sufficient conditions can be calculated by the term 2^k. The letter k refers to the number of conditions used and the number 2 to the possible binominal outcome (present; not present) (Legewie 2013). In this analysis, there are 2048 logically possible combinations of conditions [2^{11}=2048] that can lead to the outcome, of which only 15 occur in real cases. As the aim of this research paper is to find explanations why some Arab States export more foreign fighters than others (and as the total number of Arab States is restricted) the logical remainders are deleted [The *Truth Table* can be found in the Appendix, on page.]. In a next step, I assign combinations of conditions, that lead to the export of foreign fighters with 1 and those that do not with a 0. The assignemnt is given on the basis of the reasearchers knowledge and the scores from the collum *raw consistency*. Values above 0.7 indicate substantial consistency and are assigned with a 1 (Ragin 2008: 46; Schneider/Wagemann 2009: 409). The fourth cell from below (Somalia), has a consistency above 0.9. The case does not have a greater membership as 0.5 in terms of foreign fighters (ff) and did prove as an unusual exemption regarding the necessary conditions. Therefore I assign a [?], as the consistency and the researchers knowledge would lead to contradictive assumptions.

The *Truth Table* shows, that no combination of conditions fits to more than one case [Colum "numbers" of the Truth Table. The uniqueness of cases is caused by the great number of analyzed conditions. Now I proceed with the standard analysis. The standard analysis creates first the Complex Solution. The "Complex Solution" is, as its name indicates the most

complex solution term. It shows all possible combinations – that score 0,5 or higher in the conditions it includes – that must exist to reach the outcome – a high export of foreign fighters. As these different combinations inlcude near to all conditions, the solution is precise, yet lacks the simplicity necessary to gain findings that can be generalized (Legewie 2013). Therefore, I leave the outcome of the Complex Solution aside (without further examination) and go on to the next solution term. There are two possible solution terms: 1. The Parsimonious Solution and the Intermediate Solution. The Parsimonious Solution is the most simplified. It reduces the combinations of conditions to the smallest number of conditions possible, the so called Prime Implicants (Legewie 2013). Ragin argues against the use of these simplified assumptions (Ragin 2008: 154ff.; Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 106f.). The Intermediate Solution "includes selected simplifying assumptions to reduce complexity, but could not include assumptions that might be inconsistent with theoretical and/or empirical knowledge. It can be understood as the complex solution reduced by conditions that run to fundamental theoretical or substantive knowledge" (Legewie 2013). The "selected simplifying assumptions" are chosen by assigning for each condition if it contributed to the outcome if: "prensent", "absent" or "present or absent". In my analysis all conditions are assigned "present", following my assumption in chapter *4.1 Operationalization*. I choose the intermediate solution term, that is recommended "as the main point of reference for interpreting QCA result (Ragin 2008:160-175).

4.3 Findings: Sufficient Conditions

In the following I will present the findings of the Intermediate Solution. In a first step I present the ouput of the solution term regarding a positive outcome – i.e. the export of foreign fighters (ff). In a second step I do the same for the solution term for a negated outcome (~ff). Each single sufficient condition – each combination of conditions – that leads to the export of foreign fighters will be discussed in the following chapter.

Fig. 17:   Output: Outcome (ff): Export of foreign fighters

Greater than 0,5 membership in term	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
well*edu*econ*noct*net*access	0.347445	0.168613	0.959677
well*edu*econ*noct*noalter*access	0.334307	0.127007	0.927126
well*recruit*edu*econ*noislam*noalter*access	0.221898	0.059124	0.980645
edu*econ*dem*noislam*net*noalter*access	0.182482	0.040146	0.992064

Solution coverage: 0.639416

Solution consistency: 0.943965

Interpretation: The Solution coverage defines the significance of all combinations together, i.e. the probability that the solution reflects reality (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 98). With a significance of ca. 0,64 all listed combinations, explain the outcome – the export of foreign fighters – with a probability of 64%. I argue that such a probability is high enough for valid assumptions and is usefull to justify explanations about the export of foreign fighters.Yet, it is too small to preclude that other – not analyzed conditions – do not play a role. The Solution consistency defines the grade of corelation of all combinations with the outcome (Schneider/Wagemann 2007: 212); i.e. how consistent all combinations together contribute to the export of foreign fighters. With a consistency of ca. 0,94, it can be stated that together, the listed sufficient conditions that explain the export of foreign fighters correlate strongly with the export of foreign fighters. Further, the raw coverage defines, how significant a combination would be, if it would be the only one. The values rank between 0,18-0,35, and indicate that there is not one single sufficient explanation for the export of foreign fighters. This notion is stressed by the low values of the unique coverage (between 0,04-0,17). It defines, how many cases of the solution are explained roughly through solely this combination. In difference to the raw coverage and the unique coverage, the consistency values all score above 0,9. They define the correlation of a single combination with the outcome.

The four sufficient combinations of conditions that explain the export of foreign fighters include the necessary conditions economic system, education and accessibility. The ouput produces several finding:

- States with a high level of education and a modern market system from which the conflict zone is easy to access are leading exporters of foreign fighters.

- The combination of the necessary conditions *economic system*, *education*, and *accessibility* is not sufficient to explain the export of foreign fighters, but only in combination with other conditions.

- The well-being of a country is included in three of four combinations. Even though it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition by itself. This may be seen as evidence that the level of well-being in a country, in combination with the necessary conditions, increase the export of foreign fighters.

- A lack of alternatives can drive individuals to join insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq, but only in combination with other conditions. A look on Tunisia and Libya shows, that countries with alternatives, still rank high in the export of foreign fighters. This notion is stressed by the consistency score of alternatives for a positive and a negated outcome.

- Relative democracy and secularism can also contribute to the export of foreign fighters. Still, both contribute to the outcome only in some complex sufficient conditions.

- The same applies for inconsistent policies to stop the flow of foreign fighters and an absence of measures of de-radicalization, counterterrorism legaslation and mosque surveilance. Low means of counterterrorism contribute to the export of foreign fighters in cases that lack alternatives and those that do not.

- The existence of terrorist networks is not sufficient to explain the outcome, but can contribute with other conditions to the export of foreign fighters.

- The condition grievances is not included in any sufficient condition. This is evidence that grievances do not contribute to the export of foreign fighters.

Findings: Sufficient Conditions for the outcome 'no Export of Foreign Fighters'

To analyze the sufficient conditions that lead to the outcome "no export of foreign fighters", I proceed as I did in the analysis of the positive outcome, with two minor differences: I make a

Fuzzy-set analysis for the negated outcome (put "~ff" at the beginning of the Fuzzy-set analysis) and interpret all conditions that are not fulfilled to contribute to the negated outcome"no export of foreign fighters".

Fig. 18:   Output: Negated Outcome (~ff): No export of foreign fighters

Greater than 0,5 membership in term	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	consistency
~well~econ*~noct*~noalter*~access*	0.224540	0.051534	0.994565
~well~edu*~noislam*~noct*~access*	0.292025	0.142331	1.000000
~well~dem*~griev*~noct*~noalter*~access*	0.118405	0.011043	0.960199
~well~edu*~econ*~dem*~noct*~net*~access*	0.154601	0.020859	1.000000
~well~recruit*~edu*~econ*~dem*~noislam* ~noalter*~access*	0.144785	0.059509	0.728395

Solution coverage: 0.481595
Solution consistency: 0.891033

Interpretation: Both, the solution coverage and the solution consistency are lower than for the positive outcome. Still, the values help to identify patterns and combinations of conditions that contribute to "no export of foreign fighters":

- Most strikingly, one can see that the absence of *well-being* and *accessibilty* are present in all combinations that explain the negated outcome. I argue that the combination of low development, high poverty rates and inaccessibility to the conflict zone, decrease the probability that a state exports foreign fighters. Nevertheless, both conditions are not by themselve sufficient, but only in combination with other conditions.

- More different combinations lead to a negated than to a positive outcome. The combination of conditions that explain why states do not export foreign fighters are more diverse than the combinations that lead to the export of foreign fighters.

- A high level of education and a modern market system are necessary conditions for the export of foreign fighters. They are included in every combination that leads to a positive outcome. Otherwise their negation does not always occur in combinations leading to no export. Still, the absence of a high level of education and a modern market economic occurs often in the different combinations.

- The condition counterterrorism appears in four of five combinations leading to a negated outcome. Apparently, consistent policies towards the foreign fighter issue (de-radicalization campaigns, the surveilance of mosques and counterterrorism legislation) contribute to 'no export of foreign fighters'.

- Moreover, the existence of alternatives, an Islamic judicial system and the absence of a democratic system, grievances and a recruitment pool, contribute – as part of a combination of conditions – to no export of foreign fighters.

4.4 Interpretation of the Cases in the Light of the Findings

I shall now discuss the outcome of my analysis for the selected countries. The countries will be divided into three groups: (i) Countries that export a high number of foreign fighters (Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco); Countries that export a medium number of foreign fighters (Qatar and Kuwait); Countries, that export none or only small numbers of foreign fighters (Sudan, Mauretania, Algeria, Djibouti, Comoros, Egypt and Algeria). There are also two cases (Somalia and United Arab Emirates) that are not in line with my main results. In the following, I shall refer to them as 'odd cases'. In order to explain the odd cases, I rely on qualitative research. (Somalia exports more foreign fighters as other more or less structural equal states. The United Arab Emirates export less than one would expect on the basis of my analysis.) I shall rely on qualitative research to account for the odd cases.

Therefore I will give exemplary terms of complex sufficient solutions that explain the outcome for specific cases, given by the QCA-Output.

The Top Exporters: Tunisia, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan

The great flow of foreign fighters from Tunisa, Libya and Saudi Arabia to Syria and Iraq can be explained by the following sufficient combination of conditions:

well+edu+econ+noct+net+access → ff (Export of foreign fighters)

Tunisia, *Libya* and *Saudi Arabia* are comparatively well-off, rate high in terms of education and share a globalized and modern market system. Moreover, their governments did not and/or do not constistenty apply effective policies of de-radicalization and mosque surveillance to stop the flow of foreign fighters. With the events of the Arab Spring, Libya and Tunisia got through a time of political turmoil. In Tunisia, the newly established democratic government found it difficult (and was reportedly unwilling during the *Ennahda* Government) to stop the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq (Wolf 2014). Libya slided into civil war after the fall of Muammar Ghaddafi. The new government was incapable to deal with the issue and several officials supported foreign fighter recruitment and transfer openly (Abouzeid 2013; MAITIC 2014: 32). Libya moreover plays a crucial role for Tunisian foreign fighters. Reportedly, Tunsians were trained in Libya before travelling to Syria and Iraq or departed from Libya to the conflict zone (Ben Said 2015). Moreover Tunisian fighters fills the ranks of radical Islamic Insurgent groups in Libya (Reidy 2015). Saudi Arabia's policy towards the flow of foreign fighters has changed during the Syrian crisis. Saudi Arabia ranks high in terms of counterterrorism policies and takes actively part in the Anti-ISIL coalition, but the country did not take strong actions at the beginning of the conflict and was sympathic to Islamic insurgent groups that welcomed foreign fighters. The conflict zone is easily accessible from Libya and Tunisa via Turkey. Even though Saudi Arabian foreign fighters need a visa for Turkey, their chances to enter the conflict zone via Lebanon or directly (esp. at the beginning of the conflict) make for a rather easy accessibility. Terrorist networks with connections to insurgent groups in the conflict zone, exist in all three countries. Esp. Saudi Arabia, is a traditional exporter of foreign fighters to *jihad* battlefield all over the world (Hegghammer 2011b: 61; Zelin 2014a: 10). It seems that long established ties, transit routes and networks are essential to explain the number of Saudi citizens leaving to, yet another, *jihadi* battlefield. In Tunisa and Libya, radical Islamic groups established themselves increasingly with the fall of the ancient regimes. Their strenght increased with the release of Islamic radicals from prisons, after the fall of the old regimes (Wolf 2014). In Tunisia and Libya, the affiliated groups *Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia* (AST) and *Ansar al-Sharia Libya* (ASL) undertook great efforts to spread their ideology, to contest secular political factions and the

government and to recruit fighters for affiliated insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq (Zelin 2014b). This suggests that the combination of a comparatively high value for well-being, a higher level of education, a modern market system and established networks and comparatively easy accessibility to Syria and Iraq lead to the export of foreign fighters, esp. when the state is either incapable or reluctant to tackle the flow of foreign fighters. Given the high number of Tunisian foreign fighters in Libya and taking into account that Libya is an operational area for Islamic insurgent groups, the potential for foreign fighters in Tunisia and Libya countries is higher, than in other countries. Thereby Jordan, that also shares a modern market economy, relative well-being, education and easy access to the conflict zone via Turkey, did in export less than Tunisia. That may rely on it´s sophisticated security apparatus cracking down on recruitment cells or at the identified lack of networks.

Jordan and *Morocco* show similarities with Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia. The conflict zone is easibly accessible via Turkey. Moreover, they have a modern market economy and a higher level of education. Unlike the previous three cases, however, potential fighters in Jordan and Morocco do not have many alternatives. Both states are politically comparatively stable and their policies towards foreign fighters and Islamic radicalization is reasonably consistent. Morocco is the only high ranking export country with a less than 0,5 membership in terms of well-being, i.e. the country is poorer and less developed than the other top exporters. Still, the country is better off than most of the countries that only export few foreign fighters. From those, Egypt, Algeria and the UAE rank higher in terms of well-being. The UAE are an odd case that will be discussed later. That Morocco does not rank lower or Egypt and Algeria higher can be answered with regard to their economic system.

The Rich in the Middle: Kuwait & Qatar

Qatar and Kuwait rank in the middle regarding the export of foreign fighters. The sufficient combination of conditions explaining the outcome of both countries is the following:

well+edu+econ+noct+noalter+access → ff (Export of foreign fighters)

Both states are Oil rich Gulf States with inconsistent policies towards the flow of foreign fighters and Islamic radicalization. Unlike in the case of the high ranking export countries

(Tunisia, Libya and Saudi Arabia), there are no identified terrorist networks and potential fighters have little alternatives. There are three main reason for these differences. Firstly, the conflict zone is harder to access from Kuwait and Qatar than from the high ranking countries. Once the other necessary conditions are given, accessibility seems to be the decisive factor. The following graph, shows the nuances of accessibility from the different countries and supports this claim.

Fig. 19: Accessibility by country in comparision to exported foreign fighters

.

Secondly, no strong networks between organizations in the two states and insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq could be identified. In both cases, though, recent connections are reported by sources, not taken into account for the operationalization of the condition networks (MAITIC 2014). I assume, that even with recent connections, the lack of established terrorist organizations or historical grown connections through past foreign fighter movements (sinjar-records), explains a lesser export, because fighters can not rely on existing and tested financial and operational support. Thirdly, and more spekulative but still relevant: In both countries a majority of the population are immigrant workers (Malit/Youha 2013; GLMM 2013). In my analysis I used the ratio of foreign fighters to the total population, as the definition of foreign fighters and the data used do not indicate whether a foreign fighter from a particular country is a citizen or only a resident of it. Immigrants that came to work to a country may be expected to be less likely to leave the country as foreign fighters. If one calculates the number of foreign fighters in comparision to the population holding the respective citizenship, both

countries rank higher in the export of foreign fighters (Kuwait would export 7 instead of 2 per 100.000; Qatar would export 6 instead of 1).

The None-Exporters: Sudan, Mauretania, Djibouti, Comoros, Egypt, Algeria

The combinations of conditions that are sufficient to explain "no export of foreign fighters", are more heterogeneous and on average include more conditions than those who explain a positive outcome. The most striking similarity is, that countries that do not export foreign fighters are poorer and less developed. This is in line with Hegghammer's and Heinsohn's claim that the poor do not fight for ideologies but for their daily survival. Another striking similarity is, that these countries lack accessibility to the conflict area: because of poverty, potential fighters may lack the financial means to travel to the conflict stricter and thees countries have stricter visa regulations. While a modern market system and a higher level of education are seen as necessary for the export of foreign fighters, they do are not necessary if negated, i.e. they are not part of all combinations of conditions that lead to the outcome "no export of foreign fighters". Countries that have either a high level of education or a modern market system but do not fulfill the other conditions, export low numbers of foreign fighters or none (e.g. Mauretania was valued as a modern market economy, but rates low in terms of education. Egypt, on the other side, was not identified as a modern market economy but rates high in terms of education. Both countries only export compatively low numbers of foreign fighters.) This shows the relevance of the cumulative effects of these two necessary conditions: The combination of a modern market system and high levels of education make the export of foreign fighters more likely. With regard to the conditions democracy and Islam, the findings suggest, that the existence of an autocratic and Islamic state can reduce the flow of foreign fighters. Note that the democratic countries in the sample, which export many foreign fighters, are mainly new and not well established democracies and, therefore, more vulnerable for extremism. Also, a democracy could be a cause of grievances for radical Muslims as they see it as an apostate system (Gause 2005). My findings show that states with comparatively smaller numbers of foreign fighters (Mauretania, Sudan, Comoros and the UAE) are more often based on Islam. The Comoros are an example of a more or less established democracy based on Islamic law and domestic traditions (Amir 2013) that did not

export a single foreign fighter. Another feature of countries exporting comparatively smaller numbers of fighters (with few exceptions) is that their policies towards the subject are more consistent. There are two explanations that can fit for two different types of cases. The first type of cases are countries where the phenomenon does not exist to an extent that make strong actions necessary. These countries mostly lack one or more of the other necessary conditions (e.g. Comoros, Djibouti, Sudan, Mauretania). The other type of cases are states, where means of de-radicalization, surveilance and consistent counterterrorism and anti-foreign fighter policies may lead to small numbers of foreign fighters. Algeria and the UAE are of this latter Type.

The case of Algeria which is a low export country seems more difficult as it ranks higher than other cases with regard to the conditions *economic system* and *education*.The sufficient combination of conditions leading to a small export of foreign fighters from Algeria is the following.

~well*~dem*~griev*~noct*~noalter*~access → ~ff (no export of foreign fighters)

The combination of counterterrorism and alternatives is seen by researchers as an explanation for comparatively low numbers of Algerian foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq (MAITIC 2014: 53ff.). As stated before, AQIM´s competes openly over fighters with insurgent groups in Syria and Iraq (Watanabe 2015;MAITIC 2014: 43f.). Moreover Algeria is an authoritarian polic state and one of three cases in the sample that tackle terrorism and foreign fighters most consistently. Foreign fighters are criminalized since 1966 and the country screens sermons for Friday prayers and only approves state imams (US State Department 2013).

The "Odd Cases": United Arab Emirates & Somalia

United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates do not fit the condition pattern of low exporting countries. The country is comparatively very well off, rates high in terms of education and has a globalized modern market economy. The identified accessibility of Syria and Iraq is the same as it is for Qatar that exports far more foreign fighters. Still, only two individuals per one million inhabitants became foreign fighters. No sufficient combination of conditions that could

explain the case of the UAE was found. To explain this, one may look to the scores of certain conditions that were identified as relevant in the analysis of other cases: Mainly, the UAE is an authoritarian state with a consistent policy to stop the flow of foreign fighters which is shown by its foreign policy. The country contributed to the ANTI-ISIL coalition with airstrikes and delivers secularist factions in Libya with arms – and whereby entered a proxy war with Qatar, that delivers the opposite side (Wehrey 2014). Moreover, no terrorist networks were identified in the UAE.

Somalia

Somalia is another odd case because in terms of exported fighters it ranges in the middle even though it fulfills a combination of conditions that, in other cases was found to lead to smaller number of foreign fighters.

The sufficient combination of conditions that lead to 'no export of foreign fighters' is the following:

~well*~recruit*~edu*~econ*~dem*~noislam*~noalter*~access → ~ff (no export of foreign fighters)

How, then, can we account for the mysterious case of Somalia, a country that itself attracts foreign fighters (Pantucci 2013). There are no detailed reports on Somali foreign fighters in Syria and one can only try an educated guess. Not all, or even most, of the Somalian fighters in Syria came directly from Somalia to the conflict area but from Western countries. [28] Somali 'foreign fighters' that lived in western countries and than decided to go back to Somalia are not a new phenomenon (Campbell 2015). An example on reports that could let to confusion regarding the origin of Somali foreign fighters is the following article: "Somalia: Three Somali *jihadists* fighting for ISIS killed in Syria" (Horseed Media 2015). The article from a Somali news organization, refers thereby to Somalis holding Swedish citizenships. It is not precisly made clear, in the sources used, how such cases were classified. Also, the same could

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[28] Because of the methodology used by ICSR and the Soufan group empoloyed in this analysis, there is the possibility of Somalis that lived in a third country prior to their departure to Syria and Iraq. The figures are based on official estimates by governments as well as on research of media reports and publications by insurgent groups. Given that there is very little of a functioning state in Somalia, I take it that the numbers of Somali foreign fighters have been produced mostly by independent research.

account for other cases. Nevertheless, it seems like the hint to a possible answer that could explain the unfitting high number of Somalian foreign fighters.

5 *Conclusion*

My findings suggest that countries with the following features export a proportionally higher number of foreign fighters than others with different structural conditions a modern market economy in conflict with values of a clientistic society; a higher level of education leading to expectation that in many cases go unfulfilled; and comparatively easy access to the area of conflict.

Moreover, foreign fighters are predominantly recruited from more developed countries. Though they often suffer internally from terrorism and violent conflict as well. The underdeveloped and poor countries export the smallest ratio of foreign fighters (as measured against their population size). (Somalia is a remarkable exception to this rule of thumb.) Those who do not struggle for their daily survival find themselves with great expectations, often caused by gloablization and better education that are not fullfilled. The export of foreign fighters could, then, be explained by the so called 'Tocqueville-Paradox' (Esser 1999: 385ff.). It is relative frustration, it seems, that drives those to become foreign fighters, who are objectively better off than they were in earlier days, but whose even greater subjective expectations have been frustrated.

To some extend, my findings also show that the coexistence of secular and religious institutions (e.g. secular vs. Sharia law) has an effect on the export of foreign fighters – which is weaker though than the effect of the *conditions* 'education', 'well-being' and 'economic system'. I argue that societies which are thoroughly regulated by Islamic law produce comparatively less individuals confused about their identity and, for this reason, comparativly less foreign fighters. In this regard, Saudi Arabia is an exception.

Also, newly established or shaky democratic institutions may foster the export of foreign fighters, as their institutions are often unable to meet the demands of the population and to tackle effectively radicalization, terrorism and the outflow of individuals to conflict zones.

Moreover, one can argue that they bring about a clash of egalitarian and universalistic democracy values on one hand with values of a clientilistic society on the other.

In a situation in which traditional conceptions of value and meaning – be they of a religious or clientelistic kind - are challenged, Salafism and *jihad* may seem to give attractive answers to the unsettled. Both give a purpose for ones life and a sense of identity and belonging. At the same time and esp. with the proclamation of a Caliphate, they create new opportunities for social success: to raise ones social status, to gain a position of leadership or even to become a hero, or simply to build a new life in the Islamic State.

Another relevant factor are inconsistent and ineffective policies to prevent individuals from becoming foreign fighters. A lack of sound anti-foreign fighter policies and weak means of mosque surveillance and de-radicalization were identified as a condition that increases – in combination with other conditions – the export of foreign fighters. This is true in, particular, for the Arab spring states in the midst of political turmoil. They showed great inconsistency in their efforts and a lack of capability to contain the export of foreign fighters. It is also true for the Gulf States Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait which play a prominent role in Middle Eastern politics. Among the practical conditions, esp. the existence of networks and the accessibility to the conflict zone proofed to relevant. While the existence of networks can increase the export of foreign fighters as part of a (complex) sufficient condition, the accessibility was identified as a strong necessary condition. It is therefore to assume, that, even though, clandestine possibilities to enter Syria and Iraq illegally exist, low opportunity costs of access plays a crucial role for the export of large numbers of foreign fighters.

Practical Conclusions

An obvious but controversial solution to immediately decrease the flow of foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq would be to further restrict visa regulations in numerous countries. However, given the widespread alternatives to engage in *jihad* throughout the middle east, this would probably lead to an increase of foreign fighters in other *jihadi* battlefield – esp. in a situation in which potential fighters are thrilled by the seemingly invincible strength of ISIL and attracted by ISIL's sophisticated recruitment machine.

If one focusses on the underlying causes why youth from more or less better off countries join Islamic extremist groups, the solution seems to be at hand: One has to create economic and

social opportunities (first and foremost jobs) for them and develop their capability to meet reasonable expectations; also alternative narratives about a meaningful life that are consistent and practicable must be promoted. The legitmate expectations of the young have to be met by institutions and social policies that do not only entertain modern ideas of freedom, equality and market capitalism as a matter of high moral ideals, but actually deliver prosperity and opportunities to progress for all members of society and not only for a privileged and prosperous minority.

However, any attempt to do so will be contested by the very problem at hand. Violent extremism. Violent extremism (e.g. terror attacks and assasinations of secular politicians in Tunisia) does not only pose a direct threat to progressives, but also fosters authoritarianism. Benefiting are repressive governments and elites aiming to keep the status quo or to improve their position of power and their benefits by political maneveurs.

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Data – Sources
Socio-economic conditions

Condition	Published by	Available from	Reference year	Last checked
well-being				
HDI	UN-DP	http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi	2013	4 July 2015
Poverty	World Bank	http://wdi.worldbank.org/table	2002-2010	4 July 2015
Exemptions	UN-Report	Algeria (Poverty): http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/rwss/docs/2010/chapter2.pdf	2009	4 July 2015
Recruitment pool				
Age distribution	UN-DESA	http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm	2010	4 July 2015
Youth-unemployment	World Bank	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.1524.MA.ZS/countries	2010	4 July 2015
Exemptions	African Economic Outlook	Djibouti (Youth-Unemployment): http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Djibouti%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf	2012	4 July 2015
Education				
Mean years of schooling	UN-DP	http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi	2013	4 July 2015
Tertiary enrollment	UN-DP	http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi	2013	4 July 2015

Systemic Conditions

Condition	Published by	Available from	Reference year	Last checked
Economic System				
Economic freedom	Heritage Foundation	http://www.heritage.org/index/	2014	4 July 2015
Enforcing contracts	World Bank Group	http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts	2014	4 July 2015
International trade	UN-DP	http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi	2013	4 July 2015
Exemptions	African Economic Outlook	Djibouti (trade): http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Djibouti%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pd	2012	4 July 2015
State System				
Democracy Index	Freedom House	https://freedomhouse.org/	2011-2014	4 July 2015
Islam				
Shariah law as judicial source	Library of US Congress	http://library.law.yale.edu/research/guides/country-guide	Prevailing	4 July 2015

Political Conditions

Condition	Published by	Available from	Reference year	Last checked
Grievances				
Causes	Fragile state Index	http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/	2014	4 July 2015
Counterterrorism				
De-Radicalization	US State Department	http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224820.htm	2013	4 July 2015

Practical Conditions

Condition	Published by	Available from	Reference year	Last checked
Networks				
Sinjar	Fishman/Felter	See. Bib. [Journals&Reports]	2007	17. July 2015
Mapping Mil. Org.	Stanford University	See. Bib. [Institutions&Webpages]	2015	17. July 2015
Alternatives				
Terrorism Index	Institute for Economics & Peace	http://www.visionofhumanity.org/ sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism% 20Index%20Report%202014_0.pdf	2014	17. July 2015
Accessibility				
Border I	Noria Research	http://www.noria-research.com/2014/07/16/ sectarian-strategies-national-settings-and-the-war-economy-in-syria-and-iraq/	2014	17. July 2015
Border II	Buisnessinsider	http://static6.businessinsider.com/image/ 53aae73869bedd 4318c768a3-1200-667/	2014	17. July 2015
Turky Visa	Turk. Gov.	http://www.mfa.gov.tr/visa-information-for-foreigners.en.mfa	2015	17. July 2015
Lebanon Visa	Leb. Gov.	http://www.lebanontourism.com/Traveler Tools/visa.asp	2015	17. July 2015
Jordan Visa	Jord. Gov.	http://international.visitjordan.com/ generalinformation/entryintojordan.aspx#top	2015	17. July 2015
Kuwait Visa	Kuw. Gov.	http://www.kuwaitiah.net/ministry.html	2015	17. July 2015
Saudi Visa	SA Gov.	https://saudiembassy.net/services/visa /default.aspx	2015	17. July 2015

Appendix (I):   Abbrevations

fsQCA-Shortcuts

Well-Being:	*well*
Recruitment Pool:	*recruit*
Education:	*edu*
Economic System:	*econ*
Political System:	*dem*
Islam:	*noislam*
Grievances:	*griev*
Counterterrorism:	*noct*
Networks:	*net*
Alternatives:	*noalter*
Accessibility:	*access*

Other Shortcuts & Names

Al-Qaeda & Affiliates

AQ:	*Al-Qaeda*
AQIM:	*Al-Qaeda in the Magreb*
AQAP:	*Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsular*
AQI:	*Al-Qaeda in Iraq* (Predecessor Organization of ISIL; by than also under the name ISI.)
ANF:	*Al-Nusrah Front*
JAN:	*Jabhat Al-Nusrah*

ISIL & Affiliates

ISIL:	*The Islamic State in the Levant*
ISIS:	*Islamic State in al-Sham* (Arabic acronym: *daesh,* داعش)
IS:	*Islamic State*
ISI:	*Islamic State in Iraq* (Also reffered by AQI)

Further Groups & Organizations

ASL:	*Ansar Al-Shariah Libya* (Connections with AQ & ISIL)
AST:	*Ansar Al-Shariah Tunisia* (Connections to AQ & ISIL)
EJI:	*Egyptian Islamic Jihad* (Connections with AQ)

FJP:	*Freedom and Justice Party* (by Egyptian MBs)
FSA:	*Free Syrian Army*
GIA:	*Armed Islamic Group* (Predecessor of GSPC)
GICM:	*Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group* (Connections with AQ)
GSPC:	*Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat* (Maghreb; Predecessor of AQIM)
IDF:	*Israeli Defense Forces*
IG:	*The Islamic Group* (Connections with AQ)
LIFG:	*Libyan Islamic Fighting Group* (Connections with AQ)
MB:	*Muslim Brotherhood*
MNLA	*National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad* (Azawad=Tuareg; I.e. Tuareg Rebels in Mali)
PFLP:	*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*
PKK:	*Kurdistans Workers Party*
PLO:	*Palestinian Liberation Organization*
UNDOF:	*United Nations Disengagement Observer Force* (Golan Heights)
YPG:	*Peoples Protection Unites* (Marxist, predominantly Kurdish)
Al-Shabab	Somali militia affiliated with AQ (trans. The youth).
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis	Sinai insurgent group affilliated with ISIL (trans. Supporters of the holy house, i.e. Jerusalem).
Ansar Dine	Islamist Tuareg Militia in Mali/Sahel; affiliated with AQ (trans. Supporters of faith).
Baathism	In this research paper, reffering to the Iraqi Baathist Party, I.e. Strongmen from the era of Saddam Hussein.
Boko Haram	Nigerian militia; affiliated with ISIL, previously affiliated to AQ (trans. western education is sinfull).
Ennahda	*Renaissance Party* Tunsian Islamist Party, connected to the international MB, but more secular.
Frente Polisario	Sahawari/socialist rebel movement in Western Sahara.
Hezbullah	Lebanese Shiite militia (trans. Party of God)
Houthis	Shiite sect; also used for *Ansar Allah* a Shiite militia in Yemen (trans. Supporters of god).
Jund Al-Khalifa	Algerian ISIL affiliate (trans. Soldiers of the Caliphate).
The Khorosan Group	Syrian AQ planning wing for international terror attacks, reffering to the Islamic name for Afghanistan.

Appendix (II)

Figures

Appendix (III)

Raw Data

cases	hdi 2013	poverty	bulge	unemploy	recruit. pool	schooling	university	ec. freedom	contracts	int. trade	Democracy	Islam/Sec	grievances	Inconsistency	De-Rad./Surveill.	domestic	sinjar	terror	insurgend	access	foreign fighters
tunisia	0,721	2	18,82	32	6,02	6,5	35,0	57,7	60,96	106,6	3	1	47,4	1	0,5	1	32	3,29	0,6	0,375	28
jordan	0,745	2	19,81	28	5,55	9,9	40,0	69,3	54,04	119,1	5,5	0,66	41,7	0	2	1	11	1,76	0,2	0,375	23
libya	0,784	0	19,29	38,5	7,43	7,5	61,0	35,9	51,42	94,8	5,375	0,33	53,2	1	1,5	1	112	6,25	1	0,375	10
saudi arabia	0,836	0	17,24	21,1	3,64	8,7	51,0	62,1	55,86	86,4	5,375	0	45,0	1	2,5	0	244	2,71	0,4	0,25	9
morocco	0,617	2,6	19,78	19	3,76	4,4	16,0	60,1	60,14	86,6	4,5	0,66	45,7	0	1,5	1	36	2,11	0,2	0,375	5
kuwait	0,814	0	16,16	22,8	3,69	7,2	22,0	62,5	50,59	95,7	5,875	0,66	34,5	1	0	0	0	0,04	0	0,1875	2
qatar	0,851	0	14,39	0,5	0,07	9,1	12,0	70,8	56,73	96,5	5,5	0,33	30,6	1	0	0	0	0,00	0	0,125	1
somalia	0,400	50	18,93	10,2	1,93	1,91	5	27,8	20	48	7	0	64,6	1	0,5	1	0	7,41	1	0	1
algeria	0,717	4,3*	20,76	21	4,36	7,6	31,0	48,9	52,89	52,4	5,5	0,66	47,3	1	2	1	43	5,52	0,8	0,0625	0,5
egypt	0,682	2	19,73	25,8	5,09	6,4	29,0	55,2	44,02	44,8	5,375	0,66	56,8	1	2,5	1	4	6,50	0,8	0,0625	0,40
UAE	0,827	0	22,96	8,1	1,86	9,1	15,0	72,4	52,52	169,6	6	0,33	30,7	0	2	0	0	0,29	0	0,125	0,20
sudan	0,473	19,8	19,61	22,6	4,43	3,1	15,0	50,07	40,43	34,8	7	0	64,1	0	0	0	0	5,77	0,8	0	0,20
mauretania	0,487	23,4	19,62	44,5	8,73	3,7	5,0	53,3	58,47	152,3	5,5	0	51,4	0	1,5	1	0	0,56	0,6	0	0,10
djibouti	0,467	18,8	22,44	60	13,47	3,8	5,0	57,5	37,31	47,9	5,5	0,66	48,8	0	0,5	0	0	0,00	0,4	0	0
comoros	0,488	46,1	18,56	10,3	1,91	2,8	11,0	52,1	33,2	67,1	3,5	0,33	49,2	0	0	0	0	0,00	0	0	0

Calibrated Conditions

cases	well	recruit	edu	econ	dem	islam	griev	noct	net	noalter	access	ff
tunisia	0,54	0,97	0,97	1	0,99	0	0,49	0,96	0,84	0,255	0,98	1
jordan	0,74	0,92	1	1	0,49	0,33	0,01	0,025	0,255	0,755	0,98	1
libya	0,95	1	1	0,84	0,56	0,33	0,97	0,755	0,985	0,02	0,98	0,99
saudi arabia	0,99	0,2	1	0,95	0	1	0,14	0,51	0,51	0,44	0,88	0,98
morocco	0,47	0,24	0,52	1	0,88	0,33	0,22	0,245	0,85	0,695	0,98	0,88
kuwait	0,97	0,22	0,78	0,96	0,07	0,33	0	0,985	0,025	0,97	0,73	0,62
qatar	0,99	0	0,99	1	0,49	0,66	0	0,985	0,025	0,97	0,51	0,49
somalia	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,04	0	1	1	0,96	0,525	0,01	0,05	0,49
algeria	0,49	0,51	0,93	0,57	0,49	0,33	0,48	0,025	0,875	0,05	0,18	0,13
egypt	0,49	0,82	0,91	0,25	0,56	0,33	1	0,49	0,57	0,035	0,18	0,1
UAE	0,98	0,01	0,99	1	0,03	0,66	0	0,025	0,025	0,96	0,51	0,05
sudan	0,04	0,54	0,41	0,03	0	1	1	0,485	0,025	0,045	0,05	0,05
mauretania	0,05	1	0,04	1	0,51	1	0,92	0,245	0,525	0,55	0,05	0,03
djibouti	0,05	1	0,05	0,49	0,49	0,33	0,7	0,46	0,025	0,73	0,05	0,02
comoros	0,05	0,01	0,03	0,17	0,98	0,66	0,75	0,485	0,025	0,97	0,05	0,02

Access possibilities (Figure 9):

Cases	Turky Visa	Lebanon Visa	Jordan Visa	Direct Access	Best Choice
Tunisia	1	0	1	0	0,375
Jordan	1	1	1	0,125	0,375
Libya	1	0	1	0	0,375
Saudi Arabia	0	1	1	0,25	0,25
Morocco	1	0	0	0	0,375
Kuwait	0	1	1	0,125	0,1875
Qatar	0	1	1	0	0,125
Somalia	0	0	0	0	0
Algeria	0	0	1	0	0,0625
Yemen	0	0	1	0	0,0625
Egypt	0	0	1	0	0,0625
UAE	0	1	1	0	0,125
Sudan	0	0	0	0	0
Mauretania	0	0	0	0	0
Djibouti	0	0	0	0	0
Comoros	0	0	0	0	0

If a visa for a country is valued 1 in the table it is multiplied with the estimated access-possibility through that country.

Truth Table (outcome ff)

access	alter	net	ct	griev	islam	dem	econ	edu	recruit	well	number	ff	raw consist.	PRI consist.	SYM consist
1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.993333	0.990291	0.990291
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.967078	0.873016	1.000000
1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.986711	0.956689	0.956689
1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.956689	0.945946	0.945946
1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.962025	0.945946	0.945946
1	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.945946	0.931174	0.931174
1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.632000	0.520833	0.520833
1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0.520833	0.000000	0.000000
1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.944079	0.931174	0.931174
1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.994444	0.992647	0.992647
1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	1	1	1.000000	1.000000	1.000000
0	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0.291971	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.190083	0.000000	0.000000
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.175000	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0.948905	0.000000	0.000000
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.281407	0.013793	0.013793
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	0	0.398437	0.094118	0.094118
0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.259067	0.000000	0.000000

Output: Intermediate Solution (outcome ff)

```
--- INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION ---
frequency cutoff: 1.000000
consistency cutoff: 0.932000
Assumptions:
well (present)
recruit (present)
edu (present)
econ (present)
dem (present)
islam (present)
griev (present)
ct (present)
net (present)
alter (present)
access (present)

                                      raw         unique
                                   coverage     coverage     consistency
                                   ----------   ----------   ----------
well*edu*econ*ct*alter*access      0.345985     0.228467     0.929412
edu*econ*dem*net*alter*access      0.188321     0.040146     0.984733
well*recruit*edu*econ*dem*alter*access   0.183942  0.037226  0.969231
well*recruit*edu*econ*dem*ct*net*access  0.231387  0.128467  0.943452
solution coverage: 0.589051
solution consistency: 0.939464


Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term well*edu*econ*ct*alter*access: kuwait (0.73,0.62),
   saudi arabia (0.51,0.98), qatar (0.51,0.49)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term edu*econ*dem*net*alter*access: morocco (0.52,0.88)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term well*recruit*edu*econ*dem*alter*access: jordan (0.51,1)
Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term well*recruit*edu*econ*dem*ct*net*access: libya (0.56,0.99),
   tunisia (0.54,1)
```