The War of the Spanish Succession

*New Perspectives*

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The War of the Spanish Succession and Habsburg Politics of Representation

MARK HENGERER

For the Austrian Habsburgs, a great deal was at stake in the War of the Spanish Succession, and the size of their military engagement reflected this. It might therefore be assumed that scholars have long since looked at how this war was represented as an independent subject of research, but that is not the case. One reason for this may be the way in which topics for research have traditionally been defined in the area where history overlaps with art history. In this field dynastic representation is not, as a rule, related primarily to events, but more to individuals, and from there to specific media.

The War of the Spanish Succession began right at the end of Emperor Leopold I's reign, a period that has attracted relatively little scholarly attention. Even the question of whether Leopold I's media policy was governed by a uniform concept is controversial. According to Jutta Schumann, with the exception of court festivals, we can hardly speak of a consistent approach. There was simply too great a diversity of actors, of independent attempts at fashioning an image of the emperor by members of the nobility, imperial towns, publishers, and artists. And the court’s interest in

This essay was translated into English by Angela Davies (GHIL). Thanks to Andrea Sommer-Mathis, Heinz Winter, and especially Friedrich Polleröll for valuable information and offprints. Quotations from sources have been standardized and abbreviations replaced with full text. The following abbreviations are used: HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna; ÄZA: Ältere Zeremonialakten; PAC: Protocollum Aulicum in Ceremonialibus; ZerPKonzepte: Konzepte der Zeremonialprotokolle; ZerProt.: Zeremonialprotokoll.

pamphlets, broadsheets, and newspapers was not uniform, but fluctuated greatly. Moreover, much of what was produced in the way of journalism cannot be traced back to the court as originator. Friedrich Polleroß, by contrast, demonstrates consistency in Leopold I’s style of representation in the visual arts and architecture. But according to Polleroß, Leopold’s aim was not to dominate or monopolize branches of the media. Rather, the key concern was the ‘reaction to the symbolic undermining of Emperor Leopold I’s position of primacy among the European monarchs’. In contrast to Leopold I, Joseph I was emperor for only a very short time, from 1705 to 1711, so that few detailed studies of his image policy have been undertaken. Nor has research on the representation of Charles VI, whose reign began towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, profiled the war as an independent theme against the background of his long period of rule (1711–40). What is more, the representation of several rulers from the same dynasty has been investigated only with a wide chronological focus. When this approach is taken, significant contents and forms emerge for the early modern Habsburgs, such as a strong Catholic piety (Pietas Austriaca), an exuberant festive culture, and especially reliance on the Spanish court ceremonial, but not the experience of war. Any independent question about representations of the war is omitted.

7 Goloubeva, Glorification, has one section on ‘Leopold I at War’. Only in a
If, to extrapolate from the findings of Schumann und Polleroß, the emperors of the war years had less a media policy concept than a concern, and if our subject of analysis emerges neither from a ruler-centred nor from a dynasty-centred approach, then an investigation based on the court’s institutionalized observation of itself could be an option. In the decades around 1700 the organization of court ceremonial was highly formalized: specialized staff, established procedures and routines, and extensive archival registers that could be consulted on each new event were all in place. Since 1652, the imperial court had kept a systematic record of ceremonial occasions whose entries make reference to the War of the Spanish Succession, primarily festivals of thanksgiving for military successes celebrated with a Te Deum. The attribution to the war of other events recorded there, however, requires the scholar to make a decision that is not based primarily on criteria inherent in the text. While looking at the record of court ceremonial ensures that the events examined can be imputed to the emperors, the record itself omits many important details, such as who was responsible for the artistic shaping of obsequies, or the content of operas. Thus, we depend on supplementary information such as opera libretti,

subsection on the emperor as defender of the Empire against Louis XIV, however, is the representation of the war the main focus. Cf. also Marta Riess, ‘Kreuzzugsidéologie und Feindbildkonstruktion während des Spanischen Erbfolgekrieges’, in Friedrich Edelmayer, Virginia León Sanz, and José Ignacio Ruiz Rodríguez (eds.), Hispania-Austria, iii. Der spanische Erbfolgekrieg/La guerra de sucesión española (Vienna, 2008), 161–92. A notable exception is a series of plates brought out in a lavish edition by the Augsburg publisher Jeremias Wolff, Repraesentatio Belli, ob successionem in Regno Hispanico [. . .]. Work on this book, produced by a number of artists, probably began in 1712 and finished around 1714–15. Although it received the privilege of imperial copyright protection in 1715, it was not published until 1724. See Werner Schwarz, ‘Repraesentatio Belli: Eine Kupferstichfolge zum Spanischen Erbfolgekrieg aus dem Augsburger Verlag Jeremias Wolff’, Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereins für Schwaben, 84 (1991), 129–84. An edition ‘without a title-page or text’ (ibid. 181) was presumably sold in 1715. French victories were also represented in this work, which can be consulted online at [http://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/6bh/decker1715] [accessed 23 Oct. 2017].


prints, and other objects deriving from the courtly sphere that is only vaguely defined.

The addition of this dimension of artistic presentation, the detail of which was not included in the records of the ceremonies, or at least not systematically, meant that contemporary observers faced two problems: first, that of interpretation (nobody was compelled to see Louis XIV in Darius, King of the Persians, in the court opera); and second, that of attribution (nobody could say with certainty how much of the work of art derived from the artist, and how much from the person who had commissioned it). Art could speak in plain language, as it were, without it being clear who exactly was speaking or what exactly the text was. Another possibility was to shift responsibility away from the emperor and his closest circle, as in a case described below, probably the most aggressive performative representation of the emperor’s view of the War of the Spanish Succession in the form of an artillery exercise.

Vagueness, indeterminacy, the double barrier to attribution represented by artistically presented performances and objects, and not least the uncertainty surrounding the authorship of so many pro-Habsburg writings emphasized by Schumann were—this is the contention of the present essay—all part of a system. As a rule, that made it impossible to attribute communications or intentions to individuals, whether the emperor himself or his successor, individual advisers, or specific artists. This prevented actors in the arena of image politics from gaining a personal profile, but also protected them from personal attacks. There are many instances illustrating how dangerous the personalization of political positions could be: for example, the failure of the imperial ambassador, Lamberg in Rome in 1705 (a conflict between the emperor and the pope), or the Borgia crisis of 1632 (a three-way conflict between the Habsburgs, the pope, and the French). By 1700 the imperial court could already look back on a venerable tradition of removing from office courtiers whose conduct revealed any personal identification with political positions at court that could lead to conflict with the emperor. Examples are the downfall of Cardinal Khlesl in 1618, Wallenstein in 1634, Auersperg in 1669, Lobkowitz in 1674, and Sinzendorf in 1697. There were many instances illustrating how dangerous the personalization of political positions could be: for example, the failure of the imperial ambassador, Lamberg in Rome in 1705 (a conflict between the emperor and the pope), or the Borgia crisis of 1632 (a three-way conflict between the Habsburgs, the pope, and the French). By 1700 the imperial court could already look back on a venerable tradition of removing from office courtiers whose conduct revealed any personal identification with political positions at court that could lead to conflict with the emperor. Examples are the downfall of Cardinal Khlesl in 1618, Wallenstein in 1634, Auersperg in 1669, Lobkowitz in 1674, and Sinzendorf in 1697.

1680. Rulers, too, often fared badly when they ventured beyond the cover of the court and ambiguity. Examples are provided by Charles V in his dispute with Luther at the Imperial Diet of Worms in 1521; Francis I at the Battle of Pavia (1525); Emperor Matthias deposing his brother, Emperor Rudolph II, in a move that would soon prove to be disastrous for himself; and Ferdinand II in the delicate situation created by the 'Stormy Petition' of 1619. All these were object lessons in the value of distance, delegation, discretion, and patience.

Just as emperors mostly preferred to disappear behind their office, the law, religion, ceremonial, and tradition, presenting decisional policies as a deduction from and application of known principles, so their political propaganda operated with a multiplicity of voices, ambiguity, and indeterminate accountability. Cases of propaganda that evoked vehement responses—such as the dispute over the monument to Louis XIV on the Place des Victoires in Paris, and the excitement about a statue of Louis XIV in Rome—have scarcity value precisely because most objects of representation, including printed matter, did not have such a provocative impact, while still contributing to an image.

In order to illustrate these general observations, this essay will first investigate the ceremonies of the *Te Deum Laudamus* unequivocally identified as war-related in the record of court ceremonial and then go on to look at other events put on by the imperial court in connection with the War of the Spanish Succession, as well as imperial sarcophagi and the striking of medals.

*Te Deum Laudamus*

For the imperial court, the most important war-related representations were victory celebrations in the form of a *Te Deum Laudamus*. In the record of court ceremonial, this most solemn prayer of thanksgiving of the Roman Catholic Church already had a long tradition by the time of the War of the Spanish Succession. The court celebrated positive dynastic events, above all births and coronations, victories and peace settlements, with a *Te Deum*, so it was not unusual for

12 Short biographies which are still worth reading can be found in Henry Frederick Schwarz, *The Imperial Privy Council in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, 1945). The standard work on Wallenstein is still Golo Mann, *Wallenstein* (Frankfurt a.M., 1971).
it to be sung at the imperial court during the War of the Spanish Succession. What is surprising is the large number of victory celebrations held in the period from 1702 to 1712, a total of twenty-six (see Table 1).

Compared with the total number of allied victory celebrations, this is an unusually large number; in London, only ten Te Deums were held over the same period.¹⁴ Nor does this figure reflect the treatment accorded to these events in military history.¹⁵ This applies both to their significance for the course of the war and to the issue of who was to be considered the victor of any particular battle.

The religious function of the Te Deum can hardly be in doubt, given the piety at least of Leopold I and Charles VI. As far as its social function at court during the War of the Spanish Succession is concerned, two hypotheses may be considered. First, the Te Deum can be seen as passing a definitive judgement on sometimes questionable military achievements;¹⁶ or second, its serial nature can be seen as a publicly effective indicator of how the conflict was going in what were, after all, far distant theatres of war. The opponent France illustrates the competitive nature of all this: from the beginning of the war to the Treaty of Rastatt, Paris marked twenty-eight victory celebrations with a Te Deum.¹⁷ The court which decided that news of a victory was an occasion for a Te Deum (this was not automatic) became a measuring device that generated its

¹⁴ See the essay by Michael Schaich in this volume.
¹⁵ These military events were not only battles (Donauwörth 1704, Blenheim 1704, Cassano 1705, Jodogne 1706, Oudenarde 1708, Longueville/Malplaquet 1709, Almazar 1710, Saragossa 1710), but also the relief of beleaguered cities (Barcelona 1706, Turin 1706) and especially the taking of towns and fortresses by conquest or capitulation (Landau 1702, Barcelona 1705, Gaeta 1707, Cagliari 1708, Monu 1709, Douay 1710, Bethune 1710, Aire 1710, Villa Ficosa 1710–11, Porto Ercole 1712, Quenoy 1712). In many cases the Te Deum was sung to celebrate multiple military operations, such as the taking of the fortress of Lille and the relief of Brussels in 1708; the capture of Fenestrelle and further advances in the Dauphiné in 1708; the conquest of Milan and other towns of the region in 1706; the taking of Alessandria and Tortona and further advances in the Duchy of Milan in 1706; and the capture of Cagliari and the subjection of Sardinia to which this led in 1708.
¹⁶ Two examples must suffice here. The Battle of Malplaquet (1709) was celebrated in France as a French victory (see Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information, 448–50); and Prince Eugene’s victory celebration for Cassano caused a French cavalier to mock allied whitewashing (see Max Braubach, Prinz Eugen von Savoyen: Eine Biographie, 5 vols. (Munich, 1963–5), ii. 125).
¹⁷ Fogel, Cérémonies de l’information, 448–50.
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* The column headings are geographical, not political. The dates given are of the *Te Deum*, not the military event (for these see n. 15 in this essay). Landau: HHStA, ZerProt. 6, fos. 214v–215v; Donauwörth: ibid., fos. 316v–317v; Hochstädt/Blenheim: ibid., fo. 520v; Landau: ibid., fo. 324r–325r; Cassano: ibid., fo. 367v; Barcelona: ibid., fo. 442r–443r; Barcelona: ibid., fo. 469r–470r; Judogne: ibid., fo. 474r; Turin: ibid., fo. 507r; Milan: ibid., fo. 516r; Milan: ibid., fo. 517v; Gaeta: ibid., fo. 595v; Oudenaarde: ibid., fos. 727r–728v; Fenestrelle/Dauphiné: ibid., fo. 735v; Cagliari: ibid., fo. 744v; Barcelona: ibid., fo. 764v; Longueville/Malplaquet: ibid., fos. 805r–806r; Mons: ibid., fos. 807r–808r; Douay and the following: HHStA, ZerPKonzepte 5 (no folio numbers, but arranged chronologically).

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Table 1. *Te Deum at the Imperial Court on the Occasion of Military Successes*
own values, or, to put it another way, the Te Deum invested the prerogative to interpret the success of the imperial armies with a semblance of objectivity. If the Te Deum referred not so much to a victory as to the imperial court’s evaluation of news about military events to be celebrated, it is appropriate to take a look at how this news was transmitted.

It is striking that the record of court ceremonial has in several instances preserved details of how news was transmitted. These allow us to draw the conclusion that the form in which news was transmitted could make a victory celebration more likely. One piece of evidence for this is the especially festive Te Deum that the imperial court organized in thanksgiving for the victory at Saragossa, although the news had reached Vienna some time earlier and the information itself had not prompted a victory celebration. According to the record, the victory had ‘long been known on account of a particular letter from Barcelona, but after’ Count von Geül, a regimental commander dispatched by Charles III, arrived in the capital and ‘confirmed this great victory with eight postilions blowing their horns’, the festival of thanksgiving took place. In the regional dialect, the causal aspect often predominates over the temporal one in the meaning of the conjunction nachdem (‘after’) used here, and as other examples show that in principle, if not in every single case, a Te Deum required confirmation by a noble envoy bearing the news, we can assume that the arrival of the messenger sent expressly for this purpose was the decisive factor in authorizing this victory celebration.

The record of court ceremonial mentions several variables in the transmission of news, primarily distinguishing between the arrival of news without much ceremony, the dispatch of a courier, and use of a noble messenger. In most cases, the Te Deum followed upon the

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18 The same standard procedure that also applied to other court ceremonies was generally followed in taking the decision to celebrate a Te Deum. The emperors had to give their approval to the plans worked out by the ceremonial staff and laid before them by the Obersthofmeister. Since the outlines of the festivities did not specify the smallest detail, they gave the organizers some leeway during the implementation of the blueprint.

19 This was the case for the Te Deum held to celebrate the capture of Landau in 1702. The records note that after the news arrived, the emperor attended a Te Deum in St Stephen’s cathedral. In the case of the Te Deums held on the occasion of the victories at Judogne in 1706 and Oudenaarde in 1708, the records provide no information about the arrival of the news. The Te Deums for the capture of Barcelona in 1705 and Cagliari in 1706 were held after a courier brought the news of victory.
bringing of news by an aristocratic officer dispatched by a military commander, or by a high-ranking person from the commander’s entourage or family. In most but not all cases, the record specifically describes the bearer of news, giving his noble rank, military rank, family name (rarely his first name), and in one case also his age (a young Count Pálffy, Aire 1710). The record explicitly mentions four princes as messengers bringing news of victories, twenty-three counts with different military ranks, and one baron (Barcelona 1706) by name, but refers to two adjutant generals (Brussels/Lille 1708 and Quenoy 1712) and one captain (Porto Ercole 1712) without giving their names.

The record introduces a further variable when it mentions messengers travelling by mail coach, and in five cases expressly records that on arrival, the bearer of news instructed the postilions to blow their horns. This item is further differentiated, first with regard to the number of post-horns being blown, and second in respect of the distance travelled while the horns were being blown. Prince Pio (Milan 1706) arrived at court presumably with a single postilion blowing his horn, Count Harrach (Turin 1706) and the unnamed captain (Porto Ercole 1712) with two, Count Althann (Malplaquet 1709) with four, and Count von Geul (Saragossa 1710) with eight. We now see more clearly that the record of court ceremonial attributes the function of confirming the news of victory not only to the individual, but also to the sound that accompanied him. In

20 Prince Lobkowitz (Landau 1702), Prince Maximilian of Hanover (Landau 1704), Prince Pio (Milan 1706), and Prince Emanuel of Savoy (1708 Fensetrella).
21 Adjutant generals: Altheim (Blenheim 1704), Pálffy (Cassano 1705), Molart (Mons 1709), Wagensperg (Douay 1710), and Erasmus of Starhemberg (Almanar 1710). Sergeant generals: Joseph Count of Harach (Turin 1706), Althann (Malplaquet 1709), and Hamilton (Villa Vicosa 1711). Regimental commander: von Geul (Saragossa 1710). Without specifying military rank: Count Zobor (Milan 1706), Count Daun (Gaeta 1707), Count Waldstein (Almanar 1710), and Count Pálffy (Aire 1710).
22 In addition to the examples mentioned in the following, but without further explanation: Pálffy (Cassano 1705), Zobor (Milan 1706), Daun (Gaeta 1707), and Wagensperg (Douay 1710).
23 ‘. . . had the post-horn blown through the length of the town’; see n. a to Table 1.
24 Cf. Braubach, Prinz Eugen, ii. 182. Harrach was a major general and according to Braubach had ‘distinguished himself especially’; a baron was sent to The Hague and Berlin.
25 e.g. ‘confirmed this great victory with 8 postilions blowing their horns’; see Table 1 above. On the sound see Jorg Jochen Berns, ‘Herrscherliche Klangkunst und höfische Hallräume: Zur zерemoniellen Funktion akustischer Zeichen’, in Peter-Michael Hahn and Ulrich Schütte (eds.), Zeichen und Raum: Ausstattung und höfisches Zeremoniell in den deutschen Schlössern der Frühen Neuzeit (Munich, 2006), 43–64.
the cases of two messengers, the record explicitly notes that they had the post-horns blown on their way through the whole of the inner city to the Hofburg palace: Prince Pio (Milan 1706) ‘had the post-horn blown through the length of the town’, and the captain (Porto Ercole 1712) had the horns blown ‘right through the town as far as the court’. At this time, the journey by mail coach still had performative potential, as the picture of Joseph I’s famous ride by post coach from Tulln to Vienna in 1699 shows, and the use of the post-horn, or perhaps even several horns, on the way through the town to the Hofburg palace ensured that ‘the whole town’, as it were, noticed that something had happened. The fact that blowing the post-horn was permitted only in a few cases, and attracted considerable attention, meant that its use signalled an exceptional situation. The conventions of acoustic signs ensured that this was recognized as positive. Despite its different structure, the post-horn was presumably reminiscent of the trumpet, used to signify glory.

Thus, at least four aspects of an announcement of victory could trigger a Te Deum: the news itself, the messenger, the person who sent him, and the performance of the arrival. If the news itself did not speak for a Te Deum, the social status of the princes, the relatives of the commanders, the adjutants general, or the individuals from the monarchy’s most powerful families they dispatched in person would have provided good reason to initiate a Te Deum, especially as they were dispatched on the explicit order of the commanders. Not to respond to official clients of this sort by instituting a victory celebration could have discredited both the messenger and the dispatching commander. Not to react to an entry by mail coach, accompanied by blaring horns, might have been equivalent to a public denial. Because the record does not report arrivals which were not followed by a Te Deum, however, we cannot provide any evidence based on a counter-example.


28 Goloubeva, Glorification, 139, points to the use of the horn as a sign of glory in an opera that was performed in 1687 on the emperor’s name day.
That the postilions blowing their horns on arrival in anticipation of the announcement of a victory placed the court under pressure to put on a *Te Deum* is demonstrated not only by the celebration of the familiar siege of Saragossa (1710, eight horns), but also by the fact that four others arriving in this manner were responsible for originating victory celebrations in which some compromises were made. The *Te Deum* for the taking of Porto Ercole (1712) was celebrated only in St Augustine’s church in Vienna, and not, as was usual, in St Stephen’s cathedral; the emperor walked there instead of being driven; and the court record mentions neither a sermon nor a triple gun salvo (something which, however, had already been abolished in 1709). Nor was there any mention of a sermon at the celebration initiated by Prince Pio (Milan 1706). The triple gun salvo was missing from the celebration of the victory of Turin in 1706, announced with horns, but the record notes that a sermon had been delivered and that the court had driven publicly to St Stephen’s cathedral. The Battle of Malplaquet, also celebrated by the French as a victory, was announced in Vienna ‘with four postilions blowing horns’ and received a fairly average *Te Deum*. It was held in St Stephen’s cathedral with a triple cannon salvo and a sermon, but lacked the triple gun salvo still common up till then.

The numerous variables in the transmission of news were thus matched by the many variables in how the *Te Deum* could be staged. Going beyond the decision of whether or not a *Te Deum* should be held (if this was discussed, the record of court ceremonial passes over it in silence), the staging of the *Te Deum* offered a chance for qualitative evaluation. It is characteristic of many areas of the imperial court’s ceremonial that having a multiplicity of features prevented the emergence of a clear hierarchy. This also applies to victory celebrations, so that it could be said that like sounding the post-horn, sending a noble envoy as a messenger just managed to raise the news of a number of victories to the dignity of being

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29 For the celebration of Quenoy (1712) the emperor, who was in Bratislava at the time, used the town’s St Martin’s cathedral. Those who were in Vienna celebrated in St Stephen’s.

30 It was possible to enter St Augustine’s church on foot directly from the rooms of the Hofburg palace without exposing oneself to the public gaze in town.

considered worth celebrating: the smallest victory celebration was that staged for the ‘good progress’ announced by Count Zobor (Milan 1706). The *Te Deum* was sung only in the court chapel, and there was merely a triple salvo of small arms fired by soldiers of the municipal guard, and quite explicitly no cannon salvo by the guns of the city’s fortress. The next most modest victory celebration was probably a *Te Deum* held in St Stephen’s cathedral at which the cannons of the city’s fortifications fired only two salvos, although the brother of the commander, Count Daun, had brought the news (Gaeta 1707). No clear hierarchy can be inferred, however, because it is uncertain whether St Stephen’s cathedral or a triple cannon salvo was more important.

The most solemn celebrations took place in Vienna’s St Stephen’s cathedral, were accompanied by a triple gun salvo of the municipal guard and a triple salvo fired by the city’s cannons, and did not necessarily contain a sermon, but were marked by the city’s bells being rung (Treaty of Rastatt 1714 and Saragossa 1710). In the latter case, four choirs also sang ‘most solemnly’. The emperor had ordered a city illumination for the evening after the *Te Deum* for the relief of Barcelona (1706), as well as three gun salvos, three cannon salvos, and a sermon. In at least eight victory celebrations, a triple cannon salvo and a triple gun salvo were fired. If gun salvos were not fired before 1709, the *Te Deum* was sung *musicaliter* (Landau 1704), perhaps in honour of the royal ambassador, or the journey to the cathedral was undertaken publicly, in a carriage, and a sermon was delivered (Turin 1706). In general, therefore, the ways in which the news of victory was received can be roughly classified into four groups of celebrations. Heading the list were those with the ringing of bells or illuminations (Barcelona 1706, Saragossa 1710); then come those with a triple gun salvo and a triple cannon salvo delivered with unstinting pomp (Blenheim 1704, Barcelona 1705, Judogne 1706, presumably Milan 1706, Oudenaarde 1708, Brussels/Lille 1708). After the peace treaty and these eight victory

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32 The *Te Deum* for news of advances in the Dauphiné and the taking of the fortress of Fenestrelle (1708) was celebrated in St Augustine’s church. Militarily this was not of great significance, but because Prince Emanuel of Savoy brought the news, the municipal guard was brought out and set up by the court church for the triple gun salvo. There was also a triple cannon salvo, but on the other hand, there was no mention of a sermon, merely a devotion. On the taking of Porto Ercole, also celebrated in St Augustine’s church, see above.

33 Donauworth 1704; Barcelona 1705; Barcelona 1706; Judogne 1706; presumably Milan 1706; Oudenaarde 1708; Fenestrelle 1708; Cagliari 1708; Brussels/Lille 1708.
celebrations come fourteen average celebrations, marking more or less substantial victories, and, finally, four further ceremonies which were held merely in the court chapel (Milan 1706) or the court church (Fenestrelle 1708, Porto Ercole 1712), or merited only two cannon salvos (Gaeta 1707). 34

If sending news via a nobleman dispatched by a military commander and exploiting the public effectiveness of post-horns more or less compelled the court to accept the commander’s assessment, the court nevertheless managed to decouple the way in which the news was transmitted from the staging of the victory celebration, thus making its own evaluation subtly but recognizably clear. Mostly it was the imperial general, Prince Eugene of Savoy, 35 who ensured that his achievements were solemnly recognized at court by dispatching noble officers. This reminds us that in 1687 he himself had taken news of the victory at Mohács to the imperial court, which gave him first-hand experience of this particular form of communication, 36 and that he might have needed good news because of his critics and enemies at court. 37 As Joseph I and, later, Charles VI knew how to

34 That this differentiation can only be approximate is demonstrated by the language used to describe six victories in the record of court ceremonial (for the source see above, n. a to Table 1). The two victories in our top group are there qualified as ‘große und nachdrückliche Victory’ (‘a great and emphatic victory’) (Barcelona 1706) and ‘vollkommene herrliche Victory’ (‘completely magnificent victory’) (Saragossa 1710). Blenheim (1704) is described there as a ‘Volkommene und ihren umständen nach überaus grosse Victory’ (‘complete and, by its circumstances, extremely large victory’); Judogne (1706) as ‘großer Victory’ (‘great victory’); Oudenaarde (1708) as ‘herrlicher Victory’ (‘magnificent victory’); and Malplaquet (1709) as ‘eine herrliche Victory’ (‘a magnificent victory’).


37 See Braubach, Prinz Eugen, vol. ii. We may surmise that Prince Eugene’s introduction as president of the Aulic War Council in 1703 was held in the prestigious Ritterstube at court rather than at the War Council’s premises in the Stallburg, where, according to the protocol, there was ‘no comfortable place’, because of this background (HHStA, PAC 6, fos. 243–5, 30 June 1703). His (re-)investiture as president at the beginning of the reign of Joseph I in March 1706 was held, as was usual, at court, with the swearing in before the emperor taking place after a meeting of the Privy Council. Thereafter Prince Eugene drove to the Stallburg with the lord high steward, Prince Salm, where the lord high steward presented the old and new president to the staff of the Aulic War Council, ‘praising his great merits’ (ibid., fos. 480–481, 23 Mar. 1706).
handle this way of transmitting news with great subtlety, we may surmise that they saw through the mechanism governing the staging of victory, but liked the play.

A sense of victory, however, should not be equated with warlike triumphalism. Even King Joseph’s return to Vienna from the campaign glorified by the victory of Landau was deprived of a sense of triumph by Leopold I’s vow to construct the Joseph Fountain on Vienna’s Hoher Markt square. A (highly unusual) personal comment by the author of the court record when describing the Te Deum for the victory at Donauwörth (1704) makes it clear that the religious content of the victory celebration was taken seriously. He not only wrote down a blessing, but also emphasized the righteousness of the imperial struggle: ‘God bless His Majesty’s righteous weapons.’ The adjective ‘righteous’ (gerecht) represents a link with the doctrine of the bellum iustum, which was traditionally binding on the imperial court. The image of Emperor Leopold I had long emphasized his peaceablenss and closeness to God, referring specifically to the fact that the wars he had waged against the Ottoman Empire and France in the seventeenth century had ultimately been wars of defence. This view was, in principle, shared by the Protestant parts of the empire. Moreover, not only do the records often mention the emperor’s personal participation in the Te Deum, but they explicitly point out that he (and the members of his family present) had ‘given thanks for it to God almighty’. The record also calls the cannon and gun salvos fired on the occasion of the Te Deum for the taking

38 The distinctions drawn between no fewer than six victory celebrations with a Te Deum in the years 1706–7 are particularly noticeable. The terminology of the celebrations follows similar gradations.

39 HHStA, PAC 6, fos. 215–17. A reception by the emperor outside the town gates with a guard of honour drawn from the militia, a Te Deum in St Stephen’s cathedral, and an evening banquet were all held on 24 Nov. 1702.


42 See e.g. Goloubeva, Glorification, 123–54, and Schumann, Andere Sonne, 182–3.

43 Cassano 1705 (for the source see above, n. a to Table 1). Similarly, we read that the emperor ‘thanks God for this victory’ (Almanar 1710) or had ‘thanked God on account of this victory’ (Villa Viciosa 1711): the thanksgiving is here presented as a speech act on the part of the emperor. There is also explicit mention of thanks or thanksgiving in the description of the ceremonies relating to Barcelona 1705, Milan 1706, und Gaeta.
of Barcelona (1705) a ‘friedenslösung’ (peace solution). Finally, a Te Deum with all the city’s bells ringing and doubled trumpets and double choir was held for only a single victory, and not again until the celebration for the Treaty of Rastatt.

Ceremonial Occasions

The imperial court ensured that the message of symbolic occasions was entirely unambiguous when political events were, or had to be, presented performatively as legal acts, such as the ceremonies at which the imperial proscription was imposed on the electors of Bavaria and Cologne in 1706, and on Prince Ferdinand Charles of Mantua and Montferrat in 1708. At a solemn gathering in the old Hofburg palace, the judgment was read out by the imperial vice-chancellor, upon which Emperor Joseph I, sitting on his throne, tore up the deeds of enfeoffment and threw them on the floor. Heralds picked up the pieces, tore them into even smaller pieces, and threw them out of a window. Accompanied by soldiers, drummers, and trumpeters, they then proclaimed the imperial proscription at various places throughout the city.

Archduke Charles’s declaration as Charles III, King of Spain, in 1703, by contrast, took place in the Favorita, the imperial summer residence outside Vienna, in order not to make too much fuss. A report by the privy council explained that in contrast to the Favorita, in the city of Vienna decorum and ornament (‘decoro und apparatum’) were necessary, which they declared was superfluous and to be avoided; public celebrations (‘demonstrationes’) could be held later if the succession in Spain were to provide a reason. According to the report, circumstances did not justify an elaborate ceremony which could make the situation worse.

The imperial court’s strategy in presenting its own actions was obvious here. Victory celebrations were staged as celebrations of divine assistance in achieving peace, political statements of third parties were made in indirect allegorical speech, and open
enmity was clothed in the formal language of imperial law. Political claims with immediate and serious legal and military implications, however, such as followed on the elevation of Charles III, were to be articulated in a restrained and peaceable way. The ceremony was to take place in the presence of the smallest possible court public, and was to be followed immediately by a pilgrimage to Mariazell, a Marian shrine of particular significance for the Habsburgs.47

When Emperor Joseph died in 1711 and Charles, coming back to the Empire from Spain, was crowned emperor in Frankfurt, his return to Vienna was staged using similarly moderate ceremonial language. The entry into Vienna followed the standard pattern: the city guard provided a guard of honour, and the first port of call in the city was St Stephen’s cathedral, where a Te Deum was held.48 The celebration in thankful commemoration of the relief of Barcelona in 1706, complete with procession, Te Deum, and gun salutes, emphasized his Spanish kingdom, but the plague raging in 1712 offered a chance explicitly to build on older traditions.

Charles VI pledged to build a church (the Karlskirche, begun in 1715) if the epidemic in Vienna came to an end. He also accepted an important role in the presentation of the relics, brought to Vienna from Milan, of the saint especially invoked in time of plague, Carlo Borromeo.49 In 1713 the emperor participated in a procession in Vienna for deliverance from the epidemic, and the following year celebrated the end of the plague with a procession and Te Deum.50 The new emperor was thus following the example of strongly religious representation set by his father, Leopold I.51

An especially important element of imperial propaganda was the organization of obsequies at court. While the ceremonial had been more or less unchanged since the 1640s and 1650s, the structures (castra doloris) sheltering the catafalque or bier traditionally presented the emperor’s current political positions and claims.52

47 Ibid., fo. 278r–282r, describes the declaration, including the pilgrimage to Mariazell, on 14 Sept. 1703.
48 HHStA, ZerPKonzepte 5, 1712, 27 Jan. 1712.
49 HHStA, ÄZA 24, Konvolut ‘Gebube Karls VI. zur Erbauung der Karlskirche in Wien’, 24 Oct. 1712; ibid. fo. 2v, on the ‘Function eines Neu Canonisirten Heiligen’ [Karl Borromäus].
50 Procession 1713: HHStA, PAC 8, fo. 50; procession and Te Deum: HHStA, PAC 8, 13 Mar. 1714.
51 HHStA, ZerPKonzepte 5, 12 May 1712; cf. ÄZA 24, Konvolut ‘Zeremoniell bei einer Prozession zum Danke für den Entsatz von Barcelona’.
52 Michael Brix, ‘Trauergerüste für die Habsburger in Wien’, Wiener Jahrbuch für
The inscription on the *castrum doloris* erected by the court on the death of Charles II of Spain suggested that the Austrian Habsbursgs fulfilled the ideal of piety: ‘pious Austria is mourning’; while, with the assistance of an allegory referring to Louis XIV’s sun symbolism, the enemy was identified as the disturber of Spain: ‘Spain is fatigued by the Sun’. In 1703, when a pro-Habsburg prince who had fled from Naples to Vienna died, the court, in a highly unusual gesture of solidarity, erected a *castrum doloris* at the emperor’s expense. High-ranking clergy celebrated the exequies and the imperial court composer wrote the funeral music.53

The *castrum doloris* erected in Vienna to mark the death of Emperor Leopold I in 1705 and of Joseph I in 1711 displayed numerous references to the War of the Spanish Succession. On the *castrum doloris* designed by the University of Vienna for Leopold I and set up in St Stephen’s cathedral, for example, the allegorical representations of various provinces were made to speak, as it were, through the use of inscriptions. Burgundy, for instance, announced: ‘[The golden] fleece does not grow on French pasture’, referring to the Austrian Habsburgs’ claim, directed against Louis XIV, to the position of the head of the Order of the Golden Fleece, founded in 1430 by Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, an ancestor of the Austrian Habsburgs. Castile praised Leopold I as ‘most incorruptible protector’, and Spain vowed: ‘I stay with my king’.54
erected for Emperor Joseph I reminded mourners of his military successes with unprecedented intensity.\textsuperscript{55} This was true of the structure designed by the University of Vienna and built in St Stephen’s cathedral again, commemorating individual victories.\textsuperscript{56} The \textit{castrum doloris} erected in the court church had four triumphal columns modelled on Roman examples (the Antonine column in Rome had been excavated and re-erected in 1704–5).\textsuperscript{57} Every column bore an inscription referring to Habsburg military victories on the battlefields of the War of the Spanish Succession: ‘for the restitution of Belgium’; ‘for the liberation of Italy’; ‘for retaining Spain’; and ‘for triumph over France’.

The triumphal tone of this \textit{castrum doloris} was modified somewhat by the ceremonial surrounding the series of court funerals. Even during the War of the Spanish Succession, the court in Vienna erected \textit{castra doloris} and wore mourning for members of the French royal house because of their family relationship. This happened in the summer of 1701 for the duke of Orléans, brother of Louis XIV. The exequies were held in the presence of the imperial family on 18 and 19 July 1701 in the Augustinian court church, where a ‘small but graceful \textit{castrum doloris}’ had been erected. Outside, the city’s bells tolled for an hour.\textsuperscript{58} The imperial court similarly held exequies and wore mourning when the heirs to the French throne died in 1710 and 1711.

Among the celebrations which used direct references to antiquity Belgium, Italy (‘\textit{O tutela praesens Italiae}’), Sicily (‘\textit{Isthuc mens animusque}’), Naples (‘\textit{Non alius flectere sciens aequè}’), and Milan (‘\textit{Non odio morsuque venenat}’).\textsuperscript{59}
to put a particular spin on the war was that for Joseph I’s birthday in 1708. Only one day after celebrating the victory of Oudenaarde with a Te Deum, the emperor appeared in a cavalcade in a triumphal chariot in the style of ancient Rome. The celebrations in Vienna’s Augarten park included an equestrian ballet. These had become very popular at the imperial court under Leopold I, but in this context could not fail to recall the Roman ‘game of Troy’, mentioned in Suetonius’ biographies of Roman rulers.\textsuperscript{61}

Opera at the imperial court was probably the most extravagant form of mixing propaganda with entertainment. The involvement of librettists, set and costume designers, and composers placed a number of obstacles in the way of easy interpretations and attributions. Still, against the background of the Franco-Ottoman alliance, theatrical figures such as Darius in 1674 and Indamaro in 1689 recognizably represented Louis XIV, in the process denouncing his policies.\textsuperscript{62} During the War of the Spanish Succession, the opera also commented on political developments on a number of occasions. Thus, in 1702 La clemenza d’Augusto announced the division of the world between the ruler’s two sons, Joseph I and Archduke Charles.\textsuperscript{63} Andrea Sommer-Mathis has shown that Joseph I was stylized as a Habsburg Hercules on the stage of the imperial court theatre, making clear reference to events during the War of the Spanish Succession.\textsuperscript{64} Goloubeva’s comment that several operas performed at the Viennese court in the early years of the eighteenth century had Roman plots\textsuperscript{65} can also be interpreted as supporting the view that artists emphasized the imperial dynasty’s claim to universal power, including Spain.

\textsuperscript{61} HHStA, PAC 6, fo. 722v, 28 July 1708. For references to the Roman Empire as part of the programme of representation in Charles’s youth see Polleroß, ‘Monumenta Virtutis Austriacae’, 105.
\textsuperscript{63} Polleroß, ‘Pro decore Majestatis’, 200.
\textsuperscript{65} Goloubeva, Glorification, 188–9; L’Italia afflitta (1702), Il ritorno di Giulio Cesare (1702), Numa Pompilio (1703), Catone Pompilio (1705).
Fig. 1. Etching depicting a ‘serious and entertaining fireworks display’ (‘Ernst- und Lustfeuerwerks Prob’), 1709–11

Perhaps the most aggressive representation of the imperial view of the War of the Spanish Succession at the Habsburg court was not preserved in the official documents. Its only surviving record, an etching, named not the emperor or a high-ranking courtier or general as its creator, but merely an imperial field marshal and arsenal administrator, Carl Ernst von Rappach. According to the caption, Rappach instructed the artillery captain and master of fireworks, Romerio Cetto, and his pupils to stage a ‘serious and entertaining fireworks display’ (‘Ernst- und Lustfeuerwerks Prob’) near the imperial toll station of Tabor near Vienna (see Figure 1). The gunners shot, one after another, at three targets built up like theatre sets. The first consisted of a wine press painted in Austria’s colours being used by an eagle to press a ‘French . . . fleur-de-lis’ with the assistance of an Englishman and a Dutchman. The caption and coat of arms suggest that this was French blood, that more was to flow, and that ‘mortar fire with . . . bombs and bullets’ would ensure that ‘there will be even more to follow’. The second target represented Atlas plucking a rooster (the Gallic rooster was
the national symbol of France), with an eagle (the imperial symbol) hovering above, using a thunderbolt to set alight the globe carried by Atlas. The trainee gunners’ third target represented the door of a defensive installation marked with French and Bavarian flags. Next to it were Habsburg symbols recalling Charles V’s global monarchy and announcing the Habsburg claim to universal monarchy: a rock indicating the seat of virtue (Virtute Fortuna), two pyramids with Charles V’s motto (Pius Ultra), and Emperor Frederick III’s motto (AEIOU) with two columns and the inscription ‘we seize the whole globe’ (orbem complectimur omnem). After the artillery bombardment, enough was left standing in the evening to illuminate the double-headed eagle on the rock and the columns with fireworks, and three cheers were given for the emperor and empress, and King Joseph and King Charles. This production was probably considered too aggressive for the stage of the imperial Opera because it left the realm of the allegorical behind and was entirely unambiguous. So that it could survive beyond the time and space of the actual performance, it was distributed as a print with explanatory caption. Another print dating from 1709 documents a similar allegorical representation of the war for Castile: Hercules destroys a number of monsters, and imperial troops raze a French fortress.66

**Objects**

The imperial court also used representative objects that were not, like the castrum doloris, appurtenances of ceremonies, to transmit key messages while ensuring a lack of clarity in attributing the objects to the emperor. This meant that while he had an image, its subject was indistinct. Important examples are the prints which publicized the castra doloris, sometimes reprinted in journals such as the Theatrum Europaeum.67 Two prints, for instance, exist of the castrum doloris for Joseph I in St Augustine’s church, one smaller (20 cm × 12 cm) and one larger (51.5 cm × 32.5 cm: Figure 2). The inscriptions on the four columns quoted above can just be made out on the smaller print, so it is surprising that on the larger print no additional text is readable in the fields marked with lines as carrying inscriptions. Obviously, success in all European theatres of war was at the heart

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Fig. 2. Castrum Doloris erected for Joseph I in the court church at Vienna, print by Johann Bernhard Fischer von Erlach, 1709–11

of the message, further details which (if available) could have been depicted on the larger print were apparently not considered so important.

This example shows especially clearly that print-making was treated as an independent and representative art form, which, at the same time, put certain limits on its value as a medium documenting historical events. The fact that the Spanish Sacramental Brotherhood, based in St Michael’s church opposite the Hofburg palace in Vienna, had prints made of the *castra doloris* it erected for emperors Leopold I and Joseph I, thus taking a pro-Habsburg position in the War of the Spanish Succession, perhaps contributed more to awareness of the structures, even in Vienna, than the structures themselves. Presumably the Brotherhood considered it especially important to take this stance in the exceptional circumstances created by the War of the Spanish Succession. In any case, no comparable engraving is (yet) known of the Spanish infanta and empress at the time of this Brotherhood’s foundation, Maria Anna, or of her husband, Emperor Ferdinand III.

Yet even objects which represented events emblematically rather than in documentary style, such as medals, raised barriers to attribution. Unlike Louis XIV, Leopold I and Joseph I did not have the history of their reigns represented as an *histoire métallique*, and Charles VI did not start such a project until after the War of the Spanish Succession. The process by which commemorative medals carrying imperial propaganda were created generally lies in the dark, and in most cases cannot be attributed to imperial institutions with any certainty. Very few propaganda medals were created in Vienna, but even these were not necessarily struck in the Imperial Mint. Most medals commemorating Habsburg successes in the War of the Spanish Succession were issued privately and struck by private mints in Nuremberg and Augsburg. Some originated

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in Britain; many anti-French ones, mostly satirical, came from the United Netherlands. In any case, at the centre of allegedly Habsburg propaganda presented on medals, the Habsburgs do not stand alone, but are featured next to their military commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy. From 1705 it is often his image (or that of the duke of Marlborough) that was associated with imperial victories and the Treaty of Rastatt.  

The multiplicity of voices heard in allied and imperial propaganda, the focus on different individuals, and the differing periods of popularity enjoyed by the various media are all reflected in the fact that only some of the military events celebrated as victories at the imperial court by a Te Deum were also represented on medals as victories of the Habsburgs and their allies. The multiplicity of European voices is also visible in medals struck for Charles III/VI. One group has a purpose going beyond representing victories: they proclaim the legitimacy of the declared Habsburg king Charles III in Spain, and intertwine events from the war with the ruler’s biography. Thus early medals (1700) present his claim to the Spanish throne (cat. no. 4) and later declaration as Spanish king as a justified taking of what belonged to him (‘non indebita posco regna meis fatis’, cat. no. 5). The medal commemorating Charles II’s sea voyage to the Iberian peninsula emphasized the British–Dutch–Habsburg alliance and named the pretender ‘liberator and avenger’ (‘liberator et ultor’, cat. no. 12).

Many medals associated with Charles III emphasized French defeats more strongly than Habsburg victories. Just one pro-Habsburg medal celebrated the taking of Barcelona in 1705 as a homage to ‘the defender and protector’ (‘tutori ac conservatori suo’, cat. no. 16), while three commemorated it primarily as a French defeat (cat. no. 17), as a casting out of monsters (cat. no. 19) or, alluding to Louis XIV’s motto ‘Nec Pluribus Inpar’ (‘Not unequal to many’) and sun symbolism, by depicting it as a solar eclipse with the inscription ‘now unequal to one for whom heaven fights’ (‘uni nunc impar—cui militat aether’, cat. no. 18). The medal for the Battle of Lerida on 27 July 1710 was also clearly anti-French, bearing the inscription

71 Cf. Popelka, Eugenius in nummis: 1701 Carpi (cat. no. 80, no Te Deum at the imperial court), 1704 Blenheim (cat. nos. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97), 1704 Landau (cat. no. 100), 1705 Cassano (cat. no. 104), 1706 Turin (cat. nos. 105, 106), 1707 Gaeta (cat. no. 107), 1708 Oudenaarde (cat. nos. 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 129), 1708 Brussels/Lille (cat. nos. 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139), 1709 Tournai (cat. nos. 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, no Te Deum at the imperial court), 1709 Malplaquet (cat. nos. 150, 151, 152, 153), 1709 Mons (cat. nos. 160, 161, 162, 163, 164), 1710 Douay (cat. nos. 171, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176), 1710 Bethune (cat. nos. 174, 175, 176), 1710 Aire (cat. nos. 174, 175, 176), 1712 Quenoy (cat. no. 178). A number of medals commemorate several events: cat. no. 150 among others Oudenaarde, Wimmendael, Brugge, Brussels, Lille, Ghent; cat. no. 154 the taking of Douay, Bethune, Amarais, Aire; cat. no. 154 the taking of Douay, Bethune, St-Venant, Aire. Cat. nos. 83–5 have been omitted here since they depict medals which were never struck.

72 The catalogue numbers which follow in the text refer to Rath, ‘Bildnismedaillen’. 
‘He knows how to drive the harpies from his ancestral realm’ (‘scit patrio . . . harpyias pellere regno’, cat. no. 30). While the medal for the victory of Almanar, referring to the day of the battle as the saint’s day of Ignatius of Loyola, offers a Catholic interpretation supporting Charles III (cat. no. 32), that for the victory at Saragossa on 20 August 1710, which calls for an end to the farce, is primarily an insult to the Bourbon pretender to the throne: ‘tire le rideau, la farce est jouee’ (cat. no. 33).

Medals struck for Charles III/VI seem to handle the switch from the lost Spanish throne to the acquisition of the imperial throne effortlessly. The title of king of Spain (not acknowledged for life until the peace of 1725) was used on a medal for the Peace of
Baden (cat. no. 143). Another medal celebrated the founding of the Austrian Order of the Golden Fleece as a renewal (cat. no. 128), thus outdoing the Spanish–Bourbon equivalent. The change in numbering, from King Charles III to Emperor Charles VI, ‘magnus carolo sexto’ (cat. no. 151), was implemented on a number of medals bearing religious references, with some pieces featuring the votive column in Klosterneuburg, the Trinity columns in Mödling and Baden near Vienna, and St Charles’s church in Vienna (cat. nos. 138, 139, 141, 158). The switch of image depicted on the medals is thus closely related to ‘state religiosity’.

Grave monuments for the Habsburgs in the War of the Spanish Succession were also image-building without being immediately attributable to the particular ruler they were commemorating because they were built by his successors, various court offices, and individual artists. Leopold I and his predecessors in the imperial line had no visible memorial in a public space. Maximilian II (d. 1576) was the last emperor to have had one. Leopold was laid to rest, as had been customary for generations, in a simple metal coffin in an inaccessible crypt.

Joseph I’s sarcophagus (Figure 5) broke with this tradition. It was created under Charles VI with an eye to the dynasty’s need for representation and to posterity as an elaborate, representative showpiece made of metal with a portrait of the emperor in a large medallion. And it was the first emperor’s sarcophagus to be decorated with profane scenes, in this case the imperial victory at the Battle of Turin in 1706. The inscription praised the emperor as ‘victor ubique perpetuus’, naming several victories. Joseph I’s sarcophagus, like that of Leopold, was placed in the Capuchin Crypt (Kapuzinergruft), to which restricted access was granted in 1717. Lucas von Hildebrandt, who had designed the sarcophagus,

\[73\] On the even deeper ‘state piety’ in France see Polleroß, ‘Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex’, 142–55, quotation at 154.

also provided the drawing from which an engraving for public consumption was made, and which allows reliefs and inscriptions to be seen much more clearly than a visit to the crypt itself. It is reasonable to assume that the concept of four Roman columns seen on the castrum doloris in St Augustine’s church, extolling victories in four theatres of war (the Empire, Spain, the Netherlands, and Italy), was transferred to the sarcophagus by means of inscriptions. Apart from Landau, the inscriptions also served to legitimize the war by placing the victories in the service of recovering dispossessed lands (Belgium) and relieving besieged towns (Barcelona, Turin). The relief and inscription on the sarcophagus of Charles VI's wife, Elisabeth Christine, are also reminiscent of an episode in the War of the Spanish Succession that, by the time of her death in 1750, lay far in the past, namely, her journey by sea to Barcelona in 1708. Also decades later, Charles VI's sarcophagus commemorates the

75 Albertina, Vienna, Wiener Historische Blätter, vol. ii, folder 4, blue no. 74.

Battles of Saragossa in 1710 and depicts the crown of Castile, which no longer existed in reality.

Summary

The presentation of the Habsburg version of the War of the Spanish Succession resulted in an almost modern reinterpretation and redefinition of events: war was work on peace, defeats (horribile dictu) were really victories, enemies were friends, or, at least, relatives. Court ceremonial transcended the events of the war: the master of victory or defeat was not the emperor, but God. Leopold I and Charles VI described themselves as devout rulers and did not tie their public image to fortune, to volatile phenomena such as military success. Military commanders, by contrast, were able to exercise something like remote control over the presentation of the war in the imperial residence by managing the way in which news of victories was brought by their messengers. The court, for its part, publicly evaluated the news it received by making clear differences in the thanksgiving celebrations it grouped around the Te Deum.

Aggressive tones were, on the whole, rare and mostly hedged in: proscriptions were emanations of imperial law; as a precautionary measure, the declaration of Archduke Charles as King of Spain was undertaken in almost minimalist fashion. Under the young Emperor Joseph I aggressive references to war and the fame of commanders were more frequent, but tempered, for example, by being cast in antiquarian mould or delegating responsibility. The artistic shaping of obsequies at court, whose ceremonial core was highly stable, clearly aimed to legitimize the imperial court’s policy towards Spain, but even the climax of militaristic representation achieved in the castrum doloris erected for Joseph I was presented as a defensive policy of securing acknowledged rights. Court operas and medals referring to the war sidestepped militarist overtones by having recourse to traditional emblematic conventions and a lack of clarity in making attributions to their authors or creators. Anti-French medals were not minted at the imperial court; this was left to artists in the United Netherlands. The mantra of imperial representation in ceremonies (not politics) was legitimacy and peace, not victory and war. Where the subject was victory and war, the court turned to art, ambiguity, and a multiplicity of voices.

On Charles VI’s sarcophagus see Havlik-van de Water, Kapuzinergruft, 136–9; on that of Elisabeth Christine ibid. 131–5. Polleröll, ‘Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex’, 173, places special emphasis on this late Spanish reference.