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**Framing the Future of
European Integration after
Brexit. An Empirical Analysis of
Media Coverage in Germany
and France.**

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List of abbreviations

| | |
|--------|--|
| Brexit | The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union |
| EU | European Union |
| FAZ | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (<i>German newspaper</i>) |
| SZ | Süddeutsche Zeitung (<i>German newspaper</i>) |
| UK | United Kingdom |

1 Introduction

When the British Electoral Commission officially announced the British people's decision to leave the European Union on the morning of 24 June 2016, some politicians were already planning ahead. As early as the night before the disclosure of the final voting results, Marine Le Pen, like other eurosceptic politicians, had turned to Twitter construing Brexit as the opportunity to put an end to European integration altogether: "Victory of liberty! As I have asked for years, we must now have the same referendum in France and in the countries of the European Union" (Chan, 2016).

Yet the likelihood of such a development after Brexit was not uncontested in the European population. In a survey conducted in the week following the referendum, a majority of German citizens indeed expected the EU to start afresh on new foundations and emerge strengthened from the Brexit crisis (Ifop, 2016a). French citizens, on the other hand, were substantially less likely to anticipate a strengthening of the Union, while somewhat more respondents than in Germany expected other countries to follow the United Kingdom's path, leading to the breakdown of the Union (ibid.).

The present paper seizes on this finding of conspicuous differences between the French and German nationals by attempting to investigate its causes. More precisely, it examines in how far the differing expectations regarding the future of European integration can be traced back to respective framings in French and German media coverage after the Brexit vote. The research question can be formulated as follows:

"Why do expectations as to the future of European integration after Brexit differ substantially between Germany and France and, more specifically, which significance could media framing have in explaining this curiosity?"

The interest of such an analysis stems from both empirical and theoretical considerations. First, Brexit is a unique occurrence in the history of European integration, the consequences of which still remain largely unknown (Åslund & Djankov, 2017, p. 11). Nevertheless, indications for the presumption can be found that French and German people's expectations of the EU's future after Brexit may influence the real

developments taking place in this regard. For instance, Krizan and Sweeny (2013) showed that supporters of a public ballot initiative were more likely to turn out to vote if they maintained optimistic about the initiative's passage and thus its realization (p. 713). In the elections conducted in France and Germany in the year after the referendum, such a "motivating power of positive expectations" (ibid.) can be equally expected to play, or in the case of France, to have played a significant part.

In both countries, issues of European integration are likely to be of central importance and therefore carry some weight in the citizens' decision of supporting one candidate or party rather than another. Whether a citizen, however, effectively takes the trouble to cast a ballot for this party on election day may, based broadly on the concept outlined above, depend on how likely he or she considers the party's proposition for European integration to be indeed feasible and put into practice.

While this paper does not assert that the entirety of the electorate is or was impacted by such mechanisms, as probably not all citizens make their voting decision based on specific issues, at least for parts such considerations may play a role. Therefore, it can be assumed that future expectations as regards the EU have some influence in the elections and thus on whose propositions can be realized more likely than others. This is relevant even more so in Germany and France, as both are considered the central powers in shaping the Union's future (Hendricks & Morgan, 2001, p. 4).

An additional relevance of the paper arises out of a certain gap in literature. As will be outlined in more detail in the second chapter, only little research has so far been conducted on the impact of media framing in the context of European integration. Furthermore, none of these studies have dealt with citizens' expectations or the context of the Brexit decision. The present paper attempts to bridge this gap and thus contributes to the literature on both framing and the EU.

The analysis proceeds in four main steps. First, the existing studies in the paper's area of research are reviewed and discussed (ch. 2). Second, the theory and method of the analysis are presented, including a more thorough examination of the survey underlying the paper and an explanation of the frames searched for in the media content (ch. 3 and 4). This is followed, third, by the presentation of the study's re-

sults (ch. 5) and finally, fourth, by a conclusion and outlook (ch. 6). For the purpose of an indicative overview, the analysis will proceed along the lines of so-called deductive frame analyses, attempting to trace predefined elements in a given media content. Four French and German leading quality newspapers are examined for the prominence of articles emphasizing either a potential revivification of European integration in the context of Brexit or a potential paralysis in, or even regression of, the same. The results of this investigation are then put into relation with the survey results in search for resemblances and potential links pointing towards an effect.

While the paper will not be able to investigate and prove any kind of media impact empirically, the detection of parallels between framing and the expectations of French and German citizens would strongly suggest a connection between both aspects. This is due to both theoretical arguments and prior empirical findings regarding media influence, which are outlined in the course of this paper.

2 Literature and conceptual clarifications

2.1 Framing studies

Since the first half of the 1990s, framing studies have experienced a “dramatic growth” (Weaver, 2007, p. 143) in disciplines such as sociology, communication science, political science and psychology. This has led to an “intimidating multiplicity of approaches and definitions” (Campbell, 2009, p. 57) as to what the terms frames and framing describe. In one of the most frequently quoted definitions, Entman (1993) denotes framing in the following manner: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52).

Other definitions reflect a broader understanding. Helbling, Höglinger and Wüest (2008), for instance, suggest that while frames can be understood as schemata or “systems that guide our perception of reality — framing refers to the more or less consciously managed process, by which these schemata are manufactured, selected,

distributed and adopted“ (p. 8). Overall, two main characteristics of frames have been identified as recurrent in most of the literature: (1) Frames are patterns of interpretation which select and emphasize some aspects of reality while ignoring others and (2) frames connect the aspects mentioned in a specific way (Kühne, 2015, p. 25). This definition will serve as the basis for the present analysis.

So far, frames and framing have been investigated primarily at four levels (Matthes & Kohring, 2004, p. 56; Scheufele, 2004, p. 30): (1) at the level of political and societal actors attempting to launch their interpretations in the public debate, (2) at the level of journalists selecting and composing news in a particular way, (3) at the level of media content reflecting specific angles of reporting, and (4) at the level of recipients with their individual “mentally stored clusters of ideas“ (Entman, 1993, p. 53).

Symptomatic of framing studies generally, but especially of the fourth perspective of analyses, is a notion of effect. According to the approach, framing is relevant because the way an issue is presented has a common impact “on large portions of the receiving audience“ (ibid., p. 54). Although the measurement of framing effects has been contested by some researchers, numerous studies have confirmed this hypothesis, notably as far as frames in the media are concerned (Leeper & Slothuus, 2015, p. 2).

For instance, Brinson and Stohl (2012) demonstrated experimentally that framings of the 2005 London bombings in terms of “homegrown terrorism“ lead to more fear and support for restricting Muslims’ civil liberties than framing of the attacks as “international terrorism“. In a different context, Brewer (2008) demonstrated that individuals exposed to an article stressing the principle of equality became more supportive of the rights of homosexuals, and less supportive if it emphasized morality.

Framing, and specifically media framing, has thus been widely accepted to be influential. In fact, much of its power has been said to come “from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing its taking place“ (Tankard, 2001, p. 97). While the media framing perspective is therefore more and more prominent in research overall, it is still surprisingly underrepresented in certain areas of research (Matthes & Kohring, 2008, p. 258). Such an observation is valid, among others, for the field of European integration (Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 5).

2.2 European integration and Brexit

European integration can be understood as the peaceful and voluntary convergence of European societies, states and economies (Weidenfeld, 2011, p. 15). Although the integration in Europe is not limited to the European Union, the term has been predominantly used in literature in order to describe processes relating to the EU. This conceptualization also appears appropriate for the present study.

Considering historic developments, the characteristics of European integration have been notably described in terms of an increasing transferral of competences to the European level, a shift of focus from mere economic to more political matters and an increasing role for the European populations (De Vreese & Kandyla, 2009, p. 454). Over the time, the European Union has thereby developed into what can be broadly described as “a new form of supranational polity, which combines features of federal states and intergovernmental organizations” (Díez Medrano, 2003, p. 3).

If one considers the literature published in the field of European integration, a still only limited number of studies has so far addressed media framing, although this research interest gradually appears to become more important (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 2). For instance, De Vreese (2003) analyzed how media reports frame issues of European integration either in terms of conflict or in regards to economic implications. Other studies were conducted by Díez Medrano (2003) and Trenz (2005), the latter examining whether arguments used in media coverage of the European Union are related rather to interest, value or identity.

However, the literature still mostly focuses on other aspects relating to political integration in Europe. Among these are the behavior of the electorate in European elections, the positioning of political actors and citizens towards the EU, and the European Union as an issue of the public debate (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 2). For example, Hix and Marsh (2007) demonstrated that the European populations use the elections for the European Parliament mainly to punish their national governments. Koopmans (2007), on the other hand, showed that Europeanization has led to a greater role for governmental and executive actors in public debates.

Some of these studies have employed the framework of framing and are thus of particular interest to the present paper. For example, Helbling et al. (2008) have investigated how various national political parties frame the European integration process, Statham and Gray (2005) analyzed how political actors in the United Kingdom formulate their relationship to Europe, showing that EU supporters mainly emphasize economic arguments, and Díez Medrano (2003) indicates that opponents of the EU largely employ frames of sovereignty and national identity to devalue the Union.

Nevertheless, as mentioned before, genuine media framing studies still remain rather underrepresented. This is also the case as regards the growing literature on Brexit as a particular and incisive occurrence in the course of European integration (Papageorgiou, 2016). Frequently interpreted as the “biggest shock to hit the EU institutions since the creation of the European Economic Community” (Åslund & Djankov, 2017, p. 10), the British people’s vote in favor of leaving the European Union in June 2016 has so far been mostly analyzed either with regard to the drivers and explanations of the result or to the future relationship between the UK and the EU.

Despite this, at least a limited number of studies could be identified dealing with potential consequences of Brexit for the European Union, thereby thematically approaching this paper’s research interest. Koenig (2016), for instance, looked into different hypotheses as to the future development of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. However, media framing or even framing generally is, up to the present moment and to the author’s best knowledge, absent from this particular research area.

2.3 Media effects

A third set of studies that should be reviewed concerns the effects of media on individuals. While parts of this literature, namely the work on the effects of media frames, has already been addressed above, media effects studies, in general, address any change in knowledge, emotions, attitudes and behavior that can be directly or indirectly linked to media consumption (Schweiger, 2013, p. 19). Most of these studies are organized along particular theoretical strands, such as agenda setting, priming effects, cultivation theory, the “spiral of silence”, as well as framing theory.

Agenda setting studies, for example, analyze how the media influences the relevance individuals attribute to certain issues. Most notably, American researchers McCombs and Shaw (1972) theorized that “mass media set the agenda for each political campaign, influencing the salience of attitudes toward the political issues” (p. 177). The authors found evidence for this approach in an analysis of media coverage and public surveys in the context of the 1968 US presidential election.

Cultivation studies, on the other hand, investigate how the consumption of television broadcasts impacts individuals’ perceptions of social reality. Gerbner and Gross (1967), for instance, showed that the perceptions reported by people consuming a lot of fictional television often coincided with the images portrayed in such TV programs. Studies on the “spiral of silence”, finally, have indicated that individuals are more likely to express their opinion on a certain issue if it corresponds to the position reported predominantly in mass media (see e.g. Glynn, Hayes & Shanahan, 1997).

While the scope of this paper does not permit a detailed analysis of the entire media effects literature, it can be noted that an impact of media content has been frequently shown to be generally plausible but effectively conditional upon certain factors. Among these are, for instance, the characteristics of the audience: Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), for instance, showed that low levels of political knowledge often yield higher susceptibility to effects of political media coverage.

Zaller (1992), on the other hand, emphasized that media reporting needs a clear and consistent tendency to have an impact, a concept he called “one-sided information flow”. Page and Shapiro (1992) furthermore suggested that media effects should be expected primarily if the issues reported are remote from personal experience because, in these cases, other sources for the formation of attitudes are not available.

A very limited number of studies have investigated these effects and their conditionality in the context of European integration. De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006), for example, showed that citizens exposed to news coverage presenting the enlargement of the European Union in a positive way showed higher levels of support for such enlargements. However, this was only true in cases in which news media coverage on the issue was considerable in amount and had a coherent evaluative tone.

Some of these studies have furthermore used framing as their theoretical framework, similarly to the present paper. In particular, De Vreese and Kandyla (2009) analyzed how the framing of the common EU foreign and security policy in terms of “risk” or “opportunity” affected public support. Using a survey-embedded experiment, they found that participants exposed to the “risk” frame were less likely to support such policies, especially if they also reported to be afraid of globalization.

Schuck and De Vreese (2006) examined the same frames in the context of EU enlargement and found similar results. In line with Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007), they additionally demonstrated that individuals with less political knowledge were more affected by “risk” or “opportunity” frames. Existing literature thus generally appears to back the hypothesis that media framing has a potential impact on the public’s attitudes regarding European integration. However, the studies at hand have so far almost exclusively focused on current attitudes and opinions in this area, while the present study will propose a new angle by addressing future expectations.

3 Theoretical approach

3.1 Point of departure

Before setting out the main theoretical approach and assumptions of the present analysis, it is appropriate to provide more thorough information on the paper’s point of departure. As has been briefly alluded to in the introduction, the study’s research interest mainly stems from a poll conducted in the week after the UK referendum in altogether six EU countries, among others Germany and France. This survey “Les Européens et le Brexit”, carried out by French polling institute Ifop (2016a), revealed considerable differences between French and German citizens in regards to the expectations for future European integration after Brexit.

While German participants reported a certain optimism as to the future of the EU, more than half of the respondents expecting a strengthening of the Union after the Brexit crisis, French citizens were much more skeptical. Only about a third of these agreed with the German perspective, whereas a larger number than on the other side

of the Rhine river anticipated a breakdown of the European Union. As this is the key finding the present study builds on, a closer examination of the results is in order.




Figure 1: **Survey results regarding the expectations for European integration**

source: based on Ifop, 2016a, p. 58

To begin with, the substantiality and significance of the differences highlighted by the survey should be examined. In the case of the strengthening perspective (left columns), this will likely not be called into question, the margin of error reported amounting to 3.1 points at the most (Ifop, 2016a, p. 3; confidence interval of 95 percent). On the other hand, the significance of the gap in the disappearance response (right columns) is more likely to encounter challenges. However, several factors back the thesis that, also in this regard, the differences indicated by the survey hold true.

First, a follow-up survey conducted in November 2016 by the same polling institute confirmed the results. While the percentage of German participants expecting an EU breakdown remained at 27, the number of French citizens responding in this way even rose to 36 percent, hereby increasing the gap between Germans and French to 9 percentage points (Ifop, 2016b, p. 23). On the other hand, the dissimilarities in regards to the strengthening perspective remained almost identical to the initial poll.

Second, surveys presented by other institutes yielded differences similar to those demonstrated. In particular, a poll conducted by the British opinion research institute YouGov from June to July 2016 showed that French were more numerous to expect a domino effect than German respondents. Asked whether they estimated likely that other countries will leave following the UK's exit, 58 percent of French citizens responded in the affirmative, whereas 29 percent judged such developments unlikely

(Schmidt, 2016). On the other hand, only 50 percent of German respondents expected further exits, while 36 percent estimated this to be improbable (*ibid.*).

Finally, the Eurobarometer survey of November 2016 attested that French citizens were also generally less optimistic about the EU's future than Germans. While 50 percent of German respondents expressed optimism, only 41 percent of French citizens gave this answer and 56 percent even expressed pessimism (European Commission, 2016, p. 105). What is particularly interesting, these proportions were still inverted in the May 2016 survey, thus before the Brexit referendum, when a slightly higher share of French, as opposed to Germans, expressed optimism (*ibid.*).

Having reviewed these polls, it not only appears probable that both differences pointed out by the Ifop survey do indeed reflect actual and significant differences between the respective populations' expectations, but it also emerges as very likely that factors or considerations in the context of the Brexit vote had a substantial influence on provoking and shaping the differences. In this regard, the present paper seizes to assess the potential impact of one specific of those factors, namely media framing.

3.2 General approach and substantiation

At its core, this paper attempts to draw empirically corroborated conclusions on whether the differences between French and German citizens regarding expectations for future European integration after Brexit can indeed be plausibly traced back to respective media framings in the two countries after the Brexit vote. If one wanted to formulate the assumptions guiding the analysis, they would be the following:

(1) The higher share of EU optimism shared by German, in contrast to French, citizens stems from the more optimistic coverage of the EU's future in German media after the Brexit referendum. (2) On the other hand, the greater levels of eurosceptic expectations among French, in contrast to German, citizens is linked to a greater significance of EU pessimistic framing in France after the Brexit referendum.

At the outset and prior to results of the present analysis, support for these general assumptions derives from mainly four points. First, as Page and Shapiro (1992) have

argued, mass media is very likely to have an impact on citizens in areas that are remote from personal experience. This is particularly relevant in the case of European integration, as citizens have little other possibility to learn about EU affairs than through media, making them potentially susceptible to framing effects (Azrout, Van Spanje & De Vreese, 2012, p. 693). Surveys such as the Eurobarometer have substantiated this claim, showing that the media is citizens' main source of information about the EU (European Commission, 2016, pp. 190-192).

Second, support stems from a number of studies which have, in the past, demonstrated that mass media indeed impacts perceptions and attitudes towards the European Union. As outlined in more detail in the second chapter, several analyses have found that framing in media coverage has had an influence, for example, on support for specific European policies or EU enlargement. Such studies build an empirical foundation for this paper's analysis, working in a similar direction.

Third, especially as regards future expectations, a strong theoretical case for a media framing influence can be made. While current opinions and attitudes may be "based on low-information rationality" (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010, p. 207), such as party identification, researches have argued that the formation of future expectations reflects a complex cognitive decision-making process requiring high levels of information. This information is supposedly gathered largely through the media as it "provides rich information about future developments" (ibid.). The hypothesis resulting from such a consideration, namely that future expectations are affected to a larger extent by media frames than current attitudes, has been confirmed in an empirical study, providing further backing for this paper's approach (ibid, p. 210).

Finally, fourth, the Brexit vote arguably provides a particularly favorable context for a media influence regarding the aspects mentioned. As the referendum creates a situation of great uncertainty as to future integration of the European Union, citizens are likely to be induced to actively seek information, for instance from the media, in order to form their expectations. Simultaneously, after the referendum, media outlets are very likely to extensively cover prospects for the future of the EU, rendering it probable that the public will indeed come into contact with the relevant contents.

On the other hand, a number of arguments can be suggested which challenge the possibility of a media impact in the given context and propose alternative explanations for the results brought forward in the Ifop survey. Most notably, one could suggest that the differences in expectations between French and German citizens simply stem from lower levels of overall EU support in France, negatively influencing the response behavior as to EU integration anticipations. If proven, this would annul the puzzle and therefore render untenable an assumption of media influence. Yet in the present context, such straightforward presumptions are difficult to maintain.

First, theoretically, there is no obvious relationship between support for European integration and expectations in regards to the same. It is very well conceivable that a person is critical of the European Union but still anticipates it to last. More importantly, however, the detailed results of the Ifop survey indicate that even if one considers only those respondents who regard the membership of their country in the EU to be favorable, Germans remain by 15 percentage points more optimistic as to a strengthening of the EU than French respondents (Ifop, 2016a, pp. 60-62). Therefore, the puzzle, and thus the potential for a media influence, largely remains.

In spite of this, the share of the strengthening expectation in both Germany and France is substantially more elevated among EU friendly respondents in the survey, hinting indeed at a certain interrelation between EU support and this anticipation (ibid.). However, neither does this link appear comprehensive and exhaustive, nor can the direction of a potential influence be inferred based on this data.

As another possibility, one might suggest that the different expectations in France and Germany as to future European integration are rather due to framings issued by political elites of the respective countries than to frames in the media. Due to the power and position of the politicians, their assessments of the situation may appear credible and thus exercise an influence on the citizens. However, it should be considered that “political actors’ statements typically do not get direct public attention” (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 9). Instead, the statements must be selected by the media in order to be noticed by the broader public and are thus potentially subject to re-framings of the journalists (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is likely in the context of

the Brexit vote that the media's framings of future European integration are at least partly based on statements issued by politicians. In order to examine this, alongside the frames of the media coverage, their main sources will be recorded in the analysis, as well. Yet all in all, it can legitimately be stated that initial theoretical and empirical considerations rather support than refute the approach presented.

3.3 Frames examined and respective expectations

So far, it has been set forth that media framing in Germany and France after the Brexit vote is expected to have varied in terms of optimism or skepticism towards future European integration and that these framings may explain the puzzling differences in expectations between German and French citizens. In this section, the approach will be refined. In particular, this paper suggests that the presence of mainly two specific frames in the media lead to the variations in citizens' anticipations.

The nature and descriptions of these frames are based in large parts on the response options found in the 2016 Ifop survey, as it provides the puzzle this paper attempts to clarify (see Ifop, 2016a, p. 58). In some parts, however, they were slightly expanded in order to encompass prospects that likely possess a direct link with the respective responses. This should be reasonable to expect for those prospects reported in the media which, in congruence with the survey, address the political and institutional future of the EU in the context of Brexit and can be categorized as either integration optimistic or skeptical. If a link appeared refutable in a given case, the prospect was not included in order not to mitigate the results of the analysis. This applied, for instance, to anticipations relating solely to the economic situation in the EU.

The first frame hypothesized and examined in the present study was titled revival-opportunity frame. Reports employing this frame emphasize the potential of reviving European integration after the referendum and effective Brexit and are dominated by claims for, or the possibility of, furthering, advancing or improving the European Union through political reforms. An example for such a report could be an article quoting, above all, europhile politicians campaigning for an increased allocation of competences to the European level or highlighting the potential for a demo-

cratic reform of the Union's institutional framework. Under any circumstances, this first frame reflects a more optimistic or, at least, forward-looking perspective as regards the political future of the European Union. Its formulation is largely based on the strengthening prospect stated in the Ifop survey's first response option, which was expressed to a greater extent by German than by French respondents (Ifop, 2016a, p. 58). On the basis of this finding, the frame is expected to a greater intensity in German, in contrast to French, reporting.

The second frame hypothesized is referred to as the gridlock-dismantling frame. Reports with this frame focus either on a potential paralysis in European integration after the referendum or effective Brexit, for instance because decisions for improving the EU are rendered impossible due to internal disputes, or even a regression of the European integration process, for example because of further countries leaving the EU. Such a framing reflects a more EU pessimistic or turning-back perspective. Despite some theoretically derived additions, it is largely based on the Ifop survey's disappearance response option, stated to a greater extent by French than by German respondents (see right columns in ch. 3.1). Therefore, it is anticipated to have been more pronounced in French than in German media coverage, hereby possibly explaining the differences in regards to this response.

As can be inferred from both frames' descriptions, no difference is made between prospects after the Brexit vote and the effective Brexit in the frames. This may initially seem odd, as the Ifop survey only asked for citizens' expectations in regards to the latter. However, it is notably due to an observation from a short preliminary analysis showing that media reports rarely make a trackable distinction between the two, rendering the attempt for a differentiation artificial and likely inaccurate.

In addition, whether a report draws up a prospect for the EU after the referendum or after the effective Brexit can hardly be expected to have a differential effect on the expectations reported in the survey. While plans to change the EU may be presented earlier, the implementation of most of them will probably take until the effective Brexit anyway. It therefore suffices, in order to maintain the possibility of evincing a potential link between the frames and the Ifop survey, to postulate that the media

reports associate the future prospects for the EU in some way with the Brexit decision. The following table summarizes the key characteristics of the two frames:

| frame | description | examples |
|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| revival-opportunity frame | emphasis on a potential revivification of European integration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • chance for institutional reforms • trigger for a European army |
| gridlock-dismantling frame | emphasis on a potential paralysis in or regression of European integration | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • threat of other exits or referenda • incapacity to reform and improve |

Table 1: **The two main media frames examined**

source: own table

Two elements of criticism, in particular, may be voiced against the frames theorized. First, readers may criticize the frames' configurations and specific descriptions as they are not based on existing literature or prior findings, but mainly rest on the author's considerations. While this reproach is generally justified, it must be acknowledged that it is standard procedure in framing studies to develop one's own frame descriptions and operationalizations in cases where previous research is, as in the present context, not available (see e.g. Schuck & De Vreese, 2006, p. 13).

In addition, as has been explained, the frames do in fact have an empirical basis, namely the Ifop survey they are expected to elucidate. In any way, however, this paper does neither stipulate from the outset that the frames are without doubt found in the media in the precise configuration reported, nor does it lay down with certainty that both frames have an impact. Instead, both of these considerations are subject-matters of examination that will be assessed in the course of the paper.

Second, criticism may be raised against the frames themselves. Notably Leeper and Slothus (2015) have argued that many studies have confounded framing, defined as the act of "highlighting and emphasizing information and beliefs already present in a debate or the public's minds" (p. 5) with the action of providing new or additional "substantive information and arguments" (p. 3). Following this line of thought, the two "frames" hypothesized in this paper may rather fall into the second category, as it is unlikely that all arguments and information mentioned in media coverage on

future European integration are already known to the public. Nevertheless, this very restricted definition of framing proposed by Leeper and Slothus is in no way undisputed in literature. As mentioned above, multiple approaches and definitions co-exist, none of them being unambiguously better suited than the others.

It therefore suffices to specify at this point that the definition underlying the present paper, conceiving frames notably as patterns of interpretation which select and emphasize some aspects of reality while ignoring others, does not explicitly exclude that new information and arguments are also presented (Kühne, 2015, p. 25). To finalize this section, it may be useful to provide some additional information on the specific nature of frames examined in this paper, as this will allow for a simpler comparison with previous framing studies.

First, frames have been divided into cognitive and textual frames (Scheufele, 2004, p. 30). While cognitive frames are individuals' personal frames in thought and refer to the "cognitive understanding of a given situation" (Sheafer & Dvir-Gvirsman, 2010, p. 207), textual frames are frames in communication, particularly examined as structures of media reporting. The present study primarily investigates the second type of frame. In doing so, however, it attempts to draw inferences about potential effects on citizens' expectations, which could be considered cognitive frames.

Second, as regards more specifically textual and media frames, distinctions have been made between formal and content-related frames (Matthes & Kohring, 2004, pp. 41-43). While the first type is more abstract and regards the general composition and presentation of a text, the second type of frame focuses on the actual substance and information presented in a communicating text. As can be inferred from the frames' descriptions presented, the latter are examined in this analysis.

Third, a further subdivision can be made between generic and issue-specific frames. While both types are related to the content of a communication, generic frames are conceived as universal and superordinate motives such as morality, ethics or progress that are reflected in a text (Potthoff, 2012, pp. 20-21). On the other hand, issue-specific frames are only found in a particular topic area. As the precise frames hypothesized in this paper are exclusive to the field of European integration, only

the second type of frame will be examined. Finally, especially as regards effects, framing studies have been divided into equivalency and emphasis framing studies.

The first type analyzes frames that are characterized by “logically equivalent words that highlight positive or negative aspects of an issue (e.g. 5% unemployment versus 95% employment)” (Kapuściński & Richards, 2016, p. 236), whereas the second type analyzes frames offering different perspectives on an issue “without the assumption that the information is factually equivalent” (ibid.). Equivalency is not presumed in regards to the frames examined in the present study.

Having elucidated the theoretical basis and approach, it is now sensible to present the methodological design of the analysis, set up to capture and compare the presence of the two frames in French and German reporting. In this section, information will also be provided on the merits and possible limitations of the design selected.

4 Research design and method

4.1 Selection of countries, media content and assessment period

First of all, it is reasonable to set out the geographical scope of the analysis. As has been already hinted at, the present study will focus on the two European countries Germany and France. This selection is motivated, on the one hand, by the startling differences pointed out between the countries in regards to citizens’ expectations of future European integration. It is furthermore worthwhile, as France and Germany have and will probably continue to play “pivotal roles in shaping Europe” (Krotz & Schild, 2013, p. 1). Finally, in both countries, elections crucial for the future of the EU are organized in the year after the referendum, in which expectations as to future European integration after Brexit likely play a role (Schick, 2016; Smith, 2016).

If one compares the circumstances under which news framing and potential media influences are investigated in Germany and France, one quickly comes across both major similarities and differences. As regards the respective media systems, for instance, researchers repeatedly point out strong resemblances. In one of the most recent global typologies of media systems, incorporating a number of elements from

Hallin and Mancini's approach (2004), Blum (2005) places both countries in the same "North European public service model". According to this model, Germany and France are characterized by extensive media freedom, little political parallelism between the media and political parties, a financing of the media assumed by the market and the state, and a strong public service orientation of the media (Blum, 2005, pp. 5-6).

In other areas, however, the presence of significant differences between the countries cannot be denied. Such dissimilarities span, for example, from the political systems, Germany being characterized by strong federalism, while France is considered a centralistic state, to the economic and societal cultures (Krotz & Schild, 2013, pp. 3-4; Slomp, 2011, p. 378). Likewise, the citizens' political orientations in France and Germany also differ in important regards. French citizens overall appear to be less supportive of the EU than Germans, almost a third stating that their country would be better positioned for the future if it was outside of the EU, whereas no more than 17 percent of Germans share this sentiment (European Commission, 2016, p. 53).

These considerations illustrate that the investigation of framing effects in Germany and France is obviously not conducted against truly identical backdrops, rendering it impossible to rule out the entirety of other potential factors which may have also played a role in shaping the different expectations. Nevertheless, as both substantive theoretical arguments and prior findings strongly point towards a potential media influence, it can be expected that the empirical assessment of such an influence will yield essential results towards explaining the puzzle provided by the Ifop survey.

Second, it is necessary to indicate the specific media content analyzed with the aim of drawing conclusions on the plausibility of framing effects. In both countries, it was decided to examine the reporting in the respective opinion leading quality newspapers. In Germany, these papers are the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ) and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), in France *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro* were selected (ACPM, 2017; Böhringer, 2017). The decision to analyze the most widespread quality newspapers was taken not only because of their large distribution but notably because they are expected to "exert a key influence on other [domestic] media actors" (Helbling et al., 2008, p. 14) and are thus fundamental for shaping the general

tone of the media in the respective country. Relating thereto, citizens repeatedly report to rely on mass media as their main source of information about the EU (Azrout et al., 2012, p. 693; European Commission, 2016, pp. 190-192). Taken together, the four papers are likely to directly or, via other media outlets, indirectly influence citizens' perceptions even if their readership is declining (Böhringer, 2017).

A second reason to choose this specific set of papers is the fact that it enables to cover the same political media orientations in each of the two countries. While SZ and Le Monde are center-left newspapers, FAZ and Le Figaro are generally qualified as conservative or center-right papers (Alarcón, 2010, p. 401). This prevents that differences in framing detected between France and Germany are merely due to the fact that, in each country, papers of only one specific orientation were analyzed, potentially leading to false conclusions on the countries' general tone of the media.

In terms of time, the analysis of media content was determined to cover the first week after the announcement of the referendum results. This is above all justified because the conduction of the Ifop survey initiated already a few days after the referendum. Therefore, if an impact of media framing after the Brexit vote is to be established as plausible, such a framing has to be identifiable before most citizens were questioned. In addition, the first week after the vote is probably also the timeframe that most articles covering subject matters relevant to the analysis were published.

A number of clarifications regarding the retrieval and selection of the material are in order. As regards, first, accessing the newspaper content, respective databases for each of the papers are used (i.e. LexisNexis for Le Figaro and Le Monde, and the newspapers' own archives for FAZ and SZ). To select the relevant articles in the databases, in an initial step, all reports that include the keyword "Brexit" and were published between 25 June 2016 and 1 July 2016 are scanned.

Of these, only those articles enter into the final and detailed analysis that include at least one clear claim or anticipation regarding the political future of European integration after Brexit or the Brexit vote that corresponds to one of the two frames outlined above. Whether this is indeed the case, is assessed based on a category scheme presented in chapter 4.4. Such selection criteria naturally have significant implicati-

ons for the analysis and should therefore be backed up by theoretical considerations. In the present study, the criteria were drawn up, above all, with the objective of focusing the analysis on its main aim. As explained, the study wants to examine a link between media framings and the expectations expressed in the Ifop poll. Therefore, an inclusion of articles that present much broader or different frames than those developed based on the survey would dilute the analysis and mitigate its results.

For instance, the Ifop poll specifically asked respondents about their expectations as to European integration in conjunction with Brexit. This explains why articles that do not mention the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union, internationally referred to as "Brexit", are understandably not regarded (Flood, 2016). In the same line, it appears reasonable not to include articles focusing solely on prospects for the economic and financial situation after Brexit, mentioning "uncertainty" as to the future of the European Union or stating that Brexit could "weaken Europe" without clearly referring to the European Union. While such articles may be of interest to another analysis, their potential link to the Ifop poll results is much less evident than for the frames developed based on the survey, entailing that a comparison of such media reports in Germany and France would not yield results that are very meaningful and informative for explaining the puzzle.

In closing, it should be added that letters to the editor and press reviews are excluded from the analysis. This is common for these kinds of studies, as readers do most likely not perceive them as integral journalistic components of a newspaper, rendering it implausible that they have the same influence on the public and media outlets as other articles (Hilsmann, 1997, p. 44; Reith, 2014, p. 242). Likewise, reports published on regional pages or in regional editions were not considered. While all of these decisions may certainly be criticized, they appeared necessary to the author in order to limit the scope of the study in a reasonable and transparent way.

4.2 Deductive frame analysis

So far, it has only been outlined that, at the paper's core, a frame analysis of newspaper coverage is conducted prior and in order to drawing conclusions on the plausibi-

lity of a potential media impact on citizens' expectations. The specificities of this analysis have, however, up to this point not been explained. Indeed, it is important to consider that the term frame analysis itself only describes what is being looked for in an element of communication, namely frames, but not which method is used to proceed in this matter (Potthoff, 2012, p. 282).

In consequence, a variety of methodological approaches have been developed and applied in earlier studies. As regards the measurement of media frames, in particular, Matthes and Kohring (2008) have identified mainly five different approaches: a hermeneutic approach, a linguistic approach, a manual holistic approach, a computer-assisted approach, and a deductive approach (p. 259).

While it would be of little value to present each of these approaches in all their details in the present paper, it may be useful to address that the methods differ from each other notably by reflecting diverging responses to the following questions: Are the frames measured inductively or deductively? Are they recorded in a qualitative or quantitative manner? Is a manual or a computer-aided coding conducted? Are the frames identified directly or as a sum of indicators? And are the units of examination entire articles or individual propositions (ibid., pp. 259-263)?

Each of the methods and underlying decisions naturally has specific assets and drawbacks. For instance, those approaches providing "sharp and reliable measures may fall short in terms of validity" (ibid., p. 263). The choice of a method must therefore depend on the specific research interest pursued in a given analysis (Potthoff, 2012, pp. 283-284). As the interest of this analysis is to trace previously defined frames in newspaper coverage, namely those described above, and not to inductively detect new frames in the course of the study, the deductive approach was chosen.

This approach, for instance applied by Schuck and De Vreese (2004) in their analysis of newspaper framing of EU enlargement, is characterized by the coding of theoretically derived frames in a content analysis. According to Matthes and Kohring (2008), it offers advantages in terms of objectivity and reliability but is "quite inflexible when it comes to the identification of newly emerging frames" (p. 263; also Matthes & Kohring, 2004, p. 60). The latter does, however, not undermine the present study,

as its aim is not to comprehensively reveal elements of all potential frames included in the articles but to focus on the specific frames that may elucidate the Ifop survey.

Perhaps a more serious criticism may concern the risk that a deductive method could not allow for an accurate capturing of the frames expected. Most notably, even if perspectives of revival and dismantlement were in principle indeed central to the coverage of future European integration after Brexit, they might not be correctly detected in the material because of inadequate operationalizations determined beforehand. The paper will at least attempt to reduce this risk by applying a qualitative method of analysis, the benefits of which are explained in the following section.

4.3 Qualitative content analysis

The decision for a deductive approach is only the first step in choosing the method of any framing study. Above all, in contrast to some of the other methodological approaches presented above, opting for a deductive design does not determine whether a quantitative or qualitative analysis will be conducted (Matthes & Kohring, 2004, p. 61). In the present study, a decision in favor of a qualitative design was taken. This is expected, most notably, to permit a more detailed and in-depth analysis of the material examined, as the paper's aim is not exclusively to count the presence of the frames hypothesized (frequency) but also to provide a report on the specific manner in which the frames occur in the text and through which statements they are formed. More specifically, it was settled, with some adaptations, for the content analytical procedure of deductive category application, described by Mayring (2000). As a content analysis is an empirical method to describe content-related and formal features of a text and as media frames can be regarded as such features, content analysis has been recognized as a suitable method for capturing frames (Potthoff, 2012, p. 283). The procedure of deductive category application, in particular, appears suitable, as it is both a deductive and qualitative type of content analysis and therefore corresponds to the methodological aspirations outlined in the preceding sections. To provide some details, the method works with a system of categories formulated in advance to which the passages of a text are assigned (Mayring, 2000, p. 5).

In order to guarantee intersubjectivity, “explicit definitions, examples and coding rules for each deductive category [are stated], determining exactly under what circumstances a text passage can be coded with a category” (ibid.). These definitions are combined in a coding scheme that can, if necessary, be revised over the time of the analysis. As for the present paper, the purpose of the content analysis consists in capturing the frames described, this study’s category system will be largely based on the frames’ descriptions outlined in chapter 3.3.

Especially one major adaption to the standard procedure of deductive category application is made for the purpose of this analysis. While studies employing the method usually, at least as an intermediate step, code each sentence or proposition separately, the unit of examination of this study is set to one article. This is due to the finding mentioned earlier that reporting needs a clear and consistent tendency to have an impact on citizens (Zaller, 1992). The evaluation of single statements without consideration for the context is therefore unlikely to yield meaningful results.

Instead, in the present study, articles are directly categorized as a whole, based certainly on the specific statements included but also on the emphasis and prominence of certain passages and their connection with title and lead sentences. The coding rules necessary for these categorizations are provided in the category scheme. Afterwards, the articles are furthermore compared with the other articles published on the same day in France and Germany respectively, providing a measure for the overall consistency of a frame on a day of newspaper coverage.

4.4 System of categories

The figure below shows a simplified display of the system of categories used for the purpose of the present analysis. A detailed version including coding rules and examples is attached in Annex I. Some explanations to the system are in order. First, the central indicator for the classification of any article is the nature of the main prospect emphasized (I 1). This is the indicator on the basis of which the framing of each article is determined. While the category C 1 is linked to the revival-opportunity frame, categories C 2 and C 3 are assigned to the gridlock-dismantling frame, each

| indicator I 1 "nature of main prospect emphasized" | | |
|---|--|--|
| category | short definition | mapping to frame |
| C 1: furthering | • exclusive or predominant prospect concerns advancing, furthering or improving European integration | ► revival-opportunity frame (b/c clear forward-moving perspective after Brexit/Brexit vote) |
| C 2: standstill | • paralysis; core message is that major improvements or advancements (as in C 1) are impossible/very unlikely | ► gridlock-dismantling frame (b/c clear EU pessimistic perspective; no moving forward possible) |
| C 3: regression | • decay/dismantlement; exclusive or predominant prospect concerns rolling back European integration | ► gridlock-dismantling frame (b/c clear EU pessimistic perspective; moving integration back) |
| C 4: mixed | • multiple prospects (according to C 1, C 2 or C 3) are presented to a similar extent without clear prioritization | ► "mixed frame" |

| indicator I 2 "main source of dominant prospect evoked" | |
|--|---|
| category | short definition |
| C 1: journalist | • authoring journalist's considerations/evaluations are the central elements yielding the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1) |
| C 2: politician | • politicians' statements/claims/proposals are the central elements yielding the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1) |
| C 3: expert/other | • experts' or others' assessments are the central elements yielding the dominant prospect (as coded in I 1) |

| indicator I 3 "specific prospects mentioned" | |
|---|---|
| category | short definition |
| C 1: more exits/ref. | • other exits from EU or referenda to exit EU |
| C 6: more eco/soc | • more integration/cooperation in economic/social areas |
| C 11: €-zone more int. | • more integration in/of eurozone (e.g. euro-minister of finance) |

... (for a full list see Annex 1)

Table 2: **The category system (simplified)**

source: own table

of them emphasizing a rather EU pessimistic perspective but with a different focus. An article is coded with one of the three categories based both on the claims reported in the text, for instance a eurosceptic politician calling for other exits, and potential suppositions expressed, for instance an expert or the journalist judging ad-

vances in European integration very likely. If only one of the prospects stated in the three categories is mentioned, the article is coded with this category. If more than one prospect appears, an evaluation of the dominant perspective is performed, based on the prominence of each of the perspectives, the title, as well as first and last sentences. The article is then coded with this prevalent prospect.

If no one perspective can be singled out as dominant, the article is assigned to a fourth “mixed” category. Justifiably, the step of selecting a dominant prospect can be contested, notably because a last discretion in determining the selection will always persist even if the rules are stated in a very explicit way. However, the inclusion of a fourth category for articles that indeed present multiple prospects to the same extent, as well as the qualitative manner of analysis, permitting to add notes for difficult articles that can be picked up later, should relativize such criticism. Finally, as explained above, if a given article does not correspond to any of the categories of the indicator, and thus to the frames, the article is not regarded in the final analysis.

To supplement the first indicator, two additional indicators were generated in order to facilitate a more detailed analysis of the framings in French and German media coverage. First, the indicator I 2 mainly serves to trace the origin of the frames described. As has been mentioned in the theoretical part, media framing might well be shaped by politicians’ framings, especially in a case such as Brexit and European integration. On the other hand, it is possible that the journalists themselves take the initiative and present their estimations and demands. Finally, they may also quote experts, such as political scientists, or other sources.

Second, the indicator I 3 allows for a more lucid investigation of the specific prospects mentioned in the individual articles. In contrast to the other indicators, the categories for this indicator were largely not specified before the analysis but developed and adapted over the course of the first codings to maintain as much information in the analysis as possible. With the same goal in mind, the general rule of assigning any one material exclusively to one of the categories was loosened for this third indicator. This is acceptable, above all, because the categorizations of articles based on I 3 and I 2 are not intended to be interpreted by themselves. Instead, results

from both indicators will serve as bases of information for a qualitative evaluation of the frames measured by means of indicator I 1. This will become clearer in the fifth chapter, in which the results are presented and discussed.

4.5 Central limitations of the research design

Before proceeding in this manner, however, it appears appropriate to recall that the rather descriptive frame analysis performed in this study is only an intermediate step in attempting to draw conclusions on potential media impacts. The goal of this paper remains to elucidate the differences in expectations between French and German citizens as demonstrated in the 2016 Ifop survey. Media framing was chosen as the parameter the plausibility of a potential impact of which is assessed.

However, such a research design is naturally exposed to fundamental criticisms, most notably because it is unable to establish and prove, in any way, a link between both phenomena. Although, as outlined in chapter 3.2, both theoretical considerations and prior empirical, and in part even experimental, findings point towards a likely media influence in the given context, the paper will not be able to rule out all other potential explanations. Therefore, even if similarities between media framing and expectations are detected, this finding would not automatically imply causality.

At its best, the paper will thus only be able to point out that an effect is plausible. This would be the case in the given study (1) if the media framing of future European integration is found to substantially differ between Germany and France and (2) if the nature of the differences corresponds to the results of the Ifop poll.

5 Results

5.1 Initial overall findings

In this section, the results of the frame analysis and their implications for the plausibility of a media impact on citizens' expectations are presented. To begin with, some measures concerning the entirety of media reporting may be of interest. First,

it can be noted that over the week-long assessment period, a total of 220 articles in the four newspapers were detected that correspond to the selection criteria outlined above. Accordingly, these 220 articles addressed subject matters expected to be linked to the Ifop survey results and could thus be coded with either the “furthering”, “standstill”, “regression” or “mixed” categories of the scheme.

This first measure indicates that the categories hypothesized, and thus also the frames described by them, were indeed clearly present in German and French media reporting after the UK referendum. Per day of newspaper coverage, an average of 37 articles was published in the four newspapers that permitted a categorization, this figure being substantially higher in the first days after the Brexit referendum.




Figure 2: Summary of preliminary overall findings

source: own illustration; data from Annex 2

Judged from the number of articles coded with each of the categories, the revival-opportunity and the gridlock-dismantling perspectives were overall represented to a quite similar extent. 42.3 percent of all articles in Germany and France featured a revival-opportunity frame, measured by means of the “furthering” category of the first indicator, and 38.6 percent featured a gridlock-dismantling frame, as described by the categories “standstill” and “regression”. The remaining 19.1 percent were “mixed” articles, including characteristics of both frames to the same amount.

If one considers the presence of the frames over time, an interesting pattern is identifiable. While the gridlock-dismantling frame is dominant in the papers' first two editions published after the announcement of the referendum results, its share is sharply smaller in editions three, four and five, before rising again in the sixth editions. Inversely, the proportion of the revival-opportunity frame constantly rises up to the fourth edition, before dropping again in the last editions analyzed.

While this trend cannot be explained down to the last detail, it appears to be linked in large parts to the space the newspapers provided for claims of eurosceptic politicians. Especially in their very first editions after the Brexit vote, both French and German newspapers provided a very prominent space to proponents of a domino effect, like Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders. The claims of these politicians were presented in entire articles, often without any evaluation put forward by the journalist. The share of such articles, on the other hand, decreased in subsequent editions.

As regards overall results from the indicators of main sources (I 2) and specific prospects (I 3), it should be repeated that their main objective is not to provide insights by themselves, in isolation, but to serve as reference points for the qualitative comparison of frames between Germany and France. Nevertheless, a brief statistic for these indicators can be provided here. Concerning the frames' main sources, most articles' frames overall were found to be based on statements or proposals of politicians (47.8%). To a smaller extent, journalists' assessments were also of importance in shaping the frames (32.6%). On the other hand, only a smaller number of articles were greatly influenced by comments of other sources, such as experts (19.6%).

Regarding the specific prospects (indicator I 3), a variety of options was mentioned. Some of the most recurrent categories developed in the course of the analysis related to further exits of other countries, the dissolution of the European Union, more economic and social cooperation, more foreign and security cooperation, an increased integration within the eurozone, general reforms to the European Union, and a more democratic and transparent institutional system (for a full list, see Annex I). More detailed and comparative insights regarding the specific prospects will be provided in the sections of qualitative evaluation.

5.2 Frequency comparison of frames in Germany and France

According to the central expectations of this paper, the revival-opportunity frame should be found to have been more pronounced in German than in French reporting, whereas the inverse is expected to have been the case in regards to the gridlock-dismantling frame. If one considers, first, the simple quantitative measure of relative frequency based on the number of articles coded with the respective categories, the results are consistent with this expectation.




Figure 3: Shares of the frames in German and French media coverage

source: own illustration; data from Annex 2

While 45.7 percent of the relevant articles in German newspapers adopted a revival-opportunity frame, this was only the case for 39.1 percent of French reporting. Inversely, 46.1 percent of French newspaper articles corresponded to the gridlock-dismantling frame, while the same was true for only 30.5 percent of German articles. In both Germany and France, the share of the gridlock-dismantling frame can be attributed largely to the "regression", in contrast to the "standstill", perspective. Furthermore, it can be observed that reporting in Germany was overall more ambiguous than in France, a fourth of all articles having employed a mixed frame.

If one takes a more detailed look at these basic statistical measures, one finds the observations to remain valid even if one considers the newspapers individually. Both the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the Süddeutsche Zeitung published a higher

share of articles with a revival-opportunity frame than each of the French newspapers (FAZ: 44.8%, SZ: 47.4%, Le Figaro: 39.7%, Le Monde: 38.6%). Inversely, they also published a lower share of articles with a gridlock-dismantling frame (SZ: 23.7%, FAZ: 34.3%, Le Figaro: 39.7%, Le Monde: 52.6%). Furthermore, if the frames' shares are examined in the course of time, thus in each edition separately, the general finding also remains unaffected. In five out of the six editions published in the week after the announcement of the referendum results, the proportion of the revival-opportunity frame was higher in German than in French newspaper issues, and in all six editions, the share of the gridlock-dismantling frame was higher in France:

| frame | edition (date) | Germany (SZ, FAZ) | France (Le Figaro, Le Monde) |
|----------------------------|----------------|-------------------|------------------------------|
| revival-opportunity frame | e.1 (25/6/16) | 36.1 % | 24.0 % |
| | e.2 (27/6/16) | 52.6 % | 36.7 % |
| | e.3 (28/6/16) | 38.9 % | 50.0 % |
| | e.4 (29/6/16) | 73.3 % | 52.6 % |
| | e.5 (30/6/16) | 38.5 % | 30.0 % |
| | e.6 (1/7/16) | 50.0 % | 44.4 % |
| gridlock-dismantling frame | e.1 (25/6/16) | 38.9 % | 56.0 % |
| | e.2 (27/6/16)* | 36.8 % | 50.0 % |
| | e.3 (28/6/16) | 22.2 % | 36.4 % |
| | e.4 (29/6/16) | 20.0 % | 36.8 % |
| | e.5 (30/6/16) | 23.1 % | 40.0 % |
| | e.6 (1/7/16) | 25.0 % | 55.6 % |

*The remaining percentage of each edition are mixed frames. *Le Monde published its second edition after the announcement of the referendum results on 26/6; on the other hand, Le Monde did not publish an edition on 27/6.*

Table 3: Frames in German and French media coverage over time

source: own table; data from Annex 2

On the grounds of the basic quantitative measures collected, the main expectation can thus, in the first instance, be sustained. The revival-opportunity frame was indeed, based on the number of articles coded with the categories, represented to a greater extent in German than in French reporting. The inverse, on the other hand, is true for the gridlock-dismantling frame. Furthermore, it can be noted that the diffe-

rences between news reporting in the two countries are overall more pronounced in regards to the gridlock-dismantling frame than as concerns the revival perspective. Finally, the figures indicate that the revival-opportunity frame was generally the dominant perspective in Germany, as this frame was overall more pronounced than the gridlock-dismantling frame in national reporting. On the other hand, in the same sense, the gridlock-dismantling frame was the primary frame in French reporting.

5.3 Qualitative findings substantiating the expectations

In this section, the findings relating to frequency will be complemented by more detailed insights from a qualitative angle. These appear very valuable in the given case as the measures outlined above only provide information about the amount but not about the quality and specific composition of the frames detected. On the other hand, qualitative insights always run into danger of reflecting personal perceptions of the author and are often difficult to review. This is particularly so if, as in the present case, a relatively large number of articles are included in the analysis.

Therefore, to guarantee the greatest possible transparency and traceability, all findings presented will be substantiated with evidence from the articles. For simpler retrievability, these are hereafter cited with title (in single quotation marks), date (day/month, all dates 2016) and newspaper (abbreviated). Furthermore, the insights will be based mainly on three questions, answers to which were deliberately pursued by means of the three indicators introduced: (1) How clearly and unequivocally did articles in both countries present prospects towards future European integration, (2) which sources played important roles in the framings, and (3) which differences can be noticed as regards the more detailed levels of prospects mentioned?

The table given below summarizes the main findings resulting from these considerations. To facilitate the interpretation of the insights in regards to the research question, the results were grouped (a) into findings substantiating the expectations and initial quantitative results, and (b) into findings possibly contradicting them. As regards the first group, one can notably remark that French articles were generally substantially clearer and less equivocal in presenting disintegration prospects than

| substantiation/illustration (ch. 5.3) | potential challenges (ch. 5.4) |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • disintegration prospects overall clearer and less challenged in French reporting; more confrontations in German articles • integrative/reform prospects in German reporting occasionally complemented by exclusion of disintegration; not existent in France • repeated substantiations of domino effect by means of referring to experts in French reporting; considerably less in Germany • French articles often shaped by possibility/claims that own country will leave the EU; insignificant perspective in German reporting • potential for reforming the EU more prominently dismissed as unrealistic in French than in German newspaper coverage | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • disintegration perspective in many French articles based on only small passages that are not dominant in the articles • articles with the revival-opportunity frame in France address reforms/integration that are distinctly more far-reaching than in Germany • German articles with the revival-opportunity frame often explicitly exclude more integration that would truly strengthen the EU |

Table 4: Main qualitative insights

source: own table; based on Annex 2

German newspaper articles. A suitable example to illustrate this is the coverage of UKIP politician Nigel Farage's speech after the referendum, as papers in both countries reported on it but in a remarkably different manner. The two respective articles in French newspapers, one of them in *Le Monde* ('Nigel Farage, vainqueur escamoté', 25/6), the other in *Le Figaro* ('Nigel Farage s'érige en fossoyeur de l'Europe', 25/6), notably picked up Farage's prediction and desire that Brexit is only the first domino in Europe and that the EU is dying. This statement is quoted without any confrontation against competing expectations or claims:

*"L'Union européenne est en train de mourir", a jubilé le leader du parti antieuro-péen et anti-immigration Ukip, après avoir rêvé que l'aube se lève pour un Royaume-Uni indépendant. 'L'UE est en train d'échouer, l'UE est en train de mourir', a-t-il ajouté." ('Nigel Farage s'érige en fossoyeur de l'Europe', *Le Figaro*, 25/6)*

On the other hand, the main article published in German newspapers on the same speech ('Bestürzung in Europa über Brexit-Entscheidung', *FAZ*, 25/6), indeed quotes the same passage but confronts it with both the joint declaration of the presidents of the European institutions stating that the Union will stand together, and a statement

of the German president Joachim Gauck arguing that Brexit is not the end of the EU but the beginning of new efforts to defend the Union and its values:

“Er werde auf diesem Treffen vorschlagen, eine ‘weitreichende Reflexion über die Zukunft der Union’ zu beginnen [...] Beide hatten für einen neuen Kurs der EU plädiert [...] ‘Der bevorstehende Austritt der Briten aus der Europäischen Union ist nicht der Anfang vom Ende der Europäischen Union, sondern er ist der Anfang von neuen Bemühungen um die Verteidigung der Europäischen Union und ihrer Werte.’“

The German article hereby conveys a more mixed or, considering the prominence and frequency of the prospects mentioned, even EU optimistic picture. This illustrates that even with a similar base material, in this case Farage’s speech, German and French newspapers sometimes take a different approach.

A similar difference between French and German reporting can be noticed if one considers those articles focussing specifically on the prospect of a domino effect. In addition to confronting the possibility of this effect with alternative hypotheses and claims, several German articles also expressly put into question the likelihood of such a prospect. For instance, the article ‘Zurück in die Zukunft’ published in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* on 28 June 2016 indeed acknowledges long-term threats to the Union but states that prompt exits of other countries are very unlikely due to the helplessness of the Brexit camp deterring other countries from taking the same step:

“Vor dem Referendum war viel von möglichen Nachahmereffekten die Rede gewesen. Die Hilflosigkeit des Brexit-Lagers wirkt nun vermutlich abschreckend genug. Das britische Beispiel bringt die EU nicht um – die Distanz vieler Bürger zur Union auf Dauer womöglich schon.“

Similar reasonings can be found in articles published in the FAZ, for example ‘Zwischen Himmel und Hölle’ (25/6) and ‘Fahnenflucht’ (1/7), while no comparable articles were found in French media coverage. On the contrary, the respective reports in French newspapers even tend to substantiate claims or suppositions of other exits, notably by referring to experts. The following examples are archetypical:

*“Le risque d’un effet domino sur d’autres pays de l’Union a été souligné par les experts.” (‘Le poids des 27 dans le monde va s’éroder’, *Le Figaro*, 25/6)*

*“Les experts redoutent le risque d’un effet domino du Brexit.” (‘Washington perd sa tête de pont dans l’UE’, *Le Figaro*, 25/6)*

Frequently, such phrases are interspersed more or less incidentally and do not play a central role in drawing up a frame. Nevertheless, they are susceptible of enhancing the credibility of disintegration prospects and may thus render an influence on citizens' expectations more probable. In German reporting, on the other hand, these kinds of phrases are clearly less pronounced, although they cannot be said to be entirely absent (see e.g. 'Die Unsicherheit an den Börsen bleibt', SZ, 27/6).

In a similar manner, taking a closer look at the specific prospects mentioned (indicator I 3), German articles are much less than French articles shaped by the possibility or claim that the own country may leave the European Union. In France, the vast majority of newspaper editions include at least one article addressing a potential "Frexit", signifying a French withdrawal from the EU.

In the German press, a German exit is hardly ever subject to discussion (for a prominent exception, see 'Tränen der Führung', FAZ, 25/6). Instead, more articles refer more generally to further decay and divisions or exits of other countries:

"Damit der Brexit nicht auch Europa spaltet, müssen die Staats- und Regierungschef jetzt schnell für Klarheit sorgen." ('Bestimmt ins Ungewisse', SZ, 28/6)

"Obama kann freilich das Brexit-Votum nicht allzu sehr herunterspielen, da ihm auch daran gelegen ist, dass die EU nicht noch weiter auseinanderbricht." ('Ausharren am Ende der Warteschlange', FAZ, 28/6).

While this may be comprehensible, given that the intent to leave the EU tends to be more prominently represented by politicians and the public in France than in Germany, the more precise and tangible prospect of an exit of the own country may be more influential in shaping expectations of disintegration than the rather abstract or remote prospects reported in the German press.

As a final observation, whereas possibilities or claims for reforming the EU are reported quite heavily both in France and Germany, they are to a greater extent dismissed as unrealistic in French newspaper coverage. In quantitative terms, this finding was already indicated by the greater frequency of the "standstill" category in French newspaper coverage. However, a more detailed look appears worthwhile. Most notably, the closer examination reveals that both French and German articles frequently

mention that different approaches as to how the EU should be reformed exist. However, the French articles often present this observation in a way that any agreement and common reform appears impossible. An illustration is provided by the article ‘L’Europe paralysée face aux défis du ‘Brexit’’, published in *Le Monde*:

“Les dirigeants européens se retrouvent les 28 et 29 juin à Bruxelles, mais leurs réponses divergent [...] Rarement la défiance entre Européens aura semblé aussi grande [...] Y parviendront-ils [à se mettre d’accord sur des projets concrets] ? Rien n’est moins sûr.” (29/6)

On the other hand, German articles tend to depict a more differentiated picture, bringing up areas of dissent, as well as fields in which an agreement is indeed likely:

“Damit beginne ein neuer Abschnitt in der Geschichte der Europäischen Union: das Post-Brexit-Kapitel. Die Frage ist nur, wie dieses inhaltlich gestaltet werden soll. [...] Beim Thema Sicherheit gibt es die größten Übereinstimmungen unter den EU-Staaten. [...] Das galt lange Zeit als undenkbar.” (‘27 Länder suchen eine Antwort’, SZ, 28/6).

In sum, a number of qualitative findings back or further explain the differences of the framings in French and German newspapers, suggested by the quantitative measure of relative frequency. Nevertheless, some results from the more detailed qualitative assessment of the articles also provide for the possibility of challenging initial conclusions. The major insights in this regard are presented and discussed below.

5.4 Qualitative findings contrary to assumptions

First, if one takes a closer look at the articles categorized, it can be detected that much of the coding of French articles with the “regression” category, and thus the gridlock-dismantling frame, is based only on a small passage on future European integration included in the articles, while most of the text and the central topic of the reports is another. For instance, the article in *Le Figaro* ‘Coup d’arrêt à la folie immobilière londonienne’ (27/6) actually focuses on the situation in the United Kingdom after Brexit but includes a parenthetical passage evoking a potential domino effect:

“Et surtout, si le scénario du pire se profilait, c’est-à-dire en cas d’effet domino et de menace sur la cohésion de la zone euro, Londres pourrait retrouver son statut de capitale à part en Europe.”

Similarly, the article 'La croissance européenne fragilisée', published in *Le Monde* (25/06), deals largely with economic and financial consequences of Brexit and only shortly evokes that it poses the threat of nurturing eurosceptic movements in other countries of the EU, which could end in an existential crisis of the eurozone (for further examples, see e.g. 'Nigel Farage, vainqueur escamoté', *Le Monde*, 25/6 and 'Julian Fellowes, guide des bonnes manières', *Le Figaro*, 1/7)

In accordance with the coding scheme, these articles were assigned to the "regression" category and counted in the same way as articles in which a potential breakdown of the EU was a far more prominent topic. This may lead to the reproach that the proportion of the "regression" category, and thus the gridlock-dismantling frame, is overestimated in the case of French reporting, posing a challenge to the quantitative findings. The pertinence of such an argument will be discussed below.

Second, looking more precisely into the specific prospects mentioned, German articles framed in the way of revival-opportunity tend to present less ambitious prospects as regards European integration than articles of the same category published in France. Most importantly, while articles in *FAZ* and *SZ* frequently emphasize the need and possibility for reforms and are thus justifiably coded with the "furthering" category, they do so strikingly often in combination with the assertion that such reforms cannot go into the direction of more integration. Instead, articles often evoke the prospect of a better Union achieved without giving more competences to the European level. The following example provides an illustration:

"Nicht 'mehr Europa' sei das Gebot der Stunde, sondern eine Debatte über ein 'anderes Europa', sagte Gabriel auf der ersten von vier Regionalkonferenzen der SPD zur Vorbereitung des Bundestagswahlkampfes in Bonn. ('Gabriel fordert Bekämpfung der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit in der EU', FAZ, 27/06)

Articles published in the French newspapers, on the other hand, often go further. If a revival-opportunity frame is presented, this frame is likely to involve claims or potentials for more Europe, involving for instance an increased harmonization in different policy levels (e.g. 'Pour David Assouline, le 49-3 n'est jamais une bonne solution', *Le Figaro*, 30/6), a strengthening of the eurozone (e.g. 'Alain Minc : Paris et Berlin devraient aider Londres à ne pas quitter l'UE', *Le Figaro*, 29/6) or an increased EU

budget (e.g. 'Un budget commun pour des projets communs', *Le Monde*, 30/6). Therefore, one could argue that the quantitative gap between France and Germany as regards the perspective of moving the EU forward is compensated by a qualitative gap in favor of French reporting. For both of the findings and consequential interpretations presented, the qualitative assessment indeed presents a strong case. However, different interpretations of the insights also appear possible.

As regards, first, the comparably short passages in French reporting provoking a coding of the entire article with a gridlock-dismantling frame, one could reply that it is not established that articles in which the frame spans over the whole text have a higher potential of influencing readers' attitudes. As has been mentioned, the power of framing has been theorized to come "from its ability to define the terms of a debate without the audience realizing its taking place" (Tankard, 2001, p. 97) and this may even be more likely if frames are not too dominant in a given communication.

As regards the second finding, the more intensive and wide-reaching integration prospects predominantly found in French news coverage could indeed lead French citizens to be more optimistic as to European integration than Germans. However, the inverse may also be true. Citizens are likely to expect that very extensive reforms are also more difficult to put into place. Therefore, if they are informed only little about alternative reforms that may be less complicated to enforce, they may generally consider reforms for advancing the EU improbable. In France, this is furthermore reinforced by the higher share of articles that explicitly consider EU reforms unlikely (see "standstill" category). Thus also in this regard, a counterargument does not appear unreasonable, permitting the presented results to be overall maintained.

5.5 Plausibility of a media impact

As has been demonstrated, both the central quantitative and main qualitative results correspond to the expectations formulated at the outset. Media reporting in France and Germany appear to have indeed been marked by substantial differences in regards to the framing of future European integration, German news coverage emerging overall as more optimistic towards the future of the EU than French reporting.

While this finding does not prove an influence of media framings on citizens' expectations in the two countries, it provides all central prerequisites for presenting an argument of plausibility in this direction. As German citizens were considerably more likely than French citizens to be faced with media coverage emphasizing a potential revivification of European integration in the context of the Brexit vote, they may have developed more optimistic expectations than their French counterparts.

French citizens, on the other hand, likely came across more pronounced prospects of standstill or dismantlement in media reporting than Germans, accounting for higher shares of pessimistic EU expectations among the citizens. Such arguments are substantiated by the quantitative finding that the revival-opportunity frame was even the dominant perspective in German reporting, whereas the same was true for the gridlock-dismantling frame in France. The media in both countries thus presented a relatively clear directional information flow, rendering an influence very likely.

In terms of the causes of the different framings in German and French media, especially the qualitative evaluation has indicated that they cannot be plainly attributed to divergences of national politicians' statements. Instead, journalists and media organizations in both countries appear to have played a central role in provoking the differences, either by selecting which of the various actors to quote or by presenting predominantly dissimilar suppositions for the future of the EU.

As has been mentioned, while the present paper can argue with plausibility, it does not empirically prove a media influence in the given context. However, some recommendations can be provided for studies which may, in the future, pursue such an aim. Above all, a more rigorous testing should include an investigation of the suggested link on the individual level, taking into account factors which may limit a media influence for parts of the population. This can be expected, for instance, for previous knowledge and attitudes towards Brexit and European integration, as well as for the amount and type of media consumption of the individuals.

Furthermore, several theoretical assumptions that the present study could not but suppose should be backed up by empirical substantiation. For example, the supposition that the reporting of the leading quality newspapers indeed shapes the general

tone of the national media, and can therefore be used as an indicator for the same, should be verified. A follow-up study taking such considerations into account could provide more definite conclusions on the relationship suggested in this paper.

In addition, it may provide answers to findings which cannot be conclusively explained based on the aggregate data this study has at its disposal. This applies, for instance, to the result that the quantitative gap between France and Germany in relation to the revival-opportunity frame is considerably less pronounced (difference of 6.6 percentage points) than the gap in the Ifop survey's "strengthening" expectation assumed to be linked to the frame (difference of 17 percentage points).

Nevertheless, the present study has overall provided a fairly sound case for a media influence after the Brexit referendum, particularly if one takes into account the limited possibilities and scope of a bachelor thesis. In doing so, it has established a foundation for further and more in-depth research in this field.

6 Conclusion

The present paper seized to shed light on the research question: "Why do expectations as to the future of European integration after Brexit differ substantially between Germany and France and, more specifically, which significance could media framing have in explaining this curiosity?"

Having performed a frame analysis of media coverage after the Brexit vote, it is possible to conclude that framing in French and German media is indeed likely to have played an important role in causing the differing expectations in both countries. Both basic quantitative as well as qualitative indicators hint at substantial variations between the framing in leading French and German quality newspapers, presumably exemplary for the overall news coverage in these countries.

The variations demonstrated are largely reflected in French and German citizens' expectations, as reported in a survey conducted after the Brexit vote. Therefore, the results, especially in conjunction with several theoretical arguments and prior empirical findings, render a media influence probable. Nevertheless, the study certainly

has significant limitations. Most importantly, due to the research design, it was impossible to empirically establish and prove a link between both phenomena.

Other explanations could not be ruled out entirely, implying that the paper could only argue by means of theoretical and empirical plausibility. Furthermore, the qualitative approach chosen almost always implies shortfalls in terms of reliability and objectivity, though they were attempted to be reduced through precise definitions of the coding categories and anchor examples.

Despite these limitations, the study also presents a number of merits, hopefully making it useful for further research. First, it filled a gap in existing literature, combining the research areas of framing, European integration, and media influences on future expectations. Second, it provided detailed information on the media coverage after the Brexit vote, hereby making it valuable even if one retains doubts on the effect of this coverage. Third, it constituted a base for more quantitative analyses in this field, as these may benefit either from the arguments provided in the theoretical section or the data generated through the content analysis.

To carry the present study forward, it would be valuable, on the one hand, to conduct an experimental study in order to clarify the link between media framing and citizens' expectations in the context of European integration and Brexit. On the other hand, a subsequent analysis could extend the present study to other countries in the European Union in order to explore the scope of this paper's conclusions.

7 Literature

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8 Annex

8.1 Annex 1: Detailed coding scheme

Indicator 1: Nature of main prospect emphasized

| category | definition | example | coding rules |
|------------------------|---|--|--|
| C 1: furthering | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • predominant prospect concerns advancing, furthering or improving European integration • clear forward-moving perspective after Brexit/Brexit vote • focus on reforming the EU in political terms (but not primarily to reduce/dismantle the EU) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“Ja, die Europäische Union muss Teile ihres Geschäftsmodells neu aufstellen, aber sie hat in Europa enorm viel an Wohlstand, Liberalität und Lebensqualität erreicht.”</i> • <i>“Wir müssen aber die europäische Säule der Verteidigung ausbauen”</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coding based on claims and suppositions towards future • article is coded with C 1 if exclusive or predominant prospect (based on quantity and, when in doubt, title and first and last sentences) falls into the category • an article is not coded with C 1 if the prospect is only excluded (e.g. b/c unlikely) |
| C 2: standstill | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • core message is that major improvements/advancements in EU are impossible/very unlikely • thus, EU will not be able to move forward after Brexit/Brexit vote • reason e.g. discord between leaders of EU countries | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“Die völlig unterschiedlichen Reformvorschläge [...] belegen indes vor allem den tiefen inhaltlichen Riss, der durch die Union geht [...] denn große Würfe sind auch nach der Reflexionsphase kaum zu erwarten.”</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coding based on evaluation of claims and suppositions towards future • article is not coded with C 2 if merely differing opinions/proposals on how to reform EU are presented; needs discord/impossibility to move forward as core message of article (for determination see rules C1) |
| C 3: regression | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • predominant prospect concerns rolling back European integration (dismantlement/decay) • clear EU-pessimistic perspective after Brexit/Brexit vote (weaken EU) • e.g. other exits or respective referenda, less competences on European Union level, dissolution of EU | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“l'exemple britannique pourrait faire des émules en Europe. La réaction [...] intègre le risque d'une réaction en chaîne sur le plan politique, avec une montée des revendications des partis hostiles à l'Europe, qui pourrait affaiblir la construction européenne”</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coding based on claims and suppositions towards future • predominant prospect (based on quantity and, when in doubt, title and first and last sentences) must fall into C 3 • if regression is to be achieved through reforms, reforms must predominantly pursue the target of weakening the EU • an article is not coded with C 3 if the prospect is only excluded |
| C 4: mixed | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • multiple prospects (furthering, standstill and/or regression; see descriptions C1-3) are presented to a similar extent in the article • no clear prioritization/ranking apparent | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>“Der Front National klebt unterdessen schon Plakate [...] Und nun Frankreich [...] Die Versuchung ist da, nun endlich nachzubessern [...] Vertiefung der Euro-Zone</i> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • coding based on claims and suppositions towards future • space assigned to the different prospects must be similar • article is not coded with C 4 if a considerable tendency of the text towards C 1, C 2 or C 3 can be noticed |

Indicator 2: Main source of dominant prospect evoked

| category | definition | example | coding rules |
|---------------------------|---|--|---|
| C 1: journalist | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> authoring journalist's considerations/ evaluations/comments are the central elements yielding the dominant prospect of the article (as coded in I 1) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Der weitere Zerfall der EU ist also ein gar nicht so unrealistisches Szenario" | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> article is not coded with C 1 if central passages are journalist's words but actually only reports of others' statements (e.g. claims of politicians -> C 2) journalist's own judgements/ claims necessary |
| C 2: politician | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> politicians' statements/ claims/proposals are the central elements yielding the dominant prospect of the article (as coded in I 1) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Eine eher wirtschaftliche Neuorientierung verlangte SPD-Chef Sigmar Gabriel" | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> article does not necessarily need to quote the politician directly; re-narration of a statement/proposal suffices but comment must be clearly traceable back to a politician |
| C 3: expert/ other | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> experts' or others' assessments must be the central elements yielding the dominant prospect of the article (as coded in I 1) e.g. economic/financial/ political expert, writer | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Fratzscher [Chef des Wirtschaftsforschungsinstituts DIW] fordert daher, die Europäische Union zu vertiefen" | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> article does not necessarily need to quote the person directly; re-narration of a statement/proposal suffices but comment must be clearly traceable back to a person name or function of the person is noted while coding |

Indicator 3: Specific prospects mentioned

coding rules for all categories: assignment of an article to multiple categories possible, category applies always if the specific prospect is mentioned (also if it is devaluated)

| category | definition | example |
|----------------------------------|---|--|
| C 1: more exits/ref. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> other exits from EU or referenda to exit EU | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "brauchen wir jetzt auch ein Referendum in Frankreich" |
| C 2: gain EU-scept. | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> gains for eurosceptic parties or more euroscepticism generally | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "wären nur der Treibstoff für Euroskeptiker und Rechtspopulisten" |
| C 3: decay/div/end | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> further decay of EU, more divisions in EU, end of EU | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "wenn die EU jetzt den Zerfall verhindert" |
| C 4: less EU (inst./pol.) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> shrinking of EU politically (e.g. less competences/powerful institutions) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "en donnant plus de poids aux nations" |
| C 5: gen. more EU | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> generally more integration/more EU (if more specific: C 6 - C 9) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Forderungen nach einer Vertiefung der EU" |
| C 6: more eco/soc | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> more integration/cooperation in economic/social areas | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "doit les unir dans ces domaines, mais aussi ceux [...] du commerce" |

| | | |
|-------------------------------|--|---|
| C 7: more for/sec | • more integration/cooperation in foreign policy/security/defense | • <i>“amélioration des échanges [...] pour la lutte contre le terrorisme”</i> |
| C 8: more migr. | • more cooperation as regards immigration (e.g. EU asylum policy) | • <i>“doit les unir dans ces domaines, mais aussi ceux [...] de la migration”</i> |
| C 9: other more EU | • other specific area of more EU integration/cooperation | • (e.g. Erasmus:) <i>“Super-Erasmus für Europas Studenten”</i> |
| C 10: flex. more EU | • more integration for parts of EU countries, “flexible Union” | • <i>“Teilgruppe von Staaten vorangehen kann und gemeinsame Politiken”</i> |
| C 11: €-zone more int. | • more integration in/of eurozone (e.g. eurozone minister of finance) | • <i>“Finanzminister, der in die nationalen Haushalte eingreifen dürfte.”</i> |
| C 12: refo./new EU | • generally reforms/new Europe/new treaty (= unclear if more or less EU) | • <i>“Brüssel, der Hauptstadt [...] Europas, das nun ein anderes werden wird?”</i> |
| C 13: cit. benefits | • reforms that show/focus on giving benefits to EU citizens | • <i>“dass Europa [...] Antworten auf die Sorgen der Bürger geben kann”</i> |
| C 14: more effect. | • reforms that make EU more effective (more capable to act) | • <i>“L'Europe doit devenir plus pragmatique et plus efficace”</i> |
| C 15: more dem./tr. | • reforms that make EU more democratic and/or transparent | • <i>“reconstruire un projet démocratique et transparent”</i> |
| C 16: neutr. inst. rf. | • reforms that change institutions (but unclear if stronger/weaker) | • <i>“cela nécessite de penser à des institutions spécifiques”</i> |
| C 17: other refo. | • other specific reforms/changes to EU | • (e.g. more sovereign EU:) <i>“il appelle à un sursaut de souveraineté europ.”</i> |

8.2 Annex 2: Filled schemes for the newspaper articles

The filled schemes may be downloaded from <http://bit.ly/2spwPvF>. For reasons of convenience, a ZIP file was created containing individual CSV tables for each newspaper and day of newspaper coverage.