Writing: Movements of the self

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Abstract
This article presents analyses of excerpts from a study on writing conducted in a dialogical perspective. The study’s material was collected by the auto-confrontation method: writers were videotaped during their work and afterwards confronted with their writing activities. Microanalysis of the material attends to how inner dialogues during writing are “refracted” (Voloshinov) in auto-confrontation. Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope (time-and-space) as the main tool of analysis helps to discern the changing contexts and position constellations utterances are valid for. It thus sheds light on the positioning movements performed by the writing selves through language. The analyses show various utterance movements traversing the chronotopes involved, ranging from refractions of movements between the writers’ inner dialogues and their texts to retrospective imperatives with a developmental potential. This “dialogical volume” of speech activity presenting itself in writing can contribute to our understanding of the interplay of language and the self.

Keywords
auto-confrontation, chronotope, inner dialogue, microanalysis, positioning, writing

This article directs the focus of attention to writing as one type of speech activity. As the argument proceeds, the social and processual nature of writing is stressed, in line with a growing number of studies that move the activity character of human semiotic activity into the center of both theoretical considerations and empirical research (Bertau, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; for writing, e.g., Bazerman & Russell, 2003; Prior, 1998, 2009; Russell, 1997). More precisely, in concord with the articles assembled in this special issue, the activity of writing is highlighted from the perspective of a dialogical paradigm with regard to self and language. Although at first glimpse writing might appear to be a solitary and isolated speech activity, a closer look at the dynamics of the process reveals its dialogical nature. Just as other types of speech activity, such as face-to-face dialogues, oral presentations, or self-directed talk, to name but a few, writing is marked by a number

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of movements the authoring self performs. These movements comprise dialogically linked changes and subtle blendings of positioning (e.g., the writing self moving from an authoring to a reviewing position), transformations in mode (e.g., expressing oneself in thinking, speaking, writing, and gesturing), and alternations of different “worlds” in which a writer’s activity is effective (e.g., in the writing situation, in the imaginary “world” created by the text, or in the anticipated contexts of reading). This suggests that writers constantly position themselves with regard to positions of their own, of readers, and of further others. The present article intends to trace these positioning movements of writing selves performed in and through language—that is, as utterances—linked to writing.

In a first step, the main subject matter is identified. If writing is considered from a dialogical theoretical perspective, inner dialogues and the largely non-observable volume of the writing activity come to the fore. In order to get hold of the dialogic volume of the activity, a mediational methodological approach is introduced. With the help of videotaping a writer’s writing activity, confronting the writer with her activity in dialogue with the researcher and a subsequent microanalysis of this auto-confrontation dialogue, movements of the self in writing are made visible and audible. The main analytical tool used for analysis is Bakhtin’s (1937–38/1981) notion of the chronotope along with the related concept of representation-as-refraction by Vološinov (1929/1986). After a brief introduction of these notions, four analyses of excerpts from three case studies are presented. In the analytical findings, four types of movements performed by the writers can be identified, from which some conclusions can be drawn. It is argued that the findings have implications for a theory of writing and for a theory concerning language and the self, as well as for methodological possibilities to elaborate these fields.

Seizing the subject matter: Inner dialogues for writing

The general aim of this article is to unfold and develop a cultural-historical psycholinguistic perspective on language grounded in a dialogical paradigm (Bertau, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; Bertau & Werani, 2011) for a conception of writing (Karsten, 2010, 2011, 2014). This focus conceptually draws on the historical psychological and linguistic paradigm formulated by Vygotskian speech psychology in close affinity to dialogical linguistics and speech philosophy elaborated by L. P. Jakubinskij, M. M. Bakhtin, and V. N. Vološinov.

Adopting this perspective, a number of ideas regarding language and the speaking self come to the fore. The dynamics of speaking is considered via the concept of speech activity as formulated by Humboldt (termed energéia) and then developed by Vygotsky, as well as his contemporaries in dialogically oriented language philosophy and linguistics under the headings of rečevaja dejatel’nost’ (speech activity), rečevoe vyskazyvanie (speech utterance), and slovo (word) (e.g., Bakhtin, 1953–54/1986a; Jakubinskij, 1923/1979; Vološinov, 1929/1986; Vygotsky, 1934/1987). The Soviet conception of speech activity embraces three central aspects with regard to the utterance. The first aspect stresses the “positioned-ness” of the speaking selves by means of their own and others’ utterances (Bakhtin, 1929/1984, 1953–54/1986a; Vološinov, 1926/1987; Vološinov, 1929/1986). This aspect includes the selves’ bodies, their movements, and positionings, in social time
and space. From here stems the singularity of every utterance, always being performed from a unique spatiotemporal and evaluative-affective position with a specific voice (Bakhtin, 1929/1984, 1953–54/1986a; Jakubinskij, 1923/1979; Voloshinov, 1926/1987; Vološinov, 1929/1986). The second aspect is closely related to the first one. Although performed by singular and specifically positioned selves, speech activity is a fundamentally social and relational process (Bakhtin, 1953–54/1986a; Voloshinov, 1926/1987; Vološinov, 1929/1986). No position of the speaking self is possible without counter-positions, no single utterance takes place in a “social vacuum.” Rather, the utterance is one point in a never-breaking chain of related utterances (Bakhtin, 1953–54/1986a, 1959–61/1986b). Rather than merely being placed “between” other utterances, every speech act echoes past and projected utterances in a unique way, not only with regard to its sense and but also with regard to its form. A third aspect of this conception of language, therefore, is the formed and performed nature of utterances. Because of their concrete and perceivable vocal-gestural gestalts, utterances bear a communicative and cognitive and thus psychosocial effectiveness on the subjects involved (Bertau, 2014a; Voloshinov, 1926/1987; Vygotsky, 1934/1987).

From these aspects it follows that within the social dynamics of speech activity, movements of utterances, conceived of as concrete form-and-sense gestalts or voices, should be discernible over time and changing positions of the speaking self. The historically and dialogically linked utterances alter their form as well as their sense when they are “moved” from moment to moment, and from positioning to positioning by a speaking self. By this it also becomes possible to change and variegate their psychosocial effectiveness in communicative and cognitive activities performed in these very moments, by these specifically positioned selves.

Does such a perspective on language and the self apply to and maybe even change the way in which writing is understood? I argue that this view on language and the self indeed has effect on how writing is conceptualized. In writing research, central questions are often concerned with how isolated cognitive processes of written production can be modeled (e.g., Hayes, 1996; Hayes & Flower, 1980; Kellogg, 1996; Olive & Levy, 2002; Torrance, van Waes, & Galbraith, 2007), how written texts differ from oral ones (e.g., Hymes, 1964; Tannen, 1982a, 1982b, 1985), or what general effects the ability to write has on the individual or the society (e.g., Goody, 1977, 1986, 1987; Goody & Watt, 1963; Havelock, 1963; Ong, 1967, 1982). Here, it is argued that these issues can be fruitfully elaborated if the dialogical characteristics of the writing activity and the related “micro-movements” of the writing self are understood appropriately. Thus, with the present approach the focus shifts to writing as the dialogic becoming of a specifically formed written utterance.

With such a focus, the present approach does not stand isolated. Many sociocultural accounts of writing (see Prior, 2005) stress the activity character of literate practice. In a variety of studies, researchers working in the sociocultural paradigm have shown how instants of writing are dialogically related to other semiotic acts in terms of genres, activity systems, and multimodality. For instance, Russell (1997) studied the relationship of classroom writing to professional and institutional genres, combining Engeström’s (1987) cultural-historical activity theory with Bazerman’s (1994) account of genre systems. Dyson (1997) analyzed the ways in which child composers
dialogically appropriated the words from media superhero stories for their own construction of imaginary worlds in written texts and how they, by that means, negotiated their and others’ positions as people of different gender, race, and class. Dyson also follows this line of thought in her newer research (e.g., Dyson, 2008, 2009). A third example for writing research building on a sociocultural and activity framework can be found in the semiotic remediation approach by Prior et al. (Prior & Hengst, 2010; Prior, Hengst, Roozen, & Shipka, 2006). Contributing to this approach, Roozen (2009, 2010) analyzed the repurposing of literate artifacts between the vernacular, school, and academic literate practices of two university students. Shipka (2010, 2011), arguing for an extended notion of writing, examined the complexity of a number of student composing processes in detail, illustrating the multimodal nature of their literate activities. Prior’s work (1998, 2009, 2010; Prior & Shipka, 2003) similarly lays emphasis on the multimodality of academic literate activity, focusing on how writing (embracing both “classical” academic texts and new media productions) is dialogically “laminated” by talk, gesturing, drawing, and other semiotic processes both within and across situations and persons. The present approach adds to these sociocultural lines of research on writing with a somewhat different focus. Since language is understood as a relational movement, as dialogical speech (see Bertau, 2014a, 2014b), writing is conceptualized accordingly. Rather than emphasizing the instrumental character of language-as-artifact and thus tracing the use and repurposing of cultural tools in writing (with cultural tools, in that view, including language as one among many human artifacts), the per- and re-formative processes of writing-as-speech as well as their communicative and cognitive effectiveness are highlighted.

Although consisting in a fundamentally relational movement, the “outward” activity of writing is often a relatively solitary process without the immediate presence of others. Therefore, inner dialogues of writing selves play a crucial role in the process (Jakubinskij, 1923/1979, pp. 332–335; Vygotsky, 1934/1987, pp. 270–272).1 The Soviet dialogical paradigm suggests that the dialogical chain and the variegation of utterances still work when a self performs speech activities in a solitary mode. A central claim of this view of language and the self is that subjects can turn their speech activity to themselves, thereby taking up the positioned remembered, anticipated, or otherwise imagined utterances of others and themselves, re-positioning and re-accentuating these utterances. The consequence is the largely tacit process of “inner speech” (Vygotsky, 1934/1987), shaped as an “inner dialogue” of utterances (Vološinov, 1929/1986) performed from different positions of the self. For writing, this means that complex movements of utterances are to be expected until a written product takes shape. Vygotsky, drawing heavily on Jakubinskij’s thoughts (Jakubinskij, 1923/1979, p. 335), reflects upon some of these movements and points out the role of inner speech for writing:

Written speech facilitates speech as a complex activity. This underlies the use of the rough draft. The path from the rough to the final draft is a complex activity. However, even without the rough draft, the process of reflecting on one’s work in written speech is extremely powerful. Frequently, we say what we will write to ourselves before we write. What we have here is a rough draft in thought. ... this rough draft that is constructed in thought as part of written speech is inner speech. (Vygotsky, 1934/1987, p. 272)
Going beyond Vygotsky’s conception of inner speech, not so much the tacit, inner nature of such “draft-dialogues” is stressed. It is the process of turning the speech activity towards oneself and taking up or projecting other utterances in order to form a written utterance that is highlighted here. Like this, and because writing is a speech activity characterized by positional movements and blendings (e.g., interactions between reader and writer positions) and modal re-formations (e.g., from spoken or imagined utterances to written ones), written utterances show a “chronotopic lamination” (Prior, 1998; Prior & Shipka, 2003), integrating utterances and positionings from various timespaces. In other words, the activity of writing bears a “dialogic volume” (see Clot, 2008; Clot, Faïta, Fernandez, & Scheller, 2001; Vygotsky, 1925/1999). Writing is more than just the textual product, which only shows the “victorious” essence of a far more complex process.

The aim of the remaining text is to investigate this dialogic volume and to make the movements of utterances visible through various chronotopes involved in the complex activity of writing. This approach, however, poses a methodological problem. The complex psycholinguistic process of writing, as has been argued, is to a large extent not directly accessible by looking at the visible activity, listening to the hearable speech, or analyzing the textual product alone (Karsten, 2010, 2011, 2014). Therefore, an intermediate step is needed. In the present study, in order to methodologically address this problem, the dialogic processes involved are refracted by an auto-confrontation dialogue (Clot, 2008; Clot & Faïta, 2000; Clot et al., 2001; Karsten, 2010, 2011, 2014) and analyzed in a discourse analytical fashion focusing on micro-movements in speech.

**Methodological approach: Auto-confrontation and microanalysis**

The method of auto-confrontation, as adapted from French work psychology (Clot, 2005, 2008; Clot & Faïta, 2000; Clot et al., 2001), consists of two steps. First, a writer is video-taped during her everyday writing activity, for example, when working on a piece of homework. Secondly, the writer is confronted with the recordings of her writing activity in the presence of the researcher. Several episodes are watched and commented on together by writer and researcher. The dialogue taking place is not pre-structured, the role of the researcher being mostly an eliciting one: asking questions about what happens in the video, why things were done the way they were, etc. By this procedure, the use of auto-confrontation to investigate writing bears resemblance to text-based interview methods in writing research. To name an example for a text-based approach, Prior and Shipka (2003) asked academic writers to draw and then discuss representations of their writing processes in order to investigate the chronotopic lamination of the writers’ respective texts. Also, the already mentioned study by Roozen (2009) built on text-based interviews as a main source for analysis. Video confrontation methods, on the other hand, are used quite often in educational studies and are most widely known under the heading of “stimulated recall” (Calderhead, 1981). For writing, two studies can be named that investigated writing by means of video-based interviews:
Rose (1984) and DiPardo (1994). Rose’s (1984) approach can be located in the original cognitive paradigm of the stimulated recall method. He presents two out of originally ten case studies of writers who were videotaped during a composition task and afterwards confronted with their recordings. DiPardo (1994) used the method in a more ethnographic vein in order to reflect recorded talk in writing conferences.

The material examined here is taken from the case studies reported in Karsten (2014). Three writers’ activities were investigated by auto-confrontation: Elli, a 27-year-old journalist; Katharina, a 15-year-old student; and Martin, a 33-year-old researcher. Elli wrote a text about a theatre group of actors with disabilities that she had visited at their rehearsal for a play. Katharina wrote a report for her school about a two-week internship she had just performed at a school for children with special needs. Martin worked on the second draft of a still unpublished scientific article for which he had just received reviewers’ comments.2

Excerpts of transcripts and protocols from the resulting three writing episodes and three auto-confrontation dialogues form the material to be analyzed in the remainder of this article.

As a critical feature of the method, those utterances during the interviews that are related to the writing activities in question need not necessarily refer to what the writers visibly did in the recording or what they actually wrote down. The writers also expand upon what they thought and felt during writing, what they did not say or do, what they also could have said, what they now think they should have done, etc.—in sum, the less obvious and very often “vanquished” aspects of the activities come to the fore (see Clot, 2005, 2008; Clot et al., 2001; Vygotsky, 1925/1999). In this way light is shed on the dialogic volume that the activity of writing bears. For by commenting on their writing activities, the writers reveal thoughts, considerations, emotions, aims, and much more of what has influenced their written utterance. It is important to note that the writers’ accounts of their writing activities are not to be understood as direct mirrorings of their inner dialogues. Then again, if one is taking the concept of dialogical chains and laminations of utterances seriously, the writers’ comments in auto-confrontation cannot be regarded as mere ad hoc constructions either. The auto-confrontation dialogues are themselves dialogical refractions, i.e., variations, movements taking place. They are one further dialogical step, reforming the complex speech processes in writing for yet another context.
As an extension to both the original auto-confrontation method by Clot (2005, 2008; Clot & Faïta, 2000; Clot et al., 2001) and the mentioned text- and video-based approaches in writing research, the analysis to follow is characterized by a micro- or discourse-analytic lens on the transcripts and protocols. This kind of analysis is favored in order to comply with the altering movements the video-based interview method brings about. By their form-and-sense gestalts, critical utterances from the auto-confrontation dialogues can be identified as re-fracting, re-presenting, and re-constructing the indexed inner dialogues (Karsten, 2011, 2014). The microanalysis traces the dialogic movements between different modes of utterances (outspoken, written, and, indirectly, “inner” modes, e.g., remembered, anticipated, or self-directed) as well as the communicative and cognitive effectiveness of these “wandering” utterances in different times and spaces. By attending closely to micro-variegations and relations of and between utterance forms, it is intended to render visible variations of positionings of the writing selves, while always bearing in mind that the auto-confrontation situation is itself just another space-and-time for the utterances in question to be taken up and variegated. In the analyses presented below, the microanalytic approach is documented. The main analytical tools used for this purpose are Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope (1937–38/1981) and Vološinov’s notion of refraction (Vološinov, 1929/1986). For the sake of clarity, the concepts are characterized in the next section before entering the analysis.

Analytical tools: chronotope and refraction

Originally, Bakhtin developed the notion of the chronotope (time-and-space) in relation to the problem of the “process of assimilating real historical time and space in literature” (Bakhtin, 1937–38/1981, p. 84). From a literary stance, Bakhtin defines the concept as follows: “We will give the name chronotope (literally, ‘time space’) to the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that are artistically expressed in literature” (Bakhtin, 1937–38/1981, p. 84). Thus, the chronotope of an artistic utterance is the specific way temporal and spatial phenomena of the real world are given an altered shape and a new relationship in the linguistic-artistic representation. The represented time–space complex is still connected to, but differing from, the experienced time and space of reality.

The concept of the chronotope can be extended to suit non-literary utterances as well. In fact, this was done by Bakhtin himself in the “Concluding Remarks” he added to his essay in 1973 (Bakhtin, 1937–38/1981), embedding the literary notion into his more general linguistic and philosophical thinking. By the 1973 extension, the concept of the chronotope is made suitable for grasping the movements between utterances of various kinds. Light can be shed on utterances’ re-forming, re-functioning, their changed positional constellation, and their changed temporal and spatial quality. Crucial to the concept is the distinction between a “representing” or “creating” world on the one hand and a “represented” or “created” world on the other hand (Bakhtin, 1937–38/1981, pp. 252–254). The representing world is the time and space of author and reader, while the time and space created by the utterance, that is, “in the text,” is the represented world.

Because of the dialogical tensions between representing worlds and represented worlds, representation cannot mean a one-to-one mapping or a re-presentation in the
literal sense. Change and interaction between what is “there” and what is represented is a key feature of Bakhtin’s notion of the chronotope. Also in other texts by Bakhtin and by Voloshinov, it becomes clear that language has to be understood as evaluative, concrete, and dialogic activity (e.g., Bakhtin, 1953–54/1986a, 1929/1984; Voloshinov, 1926/1987; Vološinov, 1929/1986). Particularly in Voloshinov’s examination of the sign (1929/1986, pp. 9–15), the subject matter of representation and evaluation is captured by the notion of refraction:

A sign does not simply exist as a part of a reality—it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true to it, or may perceive it from a special point of view, and so forth. Every sign is subject to the criteria of ideological evaluation (i.e., whether it is true, false, correct, fair, good, etc.). (Vološinov, 1929/1986, p. 10)

Voloshinov’s notion of refraction is taken up in the present article along with the notion of the chronotope to grasp both the workings of auto-confrontation and the complex movements of utterances performed by the speaking selves during the activity of writing. The concept makes clear that, in dialogical processes, discord (i.e., variation) between utterances is just as important as approval (i.e., continuity). This embraces that, from a dialogic perspective on language and the self, there are no neutral linguistic forms, but only positioned ones. Thus, identity of two utterances is never possible, as Bakhtin points out:

“Life is good.” “Life is good.” Here are two absolutely identical judgments, or in fact one singular judgment written (or pronounced) by us twice; but this “twice” refers only to its verbal embodiment and not to the judgment itself. … if this judgment is expressed in two utterances by two different subjects, then dialogic relationships arise between them (agreement, affirmation). (Bakhtin, 1929/1984, pp. 183–184)

With regard to the method of auto-confrontation, the above citation reminds us once again that those stretches in the video-based interviews with the three writers that point to an inner dialogical speech activity during writing are not identical reproductions of such inner utterances. Therefore, only attending closely to what the writers report and, most importantly, how they put it (hence the microanalytic approach opted for in the analyses below) can give critical hints to what dialogical movements took place when they orchestrated past and projected utterances by themselves and others for forming their respective written texts.

To summarize, the concept of the chronotope, along with the notion of refraction, brings forward a dialogic conception of representation and points to both the situatedness and the situating power of an utterance. The most important hint from these theoretical concepts for dealing with linguistic material is that, as utterances are “moved” between chronotopes by speaking selves, their form, their sense, and thus their communicative and cognitive effectiveness become variegated.

Analysis I: Katharina – “Back to the TEXT”

Analysis I refers to an episode in Katharina’s writing about her internship at a school for children with special needs. In the first part of her videotaped writing activity, she started
a first draft of her text. However, at a certain point, she was not satisfied with her text, so
she tore away the sheets, balled them up, and started afresh. Excerpt 1 of our auto-
confrontation dialogue refers to an episode of Katharina working on the second draft of
her text. As becomes clear from the auto-confrontation dialogue transcript, we are watch-
ing Katharina stopping and making a small movement at one point during this second
part of her writing activity. In our auto-confrontation meeting, Katharina comments on
this event as shown in Excerpt 1.3

**Excerpt 1**

1764 K: ich glaub ähm das ist einfach dass ich mir nochmal
gedacht hab
*I think that’s just that I thought (to myself):*
1765 ja
1766 PTCL: turntaking
1767 ist es jetzt gut
*Is it good now?*
1768 A: mhm
1769 Uhum.
1770 K: und dann irgendwie gedacht hab
*And (that) I thought somehow:*
1771 ja
1772 PTCL: turntaking
1773 jetzt so kannst dus lassen
*Now you can leave it like that.*
1774 A: mhm (-)
1775 Uhum.
1776 wo dran merkst du das
*How do you notice that?*
1777 oder also erinnerst du dich dass du das gedacht hast
*Or, well, do you remember thinking that?*
1778 A: oder siehst du das irgendwie an (--) an dir
*Or do you see that somehow (--) judging by you*
*(*your image)*?
1779 K: das seh ich irgendwie
*I see that somehow.*
1780 [...]
1781 A: ((spult zurück))
*[((winds back))]*
1782 also hier
*So here...*
1783 K: mhm
1784 Uhum.
In lines 1765 to 1767, Katharina refracts her inner dialogue during the supposed event of stopping and then going back to work. As she relates, she thought during writing: “Is it good now? Is it better now than the first time?” (1766–67). These refracted inner questions are marked as reported speech with the particle “ja” (1765), which in German is usually used in order to mark the begin of the performed or quoted speech of another person in an orally told story. Here, Katharina uses the particle to introduce a voice of her inner dialogue during writing into her comment in auto-confrontation. In lines 1770 to 1773, the format is reproduced. Katharina reports that during writing she then thought, “Now you can leave it like that.” (1771), as well as “And now go on and simply continue writing the text” (1773). These two refracted utterances can be identified as another voice in her inner dialogue, giving an answer to the two questions quoted above (1766–67). Again this time, the utterances are introduced as reported speech by the particle “ja” (1770). As is clear from Katharina’s further doings in her writing activity, the inner dialogue was extremely functional for her writing, since she indeed went on writing the second draft of her text after that short episode of pausing and thinking.

In line 1775, I bring the attention to why Katharina knows that this reported inner dialogue happened during writing by asking her, “How do you notice that?” (1775). I want to know if she remembers that dialogue or if she infers the dialogue from something she sees in the video (1776–77). Katharina’s answer is clear; she can observe the inner dialogue taking place judging by her image in the video: “I see that somehow” (1778).

I then wind back the tape, play the episode again, and start commenting on what I can see Katharina doing during writing (1784–87). In line 1789, Katharina joins in and comments on her activity. Lines 1791 to 1792 are particularly interesting, because instead of giving a further verbal description of what she sees herself doing, Katharina is imitating a small movement observable in the video, a movement forward towards her text, with
both arms and her upper body (1791). This bodily mimed movement is treated like a whole utterance-gestalt, like a word, in fact. Katharina uses it together with the particle “like” (1791) and the deictic “This (…)” (1792). I also treat it that way, calling it “such a (…)” (1793). In lines 1794 to 1795, Katharina then finally gives the movement a verbal form, producing both the movement and the newly given verbal form at a time: “Back to the TEXT ((smaller movement, same dynamics as before))” (1794–95). From the similar function and the same moment of occurrence during watching the episode, this utterance-movement gestalt “Back to the TEXT ((smaller movement, same dynamics as before))” (1794–95) is to be associated with the inner utterance quoted during the first watching of this episode “And now go on and simply continue writing the text” (1773). Similarly, a pausing previous to the utterance-movement can be associated with the evaluative inner dialogue between two voices, “Is it good now? Is it better now than the first time?” (1766–67)—“Now you can leave it like that” (1771).

This stretch from Katharina’s material shows that the emerging written utterance, that is, her internship report, is related to inner dialogues taking place during writing. Katharina’s inner dialogue under scrutiny seems to give structure to her activity of writing, because she actually goes on writing her text. It is thus cognitively highly effective. The relationship between Katharina’s inner dialogue for writing and her written utterance can be characterized as dialogical movement, the further text being a response to the initiating utterance “go on” (1773), respectively, “Back to the TEXT” (1794).

In addition, it is interesting that other movements of utterances take place in the process of methodological interference, that is, by “laminating” Katharina’s writing activity with a video of that same activity and an auto-confrontation dialogue. In the auto-confrontation session, Katharina’s inner dialogue for writing is refracted in terms of a dialogical mimetic gesture, performed as reported speech and bodily mimesis. We cannot know what actual shape the inner dialogue had, for example, how verbally extended it was. All we can see outwardly (or better, Katharina and I can see when watching the video) is that Katharina makes a small movement before she continues to write her text. However, the two refractions in terms of reflective questions and a prompt to go on, on the one hand, and in terms of a pause for thinking and a re-initiating movement-utterance, on the other hand, give coherent hints as to what Katharina might have actually thought during that episode in her writing activity. The moving of these actual inner dialogues through the chronotopes of the video and of the auto-confrontation dialogue allows Katharina’s inner dialogical movements for writing to be grasped.

**Analysis II: Katharina – “Yes enough already!”**

The second analysis is also taken from Katharina’s material. This time the focus is on an episode during the writing of the first draft of her internship report. To be more precise, the episode marks the point when Katharina decided to abandon her first draft and start from scratch. Unlike in Analysis I, protocols of the writing video are given next to the auto-confrontation dialogue transcripts, in order to make synchronizations between both chronotopes better visible. In Excerpt 2, a stretch of the writing activity from the video
is presented (without indentation), followed by the temporally associated excerpts from
the auto-confrontation dialogue (indented and with numbered lines). Then the immedi-
ately subsequent writing episode is given, again followed by the associated part of the
auto-confrontation dialogue, and so forth.

**Excerpt 2**

[0:11:20]
Auch ich mu (legt Stift weg und trinkt, nimmt Stift)(6 sek) sste von meinem
Wochenende erzählen und dürfte mich erst mal vorstellen. (3 sek)(lacht)
(writes) I also ha (puts pen away and drinks, takes pen)(6 sec) d to relate about my weekend
and should introduce myself (3 sec)(laughs)

1361 ((film läuft 30 sek))
   ((video runs 30 sec))

Katharina (flüsternd): „Darf ich kurz was fragen?”
*Katharina (whispering): “Can I ask something?”*
Andrea: „Mhm.”
*Andrea: “Uhm.”*

1362 ((K in film fragt, ob sie kurz etwas fragen dürfe))
   ((K in video asks if she could ask something))
1363 ((beide lachen))
   ((both laugh))
1364 K: *ja jetzt reichts*
   *Yes, enough already (it is enough)!*

Katharina: „Also ist das jetzt schlimm, weil ich find den Text jetzt grade ziemlich
schlecht, und ich würd am liebsten jetzt noch mal von vorne anfangen.”
*Katharina: “Well, is it bad (a problem)? Because I’m finding the text really bad,
and I would like nothing better than starting from scratch.”*

1365 ((K in film sagt, sie würde am liebsten wieder
von vorn anfangen))
   ((K in video says she would really like to start
from scratch))
1366 K: ((lacht))
   ((laughs))

Andrea: „Wenn du das machen würdest, wenn du’s selber schreiben würdest,
dann mach’s einfach.”
*Andrea: “If you would do so, if you wrote it (the text) (for) yourself, then just do so.”*

1367 ((A in film sagt, sie solle alles so machen, wie sie
es selber für sich auch machen würde))
   ((A in video says, she should do everything just as
if she did it for herself))
1368 A: okay:
   Okay.
As becomes clear from the short descriptions in the auto-confrontation transcripts, the writing activity and the activity of Katharina and me watching that activity during auto-confrontation are temporally coupled. Therefore, it is possible to discern at which point of the writing activity video Katharina’s comments during auto-confrontation take place and, thus, what they refer to.

In line 1364, Katharina produces a crucial utterance, which literally translates “yes, it is enough” and means roughly “Yes, enough already!” (1364). What event or circumstance does this utterance refer to? I argue that Katharina is not addressing me, or the chronotope of the auto-confrontation dialogue as a whole, here. Instead, the utterance is valid for her past writing activity, visible in the video. It is thus to be interpreted as a refraction of part of her inner dialogue during writing: “enough with the first draft,” “enough with this text.” Unlike in Analysis I, the refraction is not framed as the reported speech of an own, past inner voice with the help of an introductory clause like “here I’m thinking” or a turn-taking particle. On the contrary, the utterance is presented suddenly, as a sort of direct, “in situ” performance. This is remarkable because, during auto-confrontation, the course of the writing activity cannot be affected anymore. However, as becomes clear from Katharina’s further activity, the utterance, or better her supposed inner dialogue “twin,” had an important effect on Katharina’s writing because she indeed abandoned her first draft and started a second one.

In the subsequent seconds of the auto-confrontation meeting, Katharina and I go on watching the episode. The discussed utterance is not commented on any further or taken up by Katharina or myself. A shift of activity occurs when, in line 1369, I stop the video and take a pause (1370). I have been using this kind of act frequently during auto-confrontation dialogues. The participants usually interpret it as a prompt to comment on the episode just seen. Accordingly, in line 1371, Katharina comes in with a kind of explanation or justification of what we have just seen happening in the video. Interestingly enough, her utterance is a clear variation of her above interjection “Yes, enough already!” (1364, see 1371). In the German original, this time the utterance is in perfect tense, literally translating as “yes, it has been enough” (1371). The temporal shift from one occurrence to the next one marks a difference in addressivity. The second utterance is directed towards me and valid in the chronotope of auto-confrontation. Katharina relates what she was thinking during writing, but she does not perform it anymore as if she was her past self.

The analysis shows that, again, there is a relationship between Katharina’s refracted inner dialogues and her written utterance: she was not satisfied with her written utterance and abandoned her first draft of text. In this analysis, it becomes very clear that Katharina synchronizes her comments in auto-confrontation (chronotope II) with her writing activity in the video (chronotope I). Like that, a dialogical relationship between the time and space of these two situations is established. The workings of auto-confrontation offer the
possibility to sustain a coupling of the two chronotopes I and II. This coupling is a pre-requisite for a dialogical movement to take place. It sets the ground for Katharina’s first utterance of “Yes, enough already!” (1364), valid for her writing activity and supposedly the refraction of an inner “twin” utterance (chronotope I), but uttered aloud only in auto-confrontation (chronotope II). In a second step, the utterance “Yes, enough already!” (1371) is formally variegated with regard to tense and thus “moves back” from the chronotope of the writing activity (I) to the chronotope of the auto-confrontation (II) in terms of its function. It is no longer a cognitively helpful inner utterance made heard retrospectively, but a communicatively effective comment addressed at another person in order to explain one’s own past activity. Whereas the first appearance of “Yes, enough already!” (1364) tells us about the relationship between inner dialogue and written utterance, the second appearance (1371) gives an even deeper insight into the workings of utterance movements across chronotopes and self-positions.

Analysis III: Martin – “Check it up in Hust!”

Analysis III refers to a stretch of researcher Martin’s material (Excerpt 3). The following excerpts of recorded writing activity and transcribed auto-confrontation dialogue refer to an episode when Martin was looking for a reference by an author called Tozzi. Martin wanted to cite Tozzi’s article for his present text, but did not remember the reference details. Therefore he was searching a paper he had written before, trying to find the reference to Tozzi’s article he had in mind. As in Analysis II, the presented excerpts are given in a form to make their synchronicity visible. First, a short writing episode is given, followed by the associated part of the auto-confrontation transcript. Then, the next excerpt of writing activity along with the corresponding part of the auto-confrontation transcript is added, and so forth.

Excerpt 3

[4—0:08:00]
(Martin öffnet ein Dokument)
(Martin opens a document)

4143 M: da such ich
There I’m looking.
4144 ich WEISS dass ichs wo zitiert hab
I KNOW that I cited it (a paper by Tozzi) somewhere.
4145 und da [kuck] ich in nem anderen paper das gra
So there I’m looking in another paper which ju(st)
4146 A: [ah ]
4147 M: das akzeptiert ist
which is accepted.
4148 A: mhm

(sucht in diesem Dokument nach „Tozzi“)
(searches in the document for “Tozzi”)
As can be seen in the records of Martin’s writing activity, he is searching his older paper with the help of the software application’s search tool. He types “Tozzi” into the search field and then jumps from one occurrence to another. In auto-confrontation, Martin comments on every match of the search tool observable in the video (4150, 4151–52, 4153–55, 4156–57). These comments are synchronized with his doings in the video, so that an alternating rhythm emerges; Martin in the video pressing a button and the search tool jumping to the next match, followed by Martin in auto-confrontation observing something about the find, then Martin in the video jumping to the next match, and so on. By this rhythmicity, a relatively stable coupling of the two chronotopes is built up.

It is interesting to look at the quality of the comments Martin makes. Martin’s utterance in line 4150, “That’s not it (--).” could be read as a refraction of his inner dialogue. The utterance, however, could also be interpreted as effective in auto-confrontation
functioning as a comment to me, just like the explanation of his doings given in lines 4143 to 4147. The next stretch of comments in lines 4151 to 4152 sheds further light on this question. While “That one NEITHER.” (4151) could still be read as a posterior comment, already here the strong accentuation is striking. The following utterance “Gosh!” (4152) then strengthens the impression that Martin is not talking from a distanced position about a past event, but that he is enacting and thus refracting his inner speech during the search. Also his short utterance “No!” (4153) concerning the next match fits into this line of interpretation, because of its very brief form, which is one feature of inner speech according to Vygotsky (1934/1987; Larraín & Haye, 2014). My laughing in line 4154 indicates that I am sensing this almost staged, theater-like break in the chronotopic validity of Martin’s comments already during our auto-confrontation dialogue.

The change of voice in the next utterance “(low voice) There, I’m not sure.” (4155) marks another change in Martin’s positioning. It is not clear whether the utterance is a comment to me, breaking with the staging of Martin’s annoyance or irritation of not finding the right reference, and situating himself in the chronotope of auto-confrontation again. The second possibility is that the utterance marks a refracted change from one inner position to another one, that is, from being annoyed, but taking it lightly, to concentrating and internally checking what to do with the present search match.

In any case, the strong coupling of the two chronotopes is not broken by Martin’s position change. On the contrary, another position is able to emerge in line 4157, which is dependent on the synchronization of the two chronotopes of writing and of auto-confrontation. Martin’s utterance “(Have a go,) check it up in Hust!” (4157) is a directive to search for the Tozzi reference not in his own paper, but in a not further specified paper by an author called Hust. This directive is marked by what I call an “imperative infringement,” because Martin in auto-confrontation gives advice to his past self in the video. The infringement functions as a movement from enacted inner dialogue to the then yet to be written text. Of course, this includes that there cannot be a “real” observable consequence of the only pretended inner advice in the auto-confrontation chronotope on the written utterance, which by the time of auto-confrontation had already been finished. However, the possibility of taking such an imperative position and speaking with an advisory voice, and be it barely an anticipated one uttered in retrospect, marks an important feature of Martin’s inner dialogue for writing. Just like Katharina in Analysis I, who was shown to be able to perform a motivating and structuring inner position, voicing comments like “Go on!,” Martin has developed a position knowing more than what seems to have been known by the time of writing. It must remain open whether this position is new, having emerged in and through auto-confrontation. It could as well be part of an existing “repertoire” of positions in Martin’s inner dialogue, which did not succeed in that episode of writing, but may have been helpful in other ones.

**Analysis IV: Elli – “Away!”**

The fourth analysis extends the topic of imperative infringement. As in Martin’s case, an excerpt from journalist Elli’s material is given, where a corrective, advisory position voiced in auto-confrontation refers to Elli’s activity during writing. In the records presented in Excerpt 4, Elli is revising the first sentences of the article she had written that day. In contrast to Martin’s excerpt discussed in Analysis III, during this revision process
the “effects” of Elli’s imperative infringement on her writing activity are observable in the video of her writing. Therefore, as the analysis will show, with very high possibility they refract an “actual” inner utterance. As in the previous analyses, the writing episode protocols are given piecewise, followed by the temporally associated lines of the auto-confrontation transcript.

**Excerpt 4**

[2—0:47:45]
(setz Cursor vor „Ich bin abgestumpft“)
(Elli sets Cursor before “I’m callous”)
(10 sek)
(markiert „Ich bin abgestumpft“)
(highlights “I’m callous”)
(6 sek)

4205 E: jetzt merk irgendwie dass dieses ich bin abgestumpft °hh gar nicht PASST
Now I’m noticing somehow that this “I’m callous” does not FIT well.

(...)

4208 E: [und] (.) hat er zwar so geSAGT
And (.) he did SAY it like that...

4209 aber ((schnalzendes geräusch))
...but ((clicks her tongue))...

4210 irgendwie PASST das eigentlich gar nicht
...somehow that actually does not FIT.

(...)

(markiert „Ich bin abgestumpft“, sagt der Arzt.)
(highlights “I’m callous’, says the doctor.”)

4216 E: ich glaub da bin ich jetzt auch grade
I believe that’s where I am right now.

„Ich bin abgestumpft“, sagt der Arzt.
(delete) “I’m callous”, says the doctor:

4217 E: deswegen <<andere stimmqualität>WEG>
Therefore: (altered voice quality) Away!

(...)

(hält inne und schaut auf ihre Hände)
(pauses and looks at her hands)
(setz Cursor an Textanfang)
(set cursor at the beginning of her text)

4220 ((film läuft 45 sek))
((video runs 45 sec))

Die ist die Geschichte einer großen Liebe.
(writes) This is the story of a true love.

4221 E: weg weg
Away, away!
The episode under scrutiny is preluded by Elli explaining her revising activity to me. She is unhappy with the expression “I’m callous,” which, according to her text, was uttered by one of the actors (playing a doctor) she was writing about: “Now I’m noticing somehow that this ‘I’m callous’ does not fit well” (4205). According to Elli, the actor did produce this expression when she was at the theater group’s rehearsal (4208), but during writing, Elli did not find it appropriate to include the line into her text (4205, 4210). At the moment as Elli in the video highlights the full sentence “I’m callous, says the doctor,” Elli in auto-confrontation builds a synchronizing link between the two chronotopes, saying “I believe that’s where I am right now” (4216). In the next moment, we can see her in the video deleting the sentence by pressing the return key. At that very moment of our auto-confrontation dialogue, Elli says, “Therefore: (altered voice quality) Away!” (4217). The change of voice quality between “Therefore:” and “Away!” marks a change in position. While “Therefore” seems to belong to the auto-confrontation comment produced for me, “Away!” is likely to be a refracted inner utterance. Thus, the material shows a relationship of Elli’s refracted inner voice (“Away!,” 4217) to the written utterance being deleted. In fact, a coupling of the three chronotopes of inner dialogue (I), observable writing activity (II) and comment in auto-confrontation (III) emerges, when Elli refracts her presumable inner utterance “Away!” (4217) in auto-confrontation the very moment a change to the text is made.

The following lines reveal a movement of Elli’s core utterance “Away!” (4217) to another context. The utterance re-appears in an altered shape some seconds after it was uttered for the first time. In the auto-confrontation situation, we are watching Elli trying out a new introductory sentence to her text: “This is the story of a true love.” When seeing this sentence appearing on her computer screen, Elli in auto-confrontation immediately exclaims, “Away, away!” (4221); a reduplication of the first version of “Away!” (4217). Here, just like in Martin’s case, a cross-chronotopic imperative infringement is taking place. Elli in auto-confrontation gives an advisory directive to her past self in the video. Interestingly, this imperative infringement is related with regard to both form and function to Elli’s refraction of her inner dialogue during revising. But this second time it is not a secondary refraction of a previous inner utterance, rather, it appears before Elli actually deletes the new introductory sentence again. It thus reveals an anticipated functional effect on the written utterance. Further, its function is a revising one, aimed at changing the text, which fits the fact that the first appearance of the utterance “Away!” (4217) takes place during a revising activity of Elli’s. The difference is that as the second time “Away, away!” (4221) appears, Elli in the video is not yet in a revising mode, only Elli in auto-confrontation seems to be. The close connection to her past writing activity, however, becomes clear as, some seconds later, Elli in the video indeed can be seen deleting the introductory sentence again. It is a remarkable finding that auto-confrontation produces movements of utterances not only from posterior chronotopes to subsequent ones in terms of refraction, but also makes anticipated movements emerge, which are notwithstanding directed backwards in time.
Movements of selves in the analytical findings

In the course of the four analyses presented, a number of movements of utterances by the writing selves were identified. These movements can be assembled in terms of four types. A first type of movement emerged in all four cases and is due to the methodological interference caused by auto-confrontation. It concerns the refraction of inner dialogue in auto-confrontation. This type of movement is crucial to the methodological argument put forward that inner dialogues during writing are accessible, though in a mediated form, through the writers’ later utterances (conceived of as vocal-gestural gestalts) when being confronted with their videotaped writing activities. One example identified above is Katharina’s refraction of a supposed inner utterance, motivating her to continue writing after checking if she is content with her new draft. Katharina’s inferred inner utterance is refracted in various ways: via a twice-performed bodily mime-sis of a movement towards the text as well as via the utterances “And now go on and simply continue writing the text.” (1773) and “Back to the TEXT” (1794). Further examples are Martin’s exclamations “That’s not it (--)” (4150), “That one NEITHER” (4151), “Gosh!” (4152), and “No!” (4153). It has been argued that these utterances refract Martin’s supposed inner dialogue of being annoyed at not finding a reference to a certain scientific article he wanted to cite.

A second type of movement could be identified by gaining access to the writers’ inner dialogues in the described way. This type of movement takes place between the writers’ inner dialogues and their written utterances. Such movements take place when the writers’ inner utterances have an effect on their further writing activity, for instance, because they delete something. The first time Katharina utters “Enough already!” (1364) in auto-confrontation, as she sees herself giving up her first draft and starting from scratch, is such a case. Another example is Elli exclaiming “Away!” (4217) in auto-confrontation, the moment she is deleting a sentence from her text in the video of her writing activity.

The third type of movement found is a cross-chronotopic variation of an utterance, regarding both its form and function. The most prevalent example was identified in Katharina’s material in Analysis II. The refracted piece of inner dialogue “Enough already (it is enough)!” (1364) previously mentioned is taken up some moments later during our auto-confrontation dialogue. The second time, it appears not in present tense, but in perfect tense: “Enough already (it has been enough)!” (1371). By that variation, the utterance is no longer a piece of refracted inner dialogue effective for writing, but it becomes a comment to me, valid in the chronotope of auto-confrontation.

The fourth type of movement identified in the material has been named cross-chronotopic imperative infringement. It is an advisory directive uttered in a posterior chronotope, namely that of auto-confrontation, directed towards an already past event, namely that of writing. This type of movement is found in Elli’s and Martin’s material, although the two appearances have a slightly different quality. Martin’s utterance “(Have a go,) check it up in Hust!” (4157) is an enacted and anticipated inner voice, formed in auto-confrontation as if Martin could influence his past activity shown in the video. By logic, the utterance is not effective by the time of writing. However, it reveals the development of a new position and voice of Martin’s, offering an alternative way of proceeding. This kind of alternative positions, emerging in terms of new kinds of utterances, are
a typical feature of auto-confrontation method. In fact, in work psychology, auto-confrontation is used as an interventionist tool to enhance work activity by finding new alternatives to old ways of doing things (Clot, 2005, 2008; Clot & Faïta, 2000; Clot et al., 2001). A similar cross-chronotopic infringement is Elli’s utterance “Away, away!” (4221). Like Martin’s imperative infringement, this directive is uttered by Elli while she watches herself writing a new, but obviously inapt introductory sentence to her text. With this utterance, a positional shift is marked in auto-confrontation, from a writing position to a revising position. Interestingly, this position swap takes place faster in auto-confrontation than in writing; in the video, Elli deletes the new sentence only after some moments of thought. Elli’s case shows that imperative infringements reveal potentially effective utterances, tied to functional positions towards one’s own activity. These inner utterances and positionings may or may not have been available to the person during the past activity in a bygone chronotope. Although, of course, these infringing utterances are not able to influence past events, they are highly productive for further development in similar situations. For even though directed backwards in time, cross-chronotopic infringements are movements towards the future.

**Conclusions**

The analyses included here have several implications. On a methodological plane, the study presented in this article suggests that the method of auto-confrontation clearly strengthens the movement-processes of the writing selves’ speech activity by adding new chronotopic levels (i.e., the videotape and the auto-confrontation dialogue). It has to be taken into consideration that this is an artificial, methodological extension and an intrusion into “natural” processes. But if this feature is considered and taken seriously in the analytic process, the power of the tool stands out. It has been noted that similar confrontation methods—both text- and video-based ones—were used in studies for investigating writing (e.g., DiPardo, 1994; Prior & Shipka, 2003; Roozen, 2009; Rose, 1984). My argument here is that auto-confrontation is an extraordinary tool for investigating the dialogically voiced self both in writing and in other psycholinguistic activities if it is combined with a microanalytic approach. In so doing, the rich dialogic volume of speech activity, which is refracted in the chronotope of auto-confrontation, is made intersubjectively visible and audible—that is, traceable—in terms of moving and changing form-and-sense gestalts. This methodological “package” could be applied to a number of different empiric scenarios in order to look deeper into the workings of self-movements through language and other related phenomena.

A first theoretical implication can be drawn with regard to writing. In line with other sociocultural approaches to writing, the complexity and dialogically interwoven nature of writing was illustrated by the analysis. These dialogic dynamics involve the bodily-linguistic performance of varying positionings of the writing selves, which are valid in different chronotopes and effective for different communicative and cognitive concerns. As a number of movements of the writing self through language were shown to occur before a written text gets its temporarily stable form, the present study strengthens the claim that writing is far beyond a mere translation of abstract thought to a written form. On the one hand, this observation adds dynamism to cognitive psychological theories of writing. Since it directs the attention to such dialogic dynamics in the intraindividual
realm, grasped by the notion of inner dialogue, on the other hand, it also adds a specific psycholinguistic focus to other sociocultural writing research. The findings of the present study are in line with Vygotsky’s (1934/1987) description of the “language production process” formulated for oral utterances, where inner speech is granted a prominent status. In fact, the analyses presented above can be taken as illustrative examples for the nature of thought-to-word-processes as formulated by Vygotsky (1934/1987), extending his conception of thinking and speech to writing—and, without going into detail here, elaborating and concretizing Vygotsky’s own thoughts on written speech (particularly Vygotsky, 1934/1987, pp. 270–272; for a more detailed account of Vygotsky’s notion of written speech see Surd-Büchele & Karsten, 2010).

Finally, on a general theoretical plane, deploying the workings of auto-confrontation, positioning movements of selves through language were shown to take place indeed. The microanalytic focus allowed the tracing of subtle variations of voiced positionings through the writers’ psycholinguistically performed acts towards themselves and towards others. This means that movements of the self do not take place on an abstract level of timely stable positions “in” the self. To the contrary, movements of a self in writing as in other speech activities occur through linguistic-bodily utterances and vocal or gestural performance. This also has consequences for how development is conceptualized. Adopting functional ways of dealing with the multifaceted affordances of communicative or cognitive practices—in writing or in other domains—is thus only possible on a very concrete level: performing a dialogic utterance and, in doing so, moving oneself to a new position.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. Many writing activities do take place in the presence of others or in a distributed form. However, even in these cases, the communication is not as physically and/or temporally immediate as it is in most oral speech forms (see Jakubinskij, 1923/1979, for a discussion of the parameters “immediate—mediate” and “monological—dialogical” leading to a number of possible speech rhythms and constellations). For example, the rhythm of distributed writing activities often is decelerated compared to oral dialogue by the comparatively slow tempo of handwriting (e.g., when working together on a flip chart). In turn, when interacting in a digital environment, writers are frequently temporally, but not bodily co-present, due to the virtual nature of the interaction.

2. For the study documented in Karsten (2014) the three cases were assembled for a number of reasons, the most important ones being (a) that the subjects participated on a voluntary basis aiming at reflecting, exploring, and possibly rethinking their writing style; (b) that the subjects were writers at a developmental threshold of becoming experts in their domain (i.e., becoming a high school-level student, a professional journalist, a senior researcher); and (c) that the writing activity was a “real” one, designed not only for the study, but mainly for the three writers’ typical audiences (teachers, newspaper readers, editors, colleagues, etc.). The last point included that the genres the writers’ texts responded to were “public” genres (a school essay, a journalistic reportage, a scientific article) where the presence of the researcher as another reader would necessarily alter, but not drastically change the addressed audience.
3. All auto-confrontation dialogues were transcribed following the conventions of the conversation analytical transcription system GAT2 (Selting et al., 2009). The writing episodes are rendered as describing protocols of the corresponding videos, their beginnings being indicated by time stamps. An English translation of every line of transcript and video protocol is given in italics beneath the original German utterance. Bold lines are dealt with in detail in the analyses.

References


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