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leadership of political outsiders
in Ecuador**

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1. Introduction

The emergence of political outsiders is a phenomenon that has occurred in numerous representative democracies. The term outsider has been discussed in academic work by multiple scholars who have observed the position of outsider candidates towards the party system, the characteristics of their political strategies and their rhetorical practices. Although definitions vary and not all researchers agree on the same characteristics of this type of politicians, in broader terms, a political outsider is understood as a person who does not belong to the party system, has no political record or administration experience, does not identify himself with a specific ideology or program, and appears as an independent candidate or with a new political party shortly before elections. Although analysis on political outsiders has increased in the past years, their rise to power is not a new phenomenon. Latin America is a region that has various examples of outsider presidents especially after the third wave of democratization. Since the 1990s we have found outsiders like Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua, Alberto Fujimori and Alejandro Toledo in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.

The rise of outsiders has taken place mainly in presidential systems. Political outsiders who arise outside the party system (Carreras 2012, 2014a, 2014b; Corrales 2008; Linz, Valenzuela 1994) are characterized by populist practices, personalistic campaigns, plebiscitarian linkages (Cammack 2000; Doyle 2011; Knight 1998; La Torre 2010b; Madrid 2008) and anti-establishment discourses (Barr 2009; Kenney 1998). Their mandates tend to be accompanied by several difficulties for the democratic institutions. Outsiders' parties are usually low represented in the legislative and the lack of skills and connections of the president hinder cooperation with opposition groups, which raises the risk of deadlock amongst governmental branches leading to democratic instability (Carreras 2014b). Lack of experience could carry hazards for the institutional performance and the quality of democracy. Although a long political career together with good reputation could be seen as valued characteristics for candidates who attempt to reach high political positions, the examples of leaders mentioned above suggest that being an outsider is seen as a positive feature rather than a threat for voters.

From the list of Latin-American outsiders, not all of them managed to finish their office time as expected according to constitutional rules. While presidents like Fujimori, Chamorro, Chávez and Correa finished their mandates and even achieved reelection, Lugo faced an impeachment process and Gutiérrez was overthrown. Since outsiders are characterized by nontraditional presidencies and the outcomes of these presidents have been radically different, it is evident that some of them made strategic choices that allowed them to conclude their terms. Therefore, the research question to be answered in this paper is: *what factors are necessary for the survival in presidential office of political outsiders?*

In order to answer this question, theoretical and empirical material will be employed. In the first place, an overview on the theory of presidentialism will be given to facilitate a better understanding of the characteristics of the system where outsiders develop. Based on academic contributions in the book of Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (1994), the first section of chapter two will observe the features of presidentialism: the electoral process in presidentialism, the competences of the head of the executive, the issue of accountability of the president and the motions that correspond to the system. A literature review on the concept of political outsider will be presented later in this work. Due to the fact that the term outsider hoards several features, the section starts with a discussion of several definitions presented by different scholars (Barr 2009; Carreras 2012; Corrales 2008; Kenney 1998; Samuels, Shugart 2010). Then, the different factors that influence the emergence of the outsider candidates such as crisis of the party system or crisis of ungovernability (Benton 2005; Carreras 2012; Madrid 2005; Mayorga 2006), and characteristics of outsider candidates, like populism/neopopulism and their use of anti-establishment discourses (Barr 2003; Cammack 2000; Doyle 2011; Madrid 2008; Panizza 2000; Weyland 1999) will be observed. Subsequently, the next section will take a look at the possible perils of the election of a outsiders, for example, the conflict between the executive and legislative branch and the risk of personalization of power (Carreras 2014b; Suarez 1982). The last part of chapter two will be a critical evaluation on the exposed literature and will provide a brief discussion on the research gap, namely, the performance after the victory of outsider presidents.

The third chapter presents the methodological approach and research design which will be employed in this dissertation. This thesis will proceed according to the qualitative method of

process tracing analysis. This model is useful to recognize the causal mechanisms of how the independent variable leads to the dependent variable, or how *X* is connected to *Y*. The intention is to retrace the career and actions taken by presidents that facilitated the ending of their mandates. To analyze the dependent variable of the study, that is, the survival in office of an outsider president, I propose *institutional predominance* as independent variable. This independent variable arises from the idea that when an outsider becomes president, an institutional “battle” between the state branches will take place in order to increase the ruling capacity and reduce the influence from the other branches. Therefore, I consider that *if the executive (led by an outsider) “wins” the institutional “battle” against the judicial and legislative, the outsider will be able to survive and finish his mandate.*

Process tracing will be carried out through “most likely” and “least likely” cases. Strategies that might facilitate the predominance of the executive and therefore the culmination of a presidential mandate of an outsider will be analyzed. Among several resources that the outsider can use to reach a predominant position, three possible strategies that I considered the most appropriate for inquiring into the research topic were selected.

An outsider could achieve predominance of the executive through:

- 1) Avoidance of legislative and judicial consultation. For example, by governing through executive decrees or carrying out referenda.
- 2) Reinforcement of the constitutional competences of the executive. For example, giving the executive the ability to dissolve the legislative or the possibility of presidential reelection.
- 3) The creation of independent agencies that enable appointments that are favorable for the executive.

The aim of this thesis is to compare how the three selected strategies were applied (or not) by political outsiders and their results. As for the case selection, the presidency of two Ecuadorian outsiders will be examined in the empirical section. There are multiple reasons why Ecuador is a good case to be studied. Since 1996 the Republic of Ecuador has been governed by eight presidents of whom only the last one could transfer his mandate. For over a decade Ecuador suffered from extreme political fragmentation and practically uncontrollable political instability. This country was governed by two outsider presidents

directly elected one after the other, however the outcomes of each were radically different. While Lucio Gutiérrez was removed from office, the consecutive President Rafael Correa achieved two reelections. Through the comparison of their use of the strategies, it is expected to find if these strategic choices increased the likelihood of winning the institutional “battle” and therefore, the achievement of survival in office.

The fourth chapter corresponds to the empirical examination and comparison of both former presidents. Each outsider will be analyzed in five sections. First, through a brief biography the background of each political leader will be given. Secondly, the political placement and the beginnings in the political arena will be contemplated, followed by the observation of the rise to power and the political alliances that accompanied each of them. Furthermore, by taking a look into some examples of the institutional “battle” that each of them faced, the strategies will be compared and the corresponding institutional debacle or victory will be observed. In the case of Gutiérrez, the last section will focus on his decline and removal from office, whereas for Correa the process of stabilization will be identified.

Finally, the conclusion will contain the results of the analysis and an evaluation of the theory, method and empirical cases used in this dissertation. The main findings are that the achievement of executive’s predominance does indeed facilitate the culmination of the presidential mandate of political outsiders. Nonetheless, for the successful implementation of the strategies that lead to this outcome, two important factors were found. First, the legislative constellation plays a relevant role for the strengthening of the executive office. The outsider needs either a majority of his party in the legislative, or stable allies and coalitions that support his initiatives. Secondly, the empirical analysis indicates that the institutional “battle” for the achievement of executive’s predominance should better take place at the beginning of the presidential mandate when the outsider leader enjoys high popular support. This is useful for the outsider to put pressure on the other branches to approve his reform proposals.

2. Theoretical section

2.1 Presidential system

Presidential democracy is one of the different systems of government that countries can adopt. The U.S. model of presidentialism served as inspiration for most presidential democracies that exist nowadays. Among different studies on this type of system, Linz and Valenzuela's edited book "The failure of presidential democracy" presents the most relevant features of presidentialism (Linz, Valenzuela 1994). The essential elements of this system are described in the contribution of Arendt Lijphart and Juan J. Linz. In the first place, in contrast with parliamentary systems, the head of the executive is directly elected by the people or by an electoral college (elected for that specific purpose); the president cannot be simultaneously a member of the parliament. Secondly, the head of the executive is elected for a fixed term and, in principle, the president cannot be dismissed. The no-confidence motion, which is a feature of parliamentary systems, is inexistent in presidentialism but in exceptional cases an impeachment process can be brought against the head of state. Third, the president, who represents a "one-person executive", counts with constitutional powers that give him full control for the appointments of his cabinet. In presidentialism, the members of cabinet have a rather subordinate and advisory role. In addition, regarding the relation to the military, the president occupies the position of the supreme commander.

According to Juan J. Linz (1994), presidential systems count on two prominent features. First, it is a system of "*dual democratic legitimacy*" because both, the president and the legislative, are directly and separately elected by the people. Because of this, it might occur that the majority in parliament differs from the political choice from the electors of the executive. This scenario could lead to a conflictive interaction among the two branches; however, since there is a dual democratic legitimacy, there is no democratic principle to resolve or decide which branch has "greater representation" of people's will. Linz observed that the likelihood that the composition of the parliament differs from that of the electors of the executive, tends to be higher in developing countries with great regional inequalities (Linz 1994, pp. 6–7).

The second feature is the "rigidity" of presidential systems. This means that both branches are elected for fixed terms and the permanence in office of each branch is independent from the other. The tenure in office is unchangeable, it cannot be prolonged or shortened and in some

cases, there is no option for reelection. Unlike parliamentary systems, the absence of a vote of no-confidence implies that the executive cannot be substituted or replaced. Even if the president faces loss of confidence from his own party, dismissal is not foreseen (Linz 1994, p. 10). The measure of impeachment, where charges are leveled against the president, can hardly be compared with the motion of no-confidence because it does not indicate a direct removal from office.

As stated by Linz: *“But there are no mechanisms to remove him without violating the constitution, unless he is willing to resign.”* (ibid.). The process of impeachment implies an overturn of the procedures by which the incumbent achieved his mandate, it is an extreme measure and it is mostly used in extraordinary cases of serious abuses. If due to parliamentary pressure the president decides to present a “voluntary resignation”, a political crisis might be generated through protests from the voters who supported him. In case of death or inability of the president, the vice president is expected to succeed him.

Regarding the identification of the presidential candidate, the voter chooses directly a candidate and he may well know immediately who is the person that will govern if his candidate wins. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the voter can truly know much about the background of that politician. In contrast to parliamentary systems, where people vote for a party which usually has a specific program and ideology, the head of the executive in presidential systems does not need to have a prior political record or identify himself with a party.

Contrasting the presidential system, if one takes a look into parliamentarism, it is possible to recognize that voters tend to be familiarized with well-known party leaders that have gathered political experience. Voters leave the decision for the election of the prime minister to politicians, but still can have a closer idea of party members that could be supported for that position and about the possible cabinet composition. The formation of the government will depend on the level of representation of the party, and in multiparty systems on the coalition agreements. In case of building alliances, these will have an impact on the cabinet selection of the prime minister and he will be obliged to appoint representatives of the formed coalition (Linz 1994, p. 12).

In presidentialism, the election of the head of the executive is often based on the image of an individual (identifiability of one person) and it is less likely for the voter to have information on the people who will be part of the cabinet. The elected president controls the whole executive branch and has complete freedom to name his cabinet and form his government without approval of the legislative branch and without including or sharing power with opponents. Nonetheless, multiparty coalition governments have also existed in presidentialism, however, the president has the power to dismiss his ministers at any time without need of formal justification for the action taken.

As for accountability, since the figure of the president is individually elected and there are not *"confused or shared responsibilities"*, he is commonly conceived as the one directly responsible for the policies and governing during his office time (Linz 1994, pp. 11–12).

Although limiting terms in office is a relevant regulation to limit power of the executive, Linz remarks that presidents who cannot be reelected should be considered as *"unaccountable"* because there are no mechanisms for the voters to punish or reward them.

The president's party cannot be held as accountable if one takes into account that after the election a president is able to govern independently of its confidence. Besides this, in case of no reelection, one could consider the party's new presidential candidate as the accountable person, who according to the outcomes of his predecessor, can get support (or not) from the voters. Nonetheless, according to Linz (1994), in order to decide if he wants to identify or deidentify himself from the previous leader, this new candidate will consider the success or failure of the former president.

"Term limits and the principle of no reelection, whose value cannot be questioned, mean that the political system has to produce a capable and popular leader periodically and that the political capital accumulated by a successful leader cannot be used beyond the leader's term office." (Linz 1994, p. 17).

In case of reelection, which can be immediate or after an interim period, the separation of powers can serve as an excuse for the president to blame the parliament, or for the president's party in the parliament to blame the president for failure. Shifting the guilt to the legislative,

even if this was dominated by his own party (but especially if it was ruled by the opposition), could serve as an escape strategy to improve the own image for the electors (ibid.).

Whether reelection is possible or not, to demand accountability electors are practically forced to wait until the end of the presidential mandate. This is another great contrast to the no-confidence motion, which can take place at any time in parliamentary systems. According to Linz, the political game in presidentialism has a zero-sum character. The number of years of the mandate period define the winners and losers. Tension and polarization are more likely because during the office time “losers” cannot have access to the executive power and there is no hope for any shifts in alliances. This represents a distinction to parliamentarism, where even when a party has absolute majority, negotiations, power sharing and awareness of others demands are relevant for the prime minister (Linz 1994, pp. 14–16).

The president is not only the head of government but also the head of state. These two dimensions are seen as ambiguous by Linz. By principle, the president represents a clear partisan option but, at the same time, he is placed as the representative of the whole people. Having independent power and direct mandate from the people could give the president an unrealistic feeling or a sense out of proportion of his power and mission. The president could identify all the people with his electorate, something that would be inaccurate considering the limited plurality behind his election and/or the presence of those who voted for his opponent (Linz 1994, p. 24).

As mentioned above, the independence of the president gives him freedom to choose with whom he wants to interact, and to decide if he wants to receive his opponents.

“This sense of identity between leader and the people that encourages or reinforces a certain populism can be a source of strength and power, but it also can lead to ignoring the limited mandate that even a majority, not to say a plurality, can give to implementation of any program. It encourages certain neglect of, sometimes disrespect toward, and even hostile relations with the opposition.” (Linz 1994, p. 25).

A particularity of presidentialism is its “*dysfunctional method of election*”. Instead of stimulating parties to cooperate and unite to back a candidate, the system rather strengthens

fragmentation. The expectancy of a runoff gives candidates incentives to participate in elections. Candidates can aspire to end up among the two most voted or at least they can gain more bargaining power which can be used to gain certain power positions in exchange for support to one of the two leading candidates in the second round (Linz 1994, p. 20).

As for the party system, Juan J. Linz notes that in the case of Latin America, most presidential regimes are multiparty systems. These democracies have been criticized for having *“weak parties that lack discipline”* and *“representatives that behave in self-interested ways”*. Notwithstanding, the author considers that this paradox results useful for the work of the president and his clientelistic alliances. By convincing individual legislators, he is able to create divisions and rupture among parties, facilitating his rule capacity despite not having a legislative majority.

Among the frequent attributes that can be found in presidentialism, some of them serve to reduce the power of the executive, while others rather strengthen its position. Lijphart (1994) mentions that presidents do not have authority to dissolve the parliament. Nonetheless, a president owes veto power over legislation, which can hardly be overridden except for unusual legislative majorities.

Though the presidential office concedes considerable powers, one should not overestimate the role of the other branches. Congress impediments can severely undermine president's leadership (Linz 1994). In case of counting with the capability of governing through emergency powers, a president could try to counteract congress obstacles by making use of that competence and leaving aside the other branches (Lijphart 1994, p. 96).

The recognition of the characteristics of the presidential system confers us a useful framework to enter the following section, namely, the concept of political outsider.

2.2 The concept of “outsider”

2.2.1 Definition(s)

In academic literature on outsider politicians it is not possible to find a single definition for the term. To define “outsidership” scholars differ on their selection of the principal features.

Nevertheless, Linz's definition from 1994 has served as a relevant reference for the descriptions articulated later by multiple researchers.

According to Juan J. Linz, outsiders are *"candidates not identified with or supported by any political party, sometimes without any governmental or even political experience, on the basis of a populist appeal often based on hostility to parties and "politicians".*" (Linz 1994, p. 26).

The relationship of presidential candidates towards the party system is also the main focus of Charles Kenney in his classification of insiders and outsiders. According to his definition, outsiders are *"politicians who have become politically prominent from outside of the national party system"* (Kenney 1998, p. 59). On the contrary, if a politician rises to political prominence from within the party system he will be considered an insider. Kenney argues that candidates who split from old established parties and create a new one later, should be also included in the group of insiders (ibid.).

Robert R. Barr's conceptualization of insiders and outsiders consists on the location of a candidate *"vis-à-vis the party system"*. According to Barr, *"an outsider is someone who gains political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties."* (Barr 2009, p. 33). Insiders are, on the contrary, politicians who belong to established and competitive parties. Taking marginal parties as example, the outsider status is not based on the newness of the party but rather on their distance from the effective parties. Barr proposes the category *maverick* for politicians who emerge within a competitive party but later break the status quo either by reshaping drastically that party; becoming independent candidates, or in association with an outsider party. Barr remarks that it is location and not rhetoric or strategies, the factor that determines the outsider status. Although the location or distance of outsiders to the traditional political system could lead to the use of anti-establishment discourses, this technique can also be used by other politicians (like mavericks) to gain support. The same applies for populism that, consistent with Barr, does not necessarily need to be associated with the notion of outsider (Barr 2009, p. 35).

Besides the location towards party system, there are other academic references for outsiders. Mayorga defines outsiders as *“neopopulist and anti-political actors”* (Mayorga 2006, p. 133). Some scholars use in their academic research expressions like *“populist outsiders”* (Doyle 2011, p. 1451), *“neopopulist outsiders”* (Weyland 2003, p. 1107) and *“antipolitical establishment outsiders”* (Levitsky, Cameron 2003, p. 2).

Similar to the differentiation presented by Barr and Kenney; Carreras does not base his analysis according to politicians' appeals but rather separates the concepts of populism, anti-politics and outsiders. He argues that even if all outsiders were populist, this “attribute” could also correspond to insiders.

In his academic work, Carreras developed an own definition of outsider: *“An outsider is a newcomer politician who rises to power with no (or very limited) experience in politics and public administration and with a new party or electoral movement.”* (Carreras 2014a, p. 16). In principle, his conceptualization for insiders and outsiders is constituted by two dimensions: political experience or previous career, and party ties or characteristics of the politician's party.

Regarding the second dimension, Carreras coincides with Linz, Kenney and Barr in sense that an outsider does not belong to their nation's traditional parties and rises to prominence mostly throughout a new party.

As for the first dimension on political (in)experience, Carreras considers a candidate's previous involvement in public administration or politics. This dimension has been discussed by Javier Corrales (2008) as well, on his study of Latin American outsiders and the causes of their emergence. Corrales, who follows Linz' definition, describes as outsiders *“those who run for president with no prior electoral experience (running for political office) and no major public administration experience.”* (Corrales 2008, p. 5). Javier Corrales explains that to meet this definition, a candidate does not need to be a *“total stranger”* and he could have taken part in politics through party or military activity. However, an outsider must be an electoral and administrative “neophyte”. Hence, outsiders will qualify as such only once, this is, for the first

time they run. A similar approach is given by Samuels, Shugart 2010 who define outsider candidates as politicians with scarce prior political experience.

The two constitutive dimensions given by Carreras lead to four possible combinations. First, experienced career politicians who run with an established party belong to the type *insider*. Later we can find three types of outsiders. *Full outsiders* are candidates who are politically inexperienced and compete in elections as independents or with a new party. Candidates who are new to politics but compete in an already established party are defined as *amateurs* and politicians that have had a previous political career but compete with a newly created party belong to the category of *maverick* (Carreras 2014a, p. 28).

Regarding the first dimension (political experience), it can be gained through different political roles such as getting elected for a legislative position or occupying an executive charge at the national or regional level, for example, as mayor of cities or governors. Also in positions of public administration or performing as party leaders, candidates can accumulate political experience through political deals and negotiations with other parties (Carreras 2014a, p. 30). A candidate who has not occupied the mentioned charges, fulfills the first dimension of outsidership, i.e. political inexperience. Miguel Carreras emphasizes that a political actor will be considered as outsider even if he had a brief political involvement, that is, less than two years of political experience before campaigning.

As for the second dimension (party ties), in the case of outsidership, there are three possibilities for rising to political prominence: running as independent, with a new party or with an ad hoc electoral movement¹ (Carreras 2014a, p. 32).

2.2.2 Emergence

The emergence of political outsiders in democratic systems is associated with scenarios of political decay and instability. This section will give an overlook of several factors such as the features of presidential elections, crisis of a nation's party system, economic instability and

¹ Defined as "personal vehicles for promoting or maintaining an individual candidate or leader" (Levitt 2012:93)

circumstances of ungovernability, that serve as explanation for the appearance of these actors in the political arena

In presidentialism the executive office is directly elected by the people and is independent from other branches. The president does not require continual party support; therefore, candidates can maintain distance from other parties without fearing to endanger their continuation in power after victory. Elections are characterized by a high degree of personalization since campaigns center all the attention on an individual leader, which serves outsiders to become more popular and influent (Weyland 1999, p. 389). In addition to the party that a candidate represents, voters orient themselves on the image and personal features of the contender. Presidential elections are an opportunity to compete against the political elite and the personalist character of the presidential campaign permits a direct appeal to the people. Direct contact facilitates the identification of electors with the candidate (Panizza 2000, p. 181). If a party system is weak and traditional politicians are discredited, the entrance of outsiders is more likely (Linz 1994, p. 26). Presidential elections held under majority-runoff systems are more attractive for outsiders because even if they are aware that there is no opportunity to attain victory in the first round, entering the runoff increases the chances to win the presidency (Carreras 2012, p. 1458).

According to Carreras (2012), in strong institutionalized party systems, there is a significant level of stability in party competition and quite low electoral volatility. Existing political parties are considered legitimate since strong ties with the society have been developed. Party fragmentation resulting from a crisis within the party system lowers the barriers for the entrance of newcomers in the political arena (Corrales 2008, p. 2). Weakness of party system is one explanation for the emergence of political outsiders because there is a growing gap between society and existing parties and voters lose their feeling of representation and attachment to them.

A study from Mitchell A. Seligson shows that minor parties and outsiders get more electoral support and are more successful when the political system suffers legitimacy decline (Seligson 2002). The rise to power of political outsiders is facilitated by drastic reduction or loss of confidence in democratic institutions. This might occur when traditional parties are blamed

for ineffective decision-making to tackle social problems. Additionally, economic hardship aggravates the legitimacy decline. Therefore, voters decide to punish established politicians by giving their vote to new candidates (Benton 2005). This argument is supported by other scholars who also consider economic crises, context of economic volatility, and socioeconomic decline as factors that influence voters for the election of outsiders (Carreras 2014a; Corrales 2008; Lagos Cruz-Coke 2008; Mayorga 2006).

Ethnic heterogeneity can also play a significant role in the electoral success of outsiders. In heterogenic societies that are split in different ethnic groups, indigenous groups tend to show less favorable socioeconomic conditions in contrast to the rest of the population (Madrid 2005, p. 1). Since major parties do not satisfy minority groups' needs, electoral volatility is more likely to occur because indigenous electors might shift their preference from traditional parties to new options. Hence, an outsider leader could emerge and claim that he will represent a minority group (Carreras 2012; Madrid 2005).

For René Mayorga the decomposition of party systems and crisis of governability are the main explanations for the rise of outsiders. Problems of governability are given by the inability of political agents to tackle citizens' problems and to articulate their preferences, losing in this way their capacity for political representation (Mayorga 2006, p. 141). Traditional parties detach from the society due to their lack of adaptation to changing circumstances (Levitsky, Cameron 2003, p. 4).

For David Doyle, the emergence of outsider populist candidates in Latin America is caused by additional reasons to loss of institutional legitimacy and failure of representation. Permanent violence, crime, increment of drug traffic, endemic corruption, poverty and socioeconomic inequality are critical factors that undermine the consolidation of democracy and engender attraction to outsider figures (Doyle 2011, p. 1452).

2.2.3 Characteristics

The characteristics of political outsiders are closely related to the scenarios where they emerge. Political conditions and the context at the moment of their candidacy serve outsiders for the construction of their discourses and strategies. Features of outsider actors have been

broadly discussed in academic work. Amid the principal ones it is possible to find populism, neopopulism and anti-establishment discourses. Outsiders arise during critical circumstances and respond to them by presenting themselves as the “saviors” who will “truly” represent the people and solve their problems by challenging the political establishment and reshaping national politics, among others. Although the characteristics of outsiders are strongly interrelated, this section will elaborate on the most representative ones.

Populism

One of the most common attributes conferred to outsiders is populism. Foremost, to understand the concept of populism it is important to recognize why it originates and how it is characterized. The factors that are influential in the emergence of outsiders are at the same time associated with populism. Nonetheless, as mentioned by Carreras (2014), although all outsiders are populists, populism is a broader concept that can also be attributed to politicians from traditional parties.

Populism is seen by Panizza 2000 as one of the results of a crisis of political representation. The author argues that institutional crisis serves as catalyst for the success of populist appeals. Similarly, Doyle 2011 understands populism as an effect of the “*erosion of trust in the institutions of liberal democracy*” (Doyle 2011, p. 1451). According to him, faith of the electorate is undermined by social exclusion and the inability of political institutions to respond to demands for public goods.

Alternatively, Robert Barr defines populism as “*(...)a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages.*” (Barr 2009, p. 38). According to Barr, insiders do not fit in his definition because they are not able to offer credible anti-establishment appeals.

While some scholars consider populism as a feature of political outsiders, others use exclusively the terms *populist* or *neopopulist* to refer to a type of politician that according to the definitions given in this dissertation correspond to what has been defined as outsider.

Despite the existence of multiple definitions of populism there is academic consensus on its principal characteristics. Populist leaders are charismatic figures who handle an antagonistic political discourse of “them versus us”. Political elites and traditional parties are negatively perceived as “the others”, whereas “the people” is represented by a heterogenous societal group. As it is discussed in the work of Carlos de la Torre, in Latin America this division is presented as “the people against the oligarchy” (La Torre 2010b, p. 10).

Most scholars coincide that populism contains a high personalistic character. Populist actors claim to be the people’s representative because he identifies with them and their needs. Taking advantage of crises of democratic representation and political marginalization, populists construct ideological discourses of defense of the poor and excluded (Mayorga 2006; Knight 1998). In these discourses, leaders use derogative expressions against national elites and seek for support mainly from followers coming from the urban working classes and marginalized groups. During crisis of the party system, when parties are blamed for incapacity to channel social interests, outsiders present themselves as alternatives to the traditional system and elites. Outsiders pledge to overcome social inequalities, poverty and corruption (Mayorga 2006, p. 136).

A common political strategy used by populist leaders is mass mobilization (Cammack 2000, p. 151) and transformation of liberal representative democracy to plebiscitary democracy (Mayorga 2006, p. 138). Mass support has a critical meaning for outsiders since their power will entirely depend on it. Due to their anti-establishment discourse and personalistic features, it becomes essential for the executive officer that “the people” strengthen his legitimacy and give him support (Barr 2003). Populist candidates frequently bypass institutional instances and use personalistic ties and direct, unmediated means to reach their supporters. Consistent with Weyland, personalistic leaders will look for heterogenous groups of supporters who are available for mobilization and will attempt to reach them in a quasi-personal manner, sidestepping established intermediary institutions, principally political parties (Weyland 1999, p. 381). Weyland indicates that in case that the contender candidates with a new party, it will maintain low levels of institutionalization and rather function as a vehicle of the populist candidate.

Barr argues that populism is constituted by a combination of location, appeals and linkages. Location is associated to the position of the candidate towards the party system. Appeals correspond to anti-establishment discourses and linkages refer to the means used for the exchange of support and influence between a political actor and constituents (Barr 2009, p. 40). This is to say, that linkages are means by which citizens connect and interact with politicians. Among the types of linkages identified in Barr's work (clientelistic, directive, electoral, participatory and plebiscitarian) participatory and plebiscitarian are especially relevant when observing outsiders.

Participatory linkages are mechanisms that include citizens in political processes by granting them influential role in the government. Citizens' initiatives are instruments by which citizens can participate and play a role in policy making by initiating proposals. Plebiscitarianism, an extreme form of electoral linkage, is a choice that policy-makers offer to electors, who can decide to accept or discard it (Barr 2009, p. 36). Plebiscites are a useful mechanism to *"provide passive political support for a leader to confirm the popular legitimacy of his authority"* (Hayward 1996). This form of linkage is a type of accountability mechanism for the leader because, even if there is no offer to the citizens to work on their own initiatives, citizens have the chance to judge directly if the ruler is representing them and doing a proper job. It is important to remark the personalistic character and the individual ambition of the leader, especially if the outsider is not accompanied by a new party. Through a plebiscite he is bypassing the role of political parties. Without organizational intermediation the outsider is taking the task of representing the people as single representative (Barr 2009).

The phenomenon of populism reveals an unstable condition. Appeals to "undifferentiated people" are especially difficult in high heterogenic societies with ethnic divisions which is the case of, among others, Latin American nations (Weyland 1999, pp. 382–383). As Barr (2009) claims, plebiscitarian linkages signify that a populist leader is responsible for representing "the people". Nonetheless, it is hard to accomplish that a single individual represents the general will.

Neopopulism

In academic literature, scholars differentiate between the classical concept of populism and “contemporary” populism, which in the case of Latin America is considered to be in scene since the 1980s. Many Latin American leaders from that period were categorized as *neopopulist* for the particularities of their political and economic practices. This was the case of the Presidents Alberto Fujimori in Perú and Carlos Menem in Argentina.

Literature on neopopulism shows that the main difference between the classical and the new concept of populism relies in the types of economic models. The classical concept is characterized by a statist model, the pursue of expansive social policies and nationalistic measures *“to disrupt the institutional nexus constituted by economic liberalism and oligarchy”* (Laclau 1977). Whereas contemporary (neo)populism is rather a reaction to *“state-led developmentarism and classical populism”* (Cammack 2000, p. 155). Neopopulism operates through a neoliberal economic model, macroeconomic austerity and deregulation of markets. Spending is directed to specific targets like impoverished and dispossessed groups (Barr 2003). Robert Barr understands neopopulism as a political phenomenon *“in which a leader attempts to build personalistic ties to the impoverished masses while pursuing neoliberal economic policies”* (Barr 2003, p. 1161).

Even though neoliberal policies appear to be unsuitable with the concept of populism, Kurt Weyland encounters compatibility between populism and neoliberalism:

“However, since in practice interest groups have considerable political influence, both populism and neoliberalism have an anti-status-quo orientation. They share an adversarial relationship to organized civil society, condemn established politicians and government bureaucrats as serving “special interests”, and accuse these “rent seekers” of undermining the collective good for the sake of particularistic benefits. Neoliberal experts use populist attacks on “special interests” to combat state interventionism, while populist leaders employ the modern, rational recipes of economic liberalism to undermine intermediary associations, entrenched bureaucrats, and rival politicians who seek to restrict their personal latitude.” (Weyland 1999, p. 382).

A distinction that causes discrepancies among scholars is that some argue that the concept of populism is not anti-system by principle. Populism rejects the political representatives in charge but does not challenge the ideals of representative democracy and institutionalization. While neopopulist leaders instead of trying to establish solid parties, count on political movements with low levels of institutionalization and show attempts to de-institutionalize the system by sidestepping other political institutions.

Nonetheless, other scholars see the anti-system discourse rather as a similarity between neopopulism and populism. As Weyland (1999) observes, in order to enforce structural adjustment, it is important for both types of leaders to weaken rival institutions and to fortify the executive branch, mainly by concentrating power in the presidency. Yet, there is consensus that both concepts are represented by a single individual who confronts the political establishment, transform the status quo and search for support from popular masses (Barr 2003).

Alternatively, Francisco Panizza thinks that there are no conceptual differences amid both terms. The term neopopulism serves rather to distinguish between Latin America's post war populism and the contemporary manifestations and their relationship with neoliberalism (Panizza 2000, p. 178). The classical view contemplates the anti-status quo and the construction of the popular identities from "the people" and "the others" (i.e. the oligarchy, dominant ethnic groups, etc.) as essential features of populism. Panizza considers that after the long period of military regimes in Latin America and the emergence of liberal democracy in the 1980s, the political dichotomy of classical populism could not characterize the new complex and pluralistic order based on a proliferation of political differences (Panizza 2000, p. 180).

Similarly, René Mayorga describes outsiders as neopopulist and anti-political actors indistinctively from the tendencies or economic models (Mayorga 2006, p. 135). For Mayorga, neopopulism is an ambiguous phenomenon, can be left- or right-wing, and involves a caesaristic conception of politics where the candidate emerges from outside the party system, there is a lack of an institutionalized party, and the leader occupies a central role concentrating the power in his hands once in office. The author remarks that neopopulism describes the

pattern of ideological legitimation that outsiders want to achieve, namely, to become the embodiment of the people and nation.

For Mayorga, neopopulism is an anti-institutional and anti-politics practice where neopopulist leaders carry out politics against political and economic elites and undermine democratic institutions such as other political parties. Through anti-political discourses, neopopulists blame economic elites, political class and traditional parties for corruption and the problems of the country (Mayorga 2006, p. 136). There is a radical rejection of the party system and a conviction that parties are *“useless and pernicious organization”* (ibid.).

Anti-establishment

The use of anti-establishment appeals is a typical but not exclusive characteristic of outsider candidates since this rhetorical mechanism is used by diverse political actors. As stated by Carreras, mavericks and amateurs often run anti-establishment campaigns and claim to be true outsiders, nonetheless once in power they have benefits from their partisan resources and political experience. Therefore these would resemble more insiders than outsiders (Carreras 2014a, p. 29).

Factors that play a role in the emergence of outsiders like crisis of democratic representation and legitimacy decline of political institutions due to their incapability to represent and to address citizens' needs, are taken by outsider candidates to construct the discourse of “us, the people” versus “them, the class wielding power”. The message behind this discourse is that citizens have been excluded and have lost control on politics because of incompetence and abuses of political elites. Therefore, they need to replace the individuals in power with someone who is not part of the establishment and will know how to improve the system in order to efficiently represent the popular will (Barr 2009, p. 37).

Outsider leaders need to convince constituents that they are on their side against the political elite that has “oppressed” them. Anti-establishment appeal can be considered to be effective if the outsider politician manages to establish a relationship between himself and his (potential) supporters, convincing them of the message that he will oppose their common adversary and be the savior of the masses (ibid.). Once more, the character and charisma of

the candidate is going to play a crucial role in the transmission of the message and convincing people of this discursive construction of reality.

In a similar way to the one of Carreras and Barr, Kenney distinguishes the term outsider from the terms anti-party and anti-establishment. While outsider relates to party systems' origins, anti-party and anti-establishment refer to discursive approaches. Kenney's differentiation parts from Schedler's conceptualization of *anti-political-establishment actors*. According to Schedler, anti-establishment denotes the creation of a political space where the political class and people are divided and the anti-establishment actor locates himself on the side of the people against the political class (Kenney 1998; Schedler 1996). Anti-political-establishment actors are different from the standard opposition and from anti-system actors. In contrast with average opposition, they do not oppose only the incumbent parties but the whole political class. Anti-establishment politicians are not anti-party because they are not contrary to democratic politics but against politics carried out by the existing establishment (Schedler 1996).

Contrasting with anti-system or anti-political appeals, the anti-establishment discourse does not denote a "*disloyal opposition*" but it criticizes the political status quo and the performance of the political setup, promoting transformation (Barr 2009, p. 32).

In his essay Juan Linz argues that presidents opt for anti-party practices in part because of political structures. Presidentialism, fragmented multiparty system and undisciplined parties, all combined, encourage presidents to use anti-party tactics to avoid difficulties of using party channels (Linz 1994).

2.3 Consequences of the election of outsiders

Political scientists have manifested in academic work that, for several reasons, the electoral victory of political outsiders is mostly accompanied by negative consequences for the democratic system.

When analyzing outsiders' personalistic manner of governance, Barr (2003) observes the influence of stylistic and institutional elements. On the institutional level, the personalist

factor implies deinstitutionalization of politics by averting intermediary institutions, the outsider leader will strive for power concentration in the executive branch. As for style, the personalistic character of the president leadership in the allocation of benefits for the people create a belief that “ (...) *this person is indispensable when it comes to improving people’s lives.*” (Barr 2003, p. 1166). The outsider will try to attain confidence of the people through demagogic means. Regarding the institutional element, Miguel Carreras (2014a) denotes that it is due to the lack of connections and skills to deal with democratic institutions, that outsiders are unable to socialize with them and rather choose to bypass them. Since they are not backed by traditional parties and rely principally on electoral support, Carreras mentions as well, that it is common for outsider presidents to choose confrontation and hostile strategies towards the other democratic branches.

Outsiders’ limited experience or lack of it, could lead to administrative conflicts and inefficient use of public resources once they reach the executive office. The composition of outsiders’ cabinets is also affected by this feature. Since they have not gained previous experience at any public office, it is hard to expect that their teams would be able to help them to compensate their amateurship because it is likely that outsiders’ networks will come from outside the system too and not have any experience either (Carreras 2014a, p. 136). This argument has also been considered by Waldino Suárez, who ponders the election of outsiders as an imminent reduction of the efficacy of the executive office in presidential systems, due to their lack of administrative experience and their personalistic style of doing politics (Suarez 1982).

The structure of presidentialism is “by nature” prone to conflict. Tensions and disagreements between the two independent organs, the executive and legislative, can occur due to the dual legitimacy detected by Linz. Namely, that the president and congressmen are directly elected by the people. Additionally, the feeling of independence of the executive and its fixed term office could “motivate” an outsider leader to absorb power in the executive instead of striving for coalition building (Lijphart 1994).

Nevertheless, there is academic work that contradicts these findings and suggests that minority presidents are actually inclined to form multiparty coalitions, seal formal alliances and include members of majority parties in their cabinets in exchange for support in order to

overcome the weakness of their own parties (Altman 2000; Carreras 2014a; Negretto 2006). However, minority presidents have other tools to influence policy making and attain cooperation from parliamentarians, for example by using presidential vetoes, urgency bills or executive decrees. Both possibilities imply high concentration of power in the presidential office (Colomer, Negretto 2005; Negretto 2006).

Juan J. Linz (1994) maintains that outsider presidents have no support in congress and no permanent institutionalized continuity, because the no reelection principle. As previously mentioned, outsiders' parties serve principally as vehicles to win the presidential elections, nonetheless they will probably occupy a minor role in the legislative and once in office it turns inevitable to face the opposition of the traditional parties in the parliament.

There are multiple indicators that show that the election of outsiders increases the possibility of prolonged conflict and gridlock between the executive and legislative branches, which can lead to political instability and presidential crises. In the first place, the likelihood of interruption of presidential mandate rises when the president's party is low represented in the parliament and the head of the executive does not achieve to build a stable coalition in the legislature (Pérez-Liñán 2007). This a probable scenario when, as Carreras remarks, outsiders lack the necessary connections and expertise to establish solid legislative coalitions and reach deals with majority parties, which is translated into very low support from parliament (Carreras 2012, p. 1454).

Another consequence of the election of outsiders identified by Carreras (2012), is their disrupting effect on the party system. This is so, because of the entrance of additional new political movements and parties to the political arena. According to Mainwaring, the combination of multipartism and presidentialism is conflictive because it makes the bargaining scenario more complex and increases the probability of deadlock among the executive-legislative (Mainwaring 1993). An important observation for the purpose of this thesis is that multiparty system has been a common feature of Latin American presidential democracies and has been often considered as a conflictive characteristic by researchers of Latin American politics (Colomer, Negretto 2005).

A greater effect of the government of an outsider leader is the distance that they take from political parties. Besides the already known adversarial relationship to traditional parties, it is possible to recognize hostility even against organizations that helped the outsider to win power. As analyzed in Weyland's work (1999), outsiders frequently refuse to strengthen the movements that supported them because of their desire to retain personal leeway.

2.4 Critical evaluation

This second chapter presented a review of the literature on the most relevant areas for the research question of this paper. The main information on the theory of presidentialism was exposed in order to understand the system where outsider presidents emerge and perform. The literature suggests that the features of presidentialism could be considered as incentives for the rise of outsiders. Presidential elections have a personalistic character where an unexperienced charismatic candidate may become president regardless of parliamentary support and poor results of his own party in legislative elections. As it was possible to deduce from the arguments from Linz and Lijphart (1994), dual democratic legitimacy and fixed term in office are also factors that could reinforce the personalist appeal of the outsider presidents.

As for the definition of the term outsider, several scholars who have contributed to the literature on this topic have piled together different concepts like populism, neopopulism and anti-establishment, among others, to define and refer to a similar type of candidate. I agree with Miguel Carreras (2012) that this lump of terms provokes a conceptual muddle. Barr's (2009) differentiation of location, linkages and appeals is a significant contribution to distinguish the term outsider from terms that approximate further characteristics that can be attributed to other political figures as well. There is consensus among political scientists that the main feature of outsidership relies on the position of the candidate towards the party system. Nonetheless, there are discrepancies on the issue of previous political experience and its importance when defining and recognizing outsider candidates. From the definitions presented in this chapter, it is possible to recognize that most authors do not include enough categories for possible combinations that may arise, for example, inexperienced candidates running with an established party. For these reasons, I have considered Carreras' (2012) conceptualization of outsider candidates in presidential systems as the most appropriate due to its clearness and dimensional specificity which does not overlaps with other concepts.

Regarding the political style of outsider politicians, three characteristics that were mentioned in various definitions were analyzed more deeply. Once more, a conceptual muddle was observable, authors differ regarding the meanings and implications of the terms populism, neopopulism and anti-establishment rhetoric. While some authors coincided that the term neopopulism implies a neoliberal economic model, others like Mayorga, maintained that the phenomenon of neopopulism can be ambiguous. Regardless of these discrepancies, scholars identified as common features of these terms the anti-status quo drive and the importance of plebiscitarian linkages.

About outsiders' political discourses, most authors pointed out the use of anti-establishment rhetoric. However, anti-establishment is not equal to anti-party or anti-system, therefore these terms should not be treated indistinctly. Academic work on outsiders' discourse practices is not precise when using these different terms. A broader analysis on the rhetoric of political outsiders would be a useful contribution, it would be also relevant to find if political styles of outsiders showed common patterns.

Besides the factors related to presidentialism, there is academic consensus with respect to the causes for the emergence of outsider candidates. The main causes are: crisis of governability and of traditional parties, weak institutionalization of the party system, policy failures, economic instability and high corruption levels. Nonetheless, these are some of the relevant factors but not all, since I did not observe into detail the ones related to the electoral process like voters' behavior in scenarios of compulsory voting or concurrent elections².

Finally, academic literature establishes that the combination of presidentialism with outsider leaders has a negative effect on the development of democratic institutions. Especially in Carreras' quantitative study "Outsiders and Executive-Legislative Conflict in Latin America", the author corroborates that there is an increment in the likelihood of conflict between the executive and legislative branches when the president is an outsider (Carreras 2014b). An

² For more information of the impact of electoral factors: Carreras, Miguel (2012): The Rise of Outsiders in Latin America, 1980-2010. An Institutional Perspective. In *Comparative Political Studies* 45 (12), pp. 1451–1482.

institutional paralysis is likely to occur since in a minority government the president will lack support, connections and skills to reach agreements and cooperation with the legislative. Since cooperation is rare and the policy agenda is mostly blocked by opposition parties in the parliament, scholars consider that it is more likely that the outsider engages in executive excesses.

All in all, there is scarce academic work regarding the political and economic consequences of outsiders' victory and on the policies that outsiders implement. Further analysis on the presidencies of political outsiders, their performance once in power and how they achieve their goals is missing. Although there is scientific evidence that shows that the likelihood for executive-legislative conflict increases with an outsider president, and the literature mentions possible executive excesses, there is no academic information on the tools that an outsider has in order to finish his mandate. Therefore, in the following chapter the research design developed to analyze the factors that could influence the survival in office of a political outsider will be presented.

3. Methodological approach and research design

3.1 Process tracing

This dissertation will attempt to answer the question of what factors are necessary for the survival in office of political outsiders through qualitative analysis. I considered the method of process tracing as the most adequate for the analysis procedure. Process tracing is a useful research method that is employed to examine causal mechanisms in single case studies, although, as stated by Bennett, Alexander 1997, it can also involve many cases when its processes can be traced individually. By using of this method, it is possible to find through smaller steps the cause-effect link that connects the independent and dependent variables, namely, how X is correlated to Y.

The idea is to retrace strategies implemented by outsider presidents that favored the ending of their respective mandates. This analysis will consider the conditions for the survival of the presidential mandate focusing on the performance of outsiders after their victory, this is during their "office time". Process tracing is a method of observation of causal mechanisms that have contributed to the construction of an outcome. The dependent variable to be

examined in this paper is *survival in office*. By this, I am referring to the scenario where an outsider president is able to finish his constitutional mandate for which he was elected without interruptions; such as processes of impeachment or coup d'état. As for the independent variable, I defined it as *predominance of the executive*. This variable is conceived as a hypothesis, which I will proceed to explain next.

In line with the information obtained from the literature review, I have considered that when an outsider candidate becomes president of a country, an institutional “battle” between the three branches from the state: legislative, executive and judicial, will take place. The purpose of the “battle” is to increase a branch’s ruling capacity and reduce or avoid the influence of the other branches; a branch will try, to a certain extent, to become the agenda setter. There are several reasons that support the idea of an institutional “battle” when the executive office is lead by an outsider.

One of the arguments relies on the likelihood of conflict between executive and legislative. As it was stated in academic research, outsiders’ parties tend to be low represented in the parliament. However, according to academic work, minority governments are feasible if the president and his party manage to build stable coalitions. Nonetheless, I ponder that this argumentation does not necessarily fit for outsiders’ parties since, due to their condition of new and unknown parties and the characteristics of the outsider president, their lack of connections and skills will make it harder to establish alliances with traditional parties. Besides this, I consider that the anti-establishment discourse used during campaign will affect the relationships with the political establishment and create a hostile environment, which will have a negative influence in case of attempts of negotiations for coalitions. If coalitions are build, they will be weak because of the discussed context. This means that regardless of achieving coalitions or not, it is going to be a constant challenge for the outsider leader to govern due to legislative deadlock. Therefore, the (outsider) executive will try to prevail before the legislative passing laws or vetoing them.

In the (unlikely) case that an outsider’s party achieves majority in the parliament, I still consider that there is going to be a “soft battle” because, as exposed in the literature, most of the time, outsiders’ parties function principally as vehicles to reinforce the image of the

personalistic leader during campaign. They have a low level of institutionalization and could be considered weak and unstable. Hence, the head of the executive will attempt to keep the main control and center the power on his position. The parliamentary function would practically occupy a secondary role and would rather be there to serve and favor the bills proposed by the president. Additionally, although the academic work refers principally to the gridlock between executive and legislative, it is important to remark that deadlock can also come from the judicial branch, which could block the policy proposals coming from the executive.

The use of anti-establishment rhetoric has other dimensions that support the idea of institutional “battle”. If an outsider is coherent with his discourse, we can deduce from his distrustful behavior towards the system that it will discourage him of trying to look for rapprochement. He will hardly try to adapt to the system or to cooperate with its representatives. An outsider president, who is going to have a personalistic style, will rather be on the defensive towards the other state institutions. From my perspective, the institutional “battle” is not likely to occur with an insider leader. From an insider politician, I do not expect an anti-establishment attitude because his own political experience was gathered within the establishment. Moreover, an insider might have a less “defiant” attitude towards the other branches, and rather be more open to dialogue and to bargaining because of the role and position of his own party within the traditional party system.

In general, we can see that from the side of the political establishment there would be incentives to avoid the influence and blockages of the executive, led by an outsider president. At the same time, the outsider would try to win the “battle” against the other branches to avoid gridlock, reduce non-compliance and to enhance his power within the executive. Considering the conditions of the institutional “battle”, I suggest the following hypothesis: *if the executive (led by an outsider) “wins” the institutional “battle” against the judicial and legislative, the outsider will be able to survive and finish his mandate.* This means that survival in office could be caused by the executive's victory.

Going back to process tracing and considering the variables proposed in this thesis, the “most-likely” and “least-likely” cases design is a helpful methodological tool to carry out the

qualitative research and test theoretical arguments. Most- and least-likely cases are not conceived to define causation in terms of probability-raising but are rather about levels of probability (likelihood) (Rohlfing 2016). While probability attaches to possible results, likelihood attaches to hypotheses (Gallistel 2015). According to Ingo Rohlfing (2016), most-likely and least-likely denote an *epistemic uncertainty* because it is not possible to be confident that one has considered all the thinkable hypotheses.

Therefore, “[w]e express this uncertainty by stating that it is more or less probable to gather certain observations, given the theory at hand and our empirical knowledge about the cases. For some cases, we have more *ex ante* confidence in collecting supporting evidence (most-likely cases), for others we have less confidence (least-likely cases).” (Rohlfing 2016). The formalization of these cases is $p(E/H)$. The intention is to see the probability of finding evidence (E) that confirms the hypothesis (H) (ibid.).

The theory says that there are greater conflicts between executive and legislative when the president is an outsider and that executive excesses can happen. Notwithstanding, it does not explain clearly how outsiders get over or overcome deadlocks, and how they manage to end their mandates. It does not provide detailed explanations of what is meant by executive excesses either.

Hence, because I cannot directly derive from the theory the variables and their correlation, I have posed the hypothesis that after the presidential election of an outsider, there is an institutional “battle” among the state branches. When confirming that the outsider executive “won” the “battle”, the achievement of institutional predominance can lead to the survival of his presidential mandate. For the outsider to win the institutional “battle” I propose three strategies. When these are implemented, it is suggested that executive predominance can be achieved. The three strategies will be exposed in detail in the following section.

3.2 The institutional “battle”

In order to win the institutional “battle” against the other branches and reach a predominant position, outsiders dispose different resources that can be used strategically to attain “victory” and consequently facilitate the culmination of their presidential mandates.

The first strategy is: *avoidance of legislative and judicial consultation.*

Knowing that opposition in the legislative and/or judicial could block the initiatives coming from the executive, an outsider could try to implement his proposals through executive decrees. An outsider could argue that in order to manage government operations he needs to enact executive orders. The use of executive decrees and their conception as emergency power varies from country to country; their use depends on the powers conferred directly by the constitution on the executive branch. Executive orders have a significant influence on the internal affairs of government, deciding how and to what extent the legislation will be applied. They also affect the way emergency situations and the management of security should be dealt with.

Another option to avoid consultation is by carrying out referendums. Because the outsider leader has strong plebiscitarian linkages, and he has declared to be the “real” representative of the people in his discourses, once in office an outsider could attempt to get the approval of his initiatives through direct support from the citizens. In this way, he would bypass possible rejection from the other branches and/or could force them to adopt the results coming from the population. Certainly, we would need to see in detail how the outsider can get a referendum if this needs to be approved by the other branches.

The second strategy is: *reinforcement of the constitutional competences of the executive.*

Among the several competences that could be attributed to the executive power, one example could be giving the president the ability to dissolve the legislative. As it is known from the theory of presidentialism, the principle of dual legitimacy hinders the existence of mechanisms such as the vote of no-confidence. Nonetheless, there are legal processes like impeachment, which can be initiated by the judicial or legislative, by which the president, if he is declared guilty, would be in a condition where it is expected that he will abdicate. Some constitutions grant power directly to the legislative to remove the head of the executive in cases of serious abuses. In any case, there is no theoretical evidence that there are mechanisms by which the executive could remove members from the parliament. Therefore, if an outsider obtains legal competences to dissolve the legislative, he would have a more powerful executive office and increase his bargaining power to deal with the legislative.

I have considered that if the constitution concedes the president the possibility of reelection this could also help the outsider to reinforce his plebiscitarian linkages and attain more support from voters. If an outsider has high popular acceptance, this can be convenient to push the other branches to support his proposals, otherwise he could threaten them with strengthening his anti-establishment discourse and accuse traditional parties for institutional blockage.

The third strategy is: *creation of independent agencies*.

This strategy complements to a certain extent the strategy of avoidance of consultation of the other branches. Independent agencies could assume competences that are traditionally attributed to the legislative power. For example, the designation of members of the judicial branch or the Attorney General. The creation of these types of agencies could be justified as a means to promote citizen participation and stimulate processes of public deliberation. Society would gain more power to monitor and exercise direct influence through the administration of independent institutions. I argue that the existence of an independent governmental institution could enable appointments that are favorable for the executive because, in contrast to the legislative structure, it would be composed by members other than parties' representatives such as representatives from social organizations, labor unions and/or citizens. This context would imply a different approach towards the outsider executive and vice versa. Taking into consideration the popular support and plebiscitarian linkages, it could be expected that social movements involved in the administration of a new agency identify themselves as government sympathizers.

The intention is to compare in the empirical part how the two political outsiders implemented these strategies and the results of their attempts. Through the comparison of the two outsiders and their use of the three strategies exposed in this chapter, it is expected to find if these strategic choices were effective in the process of winning the institutional "battle" against the other branches and consequently to achieve survival in the presidential office.

3.3 Underlying working definition

Bearing in mind that several definitions for the term outsider were exposed in the theoretical section, it seems relevant to outline the working definition of this thesis. Taking Carreras

conceptualization as reference, from the four possible combinations I considered that the definition of *full outsider* is the most appropriate for the purpose of this analysis.

“Full outsiders are politicians that have not had a political career and compete in presidential elections with a new party” (Carreras 2014b, p. 28).

3.4 Case selection: Ecuador

There are several reasons why Ecuador is a good case for the analysis of the research question of this paper. The Republic of Ecuador is a representative democracy and, like most Latin American nations, features a presidential system. Since the beginning of the republican order in 1830, the country has gone throughout several crises of political instability and has had 20 constitutions during its history. Ecuador is currently under the rule of the Constitution of 2008 and its state system is composed by five state branches³. Presidential and parliamentary elections are held simultaneously and the duration of the executive and legislative offices is four years.

After a cycle of dictatorships and military regimes, Ecuador went through a transitional process between 1976 and 1979 to reconstitute democratic constitutional order and civilian governments (La Torre 2010b, p. 81). The return to democracy was shaped by a new constitution, which was in force until 1997, although it underwent some partial changes during time. During the same period, significant economic changes happened in the country. The beginning of hydrocarbons exploitation and the increment of the international oil price implied a historical transformation of the Ecuadorian economy. Ecuador, besides being an agricultural exporting country, became an oil-producing nation (Erazo Villacrés 2007; La Torre 2010b).

For the lapse of 18 years, the country experienced institutional stability until the overthrow of President Abdalá Bucaram, who ruled the country for a period of six months from August 1996 to February 1997. The Armed Forces withdrew their support for the president, and without any previous judicial process, the National Congress dismissed Bucaram from office arguing that Bucaram suffered mental incapacity. Vice President Rosalía Arteaga assumed the presidency for the short lapse of two days until the Congress made the decision to replace her

³ The two additional branches besides the classical *trias politica* model will be presented in chapter 4.2.

and delegate the presidency of the Republic to the President of the Congress, Fabián Alarcón (Erazo Villacrés 2007). In a plebiscite held on May 25, 1997, Fabián Alarcón was ratified as Acting President and a Constituent Assembly, that should work parallel to the National Congress, was convened (ibid.). The new Constitution from 1998 was approved by the legislative substituting the one from 1979.

The fact that politicians did not follow constitutional procedures to overthrow the president had a debilitating effect in Ecuadorian democracy. After the presidency of Abdalá Bucaram, two more presidents were ousted before ending their mandates: Jamil Mahuad (1998-2000) and Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005), both being replaced by their vice presidents until the following elections.

“These elected presidents were forcefully removed from power through events that combined collective action and an instrumental use of laws by Congress, which used arguments of doubtful legality to remove them from office. Bucaram was removed through claims that he was loco, Mahuad and Gutiérrez with arguments that they had abandoned power, when in fact they did not abdicate.” (La Torre 2010b, p. 153).

During all these events, great popular discontent was visible. People rejected and distrusted traditional parties and the National Congress, triggering the weakening and fragmentation of political parties. Loss of legitimacy, mistrust and image deterioration were caused because parties were not articulating and representing citizens' interest. Multiple politicians were involved in several corruption cases and, especially in 1999 during Mahuad's presidency, the country suffered an acute economic crisis (Sucre's devaluation by 198%) that led to the substitution of the national currency by American Dollar. The transition process had an outrageous impact on the poverty rates and percentage of emigrant population.

Party system crisis, breaches of constitutional regulations, economic and social instability, among other factors, led Ecuador to a crisis of ungovernability which allowed the emergence of outsiders in the political sphere. Since Bucaram's government until the present time, Ecuador has been ruled by eight presidents from whom the last two were outsiders: Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa (2007-2017).

However, after two reelections and ten years in office, Correa, who was consecutively elected after Gutiérrez was the only president who could transfer his mandate. Therefore, the Ecuadorian case is very interesting. First, most of the characteristics mentioned in the theoretical part for the emergence of political outsiders can be recognized in the situation of the country. Secondly, despite having a failed experience with the first outsider president (Gutiérrez), years later people took again the “risk” of voting for another outsider who ended up having a different outcome than his predecessor.

4. Empirical analysis

In this section, the presidencies of the two Ecuadorian outsiders and the implementation of the three strategies proposed in the methodological section will be observed. The analysis of each political figure will begin with a short biographical overview, then information on their political placement and their rise to presidency. Consequently, the institutional “battle” will be analyzed and the use of the strategies will be tested. The last point will correspond to the outcomes of the “battle” and the scenario of overthrow or survival of the outsider presidents.

4.1 Lucio Gutiérrez (2003-2005)

4.1.1 Background of Gutiérrez

Lucio Edwin Gutiérrez Borbúa was born in Quito on March 23, 1957. He grew up in a middle-class family, had six siblings, and spent his childhood and adolescence in Tena, a city in the Ecuadorian Amazon. He graduated from a military high school and studied Civil Engineering and Administration at the Ecuadorian Polytechnic School of the Army. Further on, he attained a degree from the School of Physical Education of the Army in Rio de Janeiro and later went to the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C., where he obtained certificates in International Relations and Continental Defense. Continuing his military formation, Gutiérrez then attained diplomas in National Security by the Ecuadorian Armed Forces’ National Institute of War, and in Military Sciences by the Army’s War Academy of Quito. During his military career, the later presidential candidate also worked as professor of Geopolitics at the Ecuadorian Polytechnic School of the Army. Subsequently, namely in 1996, he became the aide-de-camp of the then president Abdalá Bucaram and later, in 1998, of the interim President Fabián Alarcón (Erazo Villacrés 2007, p. 53).

4.1.2 Political placement

It was until January 21, 2000 when Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez became a known public personality due to his involvement in the coup d'état against the then President Jamil Mahuad. Before the coup, in the context of a meeting of the Council of Generals held in January 2000, assistants articulated petitions for President Mahuad such as: extradition of fugitive bankers, seizure of their properties, and elimination of corruption of the national customs. Nonetheless, in the national broadcast held by Mahuad on January 9, 2000, besides announcing the consolidation of dollarization, the president did not consider any of the military requests, which deteriorated his relation towards the Armed Forces (Erazo Villacrés 2007). Mahuad presided over a generalized economic crisis and faced charges due to state fund deviation for the rescuing of corrupt bankers (La Torre 2010b).

On January 21, Lucio Gutiérrez, two more Colonels, 40 captains and 120 lieutenants accompanied indigenous protestors and other citizens to reach the National Congress in order to demand the resignation of Mahuad (Erazo Villacrés 2007, p. 55). The alliance of indigenous demonstrators with dissident army officers overthrew Mahuad and replaced him with the “self-styled Junta of National Salvation” integrated by Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez; Antonio Vargas, the President of the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE); and the former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Carlos Solórzano (La Torre 2010b). The participation of the military in a civic march was an unprecedented fact in the political history of the country.

As stated in the book of Carlos de la Torre (2010), in the context of Mahuad's overthrow, Gutiérrez made his first declarations on personal views and expressed that democracy should not require institutional mediation and should be based on direct forms. Referring to the Junta of National Salvation, Gutiérrez declared that: *“Sovereignty lies in the people whose will is the basis of authority, and making use of this right... without representatives has elected its representatives”* (La Torre 2010b, p. 154).

The Junta resigned after pressure by the U.S. embassy⁴ and the high command of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces. On January 22, the Congress regain power, officially dismissed Jamil Mahuad for “power abandonment” and appointed Gustavo Noboa, Mahuad’s Vice President, as the new President (Erazo Villacrés 2007; La Torre 2010b).

Shortly after, a trial against the protagonists of the rebellion took place. The first person to be imprisoned was Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez who had to stay 108 days in the prison of the Armed Forces. Subsequently, 300 soldiers and several civilians were tried. However, after four months, the National Congress granted amnesty to all who participated in the January 21 rebellion. After leaving prison, Gutiérrez left his military career and started with political activities to get into the political arena (Erazo Villacrés 2007, p. 61).

The factors that led to the overthrow of Mahuad, like high corruption levels, the difficult dollarization process and public bailouts for private banks, among others, damaged the already debilitated image of traditional parties even more but gave impulse to new actors. According to Tania Erazo (2007), the rebellion of January 21 had a positive effect in the popular perception of the rebel military officers. Their image as patriots and defenders of national interests was strengthened. This reputation helped Lucio Gutiérrez and associates with their candidacies two years later. Besides the effects on the image of the military officers, the indigenous movement gained importance in the political arena as well.

After Mahuad’s coup, the concept of “the people” started to be associated with the image of indigenous demonstrators. This was especially important because the indigenous groups “*who were not seen as belonging to the people, became its new incarnation.*” (La Torre 2010b, p. 153). The indigenous’ political branch Pachakutik (Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement) reaffirmed its position and its power for social mobilization of the popular bases that supported the organization (Erazo Villacrés 2007, p. 60).

In 2001, Gutiérrez took part in several international political meetings, which were attended by representatives of leftist parties, social organizations and labor unions, in order to form his political image. Lucio Gutiérrez held personal meetings with the then Brazilian presidential

⁴ According to Erazo 2007 the country was threatened with a “blockade worse than that of Cuba”.

candidate Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and with the former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. In various statements Gutiérrez expressed patriotic views, revolutionary tendencies and intentions for a stronger Latin American integration. Additionally, he commented on his admiration for the Cuban and Venezuelan governments in their fight and resistance against American neoliberalism (Erazo Villacrés 2007, p. 62).

In Lucio Gutiérrez's discourses, he identified himself with the poor and he permanently discredited traditional parties. Gutiérrez adopted the claims of the indigenous and black movements, who, since the 1990s, used the term *pueblo* to demand their inclusion and the recognition of their diverse conditions, cultures or nationalities (La Torre 2010b, p. 163). In addition, Gutiérrez' participation in the different political forums mentioned above, served him to project an image of a progressive, leftist and empathetic humanitarian leader.

In this line, Gutiérrez established on March 2002, seven months before the presidential elections, a new alternative political party, namely, Partido Sociedad Patriótica 21 de Enero (Patriotic Society Party, PSP). The new political platform was supported by several social movements, especially and most importantly, the indigenous movement CONAIE through its political subdivision Pachakutik, which backed Gutiérrez since the rebellion from 2000 against Mahuad. This fact played a significant role in the political strategic alliance between Pachakutik and Sociedad Patriótica in the elections of 2002 (Mainwaring et al. 2006, p. 34).

4.1.3 Rise to power

The support of the indigenous movement CONAIE was crucial for the electoral campaign and later success of Lucio Gutiérrez. Although there were some internal divisions within Pachakutik, the party decided to formally establish an alliance with Gutiérrez' Partido Sociedad Patriótica. It was the wish of several indigenous groups that "*people of their shared ethnicity represent them*" (Mainwaring et al. 2006, p. 278), therefore supporting Gutiérrez' candidacy was seen as the closest real opportunity to achieve a higher level of political representation. Additionally, small leftist movements such as Movimiento Popular Democrático (Popular Democratic Movement, MPD) gave Gutiérrez its support for the second bailout.

In the first round held in October 2002, the former Colonel competed against 10 more presidential candidates. Due to the triumph of the PSP-Pachakutik alliance with 20,64% of the votes, Gutiérrez managed to enter the second round. The second place corresponded to a candidate coming from the business sector, the millionaire Álvaro Noboa. The leader of the right-wing party PRIAN obtained 17,39% of the ballots. The difference between the two finalists was reduced in the last stretch of the campaign. At the start of the second round, the margin was around 30%.

For the second electoral round, the discourse and actions of Lucio Gutiérrez suffered several changes turning to a relatively centrist direction. On a first instance, this was accepted by Pachakutik, nonetheless, it caused a certain degree of uncertainty because it was unclear in how far the social demands for change could be reconciled with agreements made with business and banking sectors and with international organizations. Other social movements became more critical of Gutiérrez' proposals and expressed a conditioned support demanding the fulfillment of the agreements signed during the campaign (Saltos Galarza 2003, p. 11). This complex confluence put Lucio Gutiérrez in a contested terrain between the imaginary change which fortified popular support, and the commitments assumed with sectors of the dominant business bloc and international organizations.

Traditional political parties, such as the right-wing Social Christian Party and the Democratic Left, remained discursively distant from the presidential second electoral round, focusing rather in preparing their alliances for control of the Congress, where they still had a predominant representation.

The second electoral round took place in November 24, 2002. Lucio Gutiérrez won the presidency after defeating Noboa with 54% of the votes (Montúfar 2008; Posso Salgado 2004). According to César Montúfar, the triumph of Gutiérrez represented to a certain extent an opportunity of recovery of confidence in the political system among actors systematically discriminated and not included in it due to socioeconomic, cultural or ethnic reasons (Montúfar 2008, p. 266). On the other side, Saltos Galarza (2003) argues that the triumph of Gutiérrez was more related to the idea of nationalism and the rebellion of January 21 rather than to an ethnic perspective or achievement of profound social transformation.

On January 5, 2003, the Ecuadorian Congress composed of 100 members conducted its first session. The governmental alliance was low represented in the Congress with barely 17 deputies: 11 deputies were representatives of Pachakutik, 6 of PSP. In addition, the alliance counted on the support of 3 congressmen of MPD. Although the constitutional rules established that the party with the most seats was supposed to take the presidency of the Congress, the right-wing Partido Social Cristiano (Social Christian Party, PSC), that counted with 20 seats, irregularly decided to transfer the position to a representative of the second most voted party Izquierda Democrática (Democratic Left, ID) (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 41). Nonetheless, PSC kept a strong influence in the appointments of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, Constitutional Court and superintendancies, excluding the participation of members of the alliance PSP-Pachakutik (ibid).

On January 15, 2007, the new government inaugurated its mandate. The cabinet of the new President Lucio Gutiérrez was composed of ministers from different political and ideological backgrounds. Four Ministers came from the main political ally Pachakutik: Dr. Nina Pacari, Chancellor of the Republic; Dr. Luis Macas, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock; Dr. Rosa Maria Torres, Minister of Education and Dr. Doris Solís, Minister of Tourism. The first two ministers were two of CONAIE's most visible indigenous leaders. The MPD, the latest ally of the regime, received the Ministry of Environment. The remaining secretaries of the State were given to members of the president's party PSP and some other citizens not affiliated to any political parties, but related to the President and Vice President. Among the different executive appointments, active members from the military and police were included. For example, Napoleón Villa, police colonel and Gutiérrez' brother-in-law, was appointed as Manager of the Solidarity Fund, an entity which handles State resources coming from strategic areas of the economy.

As stated by Antonio Posso, the PSP-Pachakutik alliance began to debilitate from the first day because agreements regarding appointments were not fulfilled, for example, it was agreed that ministries lead by PSP Ministers, should have an undersecretary from the Pachakutik movement and vice versa, which did not happen (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 43). Yet, further changes of the presidential alliance and the development of the institutional "battle" will be analyzed in the coming section.

4.1.4 Institutional “battle”

Once the origins and political basis of the presidency of Gutiérrez are recognized, the strategies proposed to reach a predominance of the executive and therefore the survival in office will be analyzed in this section.

Avoidance of legislative and judicial consultation

As previously described, this strategy was conceived as a way for the outsider executive to overcome possible policy blockages from other state branches. When analyzing its implementation during the government of Lucio Gutiérrez, it is possible to recognize that from the beginning of his mandate, for the president it never seemed to be a priority to avoid consultation of the other branches neither to ensure the implementation of policy proposals coming from the executive. Gutiérrez’ government was rather characterized by permanent dependency on the legislative power and various shifts in his political alliances. Instead of avoiding other branches’ consultation, Gutiérrez’ party PSP continuously tried to build new coalitions and find new allies depending on the political context of the moment. There is sufficient evidence that support this reflection.

Even though he started his mandate with leftist alliances, within the first month of government, after a visit to Washington DC and a meeting with former President Bush on February 2003, the elected president decided to publicly declare Ecuador as the “best friend” of the U.S. (Acosta 2005; BBC Mundo 12.Feb.2003). Additionally, Gutiérrez signed a Letter of Intent with the IMF, establishing in this way an official commitment for IMF’s economic program implementation (International Monetary Fund 02.Feb.2003). These actions caused conflicts and deteriorated the PSP- Pachakutik alliance.

“(…) CONAIE’s support soon turned to opposition after Gutiérrez implemented austerity measures. In the ensuing months, divisions within CONAIE and with Pachakutik became even more pronounced” (Yashar 2006, p. 277).

Gutiérrez’ political tendencies and discursive practices underwent significant transformation from the beginning of his term. This could also explain why avoiding possible blockages did not seem as a priority since the outsider president ended up proposing an economic program related to several opposition parties’ will. In April 2003, before reaching 100 days in office,

Lucio Gutiérrez met former president and main leader of the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC), León Febres Cordero to establish several agreements regarding the law on customs control. Shortly after, Customs law was approved without suspending the CAE (Corporación Aduanera Ecuatoriana - Ecuadorian Customs Corporation), a controversial issue considering that PSC members led the administration of CAE and several cases of customs smuggling were publicly known. The alliance Pachakutik-PSP appeared unauthorized in the Congress and the Pachakutik movement expressed high discontent with the agreements of Gutiérrez and the PSC. As stated by Posso, the first anticorruption effort proposed in first instance by the new government, ended up being discarded after the political agreement of the outsider president (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 44). Furthermore, after the discussions with Febres Cordero, the former Colonel decided to discard the proposal for a referendum, offered during campaign, that sought to depoliticize the Courts of Justice.

On the one hand, during the first six months in office, Gutiérrez manifested that the country should comply with the IMF austerity conditions in several occasions. On the other hand, at the same time the president kept reiterating promises of change and social programs for the poor (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 58). Labor unions and other movements reclaimed government's fulfilment of the electoral proposals, while the IMF demanded the government to comply with the agreed finance program.

By July 2003, the Movimiento Popular Democrático, MPD, officially announced the decision to withdraw its support for the government due to disagreements over its "submission" to the IMF. Among several economic measures, there was a reduction of state investment in health and education, and an increase in electricity rates placing Ecuadorian industrial electricity tariffs upon the highest of the region (Cadena, López 2006). After eight months in office, the alliance PSP-Pachakutik was dissolved and Gutiérrez dismissed all the Pachakutik's ministers.

After these changes and the rupture of initial alliances, Lucio Gutiérrez did not show any attempt to reinforce the power of the executive branch as such but rather endeavored to maintain a certain status quo. At first, the government strove to find new pacts with other possible partners from the legislative branch. In this respect, PSP approached traditional and opposition parties coming to an arrangement with the Partido Social Cristiano (PSC).

In the new phase without Pachakutik, the president lost the image of representative of the indigenous people. Moreover, his alignment with the PSC dispelled his leftist discourse. As well, business and banking sectors were not inclined for the candidacy of Lucio Gutiérrez from the start, which demonstrates weakness of later alliances. From a political perspective, the government could only rely on the support of its own party PSP; a stable block in the legislative could not be ensured due to the fragility of the political agreements. However, while the pact with PSP lasted, the outsider president did not attempt to organize referendums or to govern through executive decrees.

By the end of 2004, in the context of sectional elections held in October, Gutiérrez' party PSP could not achieve electoral success in any prefecture and succeeded only in few municipalities from cantons with small population (Montúfar 2008, p. 281). Traditional parties, on the other hand, despite being discredited, continued to exert considerable influence in the national electorate; these events weakened the position of PSP. Soon after, the pact with the Partido Social Cristiano was dissolved.

In November 2004, in these "triumphal" circumstances, PSC and ID (the two biggest fractions of the Congress), backed up by Pachakutik, confronted the "defeated" Gutiérrez with the intention of calling him to a trial in the Congress in order to dismiss him later. As stated by César Montúfar (2008), Febres Cordero proposed the political trial against Gutiérrez the day after sectional elections, a proposal which Rodrigo Borja, leader of ID, joined. The argument was the government' violation of the Electoral Spending Control law because of use of public resources to benefit PSP's candidates.

To evade the trial and Gutiérrez dismissal, the government started a campaign to convince and "buy" deputies from distinct parties to avoid the necessary sum of votes for his prosecution (57/100). Among various independent deputies from several parties, Gutiérrez looked for the support of PRIAN, Álvaro Noboa's party, and the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE), the party of the overthrown and fugitive President Abdalá Bucaram. On December 9, the new conformed majority was self-denominated as "Progressive Block" (Montúfar 2008, p. 282).

To gain PRIAN's support, according to Montúfar, evidence was found that the Internal Revenue Service granted the ex-candidate and millionaire Álvaro Noboa advantages and benefits regarding tax matters for his companies. Additionally, more representation and influence in the Electoral Tribunal was offered. As for the support of the PRE, Gutiérrez offered the reversal of the pending political trials against Bucaram. Already during his campaign Lucio Gutiérrez offered the restructuring of the Supreme Court of Justice, therefore in the context of the new majority he pledged to obtain the annulment of Bucaram's judicial processes (ibid.). Moreover, in exchange for its support to the government, the PRE was allowed to occupy powerful positions in the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Constitutional Court.

Altogether, the evidence presented above shows that the outsider president did not look for alternative ways to avoid consultation of the other branches. Lucio Gutiérrez' strategy sought to reach pacts and majority adhesion with other parties to secure his position in the executive (which could not be fully achieved) but not to strengthen the executive branch as such. From the start, because Gutiérrez did not define any clear direction, before the institutional crisis by the end of 2004, no evidence was found from bills that were denied or blocked by a legislative majority. As Montúfar mentions, conceptually, Lucio Gutiérrez did not propose change or social transformation. At one point during the presidency he argued that he was neither a left- nor a right-wing politician (Montúfar 2008). The fulfillment of the agreements with PRE and PRIAN will be further discussed in the section of the third strategy.

Reinforcement of the constitutional competences of the executive

Throughout Gutiérrez mandate, the outsider president manifested his will for reforms and the possibility of a new Constitution. During his campaign, the reinforcement of the executive branch was not manifested but it was part of the proposals of the alliance PSP-Pachakutik to depoliticize the judicial branch. However, during the first dialogues with the legislative the course of the negotiations moved away from the initial proposals.

In the first place, during the first months in office, Gutiérrez announced that in the case that the legislative did not cooperate in carrying off political reforms, he would consider an alternative, namely, calling for a referendum. In a newspaper interview, the president declared that he would not promote reforms to the Constitution, but a new Constitution,

because reforms would need to pass legislative approval where PSP-Pachakutik did not have majority. Among the proposed articles for the new Constitution, Gutiérrez did not mention anything related to the presidential competences, but averred that the draft version contemplated the appointment of judges who were not to be members of a political party, and that they should be elected by citizens. Nonetheless, parallel to his declarations, the president of the Congress announced that the issues that would be part of the reforms of the Constitution would be defined during a meeting involving all state branches, implying that a judicial restructuring had not been agreed for the moment (El Universo Ecuador 16.Apr.2003). However, as mentioned in the previous strategy, after Gutiérrez' meeting with the leader of PSC, the proposal for depoliticization of control agencies and the idea of organizing a referendum were both dismissed.

Around one year later, in March 2004, Gutiérrez echoed his 2002 campaign's offer for constitutional reforms. This time he manifested his purpose to strengthen the executive branch as well (Valencia 08.Mar.2004). According to Antonio Posso (2004), the political reforms estimated by the ex-Colonel consisted of specific changes to the Political Constitution in force since 1998, approved by the Constituent Assembly of that time. Several of the changes proposed in Gutiérrez' draft were denounced by congressmen of Pachakutik.

One of the most controversial proposals was the one referring to the suffrage permission for the members of public forces. The 1998 Constitution originally stipulated in Article 185 that the public force will be obedient and not deliberative, namely, that its members cannot intervene in political decisions (El Universo Ecuador 11.Mar.2004).

Additionally, Gutiérrez draft contemplated the reform of Article 98, which established that the President and Vice President may be re-elected after alternating the mandate for one presidential period (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador 1998). The original Article would be substituted by the possibility of immediate reelection of the president.

As for Article 103 on referenda, the 1998 version stipulated that: "(...) The adopted decision will be mandatory if the popular pronouncement counts with the support of the absolute

majority of the voters.”⁵ (ibid.). However, Gutiérrez’ draft anticipated that plebiscites would not be mandatory but referential for the state (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 214).

In Article 167 of the draft version, the possibility of political prosecution of the President of the Republic for crimes against the security of the State, for crimes of concussion, bribery, embezzlement and illicit enrichment was eliminated (Posso Salgado 2004, p. 215).

The reformed version of Article 171 gave competences to the President of the Republic to enact laws without approval of the National Congress and also the capacity of the executive to dissolve the National Congress without specifying any justifying argument (ibid.). Similarly, modified Article 283 stated that the president could call for a public referendum directly, regardless of the participation and / or authorization of the Congress (ibid.).

All these reforms remained stagnant until December 2004, when in a context of institutional crisis due to a sudden restructuration of the Supreme Court of Justice⁶, Lucio Gutiérrez announced the intention to call for a referendum for their respective approval (El Tiempo Colombia 14.Dec.2004). In line with his declarations, he expected that the results of the referendum would oblige the Congress to process the reforms from his draft and to set new rules for the appointments of judges depoliticizing in that way the judicial system.

According to Montúfar (2008), it was due to the threat of a political trial that Gutiérrez attempted to strengthen his populist discourse and to organize mass mobilization to ensure popular support for his reformation plans. Lucio Gutiérrez efforts’ of concentrating more power in the executive branch were strongly criticized since the disclosure of his draft.

Already before restructuring the justice- and constitutional courts, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, spokesmen of the government and the president warned the Congress of dissolving the legislative and calling for a referendum and Constituent Assembly, if they did not give way to the project of reforming the Constitution of 1998. After the courts events, Gutiérrez ratified

⁵ Translations of the constitutional Articles by the author

⁶ The Congress dissolved the Supreme Court of Justice and appointed new members from the “Progressive Block”. A deeper analysis will be given by the observation of the third strategy.

the previous warnings and added the information on the modifications of the presidential competences (Montúfar 2008, p. 288). By the end of 2004, changes made in the judicial sector were condemned as unconstitutional by large sectors of the population (Montúfar 2008, p. 284). The democratic principle of power division was seen under threat since the same political faction was making decisions in the three state branches without previous acquisition of legal competences or means to act. At the end of January 2005, Gutiérrez sent the Congress a bill for the approval of a national plebiscite.

To justify his attempts and as answer to critics, Gutiérrez defended the proposals related to the judicial system through populist appeals. The outsider president self-defined himself as a *"dictócrata"* while giving a discourse in an Amazon region saying that: *"for the oligarchy I am a dictator and for the people a democrat"* (Ecuadorinmediato 13.Feb.2005). Lucio Gutiérrez added that the referendum was important to give the people power to decide and avoid that national elites choose the type of justice that the country requires (ibid.). Nonetheless, no evidence for public declarations or justifications of the proposals for the reinforcement of the executive competences were found.

Yet, the referendum was not carried out. Although Lucio Gutiérrez attempted to reinforce the constitutional competences of the executive, he did not have the necessary support to adopt the changes in the 1998 Constitution. Neither his allies nor "the people" backed his intentions. Gutiérrez popularity rates were in constant decline, especially after budget cuts in health, education and pensions (Posso Salgado 2004). The initiative of Gutiérrez was weakened by the actions of his own allies who hindered any attempt to remove them from the positions achieved through the pact. As stated by César Montúfar: *"Lucio Gutiérrez did not have the opportunity to re-legitimize his project by facing the opposition at the polls, neither to institutionalize direct linkages with society"* (Montúfar 2008, p. 283).

Creation of independent agencies

During Gutiérrez' presidential mandate, no independent agencies were created. However, several sources indicate that the creation of these types of organisms was contemplated in the plans of the former Colonel. Still, many competences were irregularly shifted and assumed by other state branches.

To begin with, the executive and the legislative assumed competences that did not correspond to them, in order to remove the magistrates from the Supreme Court of Justice. In line with Article 202 of the 1998 Constitution, it was competence of the plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice to designate new magistrates with the favorable vote of two thirds of its members, after observing several criteria such as professionalism and judicial career. The Article stipulated that the plenary should designate professionals who have practiced in the judiciary; have been involved in university teaching; or have remained in free professional practice (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador 1998).

Despite of the constitutional rule and although the Congress was not the nominating organ of the Supreme Court nor had it any attribution to remove or reorganize it, between November 26 and December 8, 2004, a legislative majority composed of 52 congressmen decided to displace 29 out of 31 magistrates. In the same way, the Congress dismissed all nine members of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (BBC Mundo 10.Dec.2004; Ecuadorinmediato 08.Sep.2015).

The unconstitutionally taken Supreme Court was restructured with members of political factions of the Congress. Through this momentarily effective strategy, the government and his allies, especially the PRE, could maintain control over the judicial branch. The president of the new Court, so-called “Pichi Corte” by public and media, was Guillermo Castro, a close friend of PRE’s leader Abdalá Bucaram. The new Court filed corruption cases and invalidated the trials against Bucaram, enabling his return without risk of imprisonment. The maintenance of the “Pichi Corte”, which was in office for 127 days until Gutiérrez overthrow, had a cost of over a million US Dollars (El Universo Ecuador 06.Sep.2005).

In his analysis of Gutiérrez’ government, César Montúfar argues that Lucio Gutiérrez was aware that given the fragility of his legislative alliances, if he did not restructure the bases of institutionalized power of the opposition, the stability of his government could be threatened again by a new majority in the Congress. His attempts were to rebuild the bases of political power and, in particular, debilitate the influence of the Partido Social Cristiano and Izquierda Democrática (Montúfar 2008, p. 283).

Gutiérrez maintained a populist discourse to support and justify the decision of the legislative to change the composition of the judicial. According to Lucio Gutiérrez, the decision was not an initiative of the majority in the Congress, but of the Ecuadorian people. “The Congress intended to exteriorize the discontent of the people, who were tired of the influence and control that the leader of PSC, León Febres Cordero, had over the national courts” (Montúfar 2008, p. 286). At the beginning of the crisis, when the judicial bodies and the Electoral Tribunal were restructured, Gutiérrez said that these changes were provisional and that they only sought to disrupt the power networks of the PSC and the ID and that the process should continue in a second phase of political reforms.

The outsider president declared that the people should directly elect magistrates without any interference of political parties. Namely, as stated by Montúfar, Gutiérrez proposed the designation of electoral colleges, made up of representatives of civil society in charge of the appointment of principals of the judicial and electoral branch. These social representatives should come, in line with the government proposal, from civil society organization such as the federation of lawyers, judicial workers, trade unions, production chambers, ethnic organizations, human rights organizations, teachers, among others. Each of these sectors would appoint its representatives to the respective polling stations and, in addition, would have the power to present candidates for the different dignities (Montúfar 2008, p. 289).

Moreover, the governmental proposal included modifications that enabled the presidential office to designate the General Controller of the State, and increased the power of the executive giving it the ability to present bills related to other fields besides the economy, as it had originally been established in the 1998 Constitution. In general, the second phase was conceived as a re-institutionalization plan where the role of traditional parties was weakened and to a certain extent substituted by the cooptation of social sectors granting them greater importance.

“Thus, this governmental project was based on the generation of a power structure based on a direct relationship of the president with decisive social and economic sectors, the same ones that, under a corporate scheme, would share spaces of power and decision within the State.” (Montúfar 2008, p. 290).

Altogether, the plan for the “second phase” did not succeed and the creation of independent agencies was not possible. The return of Abdalá Bucaram, after eight years of exile, contributed to a significant increase of citizen’s discontent and protest, mainly in the capital Quito. The institutional crisis and the unconstitutional politicization of the judicial system discredited the “transformation project” of the outsider president and his intention to weaken the establishment. All this led to an institutional debacle and acute crisis for which Gutiérrez ended up being overthrown.

4.1.5 Decline

Among different decisions, the “Pichi-Corte”, annulled judicial trials and dropped the charges against three high-ranked politicians who were fugitives from justice: the ex -Vice President Alberto Dahik, former President Abdalá Bucaram, and Mahuad’s Vice President Gustavo Noboa.

Multiple scholars agree that Bucaram’s return on April 2, 2005, was one of the primary triggers of the overthrow of the outsider President Lucio Gutiérrez. Bucaram, who was accused of embezzlement, corruption and purchase of overpriced school supplies, returned after eight years self-imposed exile in Panama. Major television stations offered a live broadcast of Bucaram’s arrival, which caused great indignation especially for middle-class citizens in Quito who took to the streets and organized protests against Lucio Gutiérrez. Yet, peaceful mass protests were organized in several cities of the country for several weeks increasing the number of participants (Acosta 2005). One determinant protest was organized by Quito-based radio station “Radio La Luna”; it attracted over 150.000 demonstrators that marched to the presidential palace.

“For media commentators and opinion makers, as well as for most middle- and upper-class citizens, Bucaram’s return symbolized the lack of moral values of Gutiérrez’s administration.” (La Torre 2010b, p. 112).

Gutiérrez decided to dissolve the new Supreme Court, however few hours later on April 20, 2005, the Armed Forces refused to control the protests and stated the withdrawal of their support for the president. In the next morning, the Congress used the demonstrations to justify the ousting of Gutiérrez from the presidential office and declared the dismissal of

Gutiérrez by “*abandonment of office*” (Acosta 2005). The Congress selected Gutiérrez’ Vice President, Alfredo Palacio to assume the presidency (Mainwaring et al. 2006, p. 23).

Gutiérrez’ overthrow caused greater delegitimation of the Ecuadorian political institutions and parties. Once more, Ecuador was in a scenario of institutional crisis and ungovernability which enabled the emergence and later election of a new political outsider, namely, the Economist Rafael Correa.

All in all, the presidency of Lucio Gutiérrez was characterized by constant change of alliances and political instability. The principal concept suggested in this thesis, namely, the predominance of the executive, did not seem to be among Gutiérrez’ priorities therefore not even alternative strategies were implemented to achieve it.

Although the outsider president tried to stabilize his position by reaching agreements with several traditional parties of the establishment, these were mostly fragile. In addition, Gutiérrez did not recon with strong plebiscitarian linkages. The populist discourses that helped him to win the elections, lost their impact since the president changed his direction and broke the agreements with the indigenous ally shortly after assuming the mandate. Consequently, during critical periods he could not rely on mass support to defend him.

Many of the movements that supported his candidacy on first instance, especially the indigenous movement (except for its evangelic branch), drew back from the PSP project during his first year of mandate. Discontent and distrust of citizens due to Gutiérrez’ mutability and arbitrary decisions, were clearly demonstrated during the sectional elections of 2004, where the outsider party PSP was low represented.

These events had a debilitating impact on his image and led to the failure of strategies’ implementation. It can be said that it was too late when he pretended to reinforce his constitutional power and create independent agencies since he did not have “loyal” allies and popular support to back up his efforts. Furthermore, Gutiérrez did not even attempt to previously acquire the correspondent legal competences before making the decision of restructuring the judicial and electoral bodies, which instead of securing him the presidential

position led him into a debacle. Possibly, the anti-establishment discourse would have had better results if Gutiérrez himself had not ruled with the support of many of the members of the establishment, principally the traditional Partido Social Cristiano after the rupture with Pachakutik. Lucio Gutiérrez lacked credibility to convince citizens, which he might have achieved if his distancing from traditional parties had been real from the beginning.

4.2 Rafael Correa (2006-2009/2009-2013/2013-2017)

4.2.1 Background of Correa

Rafael Vicente Correa Delgado was born in Guayaquil on April 6, 1963. Correa was raised in a Christian middle-class family and had two more siblings. During his youth, Correa was former Boy Scout and volunteer in multiple Catholic missions, one of them being in a small indigenous town in the Andes where he learned to speak Kichwa⁷. In 1987, he graduated in economics at the Universidad Católica de Santiago de Guayaquil. Rafael Correa won several scholarships that allowed him to complete his academic studies abroad. In 1991, he obtained a Master of Arts in Economics from the Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium. In 1999, he obtained a second master's degree in economics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in the United States. Later in 2001, Correa earned a Ph.D. in Economics at the same academic center (Carreras 2014a, p. 31). After finishing his doctorate, Correa returned to Ecuador where he started to work as professor and became head of the Department of Economics at the Universidad San Francisco de Quito. According to Conaghan, Correa identified his ideology as that of a *“humanist Christian of the Left”* and was known in academic circles as an *“adamant critic of neoliberalism”* (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 264). He remained in the academic sphere until 2005 when he started to get involved in the Ecuadorian political arena.

4.2.2 Political placement

In April 2005, Rafael Correa participated in the mass protest that led to the overthrow of Lucio Gutiérrez. According to Philip and Panizza, Correa was the political heir of the protest group *movimiento forajido* (“outlaws movement”). In contrast to the demonstrations that led to the resignation of President Jamil Mahuad in 2000 (which were mainly organized by indigenous movements), the *forajidos* were principally “middle-class urban citizens”, who relied on radio programs and other means of communication accessible to civilians, to coordinate their

⁷ Ecuador's second official language

actions (Philip, Panizza 2011, p. 88). The *forajidos* used the slogan *que se vayan todos!* (everybody out) to target the political class.

Shortly after Gutiérrez' desertion, despite of his lack of political linkages and previous experience in public administration, Rafael Correa was nominated as the new Minister of Economy by Gutiérrez' interim successor, President Alfredo Palacio. Correa served as minister for the limited period of four months. He resigned due to disagreements with Palacio regarding latest decisions on economic policies (El Universo Ecuador 05.Aug.2005). Several authors agree that Correa's tenure as minister was crucial for the debut of his political career. After abandoning Palacio's cabinet, Correa launched his new political movement and positioned himself as one of the principal contenders in the presidential elections of 2006.

"The photogenic and loquacious young minister captured news headlines with his tough postures toward the International Monetary Fund and virulent opposition to a free trade agreement with the United States." (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 265).

Correa maintained a patriotic and anti-establishment rhetoric. On the one hand, he alluded to symbolic losses of Ecuador saying that the country had lost its sovereignty, dignity and national symbols. The national crisis and social abandonment forced a high number of compatriots to leave the country and emigrate, more specifically ten percent of the population (Bonilla, Montúfar 2008, p. 9). On the other hand, Correa pointed out the country's political and economic elites as the ones who were responsible for all the losses. As stated by Catherine Conaghan, the two main discursive lines of Rafael Correa at the beginning of his political career were 1) *"the degeneration of state institutions and the moral bankruptcy of the political class"*, and 2) *"the disintegration of the nation/homeland (patria) as a result of elite-imposed economic policies that scarified the public interest in favor of private gain"* (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 265). Rafael Correa blamed the traditional parties for degrading state institutions and abusing their power to dominate the country, he referred to them as *la partidocracia* ("partyarchy"). Additionally, Correa blamed the political elites for their affinity with the economic policies of the Washington Consensus and the negotiations for a free trade agreement with the United States, which he promised to discard in case he won the presidency. During his academic career, he wrote several papers criticizing the effectiveness of neoliberalism.

Correa argued that a radical rupture with the establishment was necessary and that, instead of an unrepresentative democracy, an “active, radical, and deliberative democracy” had to be achieved (La Torre 2014, p. 458). For the elections of 2006, Rafael Correa identified himself as the leader of the “citizens’ revolution” which would “prevail against the *partidocracia* and achieve social justice”. This time, the populist imaginary of “the people” contemplated a broader spectrum of the population besides the indigenous people.

The emerging outsider did not build a new party as such, but rather a political movement. A key element of his discourse, the word *patria* (motherland), figured as part of the name of the new political organization *Movimiento Patria Altiva i Soberana* (PAIS), later called Alianza PAIS (AP). In first instance, Correa surrounded himself by a small group of intellectuals, technocrats and political operatives. Some of them had political trajectories and experience in campaigning and administration. They attempted to reunite disperse leftist groups as well as forces that were involved in the *forajido* movement (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 267). The movement combined small political groups and independent professional and civil society associations. After reaching more than 100 affiliates by mid-2006, the “citizens’ movement” PAIS, acknowledge itself as an alliance. The movement’s platform proposed institutional reforms, anti-corruption policies, regional integration, and improvement of the economic policies for Ecuador's poor population (Carreras 2014a; Conaghan op. 2011; La Torre 2014).

After the failed experience of backing Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002, Pachakutik decided not to join or support any alliance but rather launch an own candidate from the CONAIE. Lack of alliances with established parties of the Left influenced to a certain extent the decision of Correa to candidate for the presidency without presenting any candidates of AP for the congressional elections (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 267).

Evidently, a foreseen lack of pro-government majority in the legislative represented a threat to the outsider president’s capacity to rule in case of electoral victory. However, despite “binding” his presidency to the realization of a Constituent Assembly, Correa used this tactic as a reinforcement of his anti-establishment discourse appealing to voters’ lack of confidence in traditional parties and persuading them to support the referendum to come (Doyle 2011; Philip, Panizza 2011).

4.2.3 Rise to power

By August 2006, the campaign had officially started. Since AP did not present any candidate for Congress, Correa's personalistic advertising strategy had an important impact on the development of the electoral contest. Several slogans resounded on television and radio playing on Rafael Correa's surname which, translated from Spanish, means belt or whip. Advertisement slogans like "*Dale Correa*" (Hit 'em Correa), "*Se viene el correazo!*" (Here comes a whipping) and "*Ya basta*" (Enough's enough) made reference to the outsider candidate's confrontation with the national elites and political establishment (Conaghan, La Torre 2008, p. 272). In several travels around the country and public appearances during the campaign, Correa brandished a belt to "enhance" the message that he would "*smack his political opponents*" (Doyle 2011, p. 1452).

From the beginning of his campaign, Correa promised to convoke a Constituent Assembly in order to write a new constitution that would activate a "participatory democracy", enable the rebuilding of the state and the redistribution of power towards the people (Philip, Panizza 2011, p. 89). The outsider candidate maintained that the "citizens' revolution" would displace traditional power holders and grant a new participatory institutional setting for citizens to express themselves and take part in public decisions.

The presidential elections of 2006 met with several peculiarities. First, members of the *Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE)*, who were previously elected by the Congress, issued a ruling that prohibited the participation of former President Lucio Gutiérrez from presenting his candidacy for the presidency. Furthermore, for the first time, the vote of Ecuadorians abroad was enabled for the 2006 presidential elections. Polling stations were available in various cities in the United States, Spain and other countries with great Ecuadorian influx (Conaghan 2007, p. 824). Additionally, 2006 elections counted with the largest number of presidential candidates since Ecuador's transition to democracy in 1979, that is, the first round was contested by thirteen candidates (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 267).

The majority of Correa's rivals were political veterans. Leading in most early polls was León Roldós, brother of ex- President Jaime Roldós, who was backed by the centre-left party Red Ética y Democrática (RED) and the allied party of his candidate for vice president, Izquierda

Democrática (ID). On the other hand, the right-wing Partido Social Cristiano nominated the former congressional deputy, Cynthia Viteri, who was the only female contender in the elections. Over again, for the third time, the millionaire Álvaro Noboa launched his candidacy backed by the Partido Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN). Since Lucio Gutiérrez was barred from the ballot, the candidate of Partido Sociedad Patriótica (PSP) was Gutiérrez' brother, Gilmar Gutiérrez. Among the representatives of leftist parties were Luis Macas, leader of the CONAIE, representing Pachakutik; and Luis Villacis, aligned with the Movimiento Popular Democrático (MPD). Furthermore, Fernando Rosero presented his candidacy as representative of Bucaram's Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) as well as five additional candidates from other minor parties (Conaghan 2007, p. 825).

The first electoral round took place on October 15, 2006. The two candidates that qualified for the second round were Álvaro Noboa with 26,8% of the votes, and Rafael Correa with 22,8%. Interestingly, despite the events against the ex- President Gutiérrez, in the third place was Gilmar Gutiérrez with 17,4% of the ballots (Lucas 2007, p. 113).

Several survey agencies coincided before the second round that Noboa was leading the polls. However, on November 26, 2006, in spite of his inexperience, Rafael Correa managed to win the presidency with 57% of the votes to Noboa's 43%. According to Catherine Conaghan's study, analysts attributed Correa's success to his efforts to gain Gutiérrez' supporters vote while Noboa failed to expand his campaign beyond the coastal provinces (Conaghan 2007, p. 827).

After the elections, it became clear that Alianza PAIS' lack of seats in the legislative would greatly increase the executive-legislative confrontation. With 28 seats of Noboa's PRIAN and 24 of Gutiérrez' PSP, the two parties had a majoritarian representation in the Congress composed by a total of 100 seats. Additionally, besides other small parties, 13 congressmen were of PSC, 11 of ID, 6 of PRE and 6 of Pachakutik.

On January 15, 2007, the outsider President Rafael Correa started his mandate with 73% approval rating (Lucas 2007). A conflict with the Congress was imminent since Correa promised during campaign to convoke a Constituent Assembly but an alliance of PRIAN, PSP

and PSC announce their plan to oppose it. The development of these events will be further analyzed in the section of the institutional “battle”.

At the beginning of his mandate, Correa’s cabinet was composed of 17 ministers but this number gradually increased to 21 (El Universo Ecuador 15.Jan.2007). Most ministers did not have political linkages or previous experience in administration.

4.2.4 Institutional “battle”

Avoidance of legislative and judicial consultation

From the beginning of his mandate, the outsider president was aware of the need to avoid opposition and blockages that hinder the referendum for the Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the implementation of the first strategy seemed urgent to achieve. Getting popular approval for Correa’s initiative, namely, obtaining positive results in the referendum for the creation of a new Constitution, would force the anti-assembly majority in Congress to accept the establishment of the new body.

Before winning the elections, Rafael Correa declared that his initiative was “non-negotiable” and that, if necessary, his government would organize mass protest to pressure the new legislative (Conaghan 2007). He also promised that as soon as he began his mandate, he would sign an executive decree ordering a national plebiscite. The opposition’s alliance argued that Correa’s plan to organize a plebiscite for a Constituent Assembly was unconstitutional and threatened the elected president with blocking it (Conaghan, La Torre 2008, p. 272).

As stated by Conaghan and La Torre (2008), Correa had to confront three immediate challenges. In the first place, it was crucial to ensure that neither the congress, nor the electoral tribunal or the constitutional tribunal block the conduction of the plebiscite. Later on, the results of the referendum should be in favor of a Constituent Assembly. Finally, Correa’s party should attain majoritarian representation. A Constituent Assembly controlled by the opposition could lead to political instability followed by a possible interruption of Correa’s mandate.

Among the reforms that were conceived for multiple areas, the Constituent Assembly should serve as a vehicle for the transformative process and for *“dismantling neoliberal economic reforms”* (ibid.). Therefore, Correa claimed that it was necessary to grant the new body with full powers to operate. Moreover, this implied that the Assembly would have the authority to substitute or dissolve other institutions even though they had been democratically elected.

“With full powers, the constituent assembly could do anything from disbanding the incumbent congress to handing powers to the president to govern by decree” (Conaghan, La Torre 2008, p. 272).

Nevertheless, shortly before the inauguration of the outsider’s government, despite alliances and previous declarations of the opposition, the PSP announce its support for the initiative. Lucio Gutiérrez made public declarations that PSP congressmen would vote in favor of the plebiscite. Since this shift was not enough for the approval of the plebiscite, the executive started a legal and political campaign against the adversaries. This confrontation led to the suspension of office of 57 congressmen and members of the Constitutional Court. The justification given by the Electoral Tribunal stated that they were obstructing the electoral process (Philip, Panizza 2011, p. 90). Although the actions were *“of an extremely dubious legal foundation”*, according to Philip and Panizza, this enabled the attainment of a 55-seat majority in the Congress in favor of the referendum. Other centre-left and leftist parties like Pachakutik and MPD joined the proposal. The support of Pachakutik could be expected because the movement contemplated the reform of the constitutional text with more inclusive articles already by the time of the election of Lucio Gutiérrez in 2002 (Lucas 2007).

The creation of the assembly was approved by a majority of 81.72% “yes” votes in the plebiscite held on April 15, 2007 (La Torre, Arnson 2013, p. 307). Then, in line with the Statute of Installation and Operation of the Constituent Assembly (which was approved as an annex in the consultation) the election of the 130 Assembly members took place on September 30 of the same year.

During the campaign, with regard to the representatives for the Constituent Assembly, Correa insisted on the differences with the establishment and the “moral superiority” that, according to him, distinguished his figure and the other PAIS affiliates from members of traditional

parties. The outsider president maintained that they were people with *“clean hands, lucid minds and hearts passionate for their homeland”* (La Torre 2014, p. 458).

The result of September elections was another triumph for Correa and a defeat for the traditional parties. With 80 of 130 seats, Alianza PAIS ensured a solid majority in the Constituent Assembly granting the outsider movement complete control over the creation of the new Constitution (Conaghan, La Torre 2008, p. 274). The second most voted party was Gutiérrez’ PSP with 18 seats. By November 30, 2007, the date of the inauguration of the Constituent Assembly, all the three challenges for Rafael Correa mentioned above were overcome.

Subsequently, the new formed Assembly declared the 2006 democratically elected Congress in “recess” and assumed all legislative powers (La Torre 2014, p. 458). Furthermore, it partially suspended the 1998 Constitution. The first directive of the Assembly stated that *“the Constitution remains in effect only insofar as it does not conflict with the decisions of the Assembly”* (Bonilla, Montúfar 2008; Montúfar 2013). In this context, the Assembly had a free hand in altering legal structures. According to César Montúfar, the Constituent Assembly helped the government through direct and indirect ways to exert influence on the judiciary, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, as well as the offices of the Comptroller General, Public Prosecutor, Solicitor General and the Ombudsman (Bonilla, Montúfar 2008, p. 4).

The first President of the Constituent Assembly, Alberto Acosta declared that the new Constitution was to be the *“means and end for structural changes”*.

“[I]t would crystallize the accumulated history of multiple social struggles and resistances and overcome market-centered, neoliberal and neodevelopmental concepts of economic progress: it would transcend the “capitalist Western lifestyle” and bring out a “new coexistence pact” expressed in the Quechua concept of sumak Kawsay, meaning buen vivir or good living.” (Montúfar 2013, p. 312).

In his analysis on the “Citizens’ Revolution”, Montúfar argues that the 2008 constitutional structure relied on three principal pillars: *“(1) a broad catalogue of constitutional rights and*

the development of constitutional guarantees for their application; (2) a hyperpresidential political system; (3) a plebiscitary model of democracy operating via elections and a variety of direct participatory mechanisms.” (ibid.). The second pillar mentioned by Montúfar will be further discussed in the coming section by the second strategy.

In a period of nine months the Constituent Assembly drafted an entirely new Constitution which ended up being ratified with 63,93% of votes via referendum on September 30, 2008 (La Torre, Arnson 2013).

The implementation of the first strategy was one of Correa’s main goals during his first months in office. As it was possible to recognize, in the first place, Correa had to avoid blockages by using different political, legal and fiscal tools to call for the referendum. Since it was not possible to order the plebiscite only through executive decree and the (unofficial) agreement with PSP was not enough to reach the needed majority in Congress and avoid blockage, the government looked for alternative ways even if they implied undermining other state institutions. At the end, it was through the decision of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, namely, the suspension of 57 deputies, that the process for the plebiscite could continue. Once the first barriers were overcome, members of the outsider’s party built a majority in the Constituent Assembly. After the Assembly dissolved the Congress, the scenario mentioned by Carreras (2014b) regarding executive-legislative conflict was practically discarded. Rafael Correa counted with the necessary support from the legislative to pass laws even if they did not comply with the still in force 1998 constitutional order.

Reinforcement of the constitutional competences of the executive

The scenario of the Constituent Assembly served the outsider president to enhance the power of the executive branch in different areas. In contrast with the Constitution of 1998, the new 2008 Constitution strengthened the presidential system and established several changes regarding the competences of the executive. The implementation of the second strategy was possible due to the mass support of Correa’s party who sought for the renovation of the constitutional Articles.

As discussed in the theoretical section, the presidentialist feature of *dual legitimacy* implies that neither the executive nor the legislative branch has the competence to interrupt the functions of the other. As mentioned by Juan J. Linz (1994), not even a process of impeachment could be really compared to the parliamentary *no-confidence vote*. Yet, the Ecuadorian 1998 Constitution provided the legislative with some legal tools to remove the president from office. For example, among the competences of the legislative, Article 130 numeral 1 indicated that the Congress could remove the President and Vice President of the Republic from their charges after an impeachment process, and/or in case of determining physical or mental incapacity to govern, and/or due to abandonment of office (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador 1998). However, there were no legal means for the President to dissolve the Congress.

The ability to dissolve the Congress was conceived for the first time in the 2008 Constitution. In accordance with the new Article 148, just for once in the first three years of the presidential term, the president will be able to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections if, in his opinion, it has taken up duties that do not pertain to it according to the Constitution, or if it repeatedly and without justification obstructs the implementation of the National Development Plan. The Article also states that the decision needs to have prior approval of the Constitutional Court (Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008).

This competence confers major bargaining power to the president, and most importantly to an outsider president, since he could use it to threaten the legislative in case it opposes to pass certain laws. As for the powers of the Congress to remove the president, these suffered minor changes.

Another new feature granted to the president in the 2008 Constitution is the permission for reelection. In the new document, the immediate presidential reelection is allowed. This new Article differs from the previous rule because it allows the president to run for an additional consecutive mandate. Beforehand, since the return to civilian government in 1979, the practice had been to ban immediate presidential reelection. According to Article 98 of the previous Constitution, the president could candidate for reelection for one single time after alternating the presidency for at least one mandate.

Given that the alternation mechanism was modified, the new Constitution enabled Correa the possibility of governing until 2017. After the approval of the 2008 Constitution, his (re-) election for the period 2009-2013 would be interpreted as a first mandate, this would give him the chance to be reelected for further four years between 2013-2017, which ended up being the case. Clearly, he had to win the elections in the first place, but according to Catherine Conaghan, this could be foreseen if one considered Rafael Correa's high popularity and the fragmentation of the opposition parties (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 272).

Besides reelection, the president gained more prerogatives and powers. The new Constitution granted presidential influence over constitutional oversight bodies including the Supreme Court and the Electoral Tribunal as well as the expansion of government outlets (Bonilla, Montúfar 2008, p. 5). The President obtained the capacity to influence on participation plans and *"convoke referenda on virtually any issue"*. This ability could be useful to avoid the conflict of executive-legislative stagnation (Conaghan 2016, p. 112). Regarding the attorney general's office and regulatory agencies, it became a duty of the president to designate lists to the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) from which the TSE should select officials (ibid.).

The 2008 constitutional document reinforced a state-centric economy giving the state the ability to exert "massive" intervention in the economy. The president attained more administrative and financial influence over local governments due to centralization of fiscal resources. The control of "strategic sectors" and extension of national planning became responsibilities of the executive branch (Montúfar 2013, p. 313).

It can be argued that the content of the 2008 Constitution leans towards hyper-presidentialism and a reduction of checks and balances on the executive. However, on a theoretical level, this shift has been justified as a means to "guarantee the effectiveness of recognized rights" (Philip, Panizza 2011). Either way, the reforms ensure the predominance of the executive branch and therefore, according to the premise of this dissertation, the new constitutional competences increase likelihood of the survival in office of the outsider president.

Creation of independent agencies

As discussed in the methodological section, this third strategy is to a certain extent a complement of the first strategy which poses the avoidance of consultation of the other branches. Through the creation of independent agencies, competences that traditionally correspond to the legislative or judicial branch can be transferred to an independent body, thus evading their influence. Independent agencies could also represent a way to institutionalize citizens' participation and grant more power to society to exercise direct influence.

When analyzing the government of Rafael Correa, it is possible to identify the implementation of the third strategy through the creation of a fifth state branch besides the electoral power, namely, the "Function of Transparency and Social Control" also called Social Participation Authority. The competences of this new branch were established in the 2008 Constitution. The new institution is based on direct participation of citizens and representatives of social organizations (Philip, Panizza 2011, p. 90).

The council of the institution is composed of seven members who are appointed after passing an exam that measures their knowledge and merits (La Torre 2014, p. 460). Among its competences, Social Participation has to incorporate and promote citizens' direct involvement in the structure of the state, monitor corruption in public institutions and fight against it, and nominate control authorities. This last competence, appointments in the judicial branch, was taken from the powers of the legislative body (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 272).

Moreover, Article 207 stipulates that after the corresponding selection process, it is also the duty of Social Participation to appoint the first authority of the Attorney General's Office from among the tender previously proposed by the President of the Republic. Similarly, to appoint the first authority of the Ombudsman's Office, Public Defender's Office, State Prosecutor's Office and the State Comptroller General. Additionally, it is responsible for appointing the members of the National Electoral Council, the Electoral Court and the Judiciary Council (Constitución de la República del Ecuador 2008).

The Transparency and Social Control branch is expected to promote policies of transparency, control and accountability. At a territorial level, Social Participation is expected to collect information from multiple instances of participation (assemblies, communal meetings, etc.) and articulate them in order to improve public investment, management of budget and also the elaboration of development agendas (Ortiz Crespo 2008, p. 16).

The establishment of this new institution, in addition to the role of the TSE, complement the structure of a plebiscitary democracy, which is characteristic of populist regimes as mentioned in the theoretical section. In line with César Montúfar, this kind of democracy operates through 1) *“direct and selective incorporation of social groups into decision-making process”*, and 2) *“systematic calls for plebiscitary events focused on renewing popular support for the president”* (Montúfar 2013, p. 314). Furthermore, he argues that rather than real articulation of social needs and interaction with the civil society, citizen’s participation is reduced to cooptation of specific social organizations for the purpose of street and electoral mobilization (ibid.).

Regardless of its theoretical autonomy, Transparency and Social Control requires the involvement of representatives of government entities to elaborate procedures. The creation of this institution reinforces the position of the executive since, indirectly, the president exerts influence in the determination of its agenda and priorities. Furthermore, despite being created in favor of participation and to embrace plural rights, several authors agree that it does not promote participation because there were several scenarios where groups demanded active involvement to which the government balked. The main form of participation is through elections, once elected the leader will decide on the policies on behalf of the citizens without engaging them in that process (Conaghan op. 2011; La Torre 2014; Ortiz Crespo 2008; Philip, Panizza 2011). In fact, during the writing process of the 2008 Constitution, Alberto Acosta, the first president of the Assembly, resigned due to differences with Correa regarding consultations with social movements since Correa insisted on reducing them.

“Through its Secretaria de Pueblos, Movimientos Sociales y Participación Ciudadana, the government opted for a top-down approach aimed at co-opting grassroots organizations and marginalizing those that dared to defy the president’s agenda.” (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 275).

4.2.5 Stabilization

After the approval of the new Constitution via plebiscite, the National Electoral Council called for national elections to execute the new institutional design. On the same day, April 26, 2009, Ecuadorian citizens had to vote to elect the president, regional executive authorities and for representatives of the National Assembly, which replaced the Congress according to the new Constitution. From a total of 124 seats, Rafael Correa's party Alianza PAIS once more attained the highest representation in the legislative with 59 Assembly members. The second force was Lucio Gutiérrez' Partido Sociedad Patriótica with 19 seats, followed by Partido Social Cristiano with 11 seats (Bowen 2010, p. 187).

As for the results of the presidential elections, Correa won 52% of the overall vote, being the first president in the electoral history of the country who avoided a second-round runoff. The victory of Rafael Correa had an important national scope, AP had majorities in 17 of the 24 Ecuadorian provinces, including the ones with largest populations like Guayas, Pichincha and Azuay (Conaghan op. 2011, p. 272). Eight presidential candidates took part in the 2009 elections. In second place was Lucio Gutiérrez, who obtained 28% of the vote, a better performance compared with the 2006 PSP's results (17%). In the third place was Álvaro Noboa who attained 11% of the ballots (ibid.).

A solid parliamentary bloc of Alianza PAIS conferred Rafael Correa important legislative support to realize his political agenda. One of the main differences of the scenario where Correa developed, in contrast to former presidents of Ecuador who were overthrown, is that he relied on strong partisan support in the Assembly. In contrast, Correa's predecessors faced legislatures dominated by opposition parties that constantly pursued to destabilize the presidential office for their own gain (Bowen 2010, p. 188).

As mentioned by Philip and Panizza (2011), in a four-year period (2006-2009), Rafael Correa faced five major political contests: to win the 2006 elections, to accomplish the call for the Constituent Assembly, to get majority of seats in the Assembly, to have the new Constitution approved and to win the 2009 elections. As it can be seen from the electoral processes, especially at a national scale, contenders from opposition parties had quite weak results which reduced their ability to influence.

An interesting difference with Lucio Gutiérrez is the role that indigenous people played during the first mandate of Rafael Correa. Confrontation with Pachakutik and CONAIE did not weaken the time in office of the second outsider president. Beyond their participation in the Constituent Assembly, the “Citizen’s Revolution” did not build substantial linkages with indigenous movements. Fractions of the CONAIE campaigned against the approval of the 2008 Constitution due to discontent with extraction laws among others.

It can be said that the sum of electoral victories along with the constitutional changes would seem to have brought stability (Bowen 2010; Philip, Panizza 2011). The national political scene gained a certain degree of predictability due to the high influence of Rafael Correa and his party allies in the state branches. The new scenario put an end to a decade of fragmentation and uncontrollable political unsteadiness; however, this was reached at expense of giving away the system of “checks and balances”. Without the approval of the new constitution and his plebiscitarian linkages it is hard to conceive that Correa could have survived his mandate.

From the collected evidence that could be observed, the second outsider president was able to implement the three strategies successfully and reshape the country’s political institutions. Correa’s antagonistic discourse served him to weaken the “partidocracia” in the electoral processes that were necessary for the fulfillment of the strategies. Additionally, during the drafting of the new Constitution, Correa redirected state resources and established policies of redistribution increasing social spending and the transfer of subsidies. Some authors agree that these measures helped him to gain more political capital, consolidate a clientelistic base and create an electoral majority (La Torre 2010a; Montúfar 2013; Philip, Panizza 2011).

In any case, Correa maintained his leftist populist discourse and government plan during his first mandate, which helped him to maintain high popularity rates in contrast to Gutiérrez who permanently changed his discourse causing citizens’ distrust. From a retrospective view, many adjustments and social investments were of vital importance for the development of the country which reduced poverty rates from 37,6% in 2006 to 22,5% in 2014 (Becker 2014; World Bank 13.Apr.2017)

All in all, during Correa's mandate, the executive branch "won" the institutional "battle", increased its ruling capacity and reached a predominant position. Hence, the outsider president could finish his mandate. Nevertheless, despite having seen the impact of the three strategies, it is important to remark that other factors that were not analyzed in this dissertation could have also played a role in the survival in office of Rafael Correa.

5. Conclusion

Presidencies of political outsiders have been characterized by their non-traditional style, namely, there are several examples of outsider presidents that did not reach the end of their term in office while others managed to get reelected. Therefore, to understand the reasons behind these different outcomes, the research question posed in this dissertation was: what factors are necessary for the survival in presidential office of political outsiders?

An answer to the question could be found through a combination of theoretical and empirical research.

In general, the theoretical framework of this dissertation provided the necessary tools for the empirical analysis. In the first place, the theory of presidentialism contributed to a better understanding of the system/scenario where outsiders emerge. Mainly, the election process and the principle of dual legitimacy in presidentialism seem to encourage the participation of inexperienced candidates, who can lead personalistic campaigns and gain popularity despite not having connections or support from traditional parties. Secondly, the definition of "full outsider" served to identify the principal features that distinguish this type of presidential candidates, namely, that outsiders arise outside the party system, lack a political career and compete in presidential elections with a new party. Moreover, institutional crisis, crisis of the party system, fragmentation and ungovernability were some of the principal arguments presented in academic work to explain the emergence of political outsiders. The literature review provided relevant information on the characteristics of this type of candidate. For example, scholars agree on the populist style of outsider leaders. A common populist rhetorical practice is the discourse of "them vs. us". Outsiders claim to be "true" representatives of the people, who will confront the common adversary (elites, oligarchy, etc.) because of their inability to tackle citizens' needs. In this line, outsiders maintain anti-establishment discourses and blame traditional parties for abuse of power and exclusion.

Additionally, outsiders establish strong plebiscitarian linkages and rely on mass mobilization. Furthermore, some of the perils of the election of outsiders identified by scholars were shown in the theoretical part. Two consequences that were especially relevant for the section of empirical analysis were: the increased risk of deadlock between the executive and legislative branches, and the deterioration of democratic institutions. After the literature review, the author of this dissertation has considered that there is a research gap on the performance of outsider presidents once in office, since there is a scarcity of academic information on how outsiders govern after victory and how they deal with conflicts with the other branches.

In order to answer the research question, this thesis proposed the hypothesis that the achievement of predominance of the executive serves an outsider president to culminate his term in office, given that the ruling capacity of the president increases and the influence of the other state branches is reduced. To test this, three mechanisms that should facilitate executive's predominance were posed. The methodological framework of this thesis, process tracing served to retrace the presidential mandates of the Ecuadorian outsiders and their implementation of the three strategies. It also served to structure and compare the results and information of the empirical analysis to find the causal mechanism that connects predominance of the executive with survival in office. The results showed that the use of the suggested strategies increased the likelihood of winning the institutional "battle" and subsequently, the survival of the presidential mandate. The presidency of Lucio Gutiérrez was found to be a "least-likely" case, since there was less evidence that confirmed the hypothesis of predominance of the executive. Rafael Correa was, on the contrary, a "most-likely" case. After the analysis of the two Ecuadorian outsider presidents, the findings confirm the hypothesis and show that when the strategies are successfully implemented the premise is fulfilled.

In the fourth chapter, the case selection for the empirical analysis proved to be appropriate, since the two outsiders corresponded to the features mentioned in the theoretical section. Both empirical examples fit into Carreras's definition of "full outsider" as Lucio Gutiérrez had no political experience before his candidacy, and Correa's participation in Palacios' cabinet was for less than a year and his experience is considered too limited to be categorized as insider. The main arguments presented in academic work regarding the scenarios where

outsider leaders emerge, such as institutional crisis, crisis of the party system, fragmentation and ungovernability, could be recognized during the empirical observation. Both Gutiérrez and Correa emerged in critical scenarios of political instability and traditional parties' lack of credibility. Two presidents had been overthrown in the five years prior to Gutiérrez candidacy, and after the removal of Gutiérrez by the time of Correa's emergence, the country had returned to a stage of ungovernability.

Moreover, all the characteristics of outsider leaders presented in the theory could be recognized in the two Ecuadorian outsiders. However, although both ex-presidents had a similar populist discourse during their campaigns, their styles developed in different directions after victory. Correa's style is defined by its anti-American and anti-neoliberalist character. In the case of Gutiérrez, before winning elections he maintained a leftist speech which was partially suspended after the inauguration of his mandate and his "turn to the right". After starting his mandate, Correa maintained a style of permanent campaign and used populist strategies offensively to reinforce his popular support and plebiscitarian linkages; while Gutiérrez retook his populist speech on a defensive manner in order to retain power once he was facing a crisis. Gutiérrez' rhetorical inconsistency and his approach to traditional parties were in part causes of his political deterioration.

Additionally, some of the consequences of the election of outsiders mentioned in the literature could also be recognized in the empirical section. For example, during Correa's mandate, the conflict between the executive and legislative branches could be observed through the gridlock scenario at the time when the president planned to call for the referendum on the Constituent Assembly. This ended up being solved after the suspension of deputies. Both outsider leaders showed attempts for power concentration in the executive branch, and a tendency to avert intermediary institutions. Especially in the presidency of Correa, plebiscitary democracy played a relevant role.

With regard to the institutional "battle", in the case of Rafael Correa, it could be seen that from the beginning of his mandate, the outsider president attempted to win the institutional "battle" through the creation of a new Constitution that granted the executive branch greater decisive power. In addition, the new constitutional version shifted competences (especially

from the legislative branch) to the new institution of “Transparency and Social Control”, reducing in that way the influence of the National Assembly in several areas such as appointment of heads of control and judicial institutions, among others. Correa managed to implement the strategies through constitutional changes that were approved by a majority of his party in the Constituent Assembly. Both the second and third strategies are reflected in the constitutional text. As for the first one, its implementation could be observed principally at the time that the Constituent Assembly was in session because Correa could rule without consulting the Congress since it had been dissolved, and the Assembly granted him power to govern through executive decrees.

On the other hand, during the presidency of Lucio Gutiérrez, evidence shows that by his first year in office he did not demonstrate any intentions to reinforce the power of the executive and to achieve its predominance towards the other branches. The strategy of Gutiérrez consisted on the avoidance of opposition by the establishment of pacts and agreements with legislative fractions in exchange of power positions in state institutions and other benefits. However, after the dissolution of his first alliances and being aware of the fragility of his last pacts, Gutiérrez started a campaign for constitutional reforms. Despite his efforts to reinforce the constitutional competences of the executive (among others), the implementation of the strategies was not possible since Gutiérrez was already facing an institutional crisis by the time he attempted to win the “battle”. Given that Gutiérrez was ousted before even calling for a referendum for constitutional reforms, besides the verbal promises on behalf of the outsider president no real attempts to implement the strategies could be recognized. Hence, it cannot be said that the strategies as such did not serve to achieve predominance, but rather that the outsider president failed in the process of their implementation.

When considering these two examples, an important finding is that it is necessary to strive for predominance of the executive from the beginning of the mandate. I consider this necessary and useful because, since the outsider has just inaugurated his mandate, the leader enjoys high popular support which can serve as a tool to press the other branches to accept his reform proposals. The example of Correa supports this finding because despite not having any representative of his party in the Congress (which could have been considered as a scenario

even more complex than that of Gutiérrez who had a minor coalition in the legislative), he took advantage of the political juncture to call for the Constituent Assembly.

Moreover, another finding is the key role of the legislative constellation. On the one hand, when considering the first mandate of Correa, it is possible to recognize that the majority of Alianza PAIS in the Constituent Assembly played a crucial role in the reinforcement of the executive branch. Without majority representation of his own party, and considering that the Assembly had “full powers”, Correa would have had to face a powerful legislative ruled by opposition parties and the constitutional changes in favor of the presidential office would not have been made. Yet, if the referendum for the assembly had not been approved and the 1998 Constitution would have remained in force, deadlock would have been imminent and Correa would probably not have finished his mandate. On the other hand, returning to the example of Gutiérrez, his change of discourse and lack of stable alliances in the Congress hindered the possibility of any reforms or calls for referendums. As Montúfar (2008) mentions, for Lucio Gutiérrez it was much more effective to be populist to win the presidency than to maintain power when he was under siege by the opposition.

All in all, it can be said that achieving predominance of the executive is a useful way for outsider leaders to survive the presidential mandate but it might carry hazards for the quality of democracy. Accumulating power in the executive branch, avoiding consultation of other branches and bypassing intermediary institutions creates a conflictive scenario and tension between two models of democracy. On the one hand, it can be argued that outsiders attempt to establish a model of democracy based on “popular sovereignty” and the involvement of citizens in policy making through electoral processes bypassing the other state branches. On the other hand, the above scenario contradicts principles of liberal democracy which is based on a system of horizontal accountability (checks and balances) and constraints on presidential competences. I agree with Colomer and Negretto’s observation: *“(...) the basic objective of democratic institutions should be the production of effective decision-making in correspondence with voter’s preferences. Specifically promoting greater integration between executives and legislatures and congruence between citizens and policy makers (...)”* (Colomer, Negretto 2005, p. 88). Although the participation of outsider candidates cannot be avoided, a stable party system, adaptation of party programs to changing scenarios and proper

articulation of citizen's needs could reinforce the identification of citizens with traditional parties and reduce the chance of election of an unknown inexperienced leader.

Finally, through the analysis of the Ecuadorian case, this dissertation has contributed to reduce the research gap on the performance of political outsiders once in office, however, further research is still necessary. It would be interesting to gather more information of additional empirical cases from outsider leaders in other countries, in order to compare if different outsider presidents also strive for executive's predominance and attempt to implement the strategies proposed in this thesis. It is relevant to know what other mechanisms do outsiders dispose to maintain popularity, to strengthen their position, and to achieve the survival of their mandates, and how they employ them.

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