Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies

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ABSTRACT: The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each seller prefers to conceal his information until he is awarded the contract and then renegotiate when he is in a bilateral monopoly position with the buyer. We show that this gives rise to three inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and inefficient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism, however, imposes strong assumptions on the buyer’s prior knowledge of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. Therefore, we also propose an indirect mechanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior knowledge. The optimal direct and indirect mechanisms separate the improvement of the design and the selection of the seller who produces the good.

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1 Introduction

The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for unexpected additional costs are flaws in the initial design of the project. When these flaws are revealed after production has started, the design of the project needs to be changed and contracts have to be renegotiated which often leads to substantial adjustment costs. To minimize design flaws and the resulting adjustment costs the early collaboration with potential contractors is of crucial importance. However, if the project is procured by a standard price-only auction, potential contractors have little incentive to contribute their expertise. Each potential contractor who spotted a design flaw has a strong incentive to conceal this information, bid more aggressively in the auction in order to have a better chance to win the contract, and then – after the award of the contract – bilaterally renegotiate with the buyer to fix the design flaw and thereby grab some of the surplus generated by the design adjustment. A well known example is the “Big Dig” highway artery project in Boston. The Boston Globe reports: “On more than 3,200 occasions since 1991, the state paid extra money to contractors to compensate for design flaws, some big, some small. ... All these small errors helped add up to something very large: $1.6 billion in unplanned construction costs. About $1.1 billion can be traced back to deficiencies in the designs.”

In this paper we propose an informationally robust mechanism that allocates the contract to the seller with the lowest cost and that induces all potential sellers to reveal any information that they may have about possible design flaws early, i.e. before the contract is assigned. In a first step, we look for the direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at

1See [http://archive.boston.com/news/specials/bechtel/part_1/](http://archive.boston.com/news/specials/bechtel/part_1/) The article presents a “case study” to illustrate the problem that fits our analysis: “On July 15, 1997, state officials gathered to award a contract to build tunnels from Haymarket Square to North Station ... Bechtel estimated the job would cost about $260 million to complete ... As it turned out, the low bid came in at $218 million. Artery officials rejoiced. But their joy was short-lived. Today, the contract ... has grown $128 million beyond the bid submitted that July day, an increase of nearly 60 percent.” Other prominent examples of cost overruns include the new airport in Berlin (initial cost estimate €2.0 billion, final cost at least €5.4 billion, project not yet completed) and the Elphilharmonie in Hamburg (initial cost estimate €114 million, final cost €789 million), see [Kostka and Fiedler (2016)](http://archive.boston.com/news/specials/bechtel/part_1/) for a detailed discussion. In all of these cases design flaws and costly renegotiation are only one reason for the massive cost increases, but not the only one. Other contributors include unforeseen geological problems, design changes due to changing regulation and changing demands of the client, bureaucratic incompetence, corruption, etc. It is often difficult to disentangle these effects, but industry experts frequently point to the importance of careful design and close collaboration with potential contractors before the contract is awarded.
the lowest possible cost to the buyer. This optimal direct mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, so it does not depend on the priors (and higher order beliefs) of the involved parties about the likelihood of possible flaws and of the probabilities that these flaws have been spotted by each of the sellers. But, a crucial drawback of this direct mechanism is that it requires the parameters of the model to be common knowledge. In particular, the buyer has to know the set of potential design flaws and their payoff consequences. In the procurement context this is a very strong assumption. Buyers are often aware that the initial design may be flawed, but they have no idea how possible flaws may look like and what their payoff implications are. After all, if they had this information, it would be easy for them to look for and detect the design flaws themselves.

To deal with this problem we propose an indirect mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the same cost to the buyer as the direct mechanism, but that does not require any knowledge about the set of possible flaws ex ante. However, this indirect mechanism requires that pointing out a design flaw is an “eye-opener”: Once the flaw has been pointed out, every industry expert understands the flaw and knows how to fix it. He also knows the payoff consequences if the flaw is fixed early rather than late. This assumption is much weaker than the assumption that the buyer knows all potential flaws ex ante, and it seems plausible in the procurement context. Given this assumption our indirect mechanism can make use of an independent arbitrator. Sellers are asked to reveal all design flaws that they spotted to the arbitrator who rewards them according to the payoff consequences these flaws would have had if they had not been disclosed early. Thereafter the contract is allocated by a standard second price auction to the seller with the lowest cost.

The indirect mechanism, called the “Extended Arbitration Mechanism”, is informationally robust in the sense of the literature on “robust implementation” (Bergemann and Morris 2005), i.e. the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible and therefore belief-free. Importantly, it is also robust in a different and complementary sense; it does not require that the parameters of the underlying model (i.e. the set of possible flaws and their payoff consequences) are common knowledge. It only requires that the buyer is aware that she may have overlooked something, but she does not have to know what it is that she overlooked.

After discussing the relation of our paper to the literature in the next section, we set
up a model in Section 3 where a buyer wants to procure a project that may be plagued by design flaws. There are two potential sellers with private information about their production costs. Each seller privately observes with some positive probability some subset of the actual design flaws. Each seller may reveal this information to the buyer or keep it to himself. The buyer wants to set up a procurement mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and minimizes the information rents to the sellers. Note that this is a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem.

In Section 4 we show that a standard price-only auction offers no incentives to sellers to reveal private information about possible design flaws early. The reason is simple: If a seller reveals the information before the auction takes place he gains nothing because once the flaw has been pointed out every seller can fix it. If he waits until he has been assigned the contract, he is in a bilateral monopoly situation with the buyer. Thus, if he now reveals the flaw, the contract has to be renegotiated and the seller can capture some of the surplus from renegotiation. This gives rise to three inefficiencies. First, fixing the flaw via renegotiation is more costly than fixing it early (Inefficient Renegotiation). Two additional inefficiencies arise if the flaw is spotted only by the seller with higher production cost. Either this seller wins the auction – by bidding aggressively in anticipation of the renegotiation profit. In this case production is carried out at a too high cost (Inefficient Production). Or he does not win the auction – because the cost difference to the other seller is larger than the expected renegotiation profit. In this case the flaw will not be pointed out and the buyer suffers from the flawed design (Inefficient Design).

In Section 5 we focus on the first inefficiency (Inefficient Renegotiation) by assuming that there are no cost differences between sellers and that costs are common knowledge. We also restrict attention to the case of only one possible flaw. As a benchmark we solve the standard mechanism design problem assuming that all parameters of the model are common knowledge. The optimal direct mechanism minimizes the information rent that has to be paid to sellers by assigning the contract randomly if both sellers revealed the same information. Then, we relax the common knowledge assumption and show that there exists an equivalent indirect mechanism – called the Arbitration Mechanism – that implements the same allocation and does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws and their payoff consequences.
In Section 6, we generalize these results to the case where sellers have different costs (which is their private information) and in which there may be multiple flaws. This problem is more intricate because efficiency requires that the seller with the lowest cost gets the contract. Thus, the contract cannot be assigned randomly. This implies that a higher information rent has to be paid to the sellers. We derive the ex post incentive compatible mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer, again assuming that the parameters of the model are common knowledge. Then we show that there exists an indirect, Extended Arbitration Mechanism that implements the same allocation at the same cost and does not require prior knowledge about the underlying parameters.

An important characteristic of this mechanism is that it separates the two problems of eliciting information about design flaws and assigning the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. We show that this is necessary to achieve efficiency. Efficiency requires that the contract is assigned to the seller with the lowest cost who need not be the seller who spotted most design flaws.

So far we assumed that each seller observes some subset of the actual flaws with some exogenously given probability. In Section 7, we generalize this model and allow for search costs. Each seller has to actively search for possible design flaws which requires costly effort. The optimal mechanisms of Section 6 do not offer efficient incentives to incur these costs. We derive the optimal mechanism that induces sellers not just to reveal their information about costs and flaws truthfully, but also to search efficiently for possible flaws. This mechanism has to pay a higher information rent to the seller, but it is also somewhat easier to specify because it does not depend on the bargaining power of the parties in the renegotiation game.

Section 8 concludes and discusses some possible directions of future research. All proofs are relegated to Appendix A.

2 Relation to the Literature

Our paper contributes to three strands of the literature. First, there is a large literature on optimal procurement auctions (McAfee and McMillan [1986]; Laffont and Tirole [1993]). The novel feature in our set-up is that sellers may have superior information about possible design
flaws that the buyer would like to elicit. This is closely related to the literature on scoring auctions (Asker and Cantillon 2010; Che 1993; Che, Ioss, and Rey 2016) that also try to induce sellers to make design proposals. A scoring auction assigns the contract to the seller who comes up with the best proposal (the highest total score). In contrast, our mechanism combines the suggestions of several sellers to improve the design and assigns the contract for the improved design to the seller with lowest cost.

Second, our paper is related to the literature on “robust mechanism design”. Bayesian mechanism design theory has often been criticized because the optimal mechanism crucially depends on the precise information that the agents and the mechanism designer have (including their prior beliefs and higher order beliefs that are not observable). Wilson (1987) has pointed out that if the agents or the designer are mistaken in their beliefs, then the outcome of the supposedly optimal mechanism may be very different from the intended outcome. Bergemann and Morris (2005) require that “robust implementation” is independent of beliefs and higher order beliefs and depends only on payoff relevant types. They have shown that implementation is robust if the mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility, i.e. if the strategy of each agent is optimal against the strategies of all other agents for every possible realization of types. Our optimal mechanism satisfies ex post incentive compatibility and is therefore “informationally robust” in this sense.

The indirect arbitration mechanism that we propose is even more robust because it does not require any knowledge of the possible type spaces of the sellers. We are not aware of any other papers on robust mechanism design with this feature. This result requires that an arbitrator can evaluate the payoff consequences of detected flaws and that he can complete the mechanism ex post. This is a novel assumption in the mechanism design literature that is plausible in the procurement context and deserves further attention.

Finally, there is a small but growing literature on the inefficiencies of contract renegotiation. Several empirical studies emphasize that renegotiation is often costly and inefficient, including Crocker and Reynolds (1993), Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009), and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadels (2014). Bajari et al. (2014, p. 1317) consider highway procurement contracts

2See Bergemann and Morris (2012) for a survey of the literature on robust implementation. Bergemann and Morris distinguish between partial robust implementation and full robust implementation. We exclusively consider partial robust implementation in this paper and refer to it simply as robust implementation.
in California. They report that renegotiation costs are substantial and estimate that they “range from 55 cents to around two dollars for every dollar in change”. A behavioral foundation based on loss aversion for inefficient renegotiation is developed by Herweg and Schmidt (2015). Other contributions like Bajari and Tadelis (2001) and Herweg and Schmidt (2017) start out from the assumption that renegotiation is costly and investigate the implications. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) compare fixed-price to cost-plus contracts and show that standardized goods should be procured by fixed-price contracts that give strong cost-saving incentives to sellers, while complex goods should be procured by cost-plus contracts in order to avoid costly renegotiation. Herweg and Schmidt (2017) compare price-only auctions to bilateral negotiations. They show that negotiation with one selected seller may outperform an auction because the auction induces sellers to conceal private information about design improvements which gives rise to inefficient renegotiation. While these papers compare standard contracts and procurement procedures, the current paper solves for the optimal procurement mechanism and proposes a new procedure.

3 The Model

A buyer \( (B, \text{female}) \) wants to procure a complex good from one of two sellers (male), denoted by \( i \in \{1, 2\} \). At date 0 the buyer comes up with a design proposal \( D_0 \) for the good. Seller \( i \) can produce design \( D_0 \) at cost \( c^i \in [\underline{c}, \bar{c}] \), \( 0 \leq \underline{c} \leq \bar{c} \). These costs \( c^1 \) and \( c^2 \) are private information and drawn from some cdf \( H(c^1, c^2) \). If design \( D_0 \) is optimal, it generates utility \( v \) for the buyer. However, with some probability the design is plagued by one or multiple flaws which reduce the buyer’s utility if design \( D_0 \) is implemented. In order to restore the buyer’s utility to \( v \), the flaws have to be fixed by adjusting the design.

We model the possibility of design flaws as follows. Let \( \mathcal{F} = \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\} \) denote the set of possible design flaws and let \( \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}) \) denote the power set of \( \mathcal{F} \), i.e. the set of all possible subsets of \( \mathcal{F} \) including \( \emptyset \). A typical element of \( \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}) \) is denoted by \( F \). \( F \in \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}) \) is drawn from \( \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F}) \) according to probability distribution \( G(F) \). If \( F = \emptyset \), there is no design flaw. If

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\( ^3 \)We restrict attention to the case of two sellers for notational simplicity only. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of \( N \) sellers.

\( ^4 \)If \( |\mathcal{F}| \) is the cardinality of \( \mathcal{F} \), then \( |\mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F})| = 2^{|\mathcal{F}|} \).
$F \neq \emptyset$, a non-empty subset of flaws has materialized.

Sellers are better able to detect design flaws than the buyer. When the buyer proposes design $D_0$, each seller privately observes a subset of the realized flaws. Let $\mathcal{P}(F)$ denote the power set of $F$. Each seller observes a private signal $\hat{F}^i \in \mathcal{P}(F)$. If $\hat{F}^i = \emptyset$, seller $i$ observes nothing. If $\hat{F}^i \neq \emptyset$, seller $i$ observes some non-empty subset of the set of realized flaws $F$. The joint probability distribution over $(\hat{F}^1, \hat{F}^2)$ given the set of flaws $F$ is denoted by $Q_F$.

A seller can report only flaws that he observed, but he is free which of these flaws to report. Let $\tilde{F}^i$ denote the set of flaws reported by seller $i$, i.e., $\tilde{F}^i \in \mathcal{P}(\hat{F}^i)$. If $\tilde{F}^i = \emptyset$, seller $i$ reports nothing. If $\tilde{F}^i \neq \emptyset$, seller $i$ reports some (or all) of the flaws that he observed. His report can be partially verified:

**Assumption 1 (Partial Verifiability).** Each seller $i$ can report any subset $\tilde{F}^i$ of the set of flaws $\hat{F}^i$ that he observed (including $\emptyset$). All flaws $f \in \hat{F}^i$ can be verified. However, if $f_k \notin \hat{F}^i$, it is impossible to verify whether $f_k \in \hat{F}^i$, i.e., whether seller $i$ did or did not observe flaw $f_k$.

Sellers can report flaws at date 1 (“early”, before the contract is assigned) or at date 2 (“late”, after the contract has been assigned and production has started). We assume that once a flaw has been pointed out, it can be fixed by any seller at the same cost. If a flaw $f_k$ is fixed early (at date 1), the cost of fixing it is $\Delta c_k \geq 0$. If it is fixed late (at date 2) the cost increases by $\Delta x_k \geq 0$. If $f_k$ is not fixed, the buyer’s utility is reduced to $v - \Delta v_k$. We assume that $\Delta v_k > \Delta c_k + \Delta x_k$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, so fixing a flaw is always efficient, but it is more efficient to fix it early rather than late. At date 2 the buyer has made already several other commitments (contracts with other suppliers, customers, etc.) that are based on the design of the initial contract. Furthermore, the parties may disagree on who is responsible for the design flaw and who should bear the cost of fixing it which may lead to haggling, aggrievement, and further delays. Thus, the surplus from fixing a flaw shrinks from $S_k = \Delta v_k - \Delta c_k$ if $f_k$ is fixed at date 1 to $S_k^R = \Delta v_k - \Delta c_k - \Delta x_k$ if $f_k$ is fixed via renegotiation at date 2.

Let $D(\hat{F})$ denote the design that fixes all flaws $f_k \in \hat{F}$, where $\hat{F} = \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2$ is the set of flaws.

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5 After all, the sellers are the experts in producing the good. This is why the buyer turned to them in the first place and does not produce the good herself.

6 The model implicitly assumes that flaws can be fixed independently of each other. The idea is that if two (or more) flaws interact with each other, then the discovery of one flaw will lead to the discovery of the other connected flaws as well. Thus, we treat a set of interdependent flaws as a single flaw.
flaws that have been reported to the buyer at date 1. If the set of actual flaws is $F$, $\tilde{F} \subseteq F$, then the gross utility of the buyer derived from design $D(\tilde{F})$ is given by

$$V(D(\tilde{F})|F) = v - \sum_{\{k|f_k \in F \setminus \tilde{F}\}} \Delta v_k$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)$$

while the cost of the seller to produce $D(\tilde{F})$ is

$$C^i(D(\tilde{F})) = c^i + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \tilde{F}\}} \Delta c_k.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)$$

We assume that $v$ is sufficiently large so that the buyer always wants to procure the good no matter how many flaws there are and when they are reported.\footnote{A sufficient condition for this to be the case is $V(D_0) - \sum_{k|f_k \in F} \Delta v_k - \tau > 0$.}

Note that a seller may have an incentive to report a flaw late even though this raises the cost of fixing it. The reason is that he cannot simply “sell” his information to the buyer at date 1. Anybody can claim that there is a flaw. To prove his claim a seller has to point out what the flaw is, but once he does so, he gives his information away and the buyer no longer needs to pay for it (see \textit{Arrow} (1962) for the seminal discussion of this problem). The situation changes at date 2; i.e., after the contract has been assigned to one of the sellers (the “contractor” $C$)\footnote{This is what \textit{Williamson} (1985, p. 61-63), has termed the “fundamental transformation”.}. If the contractor reveals a flaw to the buyer now, the buyer cannot simply change the design in order to fix the flaw but has to renegotiate the initial contract with the contractor. Now the parties are in a bilateral monopoly position, and the contractor gets some share of the surplus from renegotiation.

We model the renegotiation game in reduced form by applying the Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution (GNBS). The threatpoint of the renegotiation game is that renegotiation fails and that the initial contract is carried out. Let $\alpha \in (0, 1)$ denote the bargaining power of the buyer. Then the seller’s payoff from renegotiating flaw $f_k$ at date 2 is given by $(1 - \alpha)S^R_k$.

If a flaw $f_k$, $k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, exists but is not reported (either because no seller observed it or because a seller who observed it did not report it), then the flaw becomes apparent at date 3 when the project is (to a large degree) completed. If the buyer wants to change the design now, she can write a new contract with a (potentially) new seller. At this stage all sellers are equally good at fixing the problem and the initial contract no longer binds the buyer to
seller $i$. We do not model this stage explicitly but assume that if this stage is reached, flaw $f_k$ reduces the net utility of the buyer by $\Delta v_k$.

Finally, we posit that sellers are protected by limited liability, i.e. they can always declare bankruptcy to avoid making negative profits. If a contractor declares bankruptcy, the buyer is no longer obligated to deal with this seller and can switch to another seller who can complete the project at the same cost.

The time structure of the model is summarized as follows.

Date 0: The buyer $B$ announces that she wants to procure a good with design $D_0$. Nature determines the set of actual flaws $F$ drawn from $P(F)$ according to cdf $G(F)$, the set of flaws $\hat{F}^i$ that are observed by each seller $i \in \{1, 2\}$ according to cdf $Q_F$, and each seller’s cost type $c^i$ drawn from $[\bar{c}, \bar{c}]$ according to cdf $H(c^1, c^2)$.

Date 1: A procurement mechanism is proposed by $B$ and executed. The mechanism may ask sellers to reveal their types $(c^i, \hat{F}^i)$. Given the set of all reported flaws $\tilde{F} = \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2$ it determines the design $D(\tilde{F})$ of the good, which seller $i$ becomes the contractor $C$, and which payments are made.

Date 2: $B$ and $C$ may engage in contract renegotiation if the contractor observed a flaw that has not been revealed at stage 1.

Date 3: The project is completed and payoffs are realized.

\[ \begin{array}{cccc}
0 & 1 & 2 & 3 \\
\hline
B \text{ announces } D_0, & \text{Mechanism: } & i \text{ reports } (\tilde{c}^i, \tilde{F}^i), & \text{Renegotiation: } \text{GNBS} \\
\text{ } & \text{ } & \text{ } & \text{Payoffs are realized} \\
\text{c}^i, F, \hat{F}^i \text{ determined, } & \text{ } & \text{ } & \text{ } \\
i \text{ observes } (c^i, \hat{F}^i) & C, D(\tilde{F}) \text{ determined } & \text{ } & \text{ } \\
\end{array} \]

Figure 1: Time structure

Discussion of modeling assumptions:
1. **Common knowledge of the information structure.** The mechanism design literature typically assumes that the informational structure of the underlying game is common knowledge of all players, i.e. all players know the set of possible flaws $\mathcal{F}$ and the probability distributions $G(\mathcal{F})$, $Q_F(\hat{F}^1, \hat{F}^2)$, and $H(c^1, c^2)$. In our set-up this does not make much sense. A sophisticated buyer may be aware that flaws may exist in the initial design, but she doesn’t know how these flaws look like, otherwise she could find them herself.

To deal with this problem we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we follow the standard mechanism design literature by assuming that the structure of the game is common knowledge and solve for the efficient, cost-minimizing mechanism. This yields a benchmark for what the buyer can achieve if she is very well informed. In a second step, we relax the informational requirements and assume that neither the buyer nor the sellers know the set of possible flaws nor the underlying probability distribution. We show that there exists an indirect mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the same cost to the buyer as the efficient, cost-minimizing mechanism of step 1.

2. **Flaws versus design improvements.** In the model we always talk about flaws. A seller may also discover a design improvement that raises the utility of the buyer by more than the additional cost of the seller. It is straightforward to extend to model to this case. However, the value of a design improvement is often subjective and impossible to verify, while the cost of fixing a flaw is more objective and more easily assessed by an outsider. We will get back to this distinction in Section 5.2 where it plays an important role for the Arbitration Mechanism proposed there.

3. **Timing of the discovery of flaws.** The model assumes that sellers observe flaws at date 0 only, i.e. before the contract is assigned. Thus, if the contractor reports a flaw at date 2 in order to renegotiate, the buyer knows that the seller must have known this flaw early on. In the real world not all flaws are discovered early but some are discovered late. It would be straightforward (but notationally cumbersome) to extend the model by allowing for late discoveries of design flaws as well. In this extended model a seller who reports a design flaw late will always claim that he observed it late, and the buyer
cannot find out when the flaw was discovered for simplicity we do not present this extended model formally but assume that all flaws are observed at date 0 after all these are the flaws that we care about because we want to induce sellers to report these flaws early in order to save the additional cost if a flaw is discovered late the higher cost to fix it is unavoidable.

4. No commitment not to renegotiate. If the buyer could commit never to renegotiate the sellers would not be able to profit from withholding their information and they might as well report all observed design flaws early however if there is an opportunity for a Pareto improvement at date 2 the parties can always tear up the old contract and renegotiate a new one further more if there are design flaws that are discovered late (as discussed above) a commitment not to renegotiate could be very harmful we also exclude the possibility to “design” the renegotiation game in the mechanism at date 1 such that the buyer gets all the bargaining power.

4 Three Inefficiencies

In this section we discuss a simple example to point out the inefficiencies that arise if the buyer naively uses a standard price-only auction to allocate the procurement contract in this example we assume that there is only one possible flaw denoted by \( f \) that exists with probability \( p \). If the flaw exists each seller independently observes it with probability \( q \), i.e. \( \hat{F}^i = \{ f \} \). With probability \( 1 - q \) seller \( i \) observes nothing so \( \hat{F}^i = \emptyset \). We also assume that \( \Delta c = 0 \). Thus if there is a design flaw and if the flaw is reported early (at date 1) then the problem can be solved at no additional cost however if the flaw is reported late (at date 2) and the parties have to renegotiate then there is an inefficiency \( \Delta x \), with \( \Delta v > \Delta x > 0 \).

Suppose that the buyer uses a sealed-bid second-price auction if the probability of a design flaw is 0 this auction implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost for the buyer.

9If the buyer could prove that the seller withheld the information on purpose and that he foresaw the harm caused to the buyer a court of law could interpret this as a violation of the seller’s “duty of care” in the extended version of the model proposed above this is no longer an issue.

10See Hart (1995), p. 77-78 for a detailed discussion of these issues.
Before the auction is conducted, the buyer may ask the two sellers whether they have detected a flaw in design $D_0$. If none of the suppliers reports a flaw, the buyer auctions off the procurement contract for design $D_0$. If at least one of the suppliers reports the flaw $f$, the buyer fixes the design and puts the improved design $D(f) = D_f$ up for auction.

**Observation 1.** Suppose the buyer uses a sealed-bid, second-price auction to allocate the procurement contract. Then, any seller who detected flaw $f$ has a strict incentive to conceal this information. There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in which each seller bids

$$b(c^i, \hat{F}^i) = \begin{cases} c^i - (1 - \alpha)S^R & \text{if } D = D_0 \text{ and } \hat{F}^i = \{f\} \\ c^i & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

If seller 1 who observed the flaw reports this to the buyer ex ante, the adjusted design $D_f$ is specified in the initial auction. The seller’s expected profit is the expected cost advantage – as in a standard second-price inverse auction. If, on the other hand, seller 1 conceals the flaw and also seller 2 does not report it, a contract for design $D_0$ is awarded initially. Now, if seller 1 wins the contract he can make an additional profit ex post by renegotiating the contract. This allows him to bid more aggressively in the auction. Hence, by concealing the flaw seller 1 increases the probability of winning the contract and the expected profit from being awarded the contract. Therefore, a seller who spotted the flaw has a strict incentive to conceal this information ex ante.

This behavior of an informed seller can trigger three inefficiencies if a price-only auction is used. First, because the flaw is only revealed at date 2 the parties have to renegotiate with positive probability and incur the renegotiation cost $\Delta x > 0$. Second, if $c^i > c^j$ and $i$ observes the flaw while $j$ does not, it may happen that $c^i - (1 - \alpha)S^R < c^j$. In this case the seller with the higher cost gets the contract which is inefficient – i.e., the auction does not achieve efficient production. Finally, if $c^i > c^j$ and $i$ observes the flaw while $j$ does not, it may happen that $c^i - (1 - \alpha)S^R > c^j$. In this case the lower cost seller gets the contract, but the flaw is not fixed and $S^R = \Delta v - \Delta x$ cannot be realized.

**Proposition 1 (Three Inefficiencies).** Suppose the buyer uses a sealed-bid, second-price auction to allocate the procurement contract. Then, three inefficiencies arise.

1. **Inefficient Renegotiation:**

   With probability $pq \left[ q + 2(1 - q) \times \text{Prob}(c^i - (1 - \alpha)S^R < c^j) \right]$ there is a design flaw that
is detected by at least one seller who wins the auction. In this case the design flaw is fixed via renegotiation which is inefficient because the parties have to incur $\Delta x > 0$.

2. **Inefficient Production:**

With probability $2pq(1 - q) \times \text{Prob}(c^j < c^i < c^j + (1 - \alpha)SR)$ there is a design flaw that is detected by one seller, this seller has higher production costs but wins the auction because of his expected profit in the renegotiation game. In this case production is carried out inefficiently by the seller with the higher cost.

3. **Inefficient Design:**

With probability $2pq(1 - q) \times \text{Prob}(c^j < c^i - (1 - \alpha)SR)$ there is a design flaw that is detected by one seller, but this seller does not win the auction. In this case the design flaw is not reported to the buyer and it cannot be fixed, so the buyer has to incur the loss of $\Delta v$ which is inefficient.

The question arises whether there is a mechanism that avoids these inefficiencies, i.e. a mechanism that induces both sellers to report all observed design flaws at date 1 and that always allocates the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. In the next section we focus on the first inefficiency (Inefficient Renegotiation) by assuming that there are no cost differences between sellers. Furthermore, we restrict attention to the case of just one possible design flaw for notational simplicity. In Section 6 we allow for cost differences between sellers in order to address the additional problems of Inefficient Production and Inefficient Design, and we allow for multiple design flaws.

## 5 Inducing Sellers to Report a Design Flaw Early

In this section we focus on how to optimally induce sellers to report a design flaw early. We abstract from cost differences between firms and assume that $c^1 = c^2 = c$. Furthermore, we restrict attention to only one design flaw. We proceed in two steps. First, we assume that the model is common knowledge. In particular we assume that the mechanism designer (the buyer) knows the set of flaws and the underlying probability distributions. We derive a direct mechanism that induces both sellers to reveal their private information at date 1 and that
implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost for the buyer. In the second step we show that under an additional weak assumption there exists an indirect mechanism that implements the same allocation but that is informationally robust in the sense that it does not require the mechanism designer to know any of the parameters of the model when she sets up the mechanism.

5.1 The Optimal Mechanism Design Problem

Consider the problem of a mechanism designer who knows that there is one potential flaw $f$ and who knows the values of $v$, $c$, $\Delta v$, $\Delta c$, and $\Delta x$, and the probabilities $p$ and $q$. Each seller $i \in \{1, 2\}$ is one of two possible types. If he did not observe a design flaw, he is (with a slight abuse of notion) of type $\emptyset$. This is the case if either there is no flaw (in state $F = \emptyset$) or if there is a flaw (in state $F = \{f\}$) but the seller did not observe it. If the seller observed the flaw, he is of type $f$.

A direct mechanism asks each seller $i$ to send a message $\tilde{F}_i \in \{\emptyset, f\}$. In words, a seller either claims that he did not observe anything ($\tilde{F}_i = \emptyset$) or he reports that he observed the flaw ($\tilde{F}_i = f$). While message $\tilde{F}_i = \emptyset$ can always be sent, message $\tilde{F}_i = f$ is feasible only if supplier $i$ indeed observed the flaw $f$ (is of type $f$). This is a mechanism design problem with “partially verifiable information” (Green and Laffont, 1986). In such a setup and with multiple agents, the revelation principle can be applied if the evidentiary structure (the set of feasible reports) is strongly normal (Bull and Watson, 2007). It is straightforward to check that this condition is satisfied in our model, so we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms\footnote{By focusing on single agent problems, Green and Laffont (1986) have shown that in mechanism design problems with partially verifiable information the Revelation Principle applies if the so-called “Nested Range Condition (NRC)” is satisfied. This result has been extended to the class of mechanism design problems with $n$ agents by Bull and Watson (2007). The equivalent to the NRC in the case with $n$ agents is (strong) evidentiary normality. An evidentiary structure is called strongly normal if (i) there is a report that can be send by any type ($\tilde{F}_i = \emptyset$ in our model), and (ii) if a type $\theta_1$ can claim to be of type $\theta_2$ and type $\theta_2$ can claim to be of type $\theta_3$, then also type $\theta_1$ can claim to be of type $\theta_3$. In our model, a seller can report a flaw only if he observed it. Thus, if $F_1^i \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{F}_i)$ and $F_2^i \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{F}_i)$, then we also have $F_3^i \in \mathcal{P}(\tilde{F}_i)$. Thus, strong evidentiary normality is satisfied.}. A direct mechanism asks each seller to report his type. It specifies the design $D^i \in \{D_0, D_f\}$ of the good, probabilities $\omega^i$ with which seller $i$ has to deliver good $D^i$, and transfers $t^i$, paid by the buyer and received by seller $i$, $i \in \{1, 2\}$, that depend on both messages. Because the
problem is symmetric we restrict attention to symmetric mechanisms, i.e.

\[ D^i = D(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j), \quad \omega^i = \omega(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \in [0, 1], \quad \text{and} \quad t^i = t(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \in \mathbb{R} \]

with \( j \neq i \).

The mechanism designer wants to implement an efficient outcome. This requires:

(i) The specified design is optimal given the available information (efficient design, ED)

\[
D(\tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2) = \begin{cases} D_0 & \text{if } \tilde{F}^1 = \tilde{F}^2 = \emptyset \\ D_f & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{(ED)}
\]

(ii) Production always takes place (efficient production, EP, because the good is sufficiently valuable to the buyer)

\[
\omega(\tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2) + \omega(\tilde{F}^2, \tilde{F}^1) = 1 \quad \forall \, \tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2 \in F \quad \text{(EP)}
\]

(iii) An informed seller wants to reveal the state truthfully (incentive compatibility, IC)

\[
q[t(f, f) - \omega(f, f)(c + \Delta c)] + (1 - q)[t(f, \emptyset) - \omega(f, \emptyset)(c + \Delta c)] \\
\geq q[t(\emptyset, f) - \omega(\emptyset, f)(c + \Delta c)] + (1 - q)[t(\emptyset, \emptyset) - \omega(\emptyset, \emptyset)(c - (1 - \alpha)S_R)] \quad \text{(IC)}
\]

(iv) Sellers always make non-negative profits because they are protected by limited liability (LL)

\[
t(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) - \omega(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \cdot c(D(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j)) \geq 0 \quad \forall \, \tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j \in F \quad \text{(LL)}
\]

where \( c(D(\tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2)) = c \) if \( \tilde{F}^1 = \tilde{F}^2 = \emptyset \) and \( c(D(\tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2)) = c + \Delta c \) otherwise. Note that (LL) implies that all sellers voluntarily participate in the mechanism (individual rationality).

We want to find a mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. Thus, the mechanism design problem can be stated as follows:

\[
\min_{\omega(\cdot, \cdot), t(\cdot, \cdot)} \quad 2t(\emptyset, \emptyset)[1 - p + p(1 - q)^2] + 2t(f, f)pq + 2[t(f, \emptyset) + t(\emptyset, f)]p(1 - q)q
\]

subject to (ED), (EP), (IC) and (LL).
Let \( u(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \) denote the payoff that supplier \( i \) obtains if \( \tilde{F}^i \) and \( \tilde{F}^j \) are reported (not including any additional payoffs from renegotiation at date 2), i.e.

\[
u(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \equiv t(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) - \omega(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j)c(D(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j)).\]  

(3)

Limited liability is satisfied if and only if for all \( \tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j \in \{\emptyset, f\} \) it holds that \( u(\tilde{F}^i, \tilde{F}^j) \geq 0 \).

With this notation the incentive constraint can be written as

\[
qu(f, f) + (1 - q)u(f, \emptyset) \geq qu(\emptyset, f) + (1 - q)u(\emptyset, \emptyset) + (1 - q)\omega(\emptyset, \emptyset)(1 - \alpha)S^R \quad \text{(IC)}
\]

Notice that symmetry together with (EP) implies that \( \omega(\emptyset, \emptyset) = 1/2 \). Obviously the buyer has an incentive to choose \( u(\emptyset, \tilde{F}^j) = 0 \) for all \( \tilde{F}^j \in \{\emptyset, f\} \): Doing so relaxes the (IC) constraint and reduces the expected transfers to the sellers. Hence, the mechanism design problem simplifies to

\[
\min_{u(f, f), u(f, \emptyset)} 2qu(f, f) + 2(1 - q)u(f, \emptyset)
\]

subject to:

\[
qu(f, f) + (1 - q)u(f, \emptyset) \geq (1 - q)(1 - \alpha)S^R/2 \quad \text{(IC)}
\]

\[
u(f, f) \geq 0, \quad u(f, \emptyset) \geq 0 \quad \text{(LL)}
\]

Note that (IC) must hold with equality in the optimal solution and that the buyer is indifferent between all utility vectors that achieve this. Thus, the following pair of payoffs is a solution to the problem:

\[
u^*(f, f) = 0, \quad u^*(f, \emptyset) = (1 - \alpha)S^R/2.
\]

**Proposition 2 (Optimal Direct Mechanism).** *The following efficient direct mechanism induces each seller of type \( f \) to report his type truthfully at the lowest possible cost to the buyer:*

\[
D^*(\emptyset, \emptyset) = D_0, \quad \omega^*(\emptyset, \emptyset) = \frac{1}{2}, \quad t^*(\emptyset, \emptyset) = \frac{c}{2} \\
D^*(\emptyset, f) = D_f, \quad \omega^*(\emptyset, f) = 0, \quad t^*(\emptyset, f) = 0 \\
D^*(f, \emptyset) = D_f, \quad \omega^*(f, \emptyset) = 1, \quad t^*(f, \emptyset) = c + \Delta c + \frac{(1 - \alpha)S^R}{2} \\
D^*(f, f) = D_f, \quad \omega^*(f, f) = \frac{1}{2}, \quad t^*(f, f) = \frac{c + \Delta c}{2}
\]

This mechanism is ex post incentive compatible, i.e., it does not depend on the beliefs or higher order beliefs of the players.
Note that $t^*(\emptyset, \emptyset)$ and $t^*(f, f)$ are the expected transfers. If both sellers make the same announcement, each seller gets the contract with probability 0.5. In order to satisfy ex post limited liability, the seller who produces the good is reimbursed his cost, while the other seller receives nothing.

The mechanism of Proposition 2 is very intuitive. If one seller reports the flaw while the other one does not, then the former produces the good with the adjusted design $D_f$ and gets a strictly positive rent, while the latter gets a utility of zero. This rent is necessary to induce the seller to reveal his information ex ante rather than to wait and renegotiate after having received the contract. Note that if the seller claims $\emptyset$, then – given that the other seller also claims $\emptyset$ – he gets the contract only with probability $1/2$. Thus, the rent that has to be paid is only $\frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)S^R$. With $N$ sellers this rent can be reduced to $\frac{1}{N}(1 - \alpha)S^R$ because the probability of getting the contract if all sellers report $\emptyset$ is only $1/N$. If two sellers (or more) report $f$, there is no need to pay a rent to these sellers because each of them would receive the contract with probability zero if he claimed to be of type $\emptyset$.

The mechanism of Proposition 2 is not the only mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. In fact, any pair of utilities $u(f, f), u(f, \emptyset) \geq 0$ satisfying

$$qu(f, f) + (1 - q)u(f, \emptyset) = (1 - q)(1 - \alpha)S^R/2$$

does the job. However, the mechanism proposed in Proposition 2 is the only one that is ex post incentive compatible. Thus, no seller has an incentive to change his report after observing what the other seller has reported. Mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible have the desirable feature that they do not depend on the beliefs or higher order beliefs of the players. Thus, in a model with a richer type space in which players have beliefs about the beliefs of their opponents, an ex post incentive compatible mechanism implements the desired allocation no matter how these beliefs look like.

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$^{12}$The mechanism of Proposition 2 does not implement the efficient allocation in dominant strategies because it relies on the application of the GNBS off the equilibrium path. Non-cooperative bargaining models that offer a foundation of the GNBS typically do not have equilibria in dominant strategies.

$^{13}$See Bergemann and Morris (2005).
5.2 The Arbitration Mechanism

So far we assumed that the model is common knowledge, in particular that the mechanism designer knows all the parameters of the problem when she sets up the mechanism. However, a typical buyer does not have this information. She is not aware of the design flaw, she does not know the probability that there is a flaw nor the likelihood that any of the sellers is going to find it, and she does not know how the flaw looks like and how costly it is to fix it. However, the buyer is aware that she is unaware. She knows that mistakes happen and that they can be very costly if they are not fixed early. Thus, she would like to prepare for this possibility and to give incentives to the sellers to reveal possible flaws at date 1 already. We model this by assuming that neither the buyer nor the sellers know the set of possible flaws $F$ and their payoff consequences, nor do they have Bayesian priors $G(F)$ and $Q_{F}(\hat{F}^{1}, \hat{F}^{2})$. The buyer only knows that there may be a flaw and that sellers may observe it early. However, if a flaw is pointed out, every industry expert understands it:

**Assumption 2 (Eye-Opener).** The report of a flaw is an eye-opener: Once the flaw has been pointed out, all industry experts understand the flaw and its expected payoff consequences.

In the model of Section 5.1 Assumption 2 is a direct implication of Assumption 1 because the structure of the model is assumed to be common knowledge. Thus, if a flaw is verified, all involved parties know what the flaw is and what its payoff consequences are. In this section we assume that the parties do not know the structure of the model. Assumption 2 requires that if a flaw is pointed out to an industry expert (the buyer, the sellers, or an outside expert), then the expert understands the flaw with all its relevant implications. This assumption is reasonable for most technical flaws. For example, the buyer may have overlooked that there is a technical problem with $D_{0}$ or that $D_{0}$ does not comply with some regulation. However, once this problem has been pointed out, it is often straightforward what has to be done to fix it. We do not require that industry experts know exactly what the payoff consequences of a flaw are. We only require that they are symmetrically informed and that they can form an unbiased estimate.\(^{14}\)

\(^{14}\)Assumption 2 is reasonable for most design flaws, but it may be more problematic for some design improvements. If a design improvement results in an increase of the buyer’s profits, Assumption 2 will often be satisfied, but if the design improvement increases the buyer’s utility, the assumption is less convincing. For
If Assumption 2 holds, we can use an indirect mechanism that uses an outside industry expert as an independent arbitrator. If a seller reveals a flaw to the arbitrator, the arbitrator understands the flaw and he knows the expected payoff consequences if the flaw is fixed early rather than late. The buyer can commit ex ante to using such an independent arbitrator and to follow his verdict. In particular, she can set up the following indirect mechanism that will be called the *Arbitration Mechanism* in the following:

1) The buyer publicizes her design proposal $D_0$ and invites all potential sellers to evaluate the proposal and to report possible design flaws in sealed envelopes to an independent arbitrator.

2) If there is a design flaw that is reported by at least one seller, the arbitrator evaluates the flaw and its consequences, i.e. he estimates $\Delta v$, $\Delta c$ and $\Delta x$.

3) The contract is determined as follows:

   - If none of the sellers reports a design flaw, one of them is selected randomly and gets the contract to produce $D_0$ and receives payment $c$.

   - If only one seller reports the design flaw, he gets the contract to produce $D_f$ and the payment $c + \Delta c + (1 - \alpha)S^R/2 = c + \Delta c + (1 - \alpha)\frac{\Delta v - \Delta c - \Delta x}{2}$.

   - If both sellers report the design flaw, each of them gets the contract to produce $D_f$ and the payment $c + \Delta c$ with probability $1/2$ while the other one gets nothing.

The values of $\Delta c$, $\Delta x$, and $\Delta c$ are determined by the independent arbitrator after the flaw has been reported.

If no flaw was reported but the seller who got the contract observed a flaw, he may renegotiate the contract with the buyer.

**Proposition 3** (Arbitration Mechanism). The *Arbitration Mechanism is an efficient mechanism that is cost minimizing for the buyer*. It implements the same allocation as the optimal example, if the design improvement concerns the aesthetic appeal of the product, the buyer may know what her willingness to pay for the improved design is while the sellers and other industry experts are less well informed. This gives rise problems of asymmetric information that have to be relegated to future research.
direct mechanism of Proposition 2. Furthermore, the arbitration mechanism is informationally robust in the sense that it does not require the ex ante knowledge of \( p, q, v, \Delta v, \Delta c \) and \( \Delta x \).

Informational robustness is a highly desirable property of the Arbitration Mechanism. Of course, the buyer must be aware that there could be a design flaw, but she does not have to know how this flaw looks like, what payoff consequences it implies, and what the probabilities \( p \) and \( q \) are. However, the buyer has to be able to assess her bargaining power \( \alpha \) if the initial contract is renegotiated. Furthermore, the independent arbitrator must be able to assess \( \Delta v, \Delta c \) and \( \Delta x \) \textit{ex post}, i.e. after the flaw has been pointed out to her.

6 Multiple Design Flaws and Seller Heterogeneity

In this section we generalize the optimal mechanism derived in Section 5 in two directions. First, sellers may have different costs which are private information. Second, we allow for multiple design flaws, i.e. each seller observes some subset \( \hat{F}^i \) of the set of actual flaws \( F \). Efficiency requires that the seller with the lowest cost produces the good and that both sellers are induced to reveal all flaws that they observed at date 1.

The mechanism design problem is now more intricate. In Section 5 the optimal mechanism allocates the contract by a coin flip if both producers claim not to have observed any flaw. This minimizes the information rent that has to be paid to a seller. A random allocation is efficient, if both sellers have the same cost, but if sellers have different costs, efficiency requires that the seller with the lower cost gets the contract with probability 1. We show in this section that this increases the information rent that has to be paid to the seller.

We are now dealing with a multi-dimensional mechanism design problem. Sellers have to be induced to report both the observed design flaws and their cost parameter truthfully. In subsection 6.1 we derive an ex post incentive compatible mechanism that implements the efficient allocation and show that it does so at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. In subsection 6.2 we derive an informationally robust indirect mechanism that replicates the optimal direct mechanism without requiring any ex ante knowledge of the underlying parameters and probability distributions.
6.1 The Optimal Mechanism Design Problem

We return to the general model described in Section 3. As in Section 5 we start out assuming that the mechanism designer knows all parameters of the model, i.e. the set of possible cost types \([\bar{c}, \bar{c}]\), the set of possible flaws \(F = \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\}\), the costs \(\Delta v_k, \Delta c_k\) and \(\Delta x_k\) associated with each potential flaw \(k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}\), and the (conditional) probability distributions \(G(F), H(c)\), and \(Q_F\). In the next subsection we will relax this assumption. Note that the type of seller \(i\) is now multi-dimensional: it consists of a cost type \(c_i\) and an information type \(\hat{F}_i\) (the set of flaws that seller \(i\) observed). Thus, the type of seller \(i\) is \((c_i, \hat{F}_i) \in [\bar{c}, \bar{c}] \times \mathcal{P}(F)\).

By the revelation principle we can restrict attention to direct mechanisms that ask each seller \(i\) to send a message \((\tilde{c}_i, \tilde{F}_i) \in [\bar{c}, \bar{c}] \times \mathcal{P}(F)\). Put verbally, each seller \(i\) reports a cost \(\tilde{c}_i\) and a set of observed flaws \(\tilde{F}_i\). Supplier \(i\) is free to report any cost \(\tilde{c}_i \in [\bar{c}, \bar{c}]\) (i.e. costs cannot be verified), but he is restricted to report only flaws that he observed. A reported flaw can be verified, but the seller can always choose not to report some or all of the detected flaws, i.e. Assumption 1 applies.

The (symmetric) direct mechanism specifies for any announced types \(((\tilde{c}^1_i, \hat{F}^i_1), (\tilde{c}^2_i, \hat{F}^i_2))\) a design \(D = D(((\tilde{c}^1_i, \hat{F}^i_1), (\tilde{c}^2, \hat{F}^2_2))\), a transfer \(t^i = t(((\tilde{c}^1_i, \hat{F}^i_1), (\tilde{c}^j, \hat{F}^j_2))\) paid by the buyer and received by seller \(i\), and a probability \(\omega^i = \omega(((\tilde{c}^i_i, \hat{F}^i), (\tilde{c}^j, \hat{F}^j_2))\) with which seller \(i\) gets the contract – i.e., with probability \(\omega^i\) seller \(i\) has to produce the good, for \(i, j \in \{1, 2\}\) and \(i \neq j\).

The mechanism designer seeks to induce an efficient outcome. The mechanism has to satisfy the following constraints:

(i) The design is optimal given the available information (efficient design, ED)

\[
D(((c^1, \hat{F}^1_1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2_2)) = D(\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2) \tag{ED}
\]

(ii) The good is produced by the seller with the lowest cost (efficient production, EP)

\[
\omega(((c^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j))) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } c^i < c^j \\
1/2 & \text{if } c^i = c^j \\
0 & \text{if } c^i > c^j 
\end{cases} \tag{EP}
\]

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(iii) Sellers make non-negative profits (limited liability, LL)

\[ \forall i \in \{1, 2\}, \hat{F}^i, \hat{F}^j \subseteq F, \ c^i, c^j \in [c, \bar{c}] : \]

\[ t((c^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) - \omega((c^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) \left[ c^j + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] \geq 0. \quad (LL) \]

Note that (LL) implies that all sellers voluntarily participate in the mechanism (individual rationality). Finally, we want the mechanism to be ex post incentive compatible (EPIC), so that no seller wants to change his report once he learns the report of the other seller. Furthermore, (EPIC) makes sure that the mechanism does not depend on the beliefs or higher order beliefs of the participants.

(iv) It is ex post optimal for each seller to reveal his type truthfully (ex post incentive compatibility, EPIC)

\[ \forall i \in \{1, 2\}, \hat{F}^i, \hat{F}^j \subseteq F, \text{ and } c^i, c^j \in [c, \bar{c}] : \]

\[ t((c^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) - \omega((c^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) \left[ c^j + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] \geq \]

\[ \max_{\hat{F}^i \subseteq F, \hat{c}^i \in [c, \bar{c}]} t((\hat{c}^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) - \omega((\hat{c}^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) \left[ c^j + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] \]

\[ + \omega((\hat{c}^i, \hat{F}^i), (c^j, \hat{F}^j))(1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)). \quad (EPIC) \]

**Proposition 4 (Efficient Direct Mechanism).** The following ex post incentive compatible direct mechanism implements the efficient allocation; i.e., it satisfies (ED), (EP), (LL), and (EPIC):

\[ D^*((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2)) = D^*(\hat{F}^1, \hat{F}^2) = D(\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2) \]

\[ \omega^*((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2)) = \omega^*(c^1, c^2) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c^i < c^j \\ 1/2 & \text{if } c^i = c^j \\ 0 & \text{if } c^i > c^j \end{cases} \]

\[ t^*((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2)) = \omega^*(c^i, c^j) \left[ c^j + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] + (1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j)) \]

Each seller \( i \) has to be induced to report his information \( \hat{F}^i \) and his cost \( c^i \) truthfully. Note that the direct mechanism of Proposition 4 separates these two problems. It induces
the seller to report his information $\hat{F}^i$ by paying him $(1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j))$ if he reports $\hat{F}^i$. This is exactly the rent that seller $i$ can obtain by revealing $\hat{F}^i$ ex post – at the renegotiation stage – rather than ex ante. It induces the seller to report his cost truthfully by allocating the contract to him if he reports the lower cost at a price that is equal to the cost of the second lowest bidder (as in a Vickrey auction). Thus, the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible: no seller has an incentive to revise his decision after learning the announcement $\tilde{c}^j, \tilde{F}^j$ of the other seller.

It is useful to compare this mechanism to the mechanism of Proposition 2. Suppose that there is at most one flaw and this flaw is reported by seller $i$ but not by seller $j$. Then, according to the mechanism of Proposition 4, seller $i$ obtains a rent of $(1 - \alpha)S^R$. This rent is larger than the rent $\frac{1}{2}(1 - \alpha)S^R$, which was paid by the direct mechanism of Proposition 2. The reason is that in Proposition 2 the contract was allocated randomly if both sellers claim to be of type $\emptyset$, while the mechanism of Proposition 4 must allocate the contract to the seller with the lowest cost.

An important question is whether the buyer can reduce the information rent of a seller who observed one or more flaws? If the mechanism designer knows all the probability distributions, in particular the distribution of cost types $H$, and if she is satisfied with Bayesian Implementation, then the answer is yes. For the sake of the argument, consider the scenario with at most one flaw. Suppose seller $i$ observed the flaw and has relatively high cost. In order to obtain the contract with a high probability – and then being able to profit from renegotiation – seller $i$ has to under-report his cost significantly. This, however, is costly to seller $i$. Suppose seller $j$ reports his cost $c^j < c^i$ truthfully. Thus, the ex post utility of seller $i$ from obtaining the contract and concealing the flaw is $(1 - \alpha)S^R - (c^i - c^j)$. In other words, the higher the cost type, the lower the incentive of a seller to conceal the flaw. Thus, the transfer a seller obtains for revealing the flaw could be reduced by making it contingent on the announced costs $(c^i, c^j)$. However, such a mechanism is not ex post incentive compatible and it requires that the distribution of cost types is common knowledge.

The next proposition shows that among all ex post incentive compatible mechanisms the direct mechanism of Proposition 4 is indeed optimal.

\[\text{In this case we have } F = \{\emptyset, \{f\}\} \text{ and (with slight abuse of notation) can define } S^R := S^R(f, D_0).\]
Proposition 5 (Optimal Mechanism). The mechanism of Proposition 4 is optimal, i.e. there does not exist any other ex post incentive compatible direct mechanism that implements the efficient outcome at a lower cost for the buyer.

6.2 The Extended Arbitration Mechanism

The mechanism of Proposition 4 assumes that the model is common knowledge, in particular that the buyer knows all the parameters of the problem when she designs the optimal revelation mechanism. However, if the Eye-Opener Assumption 2 holds, this knowledge is not necessary. An extended version of the Arbitration Mechanism introduced in Section 4.2 implements the same allocation as the optimal mechanism of Proposition 4 and does not require that the buyer knows anything about the nature or the payoff consequences of possible flaws, nor does she have to know the probability distributions over the realization of these flaws and over the costs of the seller. However, the buyer has to be aware that flaws are possible and she has to be able to commit to using an independent arbitrator who understands the flaws once they have been pointed out to her. The arbitrator can be instructed to determine payments ex post (after flaws have been revealed) such that they give rise to the same payoffs as the mechanism of Proposition 4. The Extended Arbitration Mechanism is defined as follows:

1) The buyer publicizes her initial design proposal $D_0$ and invites all potential sellers to evaluate the proposal and to report possible design flaws in sealed envelopes to an independent arbitrator.

2) Let $\tilde{F}_i$ denote the set of flaws reported by seller $i \in \{1, 2\}$. The arbitrator evaluates all flaws $f_k \in \tilde{F} \equiv \tilde{F}_1 \cup \tilde{F}_2$ and their potential consequences, i.e., for any reported flaw $f_k$ she estimates $\Delta v_k$, $\Delta c_k$ and $x_k$. She awards the following reward to each seller $i$:

$$T_i(\tilde{F}_i, \tilde{F}_j) = (1 - \alpha)S^R(\tilde{F}_i, D(\tilde{F}_j))$$

3) The buyer uses the information on the reported design flaws $\tilde{F} = \tilde{F}_1 \cup \tilde{F}_2$ to redesign the good to $D(\tilde{F})$, and then runs a sealed-bid, second-price auction. Each seller $i \in \{1, 2\}$
submits a bid $b^i$, the contract is allocated to the lowest bidder, and seller $i$ receives

$$T_2^i(b^i, b^j) = \begin{cases} b^i & \text{if } b^i < b_j \\ b^j/2 & \text{if } b^i = b_j \\ 0 & \text{if } b^i > b^j \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

If both sellers place the same bid $b^1 = b^2 = b$, one seller is selected at random and obtains the contract at price $b$.

4) If seller $i$ got the contract and if he observed design flaws $f_k$ that have not been revealed to the buyer at stage 1, he may renegotiate the contract with the buyer.

Proposition 6 (Extended Arbitration Mechanism). If Assumption 2 holds, the Extended Arbitration Mechanism is an efficient mechanism that is informationally robust in the sense that it is ex post incentive compatible and it does not require any prior knowledge of the set of possible flaws $\mathcal{F}$, with $\Delta v_k$, $\Delta c_k$, and $\Delta x_k$ for all $k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, and the probability distributions $G$, $Q_F$ and $H$. There does not exist any other informationally robust mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at a lower cost to the buyer.

The Extended Arbitration Mechanism is a two-stage mechanism that separates the problems of (i) inducing sellers to reveal observed design flaws early, and (ii) allocating the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. This separation is necessary if the buyer wants to implement an efficient allocation. However, if the buyer does not want to implement the efficient allocation but rather wants to maximize her expected profits, she may want to tie the allocation of the contract to the revelation of design flaws (e.g. by offering bonus points that create an advantage in the auction for sellers who reveal flaws early) in order to reduce the rent that has to be paid to sellers. But, of course, this comes at the price that the allocation is inefficient with positive probability.

The Extended Arbitration Mechanism requires the commitment of the buyer to pay sellers for the information on design flaws that they provide. The simplest and most transparent way to do this is the use of an independent third party. However, there are also other ways how this commitment can be achieved. For example, if the buyer frequently procures similar projects, i.e., if she is in a repeated relationship with the sellers, and if the allocation procedure is fully transparent, then she may be able to credibly commit to paying out $T_1^i(\tilde{F}_i, \tilde{F}_j) =$
If parties are sufficiently patient, this commitment is sustained by the threat of the sellers not to reveal any design flaws in the future if the buyer ever reneges on her promise.

7 Incentives to Invest in Finding Design Flaws

So far, we assumed that sellers receive the signal about design flaws for free. In reality finding flaws requires effort and other costly resources. Thus, the question arises whether the Extended Arbitration Mechanism provides optimal incentives to invest into finding flaws.

We analyze the investment incentives of the two sellers for the baseline model with at most one flaw; i.e., \( F = \{\emptyset, \{f\} \} \). The flaw exists with probability \( p \in (0,1) \). If the flaw exists and is detected and revealed ex ante, this creates a social surplus of \( S = \Delta v - \Delta c \).

If the flaw is revealed only at the renegotiation stage, the social surplus is reduced to \( S_R = \Delta v - \Delta c - \Delta x > 0 \).

Each seller \( i \) can invest resources in order to increase the probability of detecting the flaw (if it exists). The probability of detecting the flaw if it exists is \( q \) when seller \( i \) invests the amount \( \phi^i(q) \), where \( \phi^i(\cdot) \) is strictly increasing and convex. Given the flaw exists, the detection probabilities are assumed to be uncorrelated across sellers.

Recall that the Extended Arbitration Mechanism separates the problems of inducing sellers to reveal flaws and of allocating the contract to the most efficient seller. Thus, we can focus on the profits a seller obtains from detecting and revealing the flaw. The expected profit of seller \( i \) under the Extended Arbitration Mechanism (ignoring potential profits from production) is

\[
\pi^i(q^i) = pq^i(1 - \hat{q}^j)(1 - \alpha)S^R - \phi^i(q^i),
\]

where \( \hat{q}^j \) with \( j \neq i \) is the investment that seller \( i \) expects his competitor \( j \) to make. In the Nash Equilibrium of the investment game seller \( i \) chooses

\[
q^{iN} \in \arg \max_{q^i} pq^i(1 - \hat{q}^j)(1 - \alpha)S^R - \phi^i(q^i)
\]

Consider now the problem of a social planner who can choose \( q^1 \) and \( q^2 \) in order to
maximize social welfare

\[ W(q^1, q^2) = p(q^1 + q^2 - q^1q^2)S - \phi^1(q^1) - \phi^2(q^2). \]  

(9)

The welfare optimal investments are

\[ (q^{1*}, q^{2*}) \in \arg\max_{q^1, q^2} W(q^1, q^2). \]  

(10)

We assume that there exists a unique welfare maximizing tuple of investment levels \((q^{1*}, q^{2*}) \gg 0\).

The welfare maximizing investment levels do not coincide with the investment levels that sellers choose in Nash equilibrium. Suppose seller 1 expects that seller 2 invests efficiently. Then the investment level of seller 1 must solve \(p(1 - q^{2*})(1 - \alpha)S^R = d\phi^1/dq^1\). However, the welfare optimal investment level \(q^{1*}\) solves the following first-order condition \(p(1 - q^{2*})S = d\phi^1/dq^1\). Thus, given that seller 2 invests efficiently, seller 1 has an incentive to invest too little. The reason is that with the Extended Arbitration Mechanism seller \(i\) receives less than the social value generated by his efforts. He receives only share \((1 - \alpha) < 1\) of the renegotiation surplus, which is the social surplus reduced by the cost of renegotiation. Thus, the Extended Arbitration Mechanism induces sellers to underinvest into finding design flaws. This problem can be fixed by replacing \(T^i_1\) in the Extended Arbitration Mechanism by the full social surplus \(S\); i.e., if seller \(i\) reports the flaw and seller \(j\) reports nothing, seller \(i\) obtains a payment of \(S\) and nothing otherwise. Now, the expected profit of seller \(i\) amounts to

\[ \pi^i(q^i) = pq^i(1 - \hat{q}^j)S - \phi^i(q^i) \]  

(11)

**Proposition 7 (Investment Incentives).** Suppose the Arbitration Mechanism specifies \(\hat{T}^i_1(f, \emptyset) = S\) and \(\hat{T}^i_1(f, f) = \hat{T}^i_1(\emptyset, f) = \hat{T}^i_1(\emptyset, \emptyset) = 0\). This mechanism induces both sellers to reveal their information truthfully, it allocates the contract to the seller with the lowest cost, and it induces both sellers to invest efficiently; i.e., \((q^1, q^2) = (q^{1*}, q^{2*})\).

The mechanism proposed by Proposition 7 is essentially a Groves mechanism: Each seller is made residual claimant for his contribution to the social surplus. It is interesting to note that the mechanisms of Sections 5 and 6 are not Groves mechanisms. They do not pay each seller his marginal contribution to the social surplus, but rather the increase of his outside option utility.
The mechanism of Proposition 7 implements the efficient investment levels in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It does not require that the buyer knows the investment cost functions. Each seller, however, has to be able to anticipate the behavior of the other seller correctly. Thus, each seller has to know his competitor’s investment cost functions. Furthermore, efficiency requires that the sellers know the likelihood that a flaw exists and what the payoff consequences of the flaw are.

The question of how to incentivize sellers to search for flaws efficiently raises many additional interesting questions. For example, it may be optimal to limit the number of sellers who are incentivized to search for flaws, or it may be optimal to let sellers search sequentially in order not to duplicate search efforts. However, all of these design choices require a detailed knowledge of what sellers are searching for, i.e. the buyer must know the parameters of the model and the underlying probability distributions. This is why these problems are beyond the scope of this paper.

8 Conclusions

An important problem for real world mechanism design is the fact that the mechanism designer is often unaware of some possible contingencies. An experienced mechanism designer understands that she may have overlooked something (she is “aware that she is unaware”), but she does not know what it is that she has overlooked. The traditional mechanism design literature ignores this problem by assuming that “the model” is common knowledge. All involved parties know what the possible states of the world are, and they know the probability distributions with which nature determines the actual state (including the information structure). Following [Wilson (1987)] the literature on “robust implementation” focuses on mechanisms that do not depend on the probability distributions, i.e. on the beliefs and higher-order beliefs of the involved parties. Our paper goes one step further. We allow for the possibility that the mechanism designer has only partial knowledge of the physical state-space, i.e. she is unaware of some contingencies. Therefore, it is impossible for her to describe these contingencies in a contract or mechanism ex ante.

We have shown that, nevertheless, the mechanism designer can implement the efficient
allocation if the revelation of the state of the world is an eye-opener, i.e., once the state has been pointed out, every expert understands the state and its payoff consequences. In this case the mechanism designer can appoint an expert as an independent arbitrator who verifies the state and completes the contract ex post according to a general rule that does not require the ex ante knowledge of the state space. In the procurement context this is a reasonable assumption. The buyer is often unaware of possible design flaws, but once a flaw has been pointed out it is often obvious to every industry expert what the flaw is, how it has to be fixed, and what the payoff consequences are. By using the Extended Arbitration Mechanism the buyer can induce sellers to reveal all observed design flaws early and she can implement the efficient allocation. We believe that this approach deserves further attention in other contexts as well. For example, courts of arbitration are frequently used in labor and trade disputes. They often verify the state of the world ex post and assign payments according to rules that have been specified in very general terms ex ante. An important question is how these rules should be designed to induce efficient behavior.

One potential problem of the Extended Arbitration Mechanism is collusion. A seller who reports a set of flaws is not rewarded for all flaws that he detected, but only for those that have not been reported by other sellers. Thus, if sellers coordinated their reports so that no flaw is reported by more than one seller, they could all benefit. In some sense this is the same problem of collusion that arises in any auction. However, there is an interesting twist to it that makes collusion more difficult in our setup. In order to coordinate their behavior each seller has to point out the flaws that he observed to the other seller. Suppose that seller 1 observed a flaw that seller 2 did not observe. By pointing out the flaw to seller 2, seller 1 gives away his information. Seller 2 may now claim that he also observed the flaw and threaten to reveal it to the buyer in order to obtain concessions from seller 1 in the collusion game. An interesting question for future research is to model this in more detail and to ask whether the mechanism can be modified to make collusion more difficult.

The Extended Arbitration Mechanism separates the problem of inducing sellers to report design flaws early and assigning the contract to the seller with the lowest cost. This separation is necessary to achieve efficiency. However if the buyer is not interested in implementing the efficient allocation but rather in maximizing profits, separation need no longer be optimal. In
this case the buyer may be able to increase her expected profits by tying the assignment of the contract to the revelation of flaws, e.g. by offering “bonus points” in the auction in exchange for pointing out design improvements. In fact, this is what is sometimes observed in private procurement contexts. Note, however, that in order to design the mechanism optimally, the buyer needs to know the probabilities of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. If she does not know this, she may get it wrong which can be very costly if sellers keep the information on design flaws to themselves. Thus, even for a profit maximizing buyer the Extended Arbitration Mechanism is attractive: It allows the buyer to reap all the benefits from inducing sellers to report design flaws early, and the rents that the buyer has to pay to sellers do not exceed the rents that she would have paid if she had used a price-only auction.
A Appendix

Proof of Observation 1 The proof focuses on the incentives of a seller to reveal the flaw. The bidding strategies in the second-price auction can be shown to be optimal by applying standard arguments.

Consider the case where there is a design flaw and seller 1 observed it. If the flaw was reported at date 1, there is no scope for renegotiation at date 2. In this case it is a weakly dominant strategy for each seller \(i\) to bid \(b(c_i, \{f\}) = c_i\). Seller 1’s expected profit if he reveals the flaw (REV) is given by

\[
\Pi^1(\text{REV}) = \text{Prob}[c^1 \leq c^2] \cdot E[c^2 - c^1 \mid c^1 \leq c^2]. \tag{A.1}
\]

Alternatively, seller 1 could conceal the information, hope that he wins the auction, then report the flaw at date 2 and renegotiate. If he manages to get the contract and to renegotiate it, his payoff from renegotiation is given by \((1-\alpha)\Delta v - \Delta x = (1-\alpha)S_R\). Thus, if he conceals the flaw, it is a weakly dominant strategy for seller 2 to bid \(b(c^2, \{f\}) = c^2 - (1-\alpha)S_R\) in the auction at date 1.\(^{16}\) Let \(q'\) denote the probability that seller 2 also observed the flaw given that seller 2 did not inform the buyer about it. Clearly, \(q' \leq q\). With probability \(q'\) seller 2 bids \(b(c^2, \{f\}) = c^2 - (1-\alpha)S_R\), with probability \(1-q'\) he bids \(b(c^2, \emptyset) = c^2\).\(^{17}\) Thus, the expected payoff of seller 1 if he conceals the flaw (CON) is given by

\[
\Pi^1(\text{CON}) = q' \text{Prob}[c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2 - (1-\alpha)S_R] \\
\times E[c^2 - (1-\alpha)S_R - c^1 + (1-\alpha)S_R \mid c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2 - (1-\alpha)S_R] \\
\times (1-q') \text{Prob}[c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2] \\
\times E[c^2 - c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \mid c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2] > \Pi^1(\text{REV}) \tag{A.2}
\]

The strict inequality follows from \(q' \leq q < 1\), \(\text{Prob}[c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2] > \text{Prob}[c^1 \leq c^2]\) and \(E[c^2 - c^1 + (1-\alpha)S_R \mid c^1 - (1-\alpha)S_R \leq c^2] > E[c^2 - c^1 \mid c^1 \leq c^2]\).

\(^{16}\)Note that this strategy is weakly dominant given the reduced form outcome of the renegotiation game.

\(^{17}\)If seller 2 did not observe any flaw, he may still expect that there is a flaw with positive probability. However, as long as he does not know the flaw, this is of no relevance to him. The flaw will become apparent at date 3 only, when the initial contract expires and the contractor has no advantage over other sellers anymore.
Proof of Proposition 1. The result is shown in the main text.

Proof of Proposition 2. We have shown in the text above that the proposed mechanism satisfies all constraints and minimizes the expected cost of the buyer. Note that it is weakly optimal for each seller to report his type truthfully no matter what the announced type of his opponent is. Thus, the mechanism is ex post incentive compatible.

Proof of Proposition 3. The Arbitration Mechanism gives rise to the same monetary outcomes and the same incentives for each seller as the mechanism of Proposition 2. Thus, given that it is an equilibrium in the direct mechanism for each seller to reveal the design flaw early, it is also an equilibrium in the Arbitration Mechanism. The mechanism is informationally robust because it is independent of the probabilities $p$ and $q$ and because the reward for reporting a design flaw is determined ex post by the independent arbitrator.

Proof of Proposition 4. The above mechanism obviously satisfies (ED), (EP), and (LL).\footnote{Note again that $t^*$ is the expected transfer payment. If $c_i = c_j$ each seller gets the contract with probability one half. To make sure that (LL) is always satisfied the actual transfer payment is given by $[c_i + \sum\{k|f_k \in F_i \cup F_j\} \Delta c_k] + (1 - \alpha)S^R(F_i, D(F^j))$ if seller $i$ gets the contract and $(1 - \alpha)S^R(F_i, D(F^j))$ otherwise.}

Using the expression for the transfer payments, (EPIC) can be written as

$$\omega^*(c', c^j)[c_j - c^i] + (1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j)) \geq$$

$$\omega^*(\hat{c}^i, c^j)[c_j - c^i + (1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^i \cup \hat{F}^j))] + (1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j)) \quad (A.3)$$

for all $\hat{c}^i \in [\bar{c}, \bar{c}]$, $\hat{F}^i \subseteq \hat{F}^i$. First, note that

$$S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j)) + S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^i \cup \hat{F}^j)) = \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^i \setminus \hat{F}^j\}} \Delta v_k - \Delta c_k - \Delta x_k + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^i \setminus \hat{F}^i \cup \hat{F}^j\}} \Delta v_k - \Delta c_k - \Delta x_k = \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^i \setminus \hat{F}^j\}} \Delta v_k - \Delta c_k - \Delta x_k = S^R(\hat{F}^i, D(\hat{F}^j)). \quad (A.4)$$
Proof of Proposition 5. The optimal mechanism design problem of the buyer is given by:

\[
\omega^*(c^i, c^j)[c^j - c^i] \geq \omega^*(\tilde{c}^i, c^j)[c^j - c^i] - [1 - \omega^*(\tilde{c}^i, c^j)](1 - \alpha)S^R(\tilde{F}^i, D(\tilde{F}^i \cup \tilde{F}^j)) \tag{A.5}
\]

for all \(\tilde{c}^i \in [c, \tilde{c}], \tilde{F}^i \subseteq \tilde{F}^i\).

Thus, given that \(\omega^* \leq 1\) it never pays off for a seller to misreport the observed flaws. The remaining question is whether a seller can benefit from misreporting his cost. Given that the set of observed flaws is revealed truthfully, inequality (A.5) simplifies to

\[
\omega^*(c^i, c^j)[c^j - c^i] \geq \omega^*(\tilde{c}^i, c^j)[c^j - c^i] \quad \forall \tilde{c}^i \in [c, \tilde{c}]. \tag{A.6}
\]

If \(\tilde{c} < c^i\), we have \(\omega^*(c^i, c^j) = 1\), so misreporting cannot be beneficial. If \(\tilde{c} > c^j\), we have \(\omega^*(c^i, c^j) = 0\), so misreporting can lead to seller \(i\) getting the contract but this is not in seller \(i\)’s interest because \([c^j - c^i] < 0\). For the knife-edge case \(c^j = c^i\), seller \(i\) is indifferent between all potential cost reports – i.e., reporting truthfully is a best response.

Proof of Proposition 5. The optimal mechanism design problem of the buyer is given by:

\[
\min_{t(\cdot)} \mathbb{E}[t((c^1, \tilde{F}^1), (c^2, \tilde{F}^2)) + t((c^2, \tilde{F}^2), (c^1, \tilde{F}^1))] \tag{A.7}
\]

subject to:

\[
D((c^1, \tilde{F}^1), (c^2, \tilde{F}^2)) = D(\tilde{F}^1, \tilde{F}^2) = D(\tilde{F}^1 \cup \tilde{F}^2) \tag{ED}
\]

\[
\omega((c^1, \tilde{F}^1), (c^2, \tilde{F}^2)) = \omega(c^1, c^2) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } c^1 < c^2 \\
1/2 & \text{if } c^1 = c^2 \\
0 & \text{if } c^1 > c^2
\end{cases} \tag{EP}
\]

\[
t((c^1, \tilde{F}^1), (c^2, \tilde{F}^2)) - \omega(c^1, c^2) \left[ c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \tilde{F}^1 \cup \tilde{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] \geq 0 \tag{LL}
\]

\[
t((c^1, \tilde{F}^1), (c^2, \tilde{F}^2)) - \omega(c^1, c^2) \left[ c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \tilde{F}^1 \cup \tilde{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] \geq \omega(\tilde{c}^i, c^j) \left[ c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \tilde{F}^1 \cup \tilde{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] + \omega(c^1, c^2) \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \tilde{F}^1 \setminus (\tilde{F}^1 \cup \tilde{F}^2)\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k \tag{EPIC}
\]

All constraints have to hold for both sellers and for all seller types.
Efficient Design (ED) and Efficient Production (EP) imply directly
\[
D^*((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2)) = D^*(\hat{F}^1, \hat{F}^2) = D(\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)
\]
\[
\omega^*((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^j, \hat{F}^j)) = \omega^*(c^1, c^j) = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if } c^1 < c^j \\
0 & \text{if } c^1 > c^j
\end{cases}
\]
Consider now the implications of Ex Post Incentive Compatibility (EPIC) by focusing on the incentives of seller 1 to misreport his type (the incentives of seller 2 are symmetric). (EPIC) requires that for all \((c^1, \hat{F}^1) \in [c, \bar{c}] \times \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F})\) and for all \((c^2, \hat{F}^2) \in [c, \bar{c}] \times \mathcal{P}(\mathcal{F})\) it must hold that:
\[
t((c^1, \hat{F}^1), (c^2, \hat{F}^2)) - \omega(c^1, c^2)\left[c^1 + \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k\right] \geq \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus (\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)\}} (1 - \alpha)S_k^R
\]
(EPIC)
In the following, we derive conditions on transfers that need to be satisfied so that seller 1 has no incentive to misreport his type. We have to distinguish four cases.

**Case (i) \([c^1 < c^2\ and \ c^1 < c^2]\):** Seller 1 is more efficient than seller 2. He must have no incentive to misreport his type by claiming to have a different cost \(\hat{c}^1 \neq c^1\) such that he is still selected as the contractor. This is the case iff
\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - [c^1 + \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k] \\ \geq t(\hat{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - [c^1 + \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k] + \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus (\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)\}} (1 - \alpha)S_k^R
\]
for all \(\hat{c}^1 < c^2\) and all \(\hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1\). Rearranging yields
\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - t(\hat{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus (\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)\}} \left[\Delta c_k + (1 - \alpha)S_k^R\right] \quad \forall c^1, \hat{c}^1 < c_2, \hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1. \quad (A.8)
\]

**Case (ii) \([c^1 < c^2\ and \ c^1 > c^2]\):** If Seller 1 is more efficient than seller 2 it must also be the case that he has no incentive to report to be less efficient than seller 2, which is the case iff
\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq c^1 + \sum_{\{k \mid f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \quad \forall c^1 < c^2, \hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1. \quad (A.9)
\]
Case (iii) \([c^1 > c^2 \text{ and } \hat{c}^1 > c^2]\): Seller 1 is less efficient than seller 2. He must have no incentive to report \(\hat{c}^1 \neq c^1\) such that he is still less efficient. In this case (EPIC) reduces to

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - t(\hat{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq 0 \quad \forall c^1, \hat{c}^1 > c^2, \hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1. \tag{A.10}
\]

The reverse condition has to hold to deter type \(\hat{c}^1\) from reporting to be type \(c^1\). Furthermore these conditions have to hold for all \(\hat{F}^1\) and \(\hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1\), so in particular for \(\hat{F}^1 = \hat{F}^1\). Thus, different types of seller 1 that report the same set of flaws and have different costs that are both higher than the cost of seller 2 must receive the same transfer: For all \(c^1, \hat{c}^1\) so that

\[
\omega(c^1, \cdot) = \omega(\hat{c}^1, \cdot) = 0 \quad \text{we must have}
\]

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) = t(\hat{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \quad \forall \hat{F}^1, \forall c^1, \hat{c}^1 > c_2. \tag{A.11}
\]

Case (iv) \([c^1 > c^2 \text{ and } \hat{c}^1 < c^2]\): If seller 1 is less efficient than seller 2 he must not have an incentive to report to be more efficient. The (EPIC) constraint in this case is equivalent to

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) - t(\hat{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq -\left[ c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k \right] + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus (\hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2)\}} (1 - \alpha)S_k^R \quad \forall c^1 > c^2, \hat{c}^1 < c_2, \hat{F}^1 \subseteq \hat{F}^1. \tag{A.12}
\]

We now turn to the limited liability constraint (LL). Suppose the seller reports \(\hat{F}^1 = \emptyset\). Reducing \(t(\hat{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot)\) relaxes (EPIC), so the buyer wants to reduce the transfer until the (LL) constraint holds with equality. Thus, if \(\hat{c}^1 < c^2\) it is optimal to set

\[
t(\hat{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot) = \hat{c}^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k.
\]

Using this in inequality \([A.8]\) for \(\hat{F}^1 = \emptyset\) yields

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq t(\hat{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot) + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} [\Delta c_k + (1 - \alpha)S_k^R]
\]

\[
= \hat{c}^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k
\]

\[
= \hat{c}^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S_k^R. \tag{A.13}
\]
This inequality must hold for all \( \tilde{c}^1 \) arbitrarily close to \( c^2 \). Thus, a necessary condition for ex post incentive compatibility to hold for a type \((c^1, \hat{F}^1)\) with \( c^1 < c^2 \) is:

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq c^2 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k \quad \forall c^1 < c_2. \tag{A.14}
\]

Now suppose that \( \tilde{c}^1 < c^2 \) and \( \hat{F}^1 = \emptyset \). Again, \( t(\tilde{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot) \) satisfies (LL) with equality if

\[
t(\tilde{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot) = \tilde{c}^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k.
\]

Using this in inequality \((A.12)\) yields

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq t(\tilde{c}^1, \emptyset, \cdot) - [c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k] + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k
\]

\[
\tilde{c}^1 - c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k \quad \forall c^1 > c^2. \tag{A.15}
\]

Inequality \((A.15)\) must hold for any \( \tilde{c}^1 \) arbitrarily close to \( c_2 \) which implies

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq c^2 + \epsilon - c^1 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k \quad \forall c^1 > c_2, \quad \epsilon \geq 0. \tag{A.16}
\]

Furthermore, by \((A.11)\) it has to hold that \( t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) = t(\tilde{c}^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \) for all \( c^1, \tilde{c}^1 > c^2 \); i.e., if the seller does not execute production, his transfer is independent of the reported cost type. Hence, a necessary condition for ex post incentive compatibility is

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k \quad \forall c^1 > c_2. \tag{A.17}
\]

The next result follows immediately from equations \((A.14)\) and \((A.17)\).

**Lemma 1.** Consider a mechanism satisfying constraints (EPIC), (EP), (ED), and (LL). Then, the transfer schedule must satisfy

\[
t(c^1, \hat{F}^1, \cdot) \geq \begin{cases}  
\sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k & \text{if } c^1 > c^2, \\
c^2 + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \cup \hat{F}^2\}} \Delta c_k + \sum_{\{k|f_k \in \hat{F}^1 \setminus \hat{F}^2\}} (1 - \alpha)S^R_k & \text{if } c^1 < c^2.
\end{cases} \tag{A.18}
\]
If we extend (A.18) to $c_1 = c_2$, the ex post utility of seller 1 with cost type $c_1 = c_2$ is the same, irrespective of whether he has to produce the good and the transfer is given by the lower bound of the term for $c_1 < c_2$ or he does not obtain the contract and the transfer is given by the lower bound of the term for $c_1 > c_2$.

The mechanism of Proposition 4 satisfies (ED), (EP), (LL) and (EPIC), and it satisfies the condition provided in Lemma 1 with equality. Thus, this mechanism implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible transfers, i.e. at the lowest possible cost to the buyer.

Proof of Proposition 6. The Extended Arbitration Mechanism gives rise to the same monetary outcomes and the same incentives for each seller as the mechanism of Proposition 4. Thus, given that it is an equilibrium in the direct mechanism for each seller to reveal all observed design flaws early, it is also an equilibrium in the Extended Arbitration Mechanism. Furthermore, given that all observed flaws have been revealed it is optimal for each seller to bid his true cost in the sealed-bid, second-price auction. Hence, with the Extended Arbitration Mechanism the total payment that seller $i$ receives is given by

$$T_i^1 + T_i^2 = (1 - \alpha)S^R(\hat{F}_i, D(\hat{F}_j)) + \begin{cases} c_j + \sum_{(k|f_k \in \hat{F}_1 \cup \hat{F}_2)} \Delta c_k & \text{if } c_i < c_j \\ (1/2) \left( c_j + \sum_{(k|f_k \in \hat{F}_1 \cup \hat{F}_2)} \Delta c_k \right) & \text{if } c_i = c_j \\ 0 & \text{if } c_i > c_j \end{cases},$$

(A.19)

where $T_i^1 + T_i^2$ denotes the expected total payment. As the mechanism of Proposition 4, the Extended Arbitration Mechanism is ex post incentive compatible. Furthermore, it does not require any ex ante knowledge of the parameters of the model, if Assumption 2 holds. Finally, by Proposition 5 and the revelation principle there does not exist any other informationally robust mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at a lower cost to the buyer.

Proof of Proposition 7. By the definition and the uniqueness of the welfare optimal investment levels, we can write

$$q^{i*} = \arg \max_{q^i} W(q^i, q^{j*}) = \arg \max_{q^i} \left\{ p(q^i + q^{j*} - q^i q^{j*})S - \phi^i(q^i) - \phi^j(q^{j*}) \right\},$$

(A.20)

for $i, j \in \{1, 2\}$ and $i \neq j$. 37
If seller $i$ expects that seller $j$ invests efficiently – i.e., $q^i = q^j^*$, then the expected profit of $i$ is
\[
\pi^i(q^i) = pq^i(1 - \hat{q}^j^*)S - \phi^i(q^i). \tag{A.21}
\]
The above expression is maximized at the investment level given in equation (A.20). Hence, investing efficiently is a mutually best response, which completes the proof.

References


