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EthnoScripts

ANALYSEN UND INFORMATIONEN
AUS DEM INSTITUT FÜR ETHNOLOGIE
DER UNIVERSITÄT HAMBURG

Anthropology of Gilgit-Baltistan, Northern Pakistan



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Editorial

Mijal Gandelsman-Trier

Liebe Leserinnen und Leser,

die vorliegende Ausgabe der Ethnoscripts stellt eine Zäsur dar. Beginnend mit diesem Heft erscheint die Zeitschrift online. Diese Umstellung bedeutet gleichermaßen einen Neuanfang wie auch Kontinuität. Erhalten bleibt das Ethnoscripts-Konzept, ein Forum für aktuelle ethnologische Themen zu sein. Die Veränderungen in der Publikationsweise eröffnen indes Möglichkeiten, neue Wege auszuprobieren.

Die Veränderungen betreffen die Präsentation und die Sichtbarkeit der Zeitschrift. Wir versprechen uns eine größere Verbreitung der Hefte und eine stärkere Wahrnehmung der veröffentlichten Beiträge. Die Online-Publikation eröffnet zudem mehr Gelegenheiten zur Kommunikation und zum Austausch mit unseren Leserinnen und Lesern. Ethnoscripts erscheint als Open Access-Medium. Dieser freie Zugang entspricht unserem Verständnis, wie eine sinnvolle Diskussion zu wissenschaftlichen Themen gestaltet werden kann und sollte. Nach und nach werden wir auch die Print-Ausgaben von Ethnoscripts als Archiv hochladen und auf diese Weise in Open Access zur Verfügung stellen. Aus gegebenen Anlass möchten wir Iris Zumbusch bei dieser Gelegenheit ganz herzlich danken, die seit vielen Jahren alle Print-Editionen von Ethnoscripts vom Layout bis zum Druck sehr zuverlässig, gewissenhaft und verantwortungsbewusst betreut hat.

Wir freuen uns sehr, die neue „Ära“ der Zeitschrift mit Martin Sökefeld als Herausgeber des Heftes beginnen zu können. Martin Sökefeld ist Professor an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München. Er war in den Jahren 2000 bis 2005 Mitglied der Redaktion von Ethnoscripts und hat die Zeitschrift mit seinen Ideen und seinem Engagement stark geprägt. Seitdem hat er weiterhin kontinuierlich einzelne Beiträge für Ethnoscripts geschrieben. In der vorliegenden Ausgabe übernahm er die Herausgeberschaft für das Schwerpunktthema „Anthropology of Gilgit-Baltistan, Northern Pakistan“. Dafür möchten wir ihm an dieser Stelle sehr herzlich danken. Das Heft gibt einen umfassenden und profunden Einblick in die aktuelle Ethnologie Nordpakistans. In der Einleitung führt Martin Sökefeld in die Ethnographie der Region ein und stellt die Beiträge des Schwerpunkts vor. Wir möchten in diesem kurzen Editorial daher nur auf einen Artikel hinweisen, den von Martin Sökefeld verfassten Foto-Essay „Disaster and (im)mobility: Restoring mo-

bility in Gojal after the Attabad landslide“. Mit dem Online-Format ergeben sich neue Möglichkeiten der Präsentation von Beiträgen. Das Moment der Visualisierung eröffnet dabei weitere Formen des Zugangs zu einem Thema; das ist in diesem Beitrag eindrucksvoll gelungen.

Neben dem Schwerpunktthema werden wir weiterhin die gewohnten Rubriken beibehalten, diese jedoch nur nach Bedarf abdecken. In diesem Heft stellt Astrid Wonneberger im „Werkstattbericht“ die Rolle der Ethnologie als Teildisziplin des Studiengangs „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften“ an der HAW Hamburg vor. Andrea Blätter rezensiert den von Bierschenk et al. (2013) herausgegebenen Sammelband „Ethnologie im 21. Jahrhundert“.

Wir wünschen eine anregende Lektüre der neuen Ethnoscripts!

Im Namen der Redaktion,
Mijal Gandelsman-Trier

Mijal Gandelsman-Trier ist Lehrbeauftragte am Institut für Ethnologie der Universität Hamburg.

Anthropology of Gilgit-Baltistan: Introduction

Martin Sökefeld

Introducing Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan is a very sparsely populated (roughly twenty persons per km²) high-mountain area in the north of Pakistan. Its natural environment is usually described with superlatives – the longest glaciers outside of the polar region, home of the world's second highest peak (K2) and four more eight-thousanders, "the most spectacular and fascinating region of Pakistan," says a website for the promotion of tourism to the area.[1] This "spectacular" environment has a number of decisive consequences for human life. Gilgit-Baltistan is largely a high-mountain desert. Geologically, it spreads over three high mountain systems: Himalaya, Karakorum and Hindukush. Settlements are concentrated in the main river valleys and in the side-valleys, and the largest part of the region is simply uninhabitable because of slope, aridity, or height. Slope and aridity are decisive limitations for subsistence: Agriculture depends on irrigation which is mostly fed by melt-water streams from the glaciers. Slopes have to be terraced for cultivation and extensive networks of irrigation channels have to be constructed and maintained. The vast majority of GBs surface area is, however, simply uninhabitable and uncultivable. Over the last decades, the cultivated area had been extended with the help of development agencies, especially the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme (AKRSP), but in most parts extension has reached its limits now because of unavailability of water for irrigation. The limiting factor is water in late winter and spring: When water is most needed for the beginning of the agricultural period, it is most scarce because of reduced outflow from the glaciers in the cold season. Beside various sorts of grains that are cultivated – formerly especially barley while today wheat and maize prevail – vegetables and fruits are grown, in the first place apricots, apples and walnuts. In the past, dried fruits played a very significant role especially for diet in winter. Agriculture was always combined with animal husbandry, not only because crops were insufficient but, even more importantly, because manure was required as fertilizer for the fields. Sheep, goats, cows, in the higher areas also yaks, and chicken are kept. There is a locally variegated system of transhumance. In summer, livestock is mostly kept on high pastures. Cows, goats and sheep descend to the permanent settlements in the valleys in September while yaks

1 http://gilgit-baltistan.com/about/ (accessed 10 February 2014)

are mostly kept on high pastures all year round. Like in other high-mountain areas, communities in Gilgit-Baltistan were probably never really self-sufficient in terms of food. To some extent, local produce was supplemented by trade and in some historical cases also by raids, and very often people simply starved in winter and spring, when stocks had run out and no fresh food was yet available.



Many thanks to Professor Matthias Winiger, Bonn University, for his permission to reproduce this map here.

The society of Gilgit-Baltistan is diverse in terms of language, religion and ethnicity. Five major regional languages are spoken, Shina in many local varieties, Khowar, Balti, Burushaski and Wakhi. Besides we find also speakers of Pashtu, Hindko, Gujri, Punjabi and other languages, who have migrated from other areas of Pakistan into the area. The national language of Pakistan, Urdu, serves as the lingua franca and English plays a growing role as the language of education. Except a small group of mainly Punjabi Christians all people in Gilgit are Muslims. However, they belong to different sects or *firqe*: Shias, Sunnis, Ismailis, and a small community of Nurbakhshis in Baltistan. Religious communities are endogamous today. People are also divided into patrilineal kinship groups which are often combined into larger *qoms* (extended kinship groups, "ethnic groups" or "nations", Sökefeld 1998a). Also valleys or sub-regions are important references for collective

identity. Political organization and belonging play an important role in this regard. Thus the people of Hunza and Nager identify differently although they live in the same valley – although largely on opposite sides – and speak the same language, Burushaski. But they belonged to opposed little kingdoms and today to different religious groups – the Nagerkuts to the Shia and the Hunzukuts mostly to the Ismailiyya. Beside these many different and intersecting dimensions of identification (Sökefeld 1997a, 1998b) people increasingly share a sense of (political) belonging to Gilgit-Baltistan, as opposed to the rest of Pakistan.

Traditional political organization

Historically, two different political systems prevailed in Gilgit-Baltistan. The first was a non-centralized, "egalitarian" political organization in the southern part, roughly in what is today the district of Diamer. In these tracts which were colloquially called *Yaghestan* ("free, unruly country") communal affairs were regulated by the *jirga*, the assembly of men. All over Gilgit-Baltistan, people are divided into patrilineal *qoms* which are often locally ranked. Membership in the *jirgas* was mostly limited to the men of the landowning *qoms* like Shin and Yeshkun while "menial" and artisan groups like Kammin, Dom or Gujjur were excluded. Thus, political organization was not really egalitarian, yet it was marked by the absence of centralized rule.[2] In the greater part of Gilgit-Baltistan local rulers, *Rajas* or *Mirs*, ruled over valleys or parts of valleys. Before the British intervention a Raja was largely a *primus inter pares* who needed the support of at least a part of the local population in order to secure his position. While rajaship was hereditary in principle, there was quite fierce competition between claimants for rule and often a contender did not hesitate to kill his own brothers. During colonial rule, however, local rulers needed the recognition of the British in the first place, which guaranteed their power. As a consequence, being much less dependent on local support, many Rajas became more and more despotic. Especially the rulers, or Mirs, of Hunza and Nager were prominent and they continued their largely autonomous rule well into postcolonial times. In 1974 Mohammad Jamal Khan, the Mir of Hunza, was the last local ruler who formally lost his throne. Informally, however, he continued to wield much influence over local and regional affairs. His son Ghazanfar Ali Khan later even became a topmost executive officer in the regional government. While Raja-rule was formally abolished, the political significance of the *jirgas* in Diamer continues until today. Many valleys of Diamer district largely remain outside of administrative control even now.

2 There are some exceptions. In the valley of Tangir which is part of the 'egalitarian zone' Pakhtun Wali, a prince from Yasin valley, was able to establish his rule after 1895 until 1917 (Sökefeld 2002).

Interconnectedness

While especially lowlanders consider high-mountain areas often as impenetrable zones of retreat and isolation which were "'opened up'" only by modern road-construction, this popular imagination is clearly contradicted by the history of Gilgit-Baltistan. Historical travelogues by Buddhist wayfarers and especially rock-carvings in many parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, most famously in the Indus Valley between Chilas and Kohistan, testify constant human movement through the area. In spite of the difficult terrain, the history of Gilgit-Baltistan is a history of movement and migration. When I conducted research on ethnicity in Gilgit in the early 1990s, I found that the mythical histories of even those groups which are considered the 'original' inhabitants of the town invariably refer to narratives of migration. While there is a significant distinction between 'original' settlers and those who 'came later', also regarding rights to natural resource utilization, in the last instance all people 'originally' came from elsewhere.

Thus, Gilgit-Baltistan was not isolated before the construction of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) which since 1979 connects Pakistan with the Chinese province of Xinjiang via Gilgit-Baltistan. Still, the KKH and subsequently the construction of other roads have greatly transformed life in the area. Exchange between the mountain areas and down-country Pakistan in terms of travel of people and transport of goods and thus the dependency of Gilgit-Baltistan on the road link multiplied greatly. Theoretically, the KKH is an all-season and all-weather road. In practice, however, the road link is not very reliable. It is frequently disturbed by both natural and political events. Often the road is closed for hours or even days due to landslides, especially on rainy days. Since January 2010, the KKH is continuously interrupted due to a large-scale landslide in Gojal. Here, a giant mass of debris has dammed the Hunza-River and road-traffic is substituted by a shaky boat-service (Sökefeld 2012a, b). But the road is also often closed because of blockades by protesting village communities or, recently, sectarian violence (see below). The precariousness of the road link becomes visible when, after a few days of closure, shops in Gilgit-Baltistan quickly run out of certain items. The road connection is supplemented by an even less reliable air link. There are two airports in Gilgit-Baltistan, in Gilgit and in Skardu, that are serviced daily by PIA from Islamabad, but flights are often cancelled due to bad weather conditions or the non-availability of aircraft and there is a usually a huge backlog of people waiting for a seat.

Political history

That part of Gilgit-Baltistan's history which significantly shapes the present starts in the first half of the 19th century with the interventions of Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Gulab Singh was a Hindu vassal of Ranjit Singh's Sikh em-

pire in the Punjab. He was highly interested in extending his influence into the Himalaya, mainly with the goal to control trade routes (Stellrecht 1998: 23f). Troops under two of his generals penetrated the mountains. Zorawar Singh led campaigns towards Ladakh and Baltistan (Huttenback 1961), while Nathu Shah occupied Gilgit briefly for the first time in 1842. When, after Ranjit Singh's death in 1839 the Sikh empire was finally defeated by the British, Gulab Singh switched sides towards the new rulers. In the Treaty of Amritsar of 1848 he bought Kashmir for 7.500.000 Rupees from the British and linked it with Jammu to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Under the Treaty of Amritsar the British also considered Gilgit and Baltistan as being under Kashmiri jurisdiction.[3] While Kashmiri rule over Baltistan was largely unchallenged, the control of Gilgit was hotly contested. In 1846 the area was snatched from Kashmir by an alliance of local Rajas led by Gohar Aman, ruler of Yasin, and the following years saw a constant tug-of-war over Gilgit in which the local contenders mostly prevailed. Kashmir was able to establish more stable control over Gilgit town and its vicinity only after the death of Gohar Aman in 1860 and Kashmiri rule became consolidated only after the British developed their own interest in the area (Sökefeld 1997: 257f). With Russia's advance in Central Asia, the British became highly concerned about a possible Russian intrusion into the Subcontinent through the unexplored chains of the Karakorum and Pamir mountains. Thus, from mid-century onward, the region saw increasing activities of British explorers and surveyors who tried to assess this danger. Gilgit-Baltistan became an important site of the "Great Game". In 1877 the British established a Political Agent in Gilgit as a permanent representative. Major John Biddulph, the first British Agent, remained in the area until 1881, the year in which the Agency was closed in consequence of a change of British policy. But it was opened again in 1889 by Col. Algernon Durand who established a British presence that continued until 1947. Beside the British Political Agent, there was a Kashmiri Governor in Gilgit, the *Wazir-e-Wazarat*. While officially the British and the Kashmiri representative were on equal footing in this arrangement of "dual control", the Political Agent was able to establish his de facto supremacy and also a reputation of British rule as strict but benevolent among the local population, while the Kashmiris suffered from an image of greediness and corruption (Sökefeld 2005). Further, the British were successful in extending their power beyond the area controlled by Kashmir. Most importantly, Durand conquered Hunza and Nager in 1891. As in other parts of the world the British mostly relied on indirect rule. Thus the local rulers like the Mirs of Hunza and Nager enjoyed considerable autonomy as long as their politics did not

3 Literally, the Treaty excluded Gilgit because it included only the territories "eastward of river Indus" while Gilgit is situated in the North-West of the River. Yet this exclusion was due to geographical ignorance rather than deliberately intended. For the full text of the treaty see Hassnain1978: Appendix II.

infringe on British interests. The British took pains to at least symbolically honor the importance of the local rulers, and in fact a close symbiosis between the British administration and local rulers and elites developed. Relation between the Political Agent and the Wazir-e-Wazarat remained conflictual until 1935 when the British "leased" the Gilgit Agency from the Maharaja of Kashmir for sixty years and thereby ended the problematic arrangement of dual control. However, the period of the lease was cut short by independence and the partition of the Subcontinent in 1947.

In late July 1947, two weeks before independence, the British 'handed back' the Agency to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir who sent Brigadier Ghansar Singh as Wazir-e-Wazarat in Gilgit. This was a time of turmoil as the British government had only shortly before agreed to the partition of the Subcontinent into 'Hindu' India and 'Muslim' Pakistan. The territory was divided between the two new states according to the religious affiliation of either the majority of the population of a given region or, in the case of the princely states, of the respective ruler. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir State the two principles of partition clashed: Here, a Hindu Maharaja ruled over a politically largely disenfranchised Muslim majority of about two thirds of the State's total population. Since 1931 there had been various movements of Muslims that demanded a share of power and political participation in the State. Since early summer 1947 unrest grew especially in the South-Western part of Jammu and Kashmir. For the time being, the Maharaja decided neither for accession with India nor for Pakistan but rather attempted to maintain an independent position. On the other hand, however, both states demanded the inclusion of Kashmir in their respective territories.

A few Hindu and Sikh traders aside the population of Gilgit was completely Muslim. Also in Gilgit people were generally in favor of Pakistan. The decisive force in the Agency was the Gilgit Scouts, the paramilitary troop established by the British. Also after the withdrawal of the British administration they remained under the command of two British officers, Major Brown and Captain Mathieson, now in the Maharaja's service. In September 1947, after some deliberations with the Wazir-e-Wazarat the local junior commissioned officers who mostly belonged to the ruling families of the area took a secret oath for accession with Pakistan (Sökefeld 1997b). Under the pressure of growing revolt the Maharaja requested military support from India. The Indian government was ready to grant assistance only under the condition of the prior accession of Jammu and Kashmir with India. On October 26, 1947, the Maharaja finally signed the "Instrument of Accession". By air, India started to send troops into the Kashmir valley and succeeded in stopping the advance of the revolt and securing the capital Srinagar.

When a few days later the news of accession to India reached Gilgit, the Gilgit Scouts arrested the governor on 1st of November, and declared the "Islamic Republic of Gilgit" which lasted for sixteen days. During this time the

request for accession with Pakistan was sent to the Government in Karachi. In the following *jang-e-azadi* (freedom war) the Gilgit Scouts first took the garrison of neighboring Bunji, where Kashmiri Hindu troops were stationed, and then successfully advanced to liberate Baltistan. The Scouts even took Dras and Kargil, i.e. places which had to be given up again later and which today are part of Indian Ladakh. After more than a year of war and negotiations in the UN Security Council, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire that commenced on 1st of January 1949. Since then, the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir is divided into one part under Indian administration and two politically different parts under Pakistani control, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.[4]

I told this history in some detail because it has significant political consequences even today. Under international law, Gilgit-Baltistan remains a "disputed territory". Pakistan never formally accepted Gilgit-Baltistan's accession and the territory of the country which is outlined in Article 1 of the Constitution of Pakistan does not include Gilgit-Baltistan. Gilgit-Baltistan's postcolonial history is to a great extent shaped by this political marginalization which started when on November 16, 1947, Mohammad Alam, a *tahsildar* (sub-district officer) from Mansehra, arrived in Gilgit to take control for the Government of Pakistan as Political Agent. He deposed the provisional local government. In the following years Pakistan's administration largely continued the colonial system, including the colonial law, the *Frontier Crimes Regulation*. Exploitative taxes and forced labor were continued and there was no local participation in government affairs (Sökefeld 2005). All high officials of the local administration as well as army officers stationed in Gilgit came from 'down-country' Pakistan, mostly from the Punjab. The administration also did not touch the local rulers. The following decades saw a few incidents of protest against local rajas like in Punial in 1951 and in Nager in 1969. Protest was largely organized by men who had achieved higher education in Pakistani universities and who only fully realized the political disenfranchisement of Gilgit-Baltistan upon their return to the region. The most significant protest which developed into a short-term insurgency occurred in Gilgit town in early 1970. A minor dispute between a local school teacher and the wife of a Punjabi officer who threatened the teacher because her child failed an exam became a symbol for the arrogance and high-handedness of Pakistani control in Gilgit. A local political organization, the *Tanzim-e-Millat* ("organization of the nation") that had been established shortly before, took the lead and organized a protest demonstration. The leaders of the Tanzim-e-Millat were arrested and this further heated up the unrest. Protestors broke the jail and freed the arrested leaders. When a growing mass of people marched towards the offices of the authorities, a non-local official ordered the Gilgit

4 Later, in 1950, also China occupied a part which had been under Indian control: Aksai Chin.

Scouts to shoot the crowd. The Scouts, who were still a local troop, however, defied orders. The official himself took a gun and shot one protestor. The administration had to call in troops from the North-West Frontier Province in order to regain control.[5]

Although the revolt was defeated and many people were arrested, it led to some political reforms. In 1971, the secession of Bangladesh, the former East Pakistan, succeeded and the military government of Pakistan gave way to the civilian president Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who subsequently became elected as prime minister. Bhutto took a special interest in Gilgit-Baltistan. He amnestied all prisoners, replaced the agency system with a more regular administration, and renamed the region which before was still known as "Gilgit Agency" as "Northern Areas of Pakistan". He abolished the local rulers and the colonial law of Frontier Crimes Regulations and established a regional advisory council, the Northern Areas Council. It seems that Bhutto was on the verge of integrating the Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan fully into the Pakistani state. Reforms were stopped, however, when Bhutto was deposed by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977. Subsequently, there were further "reform packages" which mostly brought only cosmetic changes of Gilgit-Baltistan's political status. The last reform was the "Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order", issued by the Government of Pakistan in 2009. Under this order the area was called "Gilgit-Baltistan" and the regional council was renamed as *Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly* which, however, enjoys very limited legislative powers. The Order also established the *Gilgit-Baltistan Council* in which the Government of Pakistan has a strong representation. In tendency, significant issues are decided by the Council while the Legislative Assembly has minor competencies. Again, a kind of "dual control" has been established with a regional government and a regional legislation with limited powers on one hand and a strong administration under the control of the Government of Pakistan on the other.

Discontent with Gilgit-Baltistan's political status gave rise to a number of smaller political groups which are collectively referred to as "nationalists". They demand either greater autonomy of the area or even full independence from Pakistan (Sökefeld 1999, see also Sohaib Bodla's contribution in this issue). Although there has never been any poll on this issue in the area, it is safe to assume that the majority of Gilgit-Baltistan's population rather prefers the full integration of their area into Pakistan as the country's fifth province.

Sectarianism

Beside the political reforms, another significant consequence of the revolt of 1970 is often pointed out in local discourse: violent sectarianism. The population of Gilgit-Baltistan is religiously diverse. All people are Muslims but

5 For details see Sökefeld 1997a:284ff.

they belong to different sects – Shias, Sunnis, Ismailis, and, in Baltistan, also a small minority of Nurbakhshis. The southern District of Diamer is exclusively Sunni, while all other districts are mixed. Shias greatly dominate in Baltistan, while Ismailis dominate Hunza-Nager district and Ghizer. The history of Islam is also a history of tension and conflict between Sunnis and Shias. It started as conflict about the question who were the legitimate leaders of the Muslim *ummah* after the Prophet Mohammad's death, the elected Caliphs, as the Sunnis believe, or, according to Shia faith, the Imams who are genealogically related to the Prophet. Over the centuries, this dispute congealed also into differences between Shias and Sunnis in terms of ritual, law and other doctrinal issues. This does not mean, however, that relations between both groups are generally characterized by open conflict. Also in Gilgit, most people emphasize that "in the past" relations between Shias and Sunnis were amicable and peaceful. In fact, mixed families and cross-cutting marriages were very common. The 1970s and 1980s, however, saw some incidents of violence between Sunnis and Shias. Things came to a head when in May 1988 a large party of Sunnis from Diamer and adjacent Kohistan attacked Shia villages around Gilgit. They wreaked havoc, destroyed many houses and killed more than one hundred people (Sökefeld 1997: 203ff). The actual number of victims was never officially disclosed. This happened in the last months of General Zia's rule. The army which had a strong presence in Gilgit watched the havoc for several days before it finally stopped the attackers and sent them back to their valleys. The events of *athasi* ("eighty-eight"), as they are generally referred to in Gilgit, were a point of no return in Shia-Sunni relations. Since then relations became highly polarized: There are no more cross-cutting relations. Many mixed neighborhoods saw the exodus of members of the smaller religious community, commensality almost stopped and in general solidarity and cooperation across the sectarian divide was greatly reduced. Many people in Gilgit explain this development with reference to the uprising in the early 1970s. They allege that in the years after the government initiated a divide-and-rule-strategy by sending "radical" Sunni *ulema* (scholars) to Gilgit who preached that Shias were not Muslims but *kafirs* (non-believers). Of course, this accusation was reciprocated by Shia *ulema* and the antagonism between both groups rather deepened and hardened with support from Saudi Arabia for the Sunnis and from Iran for the Shias. Whether the accusation that the antagonism was instigated by the government is correct or not, it certainly went out of hand and beyond control.

Since the 1990s violent events became a more or less regular affair. Every few years there are periods of *tensions*, as the times of violence are locally called, which cost many lives. The government tries to control violence by imposing curfew which often lasts for a week or more, by closing the Karakorum Highway and, more recently, by blocking mobile phone networks. A very violent period of tension which cost many lives occurred in early 2005

when, after a longer dispute about the representation of Shias in textbooks, the Shia Imam Agha Zia Uddin was killed in Gilgit (Ali 2008, Stöber 2007). In 2012 the conflict got a new dimension because on three different occasions busses were stopped by assailants in the Sunni areas on the Karakorum Highway and the Babusar Route. The busses were searched for Shias who were killed mercilessly. Routes and places have become sectarianized and especially Shias avoid travelling on the KKH because they feel highly insecure on the road (Grieser and Sökefeld forthcoming.). In Gilgit-Baltistan the Shia-Sunni antagonism became a basic premise of life which structures social and political relations. Even institutions that actively struggle to stay outside of the antagonism and to provide a neutral space, like Karakorum International University which was established in Gilgit in 2002, have difficulties to escape the sectarian and sectarianizing rationality (Ali 2010a).

Development and community activism

Beside Shias and Sunnis, Ismailis are the third significant Muslim community in Gilgit-Baltistan. In Gilgit they have hitherto been able to keep a neutral position and they are not directly involved in the Shia-Sunni sectarian issue.[6] Besides their specific religious practices and orientations, Ismailis stand out by their extraordinary level of literacy and education. This is due to the outstanding engagement of the Aga Khan, the spiritual leader of the Ismailiyya, and the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in the area. The AKDN comprises of a number of organizations which specialize in different fields of development like rural development and infrastructure (the Aga Khan Rural Support Program, AKRSP, and the Aga Khan Planning and Building Services, AKPBS), health (the Aga Khan Health Services, AKHS), education (the Aga Khan Education Services, AKES), culture and heritage conservation (the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, AKCS), as well as disaster management (Focus Humanitarian Assistance). In a way, AKDN doubles the not very efficient state administration and provides services which the state is able to provide only to a very limited extent. However, the AKDN agencies carefully emphasize that they work *with* the state and not against or in competition with it. They do not engage in advocacy or open criticism. Although AKDN-institutions are regarded as being almost sacrosanct and beyond critique, some complaints have been voiced after the Attabad landslide of January 2010 which cut off Gojal, the northern part of Hunza. The KKH was buried under a huge mass of debris which also dammed the Hunza-River and created a lake which measured up to thirty kilometers. Being cut off and feeling utterly neglected by the government many people of Gojal had expected particularly AKRSP to raise a voice for the disaster affected people and to work for the reconnection of the area. AKRSP workers, however, responded to this

6 In neighboring Chitral, however, where there are no Shias, Ismailis have often been attacked by Sunnis (Marsden 2005).

criticism by pointing out that the program could not relieve the state of its responsibility (Sökefeld 2012a).

AKRSP is perhaps the most important of the AKDN-organizations. It was formed in 1982 to counter poverty in the high mountain area (Gilgit-Baltistan and Chitral) and from its beginning practiced a participatory approach that followed a cooperative model which emphasizes and supports community self-organization (Wood, Malik and Sagheer 2006). In order for villages or neighborhoods to participate in the program, they were required to form Village Organizations (VOs) that jointly managed resources and saved money which was complemented with funds from AKRSP for particular projects. In order to promote women and especially their income generating capacity, specific Women's Organizations (WOs) were also formed in the villages. AKRSP is a 'non-communal' program, i.e. it is not limited to Ismailis and Ismaili majority areas. Especially in Shia areas like Nager and Baltistan but also in Astor VOs have been established, while it is not active in Sunni Diamer. In any case, the success of the program is much higher among Ismailis than among others. This is due to mainly two factors. On one hand, the Ismaili population is much more committed to the program. Their participation is motivated not only by economic considerations and the expectation of some material outcome, but more importantly by the Aga Khan himself. The Aga Khan, whose word is of utmost importance for Ismailis, continuously calls his followers to participate in such programs, to work for development and to acquire education. Thus, participation is considered almost a religious duty (Sökefeld 1997: 135ff). This strong motivation to participate in projects is of course missing for the members of other religious groups. On the other hand, non-Ismailis sometimes complain that the staff of AKRSP is much more committed to Ismaili areas than to the other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. Perhaps there is also some imbalance between different Ismaili areas as Ismailis from Ghizer-District sometimes express the opinion that the program is very much centered on Hunza. Although also in Hunza the VOs and WOs do not always work perfectly, this kind of self-organization for community development has become a model. In Pakistan, the National Rural Support Program has been formed after the example of AKRSP. In Gilgit-Baltistan, AKRSP and the other AKDN-institutions have strongly contributed to the formation of an ethos of community activism, according to which particularly young men but also women are expected to work voluntarily or for a limited remuneration for their "community" which is mostly equated with the population of a village, a cluster of villages or even an entire valley. The idea that local populations have to organize for the betterment of life ("development") and that individuals should commit themselves to communal purposes have spread much beyond the Ismaili areas (see Walter, this issue). For instance, "community schools" which work on a cooperative basis and are funded through fees have sprung up in many places. They are mostly

English medium schools as English is regarded as the principal language of modernity and development.

Gender

Society in Gilgit-Baltistan is strongly gendered, although gender-relations vary greatly according to sect and region. Among Shias and Sunnis *pardah*, i.e. gender segregation, is a strict norm which, however, especially in villages where women are required to work outside the house in the fields is not always tightly enforced. In principle *pardah* (the Persian word for "curtain") means that a woman should not have any interaction with men from outside of the close circle of her family. This means that a woman should largely be restricted to her house and compound. In any case, pre-marital and extra-marital (sexual) relations are anathema. In parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, 'relation' in this context is a very broadly defined concept which may include a word or a wink between a man and a woman who are not related. Any suspicion and rumor that a woman might be engaged in such a 'relation' befouls her *izzat* (honor) and consequently the *izzat* of her family. Therefore men are called to keep "their women", in particular daughters and sisters, under very strict surveillance and control. In normal life this control is mostly executed by the mothers of the families, but also elder brothers play an important role. In some parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, killings in consequence of (supposedly) breached honor are not rare. The important symbol of *pardah* is the veil. Women should be veiled outside of the house, but there is a large variety and range of veiling practices (for details see Kriebel, this issue). Among Sunnis in Diamer *pardah* is strictest and here it is strongly supported by a culture of jealousy and violent feuds.[7]

Among Ismailis in Hunza and Ghizer veiling practices are very lax and *pardah* almost non-existent – which does not mean that 'relations' are more accepted. In Gilgit town, however, where people of all the sects live, also Ismailis have to adopt *pardah* to some extent and Ismaili women are much less "free" than in rural areas. In a fascinating ethnography Katrin Gratz (2006) describes how women live *pardah* in Gilgit and how within the "gendered space" of the town women practice social relations and develop their agency. In Gilgit-Baltistan, female education has increased much in the last decades[8] and also employment opportunities for women have multiplied, especially as teachers in girls' schools. In Gilgit town also a number of "ladies'

7 Jettmar 1960. Because of feuds and strong Islamist influence Diamer has been inaccessible for research in the last decades. Nevertheless, there are two very interesting recent studies of neighboring Kohistan which strongly resembles Diamer. Both studies also touch gender relations (Jahn 2009, Knudsen 2009).

8 Again Diamer is an exception. Here about fifty percent of all children are not enrolled in a school and the enrollment rate of girls is much lower than that of boys (SAFED 2013).

markets" have been built, access to which is restricted to women, both as customers and as shop-owners or sales-persons. Thus, gender segregation is maintained although women enter new economic realms.

Anthropological research on Gilgit-Baltistan

The "anthropology of Gilgit-Baltistan" began with the British explorations of the uncharted high-mountain areas in the mid-19th century. For the British colonizers knowledge of a certain area was a necessary precondition of being able to dominate it. Thus, explorers often preceded administrators, but also the administrators continued to collect all kinds of knowledge about local people, society and environment. In this body of literature, ethnographic information is often mixed up with history and geography. After his four years in the Gilgit area Political Agent John Biddulph published his book *Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh* (2001 [1880]) and also his successor Algernon Durand wrote about Gilgit. His book, *The Making of a Frontier* (1977 [1899]), was however more a political memoir of his term than an "ethnography" of the area. Decades later, a third Political Agent, D. L. R. Lorimer, was an even more prolific writer. He was Political Agent from 1920 to 1924, and being particularly interested in local languages, he even returned to the area after his retirement in order to pursue linguistic studies. Besides publishing extensively on Burushaski, Wakhi and Domaki languages, he also collected much ethnographic material which was published posthumously by Müller-Stellrecht (1979, 1980). Previously, the Political Agents Frederick Drew, another Englishman who was in the service of the Maharaja of Kashmir, had already written a book about *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories* (1980 [1875]) which also contains sections about Gilgit-Baltistan. All in all, the British colonial literature about the area is quite vast.[9]

In the 1950s, German research interest in the area was established, starting with the German Hindukush Expedition of 1955-56 which was planned by Adolf Friedrich, Professor of Anthropology at the University of Mainz.[10] Friedrich was particularly interested in European and Asian mountain peoples. The expedition was part of a larger research project which intended to collect comparative data on all continents. At that time, German anthropology stood firmly in the tradition of culture history. The basic idea and interest was to discover "original" or "primeval" cultural forms. The idea was that certain styles of subsistence (e.g. hunting, pastoralism, agriculture) produce different forms of culture. Some representatives of this approach even thought that with the passage of time cultures "degenerate" to "hybrid forms" – at that time hybridity was not theoretically celebrated as it is today. Friedrich chose the high mountain area of northern Pakistan for the expedition

9 Beside the books already referred to also Knight (1991 [1895]), Leitner (1985 [1889]) and Schomberg (n.d. [1935]) should be mentioned.

10 This account of the expedition is based on Buddruss and Snoy 2007.

because he believed that the remote high mountain valleys in the Hindukush and Karakorum might harbor almost "original" cultures and also different "styles of culture" at a very close geographical distance to one another which would provide new insights into the history of culture. The area was seen as a kind of "refuge" of cultures. The members of the expedition, beside Friedrich, were Dr. Karl Jettmar, who that time worked at the ethnographic museum of Vienna/Austria, Dr. Georg Buddruss, a young linguist and specialist in Indian languages, and Peter Snoy, a student of anthropology at the University of Mainz. They did some ethnographic exploration in Gilgit town, where Buddruss started to study Shina language, and then moved south towards Chilas and Tangir which had formally joined Pakistan/the northern areas only three years earlier, in 1952. In Tangir they collected data on economy, forms of settlement, ethnic relations and remnants of "pre-Islamic" religion.[11] This was to become the major topic of interest for this first generation of German researchers in the Karakorum. Especially Jettmar focused on "pre-Islamic" religion. Later, the members of the expedition separated and travelled in different directions. Jettmar continued to Baltistan while Snoy did research in Bagrot in the vicinity of Gilgit (Snoy 1975). Friedrich went via Ghizer to Chitral, crossing the Shandur Pass, to study the Kalash and especially their form of shamanism. Unfortunately, Friedrich became seriously ill during his stay in the Kalash valleys and died in spring 1956 in Rawalpindi.

After this expedition, research interest in Gilgit-Baltistan even increased. Here, I will focus on anthropological research, but also linguists like Prof. Buddruss continued their research. The pivotal anthropologist was Karl Jettmar. He was especially interested in religion because he thought that religious beliefs and practices are particularly resistant to cultural change. According to this view, the research on religion opened a window onto "early" cultures. Therefore he was particularly keen to document and reconstruct pre-Islamic aspects of religion in Gilgit-Baltistan. Jettmar moved to the University of Heidelberg in 1964 and thus Heidelberg became the center of research on Gilgit-Baltistan in Germany. Jettmar also initiated long-standing archaeological research on the petroglyphs in Gilgit-Baltistan, especially in the Indus valley.

Although the particular scientific interest and theoretical approach of the German Hindukush Expedition have long become obsolete, the expedition established a remarkable tradition of German research in the area which continues more or less until today. German anthropology research turned on the one hand towards more recent history, i.e. archival research on the British era of Gilgit-Baltistan, and on the other hand to the ethnography of the present which is firmly based on contemporary anthropological theory. Especially Jettmar's students Irmtraud Stellrecht, who retired a few years

11 Jettmar was able to revisit Tangir and the neighbouring valleys in 1958, see Jettmar 1960.

ago as professor of anthropology at the University of Tübingen, and Jürgen Frembgen, who is curator for Islamic cultures at the ethnographic museum in Munich, carried anthropological research forward. Frembgen wrote his PhD thesis on the basis of field research in Nager and focused, among other things, on the political history of Nager state (Frembgen 1985). Irmtraud (Müller-)Stellrecht worked especially on 19th century history of Gilgit-Baltistan, and many publications resulted from this work (e.g. Müller-Stellrecht 1978, 1982; Stellrecht 1998).

Irmtraud Stellrecht also initiated the next phase of German research on Gilgit-Baltistan: An interdisciplinary project of Pakistani-German cooperation under the title of "Culture Area Karakorum" which was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Council) and worked between 1989 and 1995. This project also involved physical and human geography and linguistics, among others. Research in social anthropology focused on topics like medical anthropology, social change, perception of environment and gender. Being part of this research network I myself came for the first time to Pakistan in 1991 to do fieldwork on ethnicity in Gilgit town (Sökefeld 1997). Other areas where anthropological fieldwork was undertaken within the framework of Culture Area Karakorum include Yasin, Shigar, Astor, Kohistan and Bagrot.[12]

But of course not only German anthropologists are working in Gilgit-Baltistan. Especially the works of Emma Varley and Nosheen Ali have to be mentioned for contemporary research in the area. Canadian anthropologist Emma Varley focuses on medical anthropology and worked, among other things, on the intersections of Islam, sectarian conflict, obstetric health and family planning in Gilgit town (Varley 2010, 2012). Nosheen Ali works very broadly on political issues which include sectarianism, militarization and the political status of the area but also the politics of conservation and the link between politics and poetry (Ali 2008, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 2013).

The contributions in this issue

Currently, the Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology ("Institut für Ethnologie") of Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich is the only anthropology department in Germany, where research on Gilgit-Baltistan (or Northern Pakistan, for that matter) takes place. In a way, the students at the institute in Munich form the fourth generation of German fieldworkers in Gilgit-Baltistan. Beside a number of other projects, there was a research cooperation established between the department in Munich, Quaid-I-Azam University in Islamabad and Karakorum International University in Gilgit. The cooperation worked under the title *Coping with change in Gilgit Baltis-*

12 See Gratz 2006, Jahn 2009, Lentz 2000, Marhoffer-Wolff 2002, Stellrecht 1997.

tan and was funded by the DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) for the years 2011 – 2013. Part of this framework was the *Summer School Anthropological Fieldwork Methods* which took place in Gilgit in August and September 2013. The Summer School gave the impulse for this issue of *Ethnoscripts* on Gilgit-Baltistan. The articles by Anna-Maria Walter, Claudia Stadler, Maria Beimborn and Nadine Kriebel derive from fieldwork done within the scope of the Summer School. Nosheen Ali and Azam Chaudhary were teachers at the Summer School. These contributions are supplemented by articles by Sohaib Bodla and Anna Grieser.

In her article *Changing Gilgit-Baltistan: Perceptions of the recent history and the role of community activism* Anna-Maria Walter addresses the local "development rhetoric" in Gilgit-Baltistan. For a Western anthropologist who is used to view "development" with a critical eye, the positive evaluation of "modernization" and the optimism which prevails in GBs development discourse are at times quite unsettling. Drawing on the introduction of girls' schools in Bagrote and on the new social figure of the "community activists", Walter discusses the local appropriation of "development" and arrives at a re-evaluation of the anthropological critique of development.

Claudia Stadler addresses a peculiar kind of community activism which engages in *Citizen Journalism* in Gilgit-Baltistan. Citizen Journalism via online news-blogs is a new way of participating in the public sphere. Such blogs are seen as representing the voices of the local communities. The article mainly discusses the blog *pamirtimes.net* which dominates GB's blogosphere. Yet while the blog's activists claim to represent the whole region, others criticize that reporting on some areas prevail while others are neglected. In addition, access to the Internet is quite limited in GB and, because English is mostly used, there is also a language barrier which excludes many. *Pamirtimes.net* has expanded the possibilities of public participation of reaching even beyond the local context yet still it has to be analyzed within the structures and opportunities of local society.

Since a number of years there is a small – generally Punjabi – Christian community in Gilgit. Due to the peculiar history of Christians in Pakistan, they mostly work in the cleaning sector. In her contribution *Christians in Gilgit: Negotiating subalternity and citizenship*, Maria Beimborn thoroughly discusses the concept of subalternity and uses Pandey's concept of "subaltern citizen" to analyze the Christians' organization, struggles and commitments to show how they are simultaneously marginalized and included by the state.

In *The Ways of Revenge in Chilas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan: Shia-Sunni Clashes as Blood Feuds*, Azam Chaudhary addresses the problem of Sunni-Shia violence from a perspective of segmentary opposition. Analyzing the history of feuds in Diamer and describing the mechanism of *badal* (revenge) he argues that Sunni-Shia violence in GB has to be understood on similar lines.

Nosheen Ali addresses a different field of politics. In *Spaces of Nature: Producing Gilgit-Baltistan as the Eco-Body of the Nation* she analyzes the invisibilization of Gilgit-Baltistan from the dominant perspective of down-country Pakistan. From this angle, Gilgit-Baltistan is mainly imagined as a space of spectacular nature, devoid of human beings. She argues that this is also a consequence of the region's disputed status which requires the erasure of a specific regional identity of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and emphasizes that this is replicated by discourses on environmental conservation which constructs the area largely as a space of nature in which people have no place.

Yet in reaction and resistance to the political disabilities deriving from the disputed status of Gilgit-Baltistan and to the denial of identity, a diverse movement of small nationalist groups which demand full autonomy or even independence has formed over the last twenty-five years. In *Making a Nation in High Mountains: Balawars and Balawaristan Nationalism in Ghizer District of Gilgit Baltistan* Sohaib Bodla describes the emergence of nationalist politics in the sub-district of Punial and shows how it grew, also with the help of new means of communication, from a minority perspective to a widely shared view.

Looking at the spatial practices of female students at Gilgit's Karakorum International University, Nadine Kriebel analyses the perception of *gendered space* in the town. Gender segregation is a dominant characteristic of society in Gilgit and the university is for many young women the first space in which they meet young men who are not their relatives. Interaction across gender boundaries as well as gender separation has to be negotiated. Kriebel shows how space and places are (temporarily) marked as being male or female and how *pardah*, the separation of the sexes, is a system of norms, values and practices which are interpreted and at times manipulated by individual actors.

Also Anna Grieser addresses the question of gender, but from vantage point of methodological perspectives and experiences: How can a female ethnographer work in a societal context of strict gender-segregation? She allows deep insight into her own rather difficult experiences of doing fieldwork in Gilgit. Her transgression of gender-boundaries in the course of fieldwork resulted in multiplying uncontrollable rumors. Grieser argues that the conditions of fieldwork are hardly controlled by the fieldworker her (or him)self but that it is shaped and constrained by – often diffuse – local power relations. In addition we learn from her article that local gender norms and values are not as clear and fixed as they often appear to be but that specific behavior is often evaluated in quite contradictory terms.

My own contribution *Disaster and (im)mobility: Restoring mobility in Gojal after the Attabad landslide* is about the ongoing consequences of a natural disaster that hit the Hunza Valley in early 2010. Taking advantage of the fact that *Ethnoscripts* is now published exclusively online it introduces a

new format to the journal: the visual essay. Mainly through photographs that were taken over a period of more than three years I show how a new traffic system was introduced in order to overcome the blockade which cut off the whole area of Upper Hunza.

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Changing Gilgit-Baltistan: Perceptions of the recent history and the role of community activism

Anna-Maria Walter

> *"Like an unwanted ghost, or an uninvited relative, 'development' haunts the house of anthropology. Fundamentally disliked by a discipline that at heart loves all those things that development intends to destroy, anthropology's evil twin remains too close a relative to be simply kicked out."* (Ferguson 2002:160)

Just as Ferguson points out, the concept of development seemed to haunt me during my last two-months stay in Gilgit-Baltistan in the summer of 2013.[1] Often it came masked as narratives of 'change'. During the last 20 years, Gilgit-Baltistan has undergone a major transformation from a remote, agricultural mountain area to a highly literate rural society with its urban conglomeration of Gilgit that is connected to the markets of Pakistan and China through the Karakoram Highway (KKH). This shift is a pressing topic for locals when conversing with foreigners and came up in discussions at the local university in Gilgit, when talking to friends and informants about my research on mobile phones, when searching the media, such as the online newsblog *pamirtimes.net* and even in the rural valley of Bagrote. Without raising the subject myself, local people told me about their recent history: the increase in education, the economic dependency on the Karakoram Highway (KKH), the introduction of bathrooms and agricultural projects through the globally operating but locally run Ismaili Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) as well as improved means of communication like the mobile phone. The term used to describe such recent changes is 'development' and many young, educated people seem to evaluate nearly everything – traditional views, education, attitudes of locals, women's rights, job opportunities, research topics – according to the established development concept.

Why am I so disturbed by this rhetoric? And how come so many local people actively discuss the topic and even participate in actively seeking change Gilgit-Baltistan? Having read much criticism on theories of cultural evolutionism and modernization from the anthropological perspective, local people's ease of handling the unchallenged positive connotation of development poses a real challenge. I felt I could not escape a thorough reflection on my interlocutor's perspectives on 'development' and 'change' and me associating it with the concept of modernity. I also realized that I had to resolve this topic for myself before I continued with my fieldwork on the new technol-

1 Fieldwork was generously funded by the DAAD.

ogy of mobile phones. People in Gilgit-Baltistan are thoroughly influenced by 'modern' ideas and such ideas also shape my interlocutors' views on the use of mobile phones. With the help of two case studies from the field, *Monika Girls School* in Bagrote valley and Ismaili community activists, I will examine the perception of development and discuss its association with the concept of modernity.

Talking of change and development

In order to understand the use and meaning of 'development' and 'change' in this article, one has to realize that in Gilgit-Baltistan the two words are mostly used interchangeably. All of my interlocutors used this English vocabulary, no matter whether they spoke Urdu or English with me. This points to the introduction of the two concepts of change and development from outside. Nevertheless, it is difficult to speak for the whole region as it is very diverse, containing various language, ethnic and religious groups. Most of my interlocutors were either from the Shiite rural valley of Bagrote or young community activists from predominantly Ismaili Hunza, who often passed through the region's capital of Gilgit on business matters.

Talking to my interlocutors about social change was not as easy as I supposed. Only when I insistently asked them about the difference, they acknowledged the terms as separate but still interrelated concepts. Sher Ali[2], a young community activist from Gojal, Hunza, explains *development* as bringing the community forward.

> *Sher Ali: "For me, development means when someone serves the community. Also, change is there in everything, in everything is change. But when some things happen good to the community, it's change and good development, I can say."*
>
> *I: "So, it's more like… development is a targeted change. And change just happens with everything all the time and then you have to figure out yourself whether it is good or bad."*
>
> *Sher Ali: "Yeah, if it's good then we can call it a development, […] when it increases the income of the people."*

A friend from Hunza also described *change* as perpetual process and *development* as a certain aspect of it: "[Change and development] go both together, you can't divide them: if there's development, there's change, if there's no development, there's also change!"

Thus, when local people talk about "development" they mean development, when they say "change" they can mean both, either development or mere change. In this article, both concepts address social aspects of develop-

2 For reasons of confidentiality all names are changed.

ment and change, not economic, political or infrastructural ones. But what is the root of this dual meaning? Why are the associations with both concepts so much alike? What lies really behind the idea of development? How is it connected to concepts of modernity and modernization? And why is the involvement of local people emphasized so much by Sher Ali (and others) when talking of development?

Development in Gilgit-Baltistan clearly seems to target *community*, not society as a whole. This can be interpreted as typical characteristic of a heterogeneous region like Gilgit-Baltistan where a great deal of an individual's identity derives from the lineage, local valley or language group (Sökefeld 1997). The difference between community and society was introduced by the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies as early as the 19th century (Merz-Benz 2006). In general, the term *community* is defined as the perception of a common bond, feeling as a collective whereas a *society* refers to a larger group of people who belong together because they supposedly share the same values and aims, it is rather a means to achieve something than an emotional sense of a shared identity (Salomon 2006: 8). Nowadays anthropologists recognize that neither communities nor societies are homogenous unities; different structures, orders and meanings always co-exist and the feeling of sameness is only imagined (Castro 2002: 521ff). Nevertheless, Tönnies, and after him Max Weber, already stressed a community's constructed nature and the interrelatedness of the individual and the societal level (Merz-Benz 2006: 39). In Gilgit-Baltistan, "community" is the prevalent concept used: People rarely talk of the whole society – wherever its boundaries are – but orientate themselves towards their village of origin. Therefore "community" often simply stands for the village level.

Generally speaking, many people of Gilgit-Baltistan welcome change.[3] Most campaigns for development, such as programs on infrastructure, health, education and women empowerment, during the last 25 years followed a traditional modernization approach that is based on the assumption that Western[4] modernity should – and will – spread across the world and thereby eliminate poverty. The clear contradistinction of negatively connoted terms like 'backward' or 'primitive' with 'modern' and 'developed' also shapes local people's perception of progress. A newly-married woman from

3 An exemption to the enthusiasm for progress in this sense is the region of Diamer. Since the majority of the population belongs to the Sunni sect of Islam, it takes a special stance within predominantly Shiite and Ismaili Gilgit-Baltistan. Its ties to the revivalist Deobandi Islam do not necessarily preclude developmental approaches but many people of Diamer seem to be skeptical to changes from the outside and programs presumably following Western ideals.

4 I am conscious about the controversial term "the West". To leave it open for debate and interpretation, it is only used as descriptive adjective, not an outright noun that represents an allegedly objective geopolitical unity.

Bagrote drew a sharp contrast between the rural valleys and the 'modern' city of Gilgit where, with shops, gas and electricity available, daily routine is much easier for women. The geographer Halvorson refers to women's accounts from Oshikhandas, a suburban conglomeration close to Gilgit, of their mothers' hard, arduous lives in the mountains (Halvorson 2011: 279). Such narratives reflect the perception of 'traditional' and 'advanced' as opposites, with the last one being clearly more desirable.

The generally positive connotations of development are rarely questioned in Gilgit-Baltistan. But the recent rapid adoption of mobile phones creates cracks in the narrative of beneficial change. An interlocutor from the telecommunications industry and a community activist from Gojal both mentioned that the mobile phone has many disadvantages such as distracting young people, leading to moral decay or to poor people spending too much money. The respected *lambadar* (village head) Mohmad Aziz from Bagrote drew a more differentiated picture of self-responsibility: He claimed that it is not the technology itself that is good or bad; what matters is what people make of it.

> *"Bijli achhi hai lekin bijli ko touch karke log mar jate. Side effects ho giya." (Electricity is good but when people touch it they die. There were side effects.)*
>
> *"Vo ghalti istemal kar sakta hai, sahi istemal kar sakta hai." (One can use it [new developments] wrong or right.)*

In the following argument, I will try to outline the close interrelationship of change and development for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan; I will show how they perceive change and history after twenty years of intense development aid. Due to immense influences from developmental projects, social change cannot be considered independent of development anymore. In recent history, most significant events – except sectarian tension in the city of Gilgit – are related to developmental campaigns. Thus it is not surprising that these overwhelming changes level off the difference between change and development. With the example of the *Monika Girls School* in Bagrote I will show how change has become synonymous with development.

Secondly, I want to draw the attention to the new phenomenon of *community activism*. Especially young Ismaili actively advocate what they understand as their contribution to the very progress of their society; they promote a lively scene of community activism, which is supported by international donors and the Aga Khan Development Network. I will show how local people have appropriated an allegedly (post-)colonial concept of 'targeted change' in order to take the reins of their own fate and raise their voices by means of the established development discourse. Social scientist Björn Wittrock describes the project of modernity as a two-step process: New assumptions of morals and values are introduced to and adapted by a society; while these abstract

models do not change anything momentarily, they come with "promissory notes" that entail far-reaching structural or institutional changes over time (Wittrock 2000: 36f). The ground for development needs to be prepared in advance to reap the benefits. This means for Gilgit-Baltistan that development agencies – and additionally information channels, such as the media – have spread ideas of a better, a more desirable life; the implementation of related projects is thus the second step to achieve change.

The controversial relationship of anthropology and development

From a social science perspective a critical analysis of the development concept is indispensable. At the beginning of cultural and social anthropology in the 19th century the discipline was deeply entangled with evolutionist ideas about "*savages*" representing earlier stages of culture that preceded Western civilization (Ferguson 2002: 155). When later former colonies struggled to establish themselves as sovereign nations, European and US-American politicians saw the roots of their difficulties in their 'backwardness' and wanted to lead them to Western '*modernity*' through "programmes of directed social change" (ibid.: 157). The concept of modernity, emerging from the philosophic tradition of Enlightenment, is closely related to rationalism and secularism (Arce & Long 2000: 4; Duara 2012). The opposition between supposedly traditional and modern societies and, connected to it, *modernization*, has led to a cultural program of dissemination of Western ideas and hegemony and is often perceived as homogenization (Bonacker 2007: 10). In the 1970s the Neo-Marxist critique denunciated these agendas of 'developmental aid' as capitalist expansion. Global development organizations were slowly forced to reorient themselves and to introduce a more humane, social program (Ferguson 2002: 158). To the disapproval of many scholars, social scientists also practiced applied research and worked in and for the development "*apparatus*", thus contributing to reproducing and transporting its ideas all over the world (Escobar 1991). In the age of globalization, feminism, constructivism and postcolonial studies, modernization ideology is contested and often rejected. Globally operating developmental schemes nowadays take more participatory or even grassroots approaches. Although development is the means through which visions of modernity are supposed to become reality, local people and even developmental actors usually do not have this greater framework in mind but see development simply as direct improvement. The following case study of *Monika Girls School* in Bagrote will serve as an example of a traditional modernization approach that has been embraced by the local people. Describing my findings from the field, I will stress the fusion of development and change in people's understanding.

For the present situation of Gilgit-Baltistan, an anthropological twist of Wallerstein's *world system theory* is more fitting than linear modernization

themes: peripheral areas interplay with expansions from the 'core' (cf. Thomas 2002). What needs to be acknowledged is the creative and active involvement of local people who participate in their history rather than being only passive victims to whom charity is delivered. This conception is emphasized by Hans Peter Hahn's theory of *appropriation*: He argues that globalization does not overrule everything but that global phenomena – and therefore also developmental programs – are actively adopted and adapted by the local people within their own cultural frameworks (Hahn 2008). Nevertheless, anthropologists still find themselves fighting against the prevalent idea of development as modernization and many are confronted with this idea in the field. Despite the postmodern critique of development, there are obviously still major misconceptions about the need for progress to be resolved: People all over the world look back to a rich history – for example in Gilgit-Baltistan the history of local rulers, caravan routes and migration histories (Ali 2010, Kreutzmann 1998, Stellrecht 1997). Additionally, there is no justification to direct people's destiny on the basis of one's own, presumably outsiders', believes; even if it is meant well, Westerners' views follow different ideals than local people's values or needs. Therefore development approaches might not benefit locals in the desired way, confront them with introduced issues and even force them into a certain direction.

To be sure, change itself is not negated or ignored by cultural anthropology; change is always an integral part of culture and forms the basis of current research questions. But what academics struggle with is the postcolonial, imperial way of prompting people to 'develop'. Maybe as a reaction to the widespread propaganda of Western ideas and because scholars are convinced of the activism of local people themselves, social and cultural anthropologists have continued to stress that not everything is new; changes are rather interpreted within the frame of established values. In her keynote address at the *Mobile Telephony in the Developing World Conference* in Finland in 2013 Julie Archambault argued against technodeterminist and confident developmentalists' ideas of total change and emphasized continuity, arguing that the mobile phone solely serves as catalyst that affects prevailing issues in a society (Archambault 2013). This was also my impression of many changes in Gilgit, Hunza and the Bagrote valley: They took place within an established social framework, which is always contested and stretched, yet not explicitly challenged by a new idea or technology. Rather the people themselves adapt these changes to their lives. Additionally, history is always greatly shaped by complex interdependencies among various phenomena and counter-tendencies that contrast mainstream society as described by Norbert Elias (Elias 2012). The perception of change cannot be looked at without considering the wider framework of the local society, global involvements and the relatedness of development and modernization; there are always many factors and aspects that interplay with each other in forming a complex web of interre-

latedness. No society or community is ever homogeneous; there are always different interests and people who challenge dominant conditions or values. Looking at a community from the margins can be very rewarding in order to understand its very structures (Duara 2012, Arce & Long 2000: 9). The second of the following two case studies will serve as an example of appropriated development by local community activists from Hunza. They fit the model of targeted change into the locally established value set and conception of community, thus (re-)interpreting the complex, ideological 'cargo' of modernization and actively contributing to the construction of their communities' current history. But just as Archambault, I have to admit that change is there when people conceive it – only anthropologists' outside perspective sees it in the wider framework of continuity (Archambault 2013).

Bringing about change – Girls' education in the Bagrote valley

The individual perception of history and change is both a personal and a collective cultural process. As the German anthropologist Monika Schneid[5] showed in her article on the perception of history in Bagrote, history is not necessarily remembered in chronological order but people emphasize the most important events (Schneid 1997:83f, 105ff). I, too, experienced this phenomenon during my three weeks' visit in Bagrote where all recent changes are traced back to Schneid's own social commitment to establish a local girls' high school. There, almost any recent event is interpreted against this background.

At the time of Schneid's research in the early 1990s only a few boys went to school in Bagrote. Education was not accessible for girls. Shortly before Schneid left, she agreed to fund a neighborhood initiative of the local *lambadar* and paid a teacher for young girls. When the number of students increased, rapidly a more formal setting was needed and Schneid's school was established as *Monika Girls School*. Ever since, she has been involved in the decisions of the institution and contributed to teachers' salaries and scholarships for students through funds raised in Germany (Schneid 2009). Although this example resembles a traditional 'maternalistic' development approach, Schneid has always struggled to include locals in the organization.

This story of Schneid's great personal commitment is recounted again and again by the people of Bagrote; Monika Schneid is seen as the great 'knight in shining armor' and her close friend Mohmad Aziz, the *lambadar*, even said with a smile that there ought to be a statue of her at the entrance of the valley. All stories of development in Bagrote circle around Schneid; by promoting women's education she has apparently connected Bagrote to modernity. As a local man puts it: "The people in Bagrote valley were poor and weak. Then Monika came and fed us. Today we are strong and rich" (Schneid

5 She conducted eighteen months of research in the Bagrote valley in 1990 and 1991.

2012). Nobody mentions the KKH, the road to the valley, the introduction of electricity, the mobile signal, programs from the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN),[6] or anything else as parameters of change. Only when I explicitly asked about them, people also considered other factors but in their consciousness it all dates back to Schneid's efforts: After her school was established, things started to change for the better.

Experiencing this "development" in an otherwise relatively isolated valley has shaped people's minds. Especially women perceive immense changes through the introduction of a schooling system for them. Thus, it is not surprising that recent history is perceived exclusively as developmental change. When anyone talks about change in Bagrot, it is ultimately about Monika Girls School. Development and change go hand in hand.

Interestingly, hardly anyone questions girls' education and schools anymore. In the beginning many parents expressed concerns about male teachers, the empowerment of women, or did not see the need to invest in girls' education. But this hesitancy changed within a few years as girls were enthusiastic about this chance and parents were involved in decisions concerning Monika Girls School.[7] Schneid reports from Bagrote that today's girls are confident, they improve their family's hygienic standards, nutrition and child care, get married later, have less children and may even contribute to the household's income as teachers (Schneid 2009: 3). Although these changes are measured against Western standards and coming from Western values, I understand that they are great developments for the local people and that everyone wants to be healthy and to improve one's status. The disturbing aspect for anthropologists is that "Western patterns of modernity are not the only 'authentic' modernities, though they enjoy historical precedence and continue to be the basic reference point for others" (Eisenstadt 2000: 3). Overall, the traditional set-up of the community has not been overthrown by increased education and even developmental programs. Therefore, literate and confident girls are nothing to be worried about or to be ashamed of, people are rather proud of their improved social life with women intellectu-

6 AKDN's works in Gilgit-Baltistan started in 1982 (Clemens 2000:3), just four years after the KKH was opened (Kreutzmann 2004:201). The connection between development projects and infrastructure cannot be denied as they often follow established and accessible routes (Kreutzmann 2004:204). The same is the case for the still unpaved road to Bagrote valley: before 1972 it took two days by foot to reach Gilgit, now it is not even two hours by jeep or motorcycle which has greatly improved the connection to the center for more economic activities and educational facilities and has attracted researchers and developmental programs to the valley.

7 When boys' education was introduced in the Bagrote valley in the first half of the 20th century, it was only accepted reluctantly, partly because people did not feel the need for it and partly because they repelled the control by outsiders, in this case teachers sent by the English colonial or later Pakistani authorities from Gilgit (Schneid 1997: 98ff).

ally equal. As the *lambadar* Mohmad Aziz complains with a smirk, the most negative effects are mild irritations:

> *"Vo [bacche] apne kam karte the, koi dispute nahi tha. Ajkal kamra chahie, furniture chahie. Mai apko kehta tha, chai nahi pio, chai nahi piti thi. Abhi [bacche kehte hain] ‚mai chai nahi pion, kyo?' " (The children did their work, there was no dispute. Now they want a room, they want furniture. I did tell you not to drink tea and you didn't drink. Now [they say]: 'I should not drink tea? Why?')*

Since the schools could successfully be fit into the established social framework and are greatly valued as means to support a family's future income, many local people have established further initiatives to improve the level of education, introduce college classes or private English medium schools. In Bagrote the people are very thankful to Schneid's efforts and continue to be closely related to her but they also have their own demands and requirements. They have adopted the idea of girls' schools over the last 23 years and now appropriate the school system to cater further to their own needs through a private school initiative. As in other places of Gilgit-Baltistan, all families who can afford it send their children to private English medium schools. Many of these schools are not necessarily sponsored by NGOs but are run by neighborhood initiatives, such as *Bagrote Association for Social Enhancement (BASE) School* in Bagrote where the curriculum is taught in English and even co-education is not an issue in an otherwise gender-segregated society (Dunsby & Dunsby 2013: 12).

Actively changing Gilgit-Baltistan from within

Nowadays, development is a much desired virtue in most parts of Gilgit-Baltistan and many people take actively part in changing their society from within. The works of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN)[8], especially the *Aga Khan Rural Support Program* (AKRSP), are omnipresent throughout the districts of Hunza-Nagar and Gilgit, to a lesser extent in the rest of the region and excluding the Diamer area: one meets members of the *Local Support Organizations* (LSO), which have been established within the framework of AKRPS, finds the organization's logo on the iodized salt packages or listens to stories about the introduction of clean water supplies through the *Water and Sanitation Extension Programme* (WASEP). In order

8 AKDN is part of the *Aga Khan Foundation* run by the Aga Khan, the religious leader of the Islamic Ismaili sect. It is a global non-governmental organization to support the religious community in various countries worldwide and since 1982 manages its developmental campaigns on health, education, agriculture and civil society in Gilgit-Baltistan from its headquarters in Gilgit and many regional offices.

not to overemphasize the role of AKDN one has to add that also the media play a big role in propagating knowledge about supposedly modern virtues; and religious persons, sheikhs or imams, teach at local mosques about matters of health and hygiene (Halvorson 2011: 285). In the districts of Gilgit and Hunza, however, the most important focus is on education; leading to high literacy rates among the youth.

In many regions of the world, people eye change rather suspiciously. But why are people so enthusiastic about 'development' in most parts of Gilgit-Baltistan? I met quite a few young community activists[9] who could barely make a living from their short-term projects within the development sector. In most parts of the world young people look for a well-paid career after university. However, the more I talked to young men and women from the mountain area, the more I understood that here the social norm is clearly to serve one's community through one's job instead of simply pursuing personal interests.

Foucault's conceptualization of modernity as an attitude can help to understand the relatively new phenomenon of community activism:

> *"[...] I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than as a period of history. And by 'attitude,' I mean a mode of relating to contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, rather than seeking to distinguish the 'modern era' from the 'premodern' or 'postmodern,' I think it would be more useful to try to find out how the attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with attitudes of 'countermodernity.'"* (Foucault 1984: 39)

By depicting modernity as an attitude, Foucault draws the attention to the actors who struggle to become and feel modern rather than referring to a certain developmental stage of a society. He also suggests looking at movements that are directed against modernity, in our case, against agendas of development. Nevertheless, those counter-tendencies are based on the idealistic baggage of developmental agencies, especially AKDN, which have worked in the region and set the ground for a wider conceptual change of people's minds as described earlier by Wittrocks's "promissory notes". In Gilgit-Baltistan this struggle against a perceived foreign hegemony is taken up by community activists from Gilgit and Hunza: They distance themselves from the traditional development approaches in the region and creatively design an own future

9 Community activists create and engage in projects that intend to raise awareness and lead their community into a better social, economic or political future.

for their communities. I identified four major factors that motivate activists to take up a strong commitment for social change:

- In Gilgit-Baltistan, the authorities hardly take care of social concerns. Besides maintaining schools, which are often considered as substandard, the Pakistani state is hardly present in the social sector; this fact is often considered to lead to increased frustration among the educated youth.
- People want to fight off established prejudices about the backward mountain areas.
- The long-standing activities of AKDN gave a positive example of development work and taught the people to organize at the community level in order to "make a difference".
- The most important motivation is the makeup of the society, the network of family ties, which creates a basic feeling of interdependence and responsibility.

In Germany, social problems are expected to be solved by the state; since people pay a lot of taxes, they expect this in return. However, this reduces individuals' engagements for social concerns. Quite the opposite seems to be true for Pakistan, especially the long neglected "disputed territory" of Gilgit-Baltistan. Due to this area's entanglement with the Kashmir question, the people still lack full citizen rights and a representation in the Pakistani parliament (Ali 2013). The inhabitants have always stressed the need to struggle for their rights and catch up with the richer 'down country' of Pakistan, where the average income is still twice as high as in Gilgit-Baltistan (Sökefeld 1999, Aga Khan Foundation 2007: 3,40). During recent years, political activism was supplemented by local projects of "community development", agendas set up by local activists to "develop" their own communities; both scenes fight for a better representation of Gilgit-Baltistan. Especially the young generation of college and university educated males engages in social programs: They facilitate workshops to promote civil society, teach courses in community journalism, record short videos, comment on recent news from Gilgit-Baltistan and work in projects of AKDN. So far, there are only few girls present, yet their number seems to increase as a glance on the editorial board of *pamirtimes.net*, for example, suggests.

On the newly introduced internet platform *Mountain TV*, a group of community activists professionally collects general background information, recent news and media, such as short videos about the region or its expats. The activists also organize meetings and workshops to involve more and more young people and spread their ideas of community activism, as the following quotation from a project report of the *Mountain Youth Resource & Social Welfare Association* (MYRO) shows:

> *"Under the project [Digital Social Governance: Engaging Youth through Technology, implemented by MYRO], 22 young men*

> *and women from five villages in upper Hunza (Shishkat, Gulmit, Ghulkin, Hussaini and Passu) were acquainted with international human rights practices and trained in using their camera equipped cell phones to capture and document events and success stories in their surroundings."* (MYRO 2013: 1)

The strong and active participation also serves as emotional outlet for frustrations over the Pakistani state or the territory's administration, which do not fulfill their responsibilities. This was pointed out to me repeatedly and is also confirmed by Salman Hussain, a young social activist from Hunza who lives in the Punjab:

> *"Changing a society for betterment is not an easy task and I think activists are like a catalyst who play their role in a very polite and decent way. I am personally motivated and think this is my social responsibility to play my role in generating awareness and to fight for the poor and neglected people. From a long period of time GB is neglected and deprived of constitutional rights; that's why some youth groups show anger and want to play a role in this regard. Human rights violation in GB is very rarely reported in the mainstream media of Pakistan and every day we watch talk shows about the issues of Pakistan and different provinces and very, very rarely there is something discussed about GB. This attitude develops anger in youth and they start activism."*

Many young, well-educated men from Gilgit-Baltistan are angry about prejudices from 'down-country' Pakistan and about self-descriptions of local people that often define the mountain region in evolutionistic and modernist terms. Activists feel a need to 'enlighten' society in order to counter those who label the mountain people as being *jangli* (wild) and *jahil* (ignorant, illiterate) people. Due to the omnipresence of discourses about the area's backwardness, people want to fight the long-standing prejudices by reinterpreting the established discourse themselves, either by "modernizing" their communities or by converting the ascription of primitiveness into nostalgic images of tribal and traditional heritage that is something to be proud of. Both approaches (unconsciously?) rest upon a certain assumption of modernity that must have been growing over time (cf. Wittrock's "promissory notes").
Additionally, many locals have the feeling that their mountain areas are often falsely associated with the Taliban; an image that is strictly rejected all over Gilgit-Baltistan. Sometimes I had the impression that people explicitly pointed out their 'modern' achievements to me in order to stress that there is more than the poor, violent, and Islamist Pakistan as depicted in the global mainstream media. For the purpose of setting the picture straight, commu-

nity activists explicitly make use of the mushrooming social media, the internet and mobile phones to symbolize their 'modernity': Although they live in a remote area, they are up-to-date and linked with the rest of the world.

Many of the community activists I spoke with originally come from Hunza, Gojal and Ghizer and belong to the Ismaili community, which is guided by their spiritual leader, the Aga Khan. The Aga Khan has been propagating education, gender equality and bottom-up approaches for nearly sixty years and continuously encourages his followers to take their life into their own hands:

> *"Philanthropy is very close to the notion of charity, giving away. And in Islam it's very clear: charity is desirable, necessary, but the best form of charity is to enable an individual to manage his own destiny, to improve his condition of life, or her condition of life, so they become autonomous, they make their own decisions."* [10]

These guidelines have been implemented by the community-based development programs of AKDN. They use and welcome bottom-up approaches. This goes hand in hand with a shift in the general approach to development: not to force something on the local people but rather to involve them in projects.[11] AKDN started its schools, Local Support Organizations (LSO) and women's organizations (WO) or infrastructure, agriculture and sanitation programs in the predominantly Ismaili regions but have extended their projects to bordering regions and therefore greatly influenced Shia and Sunni communities as well (Malik & Hunzai 2007). The guidelines of AKRSP's development involve the village community as a whole:

> *"The concept of social development is one of the pillars of the overall and inclusive development strategy of AKRSP in the area, especially in the context of rural life. Principally, it refers to positive changes in the behavior, norms, traditions, practices, interactions, systems, institutions, and capacities of communities towards the ownership, and management of their collective village development."* (Aga Khan Foundation 2007: 5)

Dating back to the Aga Khan and international development agencies, the idea of targeted change was experienced as betterment of daily life. The bot-

10 Interview with the Aga Khan on October 5th 2013
Available on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XFNYCoiRar0

11 The US Village Aid Program already practiced a similar approach as early as 1956 (until 1962) in Gilgit and mainly financed infrastructure projects, such as bridges, with a strong emphasis on village participation (Kreutzmann 2004: 201). Since the introduction of the former Northern Areas in 1974, a cooperation between the Rural Development Department of the government in Gilgit and local District Councils was established to supports projects on village basis.

tom-up, community-based approach fits well into people's lives, was adapted and appropriated by local communities. Because of the strong emphasis on self-help, local people have learnt to act within the development machine and developed their own creativity and agency. Sher Ali describes his personal process of learning from AKRSP; he now organizes his own projects:

> *„AKRSP introduced these things. And before everything was regulated by AKRSP. When AKRSP saw that these organizations had become self-sufficient, AKRSP gave all power to these village organizations, they can run them themselves. Now you will see that everything is governed and run by these people themselves. [...]I was working with these LSOs and got to know how everything works. I learned so many things, I had so many relations with different people, different organizations, my network has become very wide. But I still felt some restriction, for example, I had to ask the others on the board when I'm going to do this, whether it's good. In so many things I was bound. So due to this we thought we can make our own [organization], then you have freedom and then you're not limited to your villages."*

Moreover, there are not enough jobs for qualified persons in Gilgit-Baltistan, so the youth create their own jobs in the development sector. Funding is usually obtained from the various institutions of the AKDN or foreign donor agencies. Such funds are sufficient to pay the organizers a small salary. Since the salary for one project is not enough to support one's life, they engage in various activities at a time. Also many teachers consider themselves as community servants; this is especially the case for those working in private schools without the popular security of a government job.

The model of "community development" has been so successful in the area because it perfectly fits into the local people's concept of society. Extended family ties are the basis of everyday life and social relations. The social network within villages is very dense. Therefore the community is actually tangible and can be experienced through everyday encounters with relatives and neighbors at the local level of the village. No matter whether Sunni, Shia or Ismaili, or the different language groups, this perception of communitarian togetherness and devotedness seems to be a consistent characteristic in all of Gilgit-Baltistan. A group interview with young men from various parts of Hunza depicts the strong bonds within a community, even if people do not live in the village anymore as some of the respondents are settled in the urban centers of Pakistan:

> *"From tradition, there's no private life! Due to the limited area, every day you have a connection to each other."*

> *"We want to make all equal. Due to very limited area and to family structure, it's necessary that all are happy. We feel like we can be happy when our neighbors are happy."*
>
> *"We make branches, interact. Finally thousands interact and don't fight about resources."*

Thus, individuals feel as integral parts of their community. Because they are so thankful for the education they received, they want to return something to the community once they have grown up. As one of the community activists explained: "I only got education because of this school but the school was made by the other community people. So now you want to do something from which other people can benefit." This attitude of reciprocity can also be transferred to other aspects of life, such as giving something back to the community because it provided a safe childhood or a feeling of belonging.

Substituting the absent Pakistani state, fighting against established prejudices of backwardness, having gone through the practical school of AKDN and feeling responsible for the community they belong to, can be summarized as the main motivations for the active scene of community activist in Gilgit and Hunza. They portray the project of creating their own version of modernity and development. Change is not supposed to be further directed by global players but it is taken over by local actors. In this process of appropriation, underlying ideals and motifs of the originally Western modernization project are sorted out and adapted, first on the community level, but then brought up to the whole society through means of contemporary social media.

Conclusion

The concept of development had long ago been discarded by my 'anthropological self' and came back to me like a bouncing ball almost every day in Gilgit-Baltistan, in many conversations, in academic circles of the Karakoram International University or sitting around the fireplace in the Bagrote valley. The many changes from outside within the last twenty-five years, such as the building of the KKH by China and Pakistan, developmental programs by the Swiss-based Aga Khan Development Network or, on a local level, Monika Girls School have left a lasting impression on people's minds. The perception of history and change is shaped by those experiences of development and therefore overshadow other modes of remembering: Late history equals development. Therefore development is widely used synonymously with change; only at closer glance it is depicted as certain mode of change.

From my European academic background, I have interpreted development schemes as continuation of the 18th century Enlightenment project, which has been widely questioned by anthropology's postmodernism. But

maybe my protagonists talked of a different kind of modernity, one that is not quite as biased. Local actors in Gilgit, Hunza and Bagrote constantly have to interpret various foreign ideas and goods along locally established sets of values. They either discard, adopt or appropriate, that is, adapt and even change them. Just like "promissory notes" they unfold their impact gradually. Due to local people's good experiences with development, people embrace it and have started to actively contribute to it. For them development no longer follows a Western model but has been fit into the web of community relations. Or as the headline's double meaning points out, they have good experiences because they themselves are the stakeholders.

Following Foucault's suggestion to see modernity as an attitude rather than as an epoch, there clearly exists a modernity of Gilgit-Baltistan that is perceived by the local people as such and may even enrich the Western or scholarly perspective on modernity. As postcolonial studies show for the time of colonialism, the experiences of colonizers and colonized are not binary nor separated, but mutual interrelations and interdependencies are experienced together and must therefore be thought together, not as separate experiences of the colonizers or the colonized (Randeria 1999: 378). The same line of thought can be applied to the analysis of modernity: Although the concept originated in a Euro-American setting, its definition has to be understood in the wider framework of global interdependencies; it is not a one-dimensional historic product but can be augmented by the dialogue with the rest of the world. Modernity has long ago reached all regions of the world (Randeria 1999: 374), no matter through which channels, often in the shape of development aid; and these local experiments add more meaning to or even change the connotation of the original Western concept of modernity. I find that Eisenstadt's concept of "multiple modernities", which refers to varieties of modernity that nevertheless exhibit some specific 'modern' traits breaking with traditions (Wittrock 2000: 32ff), stays short of grasping the complex interaction between the local and the global level, which leads to appropriation on both sides: Local adaptations as well feed back to international thoughts and ideas about development and modernity; it is a never-ending constructing process, for example, AKRSP's participatory community approach has served as model for many other development projects worldwide. Gilgit-Baltistan's modernity is therefore not simply a reflection of the Western model but an integral part of the global project of defining our present time. This article has shed light on the appropriation of the development concept on the local level and transformations such as grassroots movements, which again influence general debates about modernization. It is still left for further research to critically analyze the local level's stimuli on the global scholarly perception of modernity.

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Öffentlichkeit und Teilhabe: *Citizen Journalism* in Gilgit-Baltistan

Claudia Stadler

Einleitung

Neue Medien, alter Journalismus? Neue Perspektiven in der Berichterstattung und den Dynamiken der öffentlichen Kommunikation kennzeichnen seit geraumer Zeit den Diskurs über die Wechselwirkung von Technik und Pressewesen. Längst wurde im Zuge der Digitalisierung von Nachrichten die Bedeutung neuer Konzepte erkannt. Das Internet gibt dem alten Paradigma des Journalismus eine neue Dimension: Nachrichtenströme gelten heute nicht mehr als linear (Heinrich 2011: 4). Die Fixierung auf die Autoren- und Rezipientenrolle wird aufgehoben, indem Empfängerinnen und Empfänger Informationen rückwirkend beeinflussen. Sie werden zu Autorinnen und Autoren. Diese Veränderung journalistischer Praxis hat viele Formen. Ich möchte in diesem Artikel näher auf Eigenschaften und Ausprägungen bürgerschaftlicher Teilhabe an der Mediengestaltung in Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan eingehen. Während meines Feldforschungsaufenthaltes ging ich der Frage nach, wie sich partizipativer Journalismus in Gilgit-Baltistan formt und in welchen gesellschaftlichen Kontexten er eingebettet ist. Mein Interesse an der Gestaltung lokaler Medien durch die Bevölkerung liegt im Bereich der neuen Medien. Ich verfolgte dies in der Stadt Gilgit und vereinzelt in Hunza und Gojal (Upper Hunza). Das liegt darin begründet, als dass in dieser Region ein Journalismus-Projekt beheimatet ist, welches auf Teilhabe der Bevölkerung aufbaut. Es wurde im Jahr 2006 als erster lokaler News-Blog unter der Webdomain *www.gojal.net* von Bewohnern Gulmits, Gojal online gestellt. Der Blog veränderte und verdichtete sich über die Jahre und stellt heute unter dem Namen *Pamir Times*[1] eine regelmäßig aktualisierte Webseite dar, die lokale Nachrichten, Kommentare und Essays publiziert. Ein Großteil der Beitragenden lebt in Gilgit und dem (Oberen) Hunzatal. Da *Pamir Times* für Gilgit-Baltistan ein vergleichsweise viel genutztes Format öffentlichen Austausches ist, konzentrierte ich mich zunächst auf die Akteure dieses Netzwerkes. Wer sind Mitglieder und was sind ihre Interessen? Welches Selbstverständnis machen sie deutlich? Meiner Fragestellung ging ich in erster Linie mit Leitfadeninterviews nach. Informelle Gespräche sowie Beobachtungen spielten ebenfalls eine wichtige Rolle. Durch eine Vollförderung des DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) konnte ich in der Zeit zwischen August und Oktober 2013 für etwa sechs Wochen in dem Teil Gil-

1 http://pamirtimes.net/

git-Baltistans forschen.[2] Dies sollte mir ermöglichen, eine Vorstellung von der Nutzung und Bedeutung des partizipatorischen Journalismusprojekts zu bekommen. Um den theoretischen Hintergrund zu skizzieren, halte ich es für sinnvoll, zunächst einen Bogen über verschiedene Formate von Teilhabe in der Mediengestaltung zu schlagen, die sich im Zuge neuer Publikationsmöglichkeiten in den letzten Jahrzehnten stark verbreiteten.

Es ist der noch jungen Entstehungsgeschichte der Berichterstattung im Internet geschuldet, dass eine Begriffsflut, aber (noch) keine klare Abgrenzung verschiedener Konzepte existiert. Die Kommunikationswissenschaftlerin Ansgard Heinrich spricht von einem „conceptual lack of terminology" (Heinrich 2011: 124). Zahlreiche, einander ähnelnde Bezeichnungen (wie beispielsweise *Community*-Journalismus, Graswurzel-Journalismus, *Citizen*-Journalismus etc.) verstehen es jeweils, „Laien" in die Produktion von Nachrichten einzubinden. Dennoch unterscheiden sie sich voneinander in der Art dieser Einbindung. *Community*-Journalismus ist ein Synonym für *public journalism*. Dabei handelt es sich um eine Journalismus-Bewegung der 1990er Jahre, welche sich in der Verantwortung sieht, Anliegen und Interessen der Bevölkerung aufzugreifen und in die Berichterstattung einzubinden (vgl. Eksterowicz 2000; Haas 2007: 6f). Dabei fungieren professionelle Journalistinnen und Journalisten als Sprachrohr für Meinungen von Rezipientinnen und Rezipienten, wodurch diese indirekt Einfluss auf politische Prozesse haben sollen (ibid.). Andere Formen von partizipatorischem Journalismus charakterisieren die Rolle der Bevölkerung weniger als beobachtend, sondern als aktiv mitgestaltend. Als *user-generated content providers* beispielsweise fasst man Personen auf, die zufällig Augenzeuge eines Geschehens werden, welches für eine Nachrichtenagentur berichtenswert erscheint (Heinrich 2011: 125f). Zwar leisten Laien durch das Zutragen von Informationen damit einen Beitrag zur Berichterstattung. Sie richten ihren Blick aber nicht zielgerichtet auf Ereignisse in ihrem Umfeld, bleiben im Wesentlichen also *User*, d.h. Nutzer.

> *"Media activists as well as citizen journalists differ from user-generated content producers in so far as they generally do not just happen to be on the spot when, for example, a bomb explodes. The ambitions of citizen journalists or media activists reach far beyond snapping a picture with a mobile phone coincidentally."* (Heinrich 2011: 138)

In oben beschriebenem Format sind zwar Menschen, die beruflich nicht im Journalismus arbeiten, am Sammeln von Informationen beteiligt, bleiben aber in der passiven Rolle der Empfängerin oder des Empfängers, da sie diese Nachrichten nicht selbst in die Öffentlichkeit tragen. Dagegen findet im

2 Für diese großzügige Unterstützung möchte ich mich an dieser Stelle herzlich bedanken.

citizen journalism und Medienaktivismus eine Aufweichung der Kategorien Autor und Rezipient statt. Ein wichtiger Unterschied ist, dass diese Formen dem Berufs-Journalismus neben- und nicht untergeordnet werden (vgl. Heinrich 2011: 138f; Kelly 2009: 1f). Dennoch handelt es sich auch hierbei nicht um ein vollständig ausformuliertes theoretisches Journalismus-Konzept. Synonym verwendet werden in der englischsprachigen Literatur unter anderem die Bezeichnungen *grassroots journalism*, *open source journalism*, *participatory journalism*, *hyperlocal journalism*, *distributed journalism* und *network journalism* (vgl. Allan 2009: 18; Bentley et al. 2007: 241). Zum besseren Verständnis werde ich mich aber auf die Verwendung der Bezeichnung *Citizen*-Journalismus beschränken. Menschen ohne journalistische Schulung arbeiten der kontinuierlichen, lokalen Berichterstattung zu und nehmen Feedback als Inhalte auf. Die Arbeitsweise und Motivation der sogenannten Graswurzeljournalisten mögen jedoch anders als bei Berufsjournalisten sein. Wichtig ist, dass die Tätigkeit von *Citizen*-Journalisten nicht erst durch die Etablierung digitaler Nachrichtenverarbeitung entstand, sondern dadurch lediglich mehr Verbreitung und Gehör erreichte. Heinrich schreibt hierzu: „The advancement in technology tools, though, has enabled a greater number of citizens to participate and produce acts of journalism" (Heinrich 2011: 139; vgl. auch Harcup 2013: 63). Im Kern besteht das Phänomen aus einer Gruppe von Menschen, die ihr gegenseitiges Interesse und ihre jeweiligen Probleme und Anliegen an einem Ort sammeln und mit anderen teilen. Wichtig dabei ist ihnen die Interaktion, die sich neben der Berichterstattung abspielt. Ihre Mission beschreiben Ryfe und Mensing als

> *"(...) disseminating information in the form of facts, descriptions and analyses. (....) Unlike their professional brethren, citizen journalists insist that the value of news lies in the opportunity it affords to interact and engage with other citizens."* (Ryfe und Mensing 2010: 33)

Auf ihren Webseiten ermuntern Graswurzeljournalistinnen und -journalisten andere Nutzerinnen und Nutzer zu posten, zu kommentieren und zu diskutieren (ibid., 37). Carpenter diskutiert in einem 2010 erschienenen Beitrag die Qualität solcher Auftritte mit der von Online-Zeitungen. Dabei definiert sie „an online citizen journalist (...) as ‚an individual who intends to publish information meant to benefit a community'" (Carpenter 2010: 69). Man könnte als Gegenargument aufführen, dass Gesellschaft und Medien ohnehin stets wechselseitig aufeinander einwirken und sich gegenseitig bedingen und formen. Meiner Auffassung nach sind direkte Teilhabe und indirektes Einwirken auf die Entwicklung der Medien aber als unterschiedliche Qualitäten von Einflussnahme zu werten. Unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Demokratisierung der Medien diskutieren Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler diese Form von Partizipation zwar seit einiger Zeit (vgl. z.B. Allan 2009:

30; Merrit 2010: 21ff; Forster 2006: 108ff), Einigkeit darüber herrscht aber nicht. Festgehalten werden kann, dass manche Autorinnen und Autoren bürgerschaftlicher Berichterstattung eine Art Überwachungsfunktion des traditionellen Journalismus zuschreiben (vgl. Forster 2007). Des Weiteren können durch Citizen-Journalismus Interessen der Bevölkerung gegenüber den „großen" Medienagenturen artikuliert werden. Wie sich bürgerschaftlicher Journalismus in Gilgit-Baltistan gestaltet und ob er sich dem Konzept des Citizen-Journalismus zuordnen lässt, möchte ich im Folgenden skizzieren.

„The Citizen is the Message"[3] – Online News-Blogs in Gilgit-Baltistan

Die Medienlandschaft Gilgit-Baltistans wurde bisher hauptsächlich von der Printpresse geprägt. Lokale Berichterstattung beschränkte sich bis vor wenigen Jahren auf regionale Zeitungen, die primär in der Stadt Gilgit produziert und vertrieben wurden und von dort ihren Weg auch in weiter entfernt liegende Regionen und Dörfer fanden. Dieser Prozess dauert aufgrund geographischer Gegebenheiten unter Umständen mehrere Tage, sodass Menschen aus höhergelegenen Gebieten nur verzögerten Zugang zur lokalen Presse haben. Ein Bewohner aus Gulmit in Gojal schilderte mir: „Here we have no access or only very bad access to print newspapers. During roadblocks and the lake[4] we didn't get any newspaper at all. I used to sell them here, but they reached here with one day delay." Inhaltlich liegt der Fokus der etwa zehn verschiedenen Zeitungen auf Gilgit selbst, d.h. sie werden für die Stadt Gilgit herausgegeben. Viele von diesen gelten bei der Bevölkerung als unkritisch. „Agencies are reading the newspapers as well. They hide many things and facts; there has been many fake news. You cannot trust these news", erklärte mir ein Lehrer und Hobbyjournalist bei einem Interview in Gilgit. Da Zeitungen vor allem über Verwaltungsinserate finanziert werden, gebe es keinen Raum für gegenläufige Berichte und Bewertungen, führte mein Gesprächspartner in Gilgit weiter aus. Ein Journalist, der seit mehreren Jahren Vollzeit für verschiedene Printmedien in Gilgit arbeitet, beschrieb mir: „Religious and political topics are sensitive issues here. And we have to be careful about security issues. We get authenticated by the authorities and therefore have to report short and precise to the point." Die Einschätzung, dass die lokale Printpresse kritisch gelesen werden muss, begegnete mir auch des Öfteren

3 Papacharissi (2009: 29)

4 Ein massiver Erdrutsch bei Attabad dämmte im Januar 2010 den Hunzafluss, infolgedessen der zunächst 28 km lange Attabad Lake entstand. Die einzige Verbindungsstraße der Region, der Karakorum Highway, wurde abgeschnitten. Dieses Desaster überflutete zahlreiche Häuser umliegender Dörfer und hinterließ deren Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner als *Displaced Persons* in einer höchst prekären Situation. Von der Abgeschiedenheit (vom Handel und z.T. medizinischer Versorgung) sind bis heute viele Menschen in ganz Gojal betroffen.

bei informellen Gesprächen in Gojal. Interessanterweise äußerten meine Gesprächspartner solche Einschätzungen jeweils von sich aus, d.h. ohne dass ich gezielt danach gefragt hatte. Ein freier Journalist und Mitarbeiter des AKRSP[5]-Büros in Gilgit betonte, dass *Pamir Times* das einzige Medium sei, das lokale Autoren und Themen sowie die Jugend berücksichtige. Der Blog versteht sich als Ergänzung zu den lokal produzierten Nachrichten, was auf eine gewisse Unzufriedenheit zurückzuführen ist. Diese Unzufriedenheit beruht auch auf der Einschätzung, dass die Bevölkerung Gilgit-Baltistans darüber hinaus keine Präsenz in nationalen Zeitungen hat. Zum Beispiel empörte sich in einem Gespräch ein Bewohner aus Gulmit: „Pakistani newspapers don't care about us". Ein anderer Dorfbewohner, ein Reporter aus Gulmit, der vor 25 Jahren begann, für verschiedene nationale und regionale Medien zu arbeiten, beschrieb mir bei einer informellen Unterhaltung: „The population here in Gilgit-Baltistan is isolated from reporting, both from China and Pakistan. We are isolated in between and therefore have to do our own thing. Now we take it into our hands (…)." Dass pakistanische Zeitungen sich nicht für Gilgit-Baltistan interessieren, erwähnte man mir gegenüber häufig. Dies ist in Zusammenhang mit dem politischen Sonderstatus der Region als *disputed area*, d.h. als Teil des ehemaligen Fürstenstaates Kaschmirs, zu verstehen. Gilgit-Baltistan zählt daher nicht als Provinz Pakistans und ist seit der Teilung Indiens und Pakistans im Jahr 1947 umstritten. Das äußerst gespannte Verhältnis zwischen dem Staat Pakistan und dem Sonderareal Gilgit-Baltistan spiegelt sich heute in der nationalen Medienlandschaft wider.

Pamir Times stellt für Menschen mit Internetzugang gewissermaßen eine Ausweitung örtlicher Informationen dar, die darüber hinaus von der Bevölkerung selbst gewählt und gelenkt werden. Als eine Motivation für die Arbeit am bürgerschaftlichem Journalismus kann man also das Schließen einer Lücke im öffentlichen Raum Gilgit-Baltistans sowie in der Berichterstattung der pakistanischen Mainstream-Medien festhalten. In den letzten Jahren entstanden weitere, ähnliche Projekte. Beispielsweise ist *Mountain TV*[6] eine kürzlich gestartete, gut konzipierte Webseite, die vier junge Männer aus Gulmit gründeten und organisieren. Sie bieten Trainings für Jugendliche an, aktuelles Geschehen sowie ihre Interessen in ein öffentliches Format zu bringen. Beispielsweise fand im Mai 2013 ein fünftägiger Workshop unter dem Titel „Digital Social Governance: Engaging Youth through Technology" statt, bei dem 22 junge Männer und Frauen aus Gulmit und umliegenden Dörfern die Möglichkeit hatten, lokale Themen mithilfe von Digitalkameras

5 Das *Aga Khan Rural Support Programme* (AKRSP) wurde in den 1980er Jahren von der *Aga Khan Foundation* initiiert. Sie ist die größte ismailitische Entwicklungshilfeorganisation des *Aga Khan Development Network*s (AKDN) (http://www.akdn.org/AKF). Darunter wurden viele Programmen zur Unterstützung von Bereichen wie ländliche Entwicklung, Umwelt, Gesundheit etc. initiiert.

6 http://mountaintv.net/

oder den Kameras von Mobiltelefonen zu veranschaulichen und für (soziale) Medien aufzubereiten. Dabei arbeiteten zwei der Gründer *Mountain TV*s mit. Im Projektbericht steht als eine der Zielsetzungen: „To train the youth and create awareness among them in how they can introduce change in the society via citizen journalism and social media" (Mountain Youth Resource & Social Welfare Organization 2013: 6). Auf der Homepage von *Mountain TV* werden Beiträge von Graswurzeljournalisten veröffentlicht und diskutiert. Neben Texten spielen Videoaufnahmen und Bilder eine große Rolle. Die dahinter liegende Idee der Online-Blogs ist es, jeweils aktuelle Geschehnisse, Meinungen, Perspektiven sowie das kulturelle und soziale „Erbe" der Bergbevölkerung nach außen zu kommunizieren. *Pamir Times* bezeichnet sich selbst als „community news and views blog of Gilgit-Baltistan".[7] Als Anspruch erheben die Herausgeber der Webseite, „voluntary, not-for-profit, non-partisan and independent" zu sein.[8]

Der gesamte Prozess der Nachrichten- und Beitragsproduktion der Online-Projekte wird von „Laien-Journalisten" in der Region selbst gestaltet.[9] Ihr Konzept besteht aus direkter Interaktion mit der Bevölkerung. Das kann aktiv geschehen, indem jemand von einem aktuellen Geschehen berichtet oder beispielsweise durch die Bereitstellung von visuellem Material mitwirkt. Andererseits – dies stellt für mich einen weitaus bedeutenderen Aspekt dar – leben News-Blogs zu einem großen Teil von Kolumnen, Essays, Kommentaren und Diskussionen. Mitgestaltung bei *Pamir Times* nimmt vielfältige Formen an: manche schreiben Beiträge oder Kommentare, in denen sie ihre Perspektiven zu bestimmten Themen ausdrücken, tragen durch das Zusenden von Fotos bei oder tätigen beispielsweise Anrufe (oder schreiben Textnachrichten), um zu informieren. Letztere sind an die jeweils nächsten „zentralen" Personen gerichtet, die entweder direkten Zugriff auf die Homepage haben oder einfach Informationen für die Webseite sammeln. Jafar[10], ein Kolumnist von *Pamir Times*, beschrieb den Informationsfluss als „mixture": einerseits werden ihm Neuigkeiten und berichtenswerte Themen von außen zugetragen, andererseits sucht er sie sich selbst. Auf meine Frage hin, wie seine Beiträge für *Pamir Times*, die er neben seiner Beschäftigung bei einer NGO und der Arbeit bei einer Printzeitung schreibt, zustande kommen, antwortete er mir, dass er mit einem der beiden Herausgeber eng

7 vgl. http://pamirtimes.net/about-us/

8 vgl. http://pamirtimes.net/about-us/

9 Für den Web-Blog *Pamir Times* (http://pamirtimes.net) arbeiten zwar auch einige wenige professionelle Journalisten, deren Beitrag liegt aber meist darin, dem Blog durch Kurzmeldungen zuzuarbeiten. Aus dem Gespräch mit ihnen entnehme ich eine unterstützende Haltung bzw. eine entsprechende Motivationsbasis, sodass ich sie an dieser Stelle übergreifend zu den Bewohnerinnen und Bewohnern zähle, die nicht für eine journalistische Tätigkeit entlohnt werden.

10 Name geändert

befreundet sei. Dieser hätte ihn gebeten, über verschiedene Themen Gilgit-Baltistans zu schreiben. „I have my own column with my name where I write about topics that interest me. (…) When I get messages I draft them as articles on my computer and send it to (…) [the editor, Anm. der Autorin]. We report about facilities, education, lacks or breaking news, for example." Wie in diesem Fall haben die Beitragenden oft direkten Kontakt zu den Editierenden. Es kommt aber auch häufig vor, dass Menschen ihre Beiträge an „Mittelspersonen" schicken, die sie wiederum an die Herausgeber weitergeben. In Gilgit habe ich beispielsweise Menschen kennengelernt, die schon seit Jahren in der medialen Öffentlichkeit aktiv und bekannt sind und daher als Anlaufstelle für Bewohnerinnen oder Bewohner dienen, die selbst weniger Kontakte zum Journalismus haben. Sie erhalten Informationen und leiten sie direkt an die Herausgeber weiter. Viele schreiben unregelmäßig zu Themen, die ihnen wichtig sind, in Form von Essays und arbeiten an ihren Texten unterschiedlich lange. Zwei Tage nach dem Anschlag gegen Christen im September 2013 in Peschawar (Hauptstadt der pakistanischen Provinz Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) erzählte mir ein Medienaktivist und Student der Universität Gilgit, dass er einen Artikel mit einem Appell zu überreligiöser Akzeptanz und Zusammenhalt in Pakistan schrieb. Diesen schickte er an verschiedene Zeitungen sowie an *Pamir Times* und *Mountain TV*. „We will see if they publish it" kommentierte er. Im Zuge des Attentats konnte ich das Handeln eines Autors von *Mountain TV* beobachteten. An der Universität in Gilgit fand für die Opfer des Anschlages eine kleine Solidaritätsversammlung statt. Während meiner Anwesenheit kam der Autor zufällig hinzu, der daraufhin den Webmaster der Homepage anrief und ihm Fotos sandte. Wenige Stunden später war ein Beitrag online gestellt, der über die kleine Veranstaltung an der Universität berichtete. Ein interessantes Gespräch hatte ich darüber hinaus im Büro eines Menschenrechtsaktivisten sowie Autors von *Pamir Times,* der für die *Human Rights Commission of Pakistan* arbeitet. Er kommt aus Ghizer und lebt und arbeitet seit 2004 in Gilgit. Da er seine Artikel bisher auf Urdu schrieb, beschloss er auf den Vorschlag eines Freundes aus Islamabad, durch das Verfassen von Beiträgen für *Pamir Times* sein Englisch zu verbessern, erklärte er mir. Das habe ihm eine gute Möglichkeit gegeben, sein Interesse, Menschenrechtsthemen in den lokalen Bezug zu stellen und in der Region zu veröffentlichen, umzusetzen. Durch seine persönliche Stellungnahme u.a. zu politischen Einflüssen in Gilgit-Baltistan hoffe er, vor allem Jugendliche anzusprechen und in ihnen ein Bewusstsein für gesellschaftliche Um- oder Missstände zu stärken. Er äußerte, dass er sich vergleichsweise lange für das Schreiben seiner Essays Zeit lasse, weil ihm die jeweiligen Themen am Herzen lägen und ihm die Formulierung der Inhalte wichtig sei. Die fertigen Berichte schicke er dann an den Herausgeber, „who checks them and edits them on a minor level". Auf welche Weise und inwiefern Autoren auf Reaktionen der Empfängerinnen und Empfänger reagieren, ist unter-

schiedlich. Mein Interviewpartner in Gilgit meinte, dass er persönlich auf Einwände nicht in Form von Kommentaren antworte, sondern lieber einen neuen Artikel verfasse, da er sich dessen bewusst sei, über heikle Themen zu schreiben. Das gebe ihm den Raum für Ausführungen, um seine Perspektiven klar auszudrücken zu können.

Die Selbstdarstellung des News-Blogs *Pamir Times* ist die eines Diskussionsforums. Die Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner Gilgit-Baltistans haben demnach die Möglichkeit, sowohl in die Rolle des Autors als auch in die des Lesers zu schlüpfen und jederzeit in die Beitragsproduktion und -diskussion einzugreifen[11]. Online News-Blogs können als eine Art Sprachrohr für die Bevölkerung betrachtet werden, die von Einwohnern gefüllt werden und ohne sie weder entstehen noch funktionieren würden. Die Bevölkerung bildet das „Skelett" des Ganzen. Dennoch möchte ich betonen, dass es sich hierbei nicht um eine gänzlich amorphe Art journalistischer Praxis handelt. Gilgit-Baltistans News-Blogs arbeiten jeweils mithilfe einer Instanz, die als Moderation agiert und die Rolle des Herausgebens bzw. des Lektorats innehat. Dies kann sowohl eine einzelne Person als auch ein kleiner Personenkreis sein. *Pamir Times'* Herausgeber arbeiten von Islamabad aus, empfangen dort Beiträge, Informationen etc. Sie verarbeiten diese zum Teil selbst zu Kurznachrichten und editieren zugesandte Beiträge nach inhaltlichen und formalen Kriterien. Damit haben sie eine sehr zentrale Rolle inne. Sie sind Bezugspunkt für die aktiv Mitgestaltenden und entscheiden darüber, welche Kurzmeldungen auf der Startseite der Webdomain platziert werden, welche Beträge veröffentlicht werden und welche Kommentare bestehen bleiben. Ein Mitarbeiter des AKRSP-Büros in Gilgit und freier Blogger entgegnete mir auf die Frage, inwieweit Texte überprüft werden, bevor sie auf *Pamir Times* veröffentlicht werden: „All kind of data are under [the editor's] policy; he's editing, checking etc". Aus Gesprächen mit Beitragenden schließe ich, dass Meinungsäußerungen, Inhalte von Kommentaren sowie Essays oder Kolumnen dennoch weitgehend unbearbeitet bleiben. „The editors and the structure of the website suggest topics, but everyone can write according to his or her opinion and interest", erklärte Jafar in Gilgit.

Genutzt wird der Web-Blog vor allem von jungen Menschen: von NGO-Mitarbeitenden, politischen Aktivistinnen und Aktivisten, die zum Bürgerengagement aufrufen, sowie Studierenden. Als Plattform für Diskussion und Veröffentlichung soll der Blog – wie mir gegenüber erwähnt wurde – auch Menschen Gilgit-Baltistans erreichen, die im pakistanischen Tiefland oder im Ausland leben. *Pamir Times* verwendet (bewusst) Englisch als Hauptsprache und beschreibt sich damit als ein offenes, an die (Außen-)Welt gewandtes Projekt. Der Blog strebt eine Einbindung der lokalen Themen und Diskurse in den „global knowledge mainstream"[12] an. Teilhabe am News-

11 Tatsächliche Zugangsschwierigkeiten beschreibe ich im Folgenden.

12 http://pamirtimes.net/about-us/

Blogs und somit am bürgerschaftlichen Journalismus in Gilgit-Baltistan ist damit stark vom Faktor Bildung abhängig. Die Journalismus-Projekte sind somit in erster Linie an Menschen mit höherem Bildungsgrad adressiert. Die Jugend mit guten Bildungschancen bildet den Hauptakteur. „The youth here in GB [Gilgit-Baltistan] and outside of GB, from everywhere in the world, is commenting", erklärte mir Tariq[13], der als Hobbyfotograf *Pamir Times* zuarbeitet. Er meinte, dadurch entstehe ein Dialog und es würden Themen diskutiert, die in Zeitungen nicht vorkämen. „It's them who read blogs, because they have the technics for doing so." Mit dem Ausdruck „technics" können unterschiedliche Voraussetzungen für Zugang gemeint sein.

Herausforderungen und Kritik

Zugänglichkeit ist ein zentraler Punkt der Kritik an bürgerschaftlichem Journalismus in Form von digitalen Blogs in Gilgit-Baltistan. Wie bereits angedeutet, spielt der Faktor Bildung dabei eine zentrale Rolle. Die Möglichkeit zur Teilhabe besteht nur für Personen, die Englisch lernen konnten. „Most of the people working on the blog are educated. The blog is for the youth, for the people with internet access (...)", so ein Autor von *Pamir Times* in einem Interview in Gilgit. Zwar erhöhten sich die Bildungschancen in Gilgit-Baltistan innerhalb der vergangenen Jahrzehnte vergleichsweise schnell; dieser Prozess verlief aber nicht linear, sondern ungleichmäßig, d.h. es gibt sichtbare regionale, sozio-ökonomische, alters- sowie genderbezogene Disparitäten. Für die Nutzung der Plattformen ist die gebildete Jugend damit klar bevorzugt. Diese Kritik wird häufig innerhalb der Gesellschaft geäußert, vor allem von Mitgliedern des lokalen Printjournalismus. Für den mittellosen Mann, der tagsüber in seinem Geschäft sitze und keine Ressourcen habe, Nachrichten im Internet zu lesen, sei schlichtweg die tägliche Morgenzeitung am wichtigsten, entgegnete mir ein Berufsjournalist in Gilgit. Er sagte: „They [the newspapers, Anm. der Autorin] are in Urdu, more people can read them. And the majority of the people here is not able to use the internet." Damit spricht er die Kosten des Internetzugangs an. Obwohl einige Menschen in Gilgit-Baltistan heutzutage mobiles Internet nutzen und sich die Kosten von Internetanbietern gegenüber früher bereits erheblich verringerten, fehlen dennoch den meisten die finanziellen Mittel dafür. Zugang zum Internet haben vor allem Jugendliche aus der Bildungsschicht. Sie können sich den Besuch in Internet-Cafés oder den Gebrauch von internetfähigen Mobiltelefonen leisten oder haben als Studierende am Campus Internetzugang. Der breiten Bevölkerung dagegen fehlen diese Möglichkeiten. Es gebe immer noch viele Menschen, die das Internet nicht handhaben könnten oder keinen Zugang hätten, räumte zwar ein Blogger von *Pamir Times* bei einem Interview ein, „Internet access is the limiting factor". Dennoch ist ein großer

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Teil der Blogger-Community der Meinung, dass Menschen in allen Dörfern über Mobiltelefone einfach und günstig Nachrichten online abrufen können. Innerhalb dieser Community mag das wahrscheinlich stimmen. Ahmed[14], *Pamir Times*' Webmaster, erzählte mir dagegen, dass sich die Herausgeber der Seite unter anderem deshalb hauptsächlich in Islamabad aufhielten, weil es in Gilgit-Baltistan kaum verlässlichen und stetigen Zugang zum Internet gebe. In den meisten abgelegenen Dörfern gebe es keine Möglichkeit, ins Netz zu gelangen, erklärte mir ein Blogger. Selbst dort, wo es Zugang zum Internet gibt, gebe es aufgrund der Verbindung Schwierigkeiten, Seiten zu laden. Nutzerinnen und Nutzer eines mobilen Internets müssten darüber hinaus auf den Verbrauch von Datenvolumen, d.h. Kosten und Speicherplatz achten und könnten deshalb nicht unbegrenzt Updates abrufen. Imran[15] aus Yasin arbeitete unter anderem für eine lokale Tageszeitung und schrieb regelmäßig eine Kolumne sowie Essays für *Pamir Times*. Er brachte das Problem auf den Punkt: „A current problem is internet access. Only people with internet access are able to assist and its speed is low." Auch die Stromversorgung ist im Tiefland beständiger. Viele Menschen sind also von digitalen Nachrichten ausgeschlossen. An dieser Stelle kann auf die Diskussion über den *digital gap* verwiesen werden. Der Begriff bezeichnet die Annahme eines Strukturproblems in der Wissensbildung. Dabei wird davon ausgegangen, dass Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf neue Medien von sozioökonomischen Faktoren abhängen und ungleichen Zugang und ungleiche Aneignung von Wissen bedingen (siehe z.B. Compaine 2001). Wer also modernde Kommunikationstechnologien zur Verfügung hat, besitzt bessere Entwicklungschancen, so die Hypothese. Kritiker fordern, darunter nicht mehr nur technische, sondern auch inhaltliche Zugänglichkeit (z.B. sprachliche Barrieren) zu fassen. Ich denke nicht, dass die (Online-)Vernetzung von Bürgerinnen und Bürgern nur aufgrund des Vorhandenseins des Mediums Internet selbst entsteht, doch bringt es eine erhebliche Beschleunigung und Vereinfachung mit sich. Internetnutzung ist aber nicht nur mit Anschaffungskosten (Verbindung sowie Geräte) verbunden, sondern erfordert auch eine verlässliche Stromversorgung und Netzabdeckung. Beide Punkte sind in Gilgit-Baltistan problematisch: Noch immer haben nicht alle Teilregionen und Täler Zugang zum Mobilnetz, und die Stromversorgung ist in ganz Pakistan sehr prekär. Unter diesem Blickwinkel ist für die Möglichkeit der aktiven Beteiligung am *Citizen*-Journalismus unter anderem der Wohnort ausschlaggebend.

Im lokalen Selbstverständnis der Blogger von *Pamir Times* ist Bildung darüber hinaus eng mit Religionszugehörigkeit verknüpft. Überwiegend

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15 Name geändert

übernehmen Ismailiten[16] die aktive Gestaltung des Weblogs. Obwohl die unter dem Aga Khan initiierten Programme in den Bereichen Gesundheit, ländliche Entwicklung, Umwelt und Bildung offiziell nicht konfessionell sind, scheint in der Wahrnehmung der Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner Gilgit-Baltistans vor allem die ismailitische Gemeinschaft davon profitiert zu haben. In nahezu jedem Interview, das ich führte, bezeichneten sich Mitglieder der Ismaili-Community als „educated" oder „modern" und machten Bildung für den Erfolg von *Citizen*-Journalismus aus Hunza verantwortlich: „Education is the main reason why they are successful." Auch Menschen außerhalb dieser Gruppe stellten im Gespräch über Ismailiten jeweils eine direkte Verknüpfung zwischen Religionszugehörigkeit, Bildungschancen und Bildungsstand her. Hunza wird oft als eine „Oase der Moderne" oder als „Paradies von hohem Bildungsgrad" beschrieben (Gosh 2014; Ahmed 2014). Unter dem Schirm des spirituellen Oberhaupts der Ismailis sei es schon in den letzten Jahrzehnten für die Mehrheit der Gruppe möglich gewesen, Bildung zu genießen, so Hussein[17], der aus Nager kommt, einem Ort auf der anderen Seite des Flusses, vis-a-vis zu Hunza. Dort ist die Mehrheit der Bewohnerinnen und Bewohner schiitisch. *Pamir Times,* so führte er aus, sei eine „Zurschaustellung des Problems" des unterschiedlichen Bildungsgrades, den man in den beiden ehemaligen Kleinstaaten finden könne. „They have a generation of educated young people now. We had the *madrasa*[18] system and now we have government schools but they are not working. They all spend their money to send their children to schools – that's why something like that blog can work there but is not working here." Er beschreibt, dass die Ismailiten in Hunza und Gojal schon seit Jahren Vorteile durch ein funktionierendes modernes Schulsystem genießen. Dies ist eng mit dem Aga Khan verknüpft. Erst in Folge des Engagements von AKDN entstand in der Gemeinschaft der Ismailis darüber hinaus ein verstärktes Selbstverständnis von Selbstorganisation, Gemeinschaftsarbeit und Engagement für die Community. Der Sinn für Gemeinschaftsarbeit wird neben Hussein auch von anderen Interview-

16 Die Glaubensgemeinschaft der Ismailiten folgt sieben Imamen und wird daher auch als Siebener-Schia bezeichnet. Von den in Gilgit-Baltistan lebenden Ismailiten (Nizārīya) werden weitere Imame anerkannt (Daftary 1995): ihr geistiges Oberhaupt ist der Aga Khan. Prinz Karim Aga Khan IV. wird als 49. Imam in der Nachfolge des Propheten verehrt und lebt heute nördlich von Paris. Aga Khan III., Sultan Muhammad Shah, plädierte in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren für die Förderung von Bildung als wichtigste Ressource für Gilgit-Baltistan. Daraufhin wurde durch den Bau der *Diamond Jubilee Schools* begonnen, zahlreiche Bildungseinrichtungen im Hunzatal zu errichten (Gosh 2014).

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18 Madrasas bezeichnen eine von drei Schularten in Pakistan und bestehen neben öffentlichen und privaten Schulen. Nur eine sehr geringe Anzahl pakistanischer Schüler besucht eine Madrasa. Ursprünglich war es eine Bezeichnung für eine Schule, in der islamische Wissenschaften unterrichtet werden.

partnern als Erklärungsmuster für den Erfolg der News-Blogs aus Hunza und Gojal herangezogen. Hussein bezeichnet den Faktor Bildung bewusst als religiöse Begründung für das Gelingen von *Pamir Times*. Darin spiegelt sich die enge Verflechtung der Kategorien wider.

Ferner muss sich das Projekt *Pamir Times* dem Vorwurf stellen, sich überwiegend nur auf eine Teilregion zu konzentrieren, obwohl es nach außen beansprucht, eine Stimme für Gilgit-Baltistan – und damit für die gesamte Region – zu sein. Dass Aktive nicht aus allen Gebieten Gilgit-Baltistans kommen, sondern vor allem aus Hunza und Gojal, führt zu Kritik. Darüber, welche Gruppen ihre Interessen einbringen können, bestehen divergente Meinungen. Ein schiitischer Interviewpartner, der nicht aus dem Hunza-Tal kommt, ist der Ansicht: „*Pamir Times* is a core group. (…) There are 90% Ismaili people in Hunza, they have a strong sense of community. (…) They will always give priority to members of their community. I can only become a contributor but they would never let me be an editor." Er beschreibt den Online-News-Blog als unnütz und sinnlos für Menschen, deren Heimat nicht Hunza oder Gojal ist und deren zentrale Interessen stattdessen eher auf ihren eigenen Wohn- oder Herkunftsorten liegen mögen. „Blogs are locally useless and internationally useful", so Hussein aus Nager. Außerhalb eines gebildeten Kreises seien Blogs unbrauchbar, argumentiert er. Sie gäben zwar die Möglichkeit, lokale Themen anzusprechen, Probleme zu diskutieren sowie Raum für Interpretationen. Dies geschehe aber in regional sehr eingegrenztem Interesse, sodass die Inhalte für Menschen außerhalb der Blogger-Community uninteressant und daher „locally useless" seien, so die Erläuterung seiner Aussage. Als ich in Nager auf meine Weiterfahrt wartete, entstand zufällig ein Gespräch mit einem Lehrer aus Khaplu. Er äußerte die Meinung, dass Meldungen nur aus Chitral, Hunza oder Gilgit veröffentlicht würden, *Pamir Times* dagegen kaum über Baltistan berichte. „They don't have representatives all over the area. There are no updates for Skardu even if an important conference is happening there. But a cricket game in Gojal for example will be highlighted." Darüber, über welche Teile Gilgit-Baltistans geschrieben wird, bestehen unterschiedliche Ansichten. Laut den meisten Interviewpartnern wird heute aus (fast) allen Teilen der Region berichtet, wenn auch früher der Fokus auf Hunza lag. Jafar, ein Kolumnist von *Pamir Times*, räumte aber ein: „*Pamir Times* wants to cover all area. (…) Most news are from Gilgit District, because it's the provincial headquarter." Ein weiterer Autor von *Pamir Times* meinte, dass sich der Blog primär an Menschen richtet, die aus Gilgit-Baltistan kommen, aber im Ausland oder im pakistanischen Tiefland leben. „Most of the users live abroad, for example in the Arab Emirates and this is one reason why the homepage is mainly in English." Der Blog solle dazu dienen, diese Menschen am aktuellen Geschehen in ihrer Heimat teilhaben zu lassen. Auf der Homepage werden Herkunft und Anzahl der Besucher des Blogs registriert. Laut dieser Statistik wurde *Pamir Times*

bisher aus über 200 Ländern aufgerufen; durchschnittlich griffen etwa 60% der Besucher von Pakistan (i.e. auch Gilgit-Baltistan) aus auf die Seite zu[19].

Innergesellschaftliche Abgrenzungsmechanismen bestehen zwar ohnehin aufgrund von familiären, konfessionellen, tätigkeitsbezogenen oder anderen Netzwerken; einen bedeutenden Rahmen aber bildet, wie oben bereits sichtbar wurde, die Kategorie „Herkunft". „Gilgit-Baltistan is ethnically so diverse: it could be divided into seven or eight different countries", lautete Husseins Argumentation weiter. Wenige Graswurzelbewegungen stehen wahrscheinlich von Beginn an für ein Kollektiv, sondern unterliegen zunächst besonderen Interessen einer kleineren Menschengruppe und durchlaufen einen Entwicklungsprozess. Bürgernaher Journalismus in Form von Team-Blogs stellt trotz einiger (Zugangs-)Schwierigkeiten für einen kleinen Teil der Bevölkerung eine Plattform dar, lokalen gesellschaftlichen Diskursen eine greifbare Gestalt zu geben. Er hat Potential, Menschen Raum zu bieten, um miteinander in Kontakt zu treten, aufeinander zu reagieren und ihren Meinungen Gehör zu verschaffen. Dabei können Themen, die bisher nicht öffentlich verhandelt wurden, nach außen hin (mehr) Gewicht gewinnen.

Das westliche Konzept *Citizen*-Journalismus passt zwar in vielen Aspekten auf die Situation in Gilgit-Baltistan. Der Begriff erscheint mir aber insofern nicht übertragbar, als dass Bürgerjournalismus dort der eigenen Selbstbeschreibung nach nicht primär mit dem „Lebendigwerden" von Demokratie verknüpft ist. Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler gehen davon aus, dass Graswurzeljournalismus einen positiven Einfluss auf politische Teilhabe hat und demokratische Prozesse fördert (De Zúñiga 2009: 117). „Formale" Politik als Motivation, einen Blog zu gründen, begegnete mir in Gilgit-Baltistan nicht. Es geht nicht darum, sich als kämpfende politische Gruppierung gegenüber Parteien zu positionieren oder als politische Organisation direkt Entscheidungsprozesse auf Verwaltungsebene anzugreifen. Der Blog ist kein Verband und auch nicht mit einer Lobby vergleichbar. Dennoch verfolgt der Online-News-Blog das Ziel, Gilgit-Baltistans Interessen an die Öffentlichkeit zu bringen und damit auch an politische Entscheidungsträger heranzutragen. Man findet auf *Pamir Times* kritische Stellungnahmen gegenüber der pakistanischen Regierung, zum politischen Status von Gilgit-Baltistan und zur Situation der Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Solch kritische Haltungen wurden mir gegenüber in Gesprächen vereinzelt deutlich. Interessanterweise wurde ich aber jeweils dazu angehalten, diese nicht zu notieren. Dennoch ist der Blog ein Sammelbecken für die Interessen der Bevölkerung Gilgit-Baltistans, welche sich zu einem hohen Grad in politischen Stellungnahmen und Forderungen, den Status der Region zu ändern, artikulieren. Online-News-Blogs werden aber auch als Möglichkeit zur „Dokumentation der eigenen Kultur" (d.h. lokaler Traditionen etc.) genutzt. „Gilgit-Baltistan

19 http://www.revolvermaps.com/?target=enlarge&i=7ymqn78udar&nostars=false&color=00ff6c&m=0&ref=null (aufgerufen am 9. Januar 2014)

is very rich in culture. Even we don't know all our culture! The Internet is a main tool to conserve and document our culture and to show that image. With the internet we can show others how interesting and valuable Gilgit-Baltistan is", so Ishtiaq[20], Mitbegründer des Projekts *Mountain TV* und Student aus Gulmit. "Our population is afraid to make political comments in this country. They are afraid to get into trouble (...) and they are careful. But by the use of blogs fears go down and people start talking. The internet is the place where people can take comments and where discussion is started." Dies verdeutlicht, dass News-Blogs für Gilgit-Baltistan mehr als Webseiten zur Bereitstellung von lokalen Nachrichten sind.

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Christians in Gilgit: Negotiating subalternity and citizenship

Maria Beimborn

„This is the greatest gift of deconstruction:
to question the authority of the investigating subject
without paralyzing him." (Spivak 1988: 9)

Intellectual projects are no doubt products of their times, but do they also belong to them? Partha Chatterjee, an early member of the South Asian Subaltern Studies Group, recently made that claim when heralding the end of Subaltern Studies – a historical approach that started to re-write (national) history 'from below'. "The task, as it now stands cannot, I think, be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies" (Chatterjee 2012: 44), he argues in *After Subaltern Studies*. It is especially two crucial ideas of the theoretical approach he is refusing: first, the externality of 'the subaltern' and second the image of the 'subaltern rebel'.

Starting from Chatterjee's argument this article critically reviews the Subaltern Studies project to then discuss empirical material from a fieldwork in Gilgit in 2013. Focusing on the socio-political situation of the Christian minority and their politics, the approach is revised as also recently developments like the notion of the 'subaltern citizen' are introduced and discussed. Is the Subaltern Studies project really outdated and the subaltern rebel a figure of the past? The article doubts it pointing to a need not only for new concepts that cast the paradoxes and complexities of contemporary subalternities in one theoretical notion but also to a reflected plurality of theoretical approaches as they enable us to tell different stories of modernity.

Subalternity reconsidered

Subaltern Studies have always been subject to criticism, leading scholars to rework theoretical outlines and research questions. The political project of Subaltern Studies was formulated by a group of historians in South Asia in the 1980s but over the years was adopted in Latin America, Africa and also by scholars from 'the West'. The concept was adopted and further developed in other disciplines, among them sociology, anthropology and pedagogy. Subaltern Studies began as a critical historical approach focusing on 'people's history' in colonial times, strongly influenced by the paradigm of structuralism. By the 1990s it was reworked in the framework of Post-structuralism.

Questions of subalternity were linked to Postcolonial Critique. In that turn, the early structuralist claim of a 'subaltern consciousness' was reformulated as question: How does subaltern self-consciousness develop? Subaltern Studies became a field with diffuse borders. The now rather interdisciplinary approach has been increasingly addressing questions of subalternity in contemporary times: in postcolonial as well as in 'western' and global contexts. The critical approach is not only asking for societal and cultural mechanisms of exclusion and marginalization and the experiences and politics of 'the subaltern' but also of figurations of power and knowledge.

Who 'the subaltern' are and what subalternity is, has since the very beginning been a matter of debate. "I like the word 'subaltern' for one reason", Spivak stated in the middle of turmoil. "It is truly situational. 'Subaltern' began as a description of certain rank in the military", "(…) was later used under censorship of Gramsci (…) [who] was obliged to call the proletarian 'subaltern'" and "(…) has been transformed into the description of everything that doesn't fall under strict class analysis. I like that, because it has no theoretical rigor." (Spivak 1990: 141)

The concept has been, and still is criticized for being blurred and conceptually empty. Over time though, various scholars have put much effort to sharpen the notion – not least in order to point out the political program of the approach. And there is an ongoing debate on how essential / how partial different subalternities have been in the past as well as in contemporary societies.

Guha, often considered the founding father of the South Asian Studies Group, in 1982 only loosely defined 'the subaltern' when describing it as: "the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the 'elite'". While in the beginning she expressed sympathy for the conceptual vagueness, Spivak has been offering continuously new definitions of subalternity since the beginning of the 1990s, giving attention to different aspects of the societal status. The loose materialistic conceptualization in Subaltern Studies, which was taken from Gramsci's work on the proletariat in industrializing Europe, was abandoned, when in the 1990s she defined subalternity as exclusion from cultural production. Subaltern, she said in an interview, is "everything that has limited or no access to cultural imperialism—a space of difference" (De Kock 1992: 45). In 2005 she underlined the very practical and political dimension of subalternity, stating: "When we are talking about subaltern isolation we are not talking some fuzzy hegemonic identity, we are talking about the abstract structures of civil society to which the subaltern has no access." Defending the notion against its current misuse, she argues "[t]he subaltern is not one of those wishy-washy, weepy, whimsy, hybrid identities type concept at all" (Dhawan 2007 citing Spivak 2003, see also Milevska 2003). Another two years later she highlighted another aspect of societal exclusion: "subalternity is where

social lines of mobility, being elsewhere, do not permit the formation of a recognizable basis of action" (Spivak 2005: 476). An outline of the ongoing debate cannot possibly be done here, but even the short listing of some definitions – some of which we will discuss in more detail later – can at least indicate the richness of the Subaltern Approach. Let us now see what Chatterjee referred to when claiming the end of subaltern studies.

Why does the indebted farmer of today's India choose suicide? Reconsidering the subaltern paradigm

Guha's early theoretical outline has caused an ongoing debate. Especially two interlinked arguments provoked dispute. Firstly that the "*politics of people*... [form] an *autonomous domain*" (Guha 1982: 40). And secondly his structuralist explanation: the claim of a 'subaltern consciousness'. Chatterjee, in his recent article, claims that for this theoretical body time has come.

In *Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India* (1983) Guha argued "the lower classes, historically on the defensive, can only achieve self-awareness via a series of negations via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy." The subaltern, "learned to recognize himself not by the properties and attributes of his own social being but by diminution, if not negation, of those of his superiors" (Guha 1983: 18).

Chatterjee defends this approach to be appropriate at that time. Guhas essentialism "was not a question of drawing the faces in the crowd (...) [T]he insurgent peasants of Colonial India were political not in a sense of the individualized bourgeois citizen of liberal democracy, they were mass-political subjects whose rationality had to be sought in the collective life of peasant community. He found his answer in the structure of rebel consciousness which he located, in turn, in the structure of the peasant community" (Chatterjee 2012: 46).

Subaltern Studies back then were accused of positivist essentialism, recovering a subject from archives that actually never existed. Spivak, referring to the political program of the critical historical approach of writing 'people's history', claimed 'the subaltern' to be a necessary theoretical fiction. "I would read it", she wrote, "as a *strategic* use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest" (Spivak 1988: 13). She had highlighted the voicelessness of 'the subaltern' in her influential essay first published in 1988 *Can the subaltern speak?* (Spivak 2007) She contributed crucially to shaping Subaltern Studies' twofold program: telling the history of the subaltern and speaking up against contemporary subalternity. Later on, though, she backed her defense of essentialism, claiming "Subaltern Studies had no need for such apologetics" (Spivak 2000: 332).

The whole debate around the subaltern consciousness, Chatterjee argues lately, was based on a misunderstanding. The figure of the 'rebel consciousness' was never meant to explain all peasant politics. Defending Guha and the early South Asian Studies group he points to Guhas essay *Chandras Death* – a story of a non-insurgent peasant – and *Weapons of the Weak* (Scott 1985) to prove that they were aware of the diversity of popular politics as well as the need for their separate analysis. In his influential book Scott pointed to the myriad of forms of everyday practices of subaltern resistance: loud and confronting ones like insurrection and terrorism and silent and inverse forms that don't involve direct confrontation with authorities, like i.e. desertion, false compliance, pilfering, slander or sabotage.

Subaltern Studies have always had a disproportional interest in and paid much attention to subaltern resistance. Subaltern politics of non-resistance, i.e. cooperation and collaboration, negotiations and involvements were widely ignored and poorly theorized. The figure of the 'subaltern rebel' and the structuralistic framed argument of a subaltern 'rebel consciousness' led to such a limited focus and an overestimation of resistance and subversion in the margins of societies. Spivak's introduction to *Selected Subaltern Studies* (Spivak 1988) can be read as a critique and redirection of Subaltern Studies, as an effort to abandon Guha's theoretical framework and its essentialist notion of subalternity and shift away from structuralist explanations to the question of how subaltern self-consciousness emerges.

Another reading suggests that she preserved the idea of a 'subaltern rebel consciousness' in post-structural theory even though reworking it as "subaltern effect". If misunderstood or not, there is a need for awareness that the plurality, complexity and ambiguity of the politics of the people, analyzed in the framework of subalternity, are not dismissed. The theoretical framework and political interest of the approach simply suggest framing any everyday practices and politics as resistance and subversion.

Let's come back to Chatterjee's funeral eulogy. He withdraws from two fundamental ideas of theoretical paradigms, firstly the conceptualization of subaltern politics as 'external' and independent domain and secondly the conceptualization of the subaltern subject as 'subaltern rebel'. Both ideas had been criticized much earlier, i. e. in 1992 by Masselos, co-editor of various volumes of Subaltern Studies, speaking up against the stereotyping of 'the subaltern' in Subaltern Studies. Ludden in his introduction to *Reading Subaltern Studies* summarizes:

> *"[Masselos] calls 'the subaltern' . . . a creation, a reification of historians, which combines a polarised social category with the 'mentality of opposition', and which he distinguishes from real subaltern people, in the real world (...). He rejects Subaltern Studies theoretical identification of subordinate social status*

> *with mentalities of resistance and literary penchant for dramatising class opposition, both of which he traces to the activist world of the late 1960s and early 1970s. (…) In reality, he says, subaltern 'acts of resistance link up with, interact with, intersect with what is happening around them'. In his view, any theory of subaltern autonomy would tend to erase real subalterns from history.*" (Ludden 2002: 23)

Chakrabarty had challenged Guha's argument of subaltern politics being an autonomous domain even earlier. In braces he clarifies that subaltern politics are of course only a 'relative' autonomous and independent domain. In the same text he offers – again quite casually and in parenthesis – a quite short but rich outline of subalternity: "Subalternity – the composite culture of resistance to and acceptance of domination and hierarchy – (…)" (Chakrabarty1985: 376). In a number of works he points to the complexity and ambivalence of subalternity – a point that will be argued at some length later.

Why then does Chatterjee disqualify the theoretical paradigm of early Subaltern Studies *now*? Drawing to the changing situation of contemporary Indian peasantry – the subaltern subject *per se* – he argues that:

> *"(…) now the activities of the government have penetrated deep into the everyday lives of rural people and affect matters like the supply of water to their fields or electricity to their homes, or the access to their villages to public roads and transport to the facilities of schooling, public health services, public distribution to subsidies food grains or kerosene, and employment in public works, or indeed such novel necessities as the registration of lands and houses or births and deaths, should we not expect that even mass political action will no longer be characterized principally by the marks of negation."* (Chatterjee 2012: 47)

The point he makes is by no means valid exclusively with regard to Indian rural peasantry but true for most of the groups that have been described within the framework of Subaltern Studies, i.e. peasants, dalits, slaves, orphans, black people, ethnic and religious minorities. It is quite emblematic that the 'drastic change of the objective conditions of subaltern studies' in his opinion is caused by a changing style of governance and democratization – the role of subaltern subjects and the 'politics of the governed' in history and for change are neglected in that story. Under these new conditions he claims that the theoretical figure of the 'subaltern rebel' is useless: Formations of the political mass and mass-politics in contemporary democratic India cannot be understood applying the antiquated paradigm. Why do indebted farmers of today's India choose suicide despite the rich tradition of insurrection against money-lenders recorded by historians? Chatterjee keeps silence.

> *"The subaltern rebel so meticulously portrayed by us, now seemed like a throwback to the days of the British Raj – a construct that historians of colonial India might find useful but one that would be of little help in understanding the contemporary Indian peasant. We now saw that the latter would have to be understood within a new framework of democratic citizenship, perhaps fundamentally altered from the normative ideas of citizenship in western liberal democracies, but nonetheless citizenship, not subjecthood. Subalternity would have to be redefined."* (Chatterjee 2012: 45f)

He doesn't exclude the possibility that there still are and will be "relatively marginal zones" of subaltern insurrection. In those cases the approach still holds its validity, he argues. But "[j]ust as the relation between rulers and subjects have changed, so has the formation of the political mass" (ibid. 47). But nowadays the different groups are increasingly involved with government agencies and contemporary subaltern politics take forms of "[r]ather complex negotiations (…) between the insurgent movements and government agencies over what services and benefits should be delivered, to whom and through which agencies, and who should supervise the operations" on the one and "the ordinary stuff of democratic politics" in form of "constant tussles of different populations groups with authorities over the distribution of governmental services" on the other hand. "These tussles become political", he thereby states, "because many of the demands cannot be conceded within the normal rules of legal and bureaucratic rationality. The usual way accommodating those demands is to declare them as exceptional cases that have to be dealt with by administrative adjustments to the normal rules, without, however, jeopardizing the normative rationality of the legal structure itself" (ibid.).

When it comes to the task of how to understand contemporary subalternities, I feel the need to add one point Chatterjee misses out on. His argumentation never leaves the frame of the national state. Do states form an autonomous domain? Not only federal and provincial governments but also the 'politics of people' – to borrow a common term of Subaltern Studies - are shaped and do interrelate with international and global politics as well as different institutions and social movements acting on an international and global scale. Additionally, the practices of global and international politics have changed: they are increasingly creeping into every day lives of even the most marginalized segments on the globe. Questions of exclusion and negation, of subaltern self-consciousness, mechanisms of formation of political mass/action and voice/lessness urgently need to be reconsidered and researched considering new complexities and involvements (see also Spivak 2000a: 332). Thereby it needs to be considered that while on the one hand

global democratic politics and global capitalism, i. e. in form of agendas of development or gender, subjectify and empower different groups that are rather excluded in national or local communities, on the other hand new subalternities arise. Subaltern status(es) become more ambivalent and complex just as the arena of 'subaltern politics'.

But is all that really *new*? And if not so, how to avoid throwing out the baby with the bath? Subaltern Studies today are much more than an antiquated structuralist project, as Chatterjee's article could make us believe. The approach is rather characterized by constant reformulations of its very fundamental concepts and a heterogeneous and pluralist theoretical body. No doubt the 'old' concept of subalternity needs to be reformulated, not only regarding the case of rural peasantry but also subaltern urbanism in the global south (see i.e. Roy 2011) as well as in respect of the 'old' subalternities, that might change and the 'new' subalternities, that are emerging under new societal conditions (in form of new figurations of power, new forms of governance, global capitalism etc). Spivak argued to women being the new subaltern of global capitalism while pointing to the ambiguity of oppression and empowerment, the voicelessness and the giving voice through and in global women politics (Spivak 2000b). She has not only analyzed the changing situation of subaltern women but also of scheduled tribes through political agendas of development and gender (Spivak 2000a). Others argued immigrants, illegalized people and people without papers to be 'the subaltern' of contemporaneous times (see Odem 2009; Chea 2010). Looking to approaches regarding questions of subalternity, we can see a rich and diverse theoretical body and methodological plurality, both with constant reworking under way.

Chatterjee closes his paper with an outlook on new projects to come. According to him not only the theoretical paradigm of Subaltern Studies is useless to understand subalternity in contemporary times, but also the historical methodology is incompatible with current questions. The methodology fails, he argues, when it comes to the study of visual communication i.e. cinema – a widely neglected field in Subaltern Studies but important archive of popular culture (especially in regions with universal illiteracy) especially when it comes to the search for subaltern voice. The historical method also fails when it comes to understanding everyday practices. He points to the "autonomous status of embodied or institutionalized practices whose significance cannot simply be tread of texts describing the underlying concepts." (Chatterjee 2012: 49). Looking towards the new projects to come he sees Subaltern Studies "shift to the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local" (ibid.). The Subaltern Studies approach of his time therefore to him seems mistimed.

The paradox of subalternity and citizenship

Pandey's book *Subaltern Citizens and their Histories* (Pandey 2010a) is not meant to be a restart but rather a critical rework of the conceptual framework and an emphasis of the political program of Subaltern Studies. The book is quite an innovative assemblage. Works on different subalternities, historical and contemporary ones, in India and the US are standing side by side. It is the result of a new conceptual outline of contemporary subalternity: the 'subaltern citizen'. "The immediate advantage of the term 'subaltern citizen'", Pandey argues, is that "it prevents the easy erection of a barrier between *us* (citizens, the people with history) and *them* (subalterns, people without), as well as between *our times* (the time of equality, democracy, the recognition of human worth) and *earlier times* (the time without reason and such understanding) (Pandey 2010b: 1).

The notion is meant to be a provocative theoretical figure, pointing out the simultaneity of subalternity and citizenship. That, Pandey argues, is a "fairly common contemporary condition" (ibid.: 5), established in the second half of the twentieth century. Subaltern groups in most parts of the globe have been "granted the status of citizens (right-holders, inhabitants, subjects of the state) without becoming quite 'mainstream'" (ibid.). Even for those without such a status, "their existence as relatively stable populations has been secured (…) by the essential character of many services they provide, and they have been able consequently to make certain kinds of claims on state and quasi-state resources" (ibid.). In contrast to Chatterjee, Pandey's conceptual reframing is not only an answer to the changing conditions of subalternity in contemporary society but also meant to finally recover the subaltern subject as an agent of history and change. In his eyes Subaltern Studies so far have failed. While using the term 'citizen', he excuses himself for not having found a more suitable term for now, as "a modifier for 'subaltern', an indicator of the political quality of all subalternity (and all dominance)" (ibid.). The concept is meant to disrupt historical and political narratives.

> *"The pairing of the terms subaltern and citizen should accomplish precisely such a disruption, since the idea of the citizen flies in the face of almost everything found in the commonly received narrative of subalternity, which is a description and analysis of a condition anticipated as a condition of the down and out, the miserable, and the victimized. The word subaltern plainly reinforces what the charge of a critical historiography (…) has long been: the endeavor to recover subject positions, lives, possibilities and political actions that have been marginalized, distorted, suppressed and even forgotten. The term citizen helps to underline (…) the fact of historical agency and political arrangement*

> *(or 'persuasion'). It draws attention forcefully to the 'citizenly', the political quality in subalternity."* (ibid. 7)

With his provocative theoretical figure, Pandey highlights the complexities and paradoxes marking the status(es) of subalternity. He explains that he uses the term citizen in two different senses: "first as the bearer of the legal right to residence, political participation, state support and protection in a given territory; the second, a more diffuse sense of acceptance in, and acceptance of, an existing order or existing social arrangements" (ibid.5). His definition cites and twists Chakrabarty's notion from 1985 (claiming subalternity to be the combination of the resistance against and acceptance of domination). Chakrabarty's concept was framed by ideas of 'the state' and 'the people' as separate spheres, the latter forming a relatively independent political domain. People's (national) history was written as a history of native culture and subaltern insurrections, detached from official (national) history made by elites and political parties (see Ludden 2002: 8). Even though popular resistance to state power was a prominent field of study, subaltern politics were drawn as quite effectless on the national (elite) history. In contrast, Pandey's concept of citizenly modulation of the subaltern subject directs the focus on the subaltern citizens' potentiality and practices of changing history. Pandey's paradox figure of the subaltern citizen, forcing attention to the citizenly forms and political quality of subaltern everyday politics, forms the background to the following discussion of ethnographic data from fieldwork among the Christian immigrant community of Gilgit. In the presented case we will thereby see that at certain times, the 'citizenly' needs to be understood in a very literal sense: even though formally citizenship and rights are negated to the immigrant community, their social organization, political practice and everyday experiences are throughout 'citizenly' – though in a sense that differs from concepts of liberal democracy.

Christians in Gilgit

Last summer I spent six weeks doing research in Gilgit.[1] There are only few historical and not any contemporary accounts of the Christian minority living here, so I started with a broad focus reconstructing the migration and getting insights into the current socio-political situation, community organization and religious life. My research interest though was the political sphere, especially the relation between the minority and 'the state'. The Christian households are scattered over the city and various conflicts crack through the community. To get grip of different perspectives and (hi)stories I needed to establish different access points. Changing and cutting fronts provided not only insights into the rivalries within the community but also created awareness of two things: firstly the plurality of actors and their networking

1 I am grateful to the DAAD for generously funding fieldwork in the town.

and negotiating with government agencies, politicians, local authorities, local middlemen, Pakistani churches and international donors; secondly that political positions, strategies and practices were multilayered as they were internal community politics as well as politics for the Christian community. The image of subalternity has been ascribed to the religious minority in Pakistan not only by international media but also by various scientists. The situation of Christians in Pakistan is generally portrayed as an inter-faith relation. Christians are described as culturally marginalized and discriminated minority in an (increasingly) 'Islamic state' (see Gabriel 2007). O'Brien has contributed to widen the picture by writing a history of Christianity in the region that starts long before the 'Islamization' of the state, the independence of Pakistan and even the 'mass-movement' – a term referring to a mass conversion around the turn of the 19th to the 20th century in Punjab. *The Construction of Pakistani Christian Identity* (O'Brien 2006) was published in the Subaltern Studies Series of the Research Society of Pakistan. The work, being the first of that kind and based on a long-term ethnographic study, draws a rich picture of Christian history and culture. He fails though to recover the Christians of Pakistan as subject(s) of history and change. The collective identity drawn in his work is a subaltern identity in the classical shape of early Subaltern Studies. The image drawn of Pakistani Christians is that of 'sweepers', of a 'passive' and 'excluded' community. Community culture and especially religion are drawn as a separate sphere: a space of honor, lived 'equality' and 'ritual role reversing'; a place where the 'spoiled identity' is managed. In his concluding chapter he points to the 'struggle, resilience, and unconquerability' of the Pakistani Christian identity.

Drawing on the frame of subaltern citizenship, in the following pages I decided to tell a different story. We will focus on the relation of the Christian community with the surroundings, the struggles, involvements and negotiations with 'the state' as well as the disputes and cracks that run through it. Special attention will be directed to the 'citizenly' dimension of Christian politics in Gilgit. Different theories create different stories and as you will see, the following one is inspired by the notion of the 'subaltern citizen'. We will come across non-political politics as well as non-Christian Christian politicians, grassroot-democracy and favouritism, exchange systems in which citizenly rights are traded and not least stories in which the hegemonic narratives of impurity and honor, that structure Christian's social status, are subverted.

Externality – the central feature of subalternity – to my opinion is a somehow misleading idea when talking about the relation of the Christian minority of Gilgit and 'the state'. To start in the beginning: the immigration of Christians to Gilgit-Baltistan and especially to the city of Gilgit is directly linked to the (increasing) presence of 'the state' in the northern region. Talking about 'the state' in the context of Gigit-Baltistan is confusing as long as

there are at least two if not three powers of political governance: the government of Gilgit Baltistan, the Pakistani State and the Pakistani military. The installment of a central government in the announced region's capital Gilgit, and the increasing presence of the Pakistani state and military led to a fast increment of public space. Christian military sweepers being transferred back from the northern bases to the lowlands must have spread the notice in their communities that there is work up in the north, different people guessed, and that is how the migration started. The work of public cleaning – be it of streets, canals, offices or toilets – as well as handling certain materials like blood or excrements is widely stigmatized as impure. So while cleaning public space is an intolerable job for locals – the only locals performing such jobs are people with mental disorders and disabilities – not least because the discourse of im/purity is closely linked to the discourse of honor, for Pakistani Christians it has been a quite common work and important resource of income over decades. Today's situation, Pakistani Christians working in the 'spheres of impurity', also results of a historical arrangement: A great part of Christians stem from converts belonging to a group that has been discussed as the caste of sweepers (for a controversial discussion see O' Brien 2006: 37ff). Other job opportunities are scarce, and the public cleaning sector – as they are often government jobs – offers acceptable and secures incomes for Christians. That counts especially for people with low education. Sweeping jobs have led quite many Christian families to urban areas where they perform a great part of public cleaning. Gilgit forms no exception, as the minority also here performs the cleaning of the main streets and canals, the bazaar and public toilets in the city and main mosques. It is also mainly Christians who clean government offices, banks, the university, and hotels and who are holding the positions of sweepers in the military and its different institutions, i.e. it is Christians handling all 'the impure' in the local military hospital. In contrast to lowland cities, in Gilgit only the sweepers employed by the Pakistani state and military have the privileged status of government servants. The vast of public cleaning is organized through a contractor-system. Every two years the contractor-positions, called *tekedar*, are announced newly and due to government authorities the lowest offer wins. Until now it were always Christians holding these positions. The *tekedar* positions promise both: high influence within the community as well as easy access to government officials and social capital in form of relations – a good that is highly important to access certain goods and privileges. Both *tekedars* enjoy sovereignty in managing the work and can decide independently whom and to which conditions they employ their subcontractors. There has been an ongoing struggle for the *tekedar* positions in Gilgit, creating a serious antagonism between two extended families and a lot of trouble within the whole community. Enmity has increased and several cases have been filed in that ongoing conflict. But before telling that story, let me first sketch the general socio-political situation of the Christian immigrants.

It can be stated that the socio-political situation and the politics of Christians in Gilgit generally seem to be shaped by three factors: firstly, a lack of knowledge about Christianity; secondly, the political negation of citizenship; and thirdly an inclusion of Christians in the workforce. Even though we need to recognize that this is an unfavorable inclusion in many aspects it deserves consideration that it creates a certain intimacy between the minority and 'the state'. Let us take a closer look at those three.

Gilgit-Baltistan officially presents itself as "self-governed region" characterized by ethnic and religious plurality (see http://www.gilgitbaltistan.gov.pk/). In the city of Gilgit, apart from Sunni and Shia, there is a community of Ismailis and the mosque of Ahmadiyya in the city center has lately (re)opened. The first Christians migrated to Gilgit in the beginning or mid-1980s. They are, also due to immigration from relatives, today forming the largest extended families holding various community offices and struggle with each other for the *tekedar* positions. Apart from them, there are various nuclear families and also single young men, the latter mostly performing temporary jobs in fields considered unacceptable by locals like private cleaning, construction work or painting. Additionally there are about 100 military sweepers, some with, some without families in Gilgit. The vast majority is living in poor conditions. Some of the households are loosely organized in neighborhoods. Other mechanisms of building solidarity networks between not-related families are marriage, the establishment of fictive kinship relations called *mubala bhai/ mubala behen*, and not least celebrating feasts in the churches as well as by private people. The latter as I learned during my stay can be based on shared Punjabi customs or be invented traditions. The churches and religious community life play an important role for community organization but are by no means the only space and form of community building and governance. In context of a struggle for a 'real church' a democratic council was held and the community elected their representatives. But this story will be told a bit later.

Today Gilgit counts about 50 Christian households, nuclear and extended families as well as compositions of non-related persons that reside in the city permanently. As long as I heard Christians haven't suffered much daily discrimination, nor have there been any cases of faith-based violence. Over the years quite some 'Christian' infrastructure has been established: three churches (the so called 'chapel house' that has been closed after a conflict, one church called the 'real church' and one people refer to as 'community' or 'house church'), a Christian cemetery, a school and an NGO, running different community and disaster relief projects in the region. Christian people used to praise their new home when talking to me, not only for natural beauty but also for the situation in the north being friendly and safe. Thereby they pointed to lowland Pakistan, where they felt insecurity and faith-based

violence increasing and fear rising[2]. I noticed however that quite a lot of security arrangements are being made: high walls have been built around the church compound, pupils are transported from hostels to school and back, wardens watch the gates of the Christian institutions, many private houses are protected by dogs and people generally don't stay out after dusk. The arrangements, people argued, are necessary because of the ongoing sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shia and the masses are incalculable in times of turmoil. "We have to be careful, especially in Gilgit-Baltistan", were the words of a pastor. Being careful is also an imperative that shapes his politics. "We do not want to get involved in politics", he insisted and somehow denied the political dimension of his broad networking activities, institutional involvements, his negotiations with government officials, politicians, intelligence agencies, local authorities and not least the exchange arrangements between the Christian community and 'the state' that he shaped.

Local people are inexperienced and they lack knowledge about Christianity, is what I was told as explanation for the situation. And indeed I was surprised that locals hardly knew anything nor recognized the presence of the religious minority. "Are there any Christians?" I was asked various times. "Is it a sect of Islam?" is a common question towards the pastor who also experiences a lot of curiosity. "Some" he said, "come to church to see if we really worship idols." Till now conflicts between the Christian community and local opponents could be solved. In the pastor's eyes, the NGO and the school thereby play a crucial role. The NGO is running a peace project in which women from all faiths and local groups are provided a cost-free sewing training and the mixed groups are being educated in peace. The Christian school is a place where children from Christian families are studying together with local children. Due to its good reputation quite some local religious and political leaders send their children here. While the pastor highlighted the two Christian institutions as creating spaces for people of different faiths to come together, I'd like to point out that they create good grounds for networking, cooperation and exchange with local people and institutions.

2 Within the last years violence against Christians is on the rise. Various Christian neighbourhoods and churches have been attacked. Last year the attack of two suicide bombers blasting in the catholic church of Peshawar caused 85 deaths and various injured. The attack shattered the already frightened community. In 2011 Shahbaz Bhatti, the first ever Christian holding the office of a minister, had been killed by Therik-i-Taliban after Bhatti, in his office as minister of minorities, spoke up publically against the blasphemy law. The disputed law, installed under the military dictatorship of Zia- ul Haq in 1986, presents a serious thread for religious minorities living in Pakistan. Repeatedly Christians have been accused of blasphemy and punished with draconic sentences. The mob burning down a Christian neighbourhood in Lahore in 2011, causing various deaths and great fear, is argued to have happened after a sanitary worker allegedly blasphemed the Prophet Mohamed.

Christian residents are denied citizenship in the self-governed region so far. Legally they are citizens of the Pakistani state, while in Gilgit-Baltistan they have the status of immigrants. Even those who met the formal needs for citizenship weren't granted citizen status. The consequence is that Christians have no formal right to vote. That counts for all Christians in Gilgit-Baltistan: the community in Gilgit as well as the smaller ones concentrating around the military bases in Chilas and Skardu. According to the Christians I talked to, the status as immigrants modulates the precarious political situation of Christians in Giligit-Baltistan: the lack of voting rights, the denial of land ownership and the impossibility to get permanent jobs in the region's government sector. These legal restrictions, which have been debated for some time, thereby aren't practically enforced on all immigrants. It would have needed further research to find out why these rules are unequally enforced on different groups and people who immigrated to Gilgit. In practice though, it becomes apparent that the regulations of citizenship are also negotiable in the case of the Christian immigrants. With the power of relations rules have been bent and even though not citizen status but citizen rights became accessible. In fact though, at the moment the religious minority has no legal political representation within the democratic government neither of the region nor of the city. There were rumors, that the region has reserved seats for the minority (that due to the immigration politics are vacant). Whatsoever Gilgit's Christians still hold their NICs of Pakistan and their old homes are registered as their permanent address. As long as I got to know, they don't make use of their voting right in their home towns and do not profit from their status as citizens of the Pakistani state – for which they are sometimes envied by locals. Another result of the unsolved political relation between Pakistan and the region of Gilgit-Baltistan and the latter's immigration politics is that the Christian immigrants practically have no access to goods and services provided to the poor by 'the state': neither to the services of the region nor to those provided through national welfare schemes. They could neither access the services and goods distributed through the Benazir Bhutto Income Support Program nor out of the Bait-ul-mal Fund.

As a third aspect of the situation and politics of Christians in Gilgit, I want to discuss the 'inclusion' of the minority and the intimacy between the minority and 'the state' created through work performance. Christians perform government duties not only for the government of Gilgit-Baltistan and the municipality of Gilgit but also the Pakistani state and military present in the northern region. Christians are not only present but deeply involved in the governance of public space: as government servants of the Pakistani state and military, as permanent workers, *tekedars* and subcontractors, sweepers, drivers, wardens, gardeners etc. They literally form a part of 'the state'. The term inclusion might be irritating here and no doubt it needs to be highlighted that it is a quite unfavorable inclusion, as long as most work they perform

is stigmatized as impure, polluted and dishonorable. Even though locals denied that the stigma of jobs and materials is passed on to those who perform them, I witnessed certain discomfort of locals with the Christian immigrants. To quote my local co-researcher, who joined me on two afternoons visiting Christian sweeper families: "See, I am not like the others." He said that when shaking the hand of the mosques toilet sweeper. A government official left no doubts when explaining to me why the municipality organizes cleaning work through the contractor/subcontractor model: it serves to keep distance between the officers of the municipality and those handling waste, blood and excrements. In Gilgit-Baltistan as mentioned before not only Christians work in the 'sphere of impurity'. As I learned from the same official, Christians even perform the better (paid) jobs as they generally work as *sweepers*, while the least honored job, that of the *coolis* – the collection and burning of waste – is done by local people with disabilities and mental disorders.

Looking to the very practice, the relation between the in wide parts poor and illiterate religious minority and local Muslim society as well as 'the state' is by no means characterized only by distance and avoidance but also by proximity and intimacy. Cleaning government offices and private houses demands and creates mutual trust. In contrast to the other representation of these relations, I want to argue, that Christians are much closer to the Muslim society and somehow much less excluded from 'the state' than generally perceived. Current works tend to mark the religious minority as 'subaltern' in a very classical sense (O'Brien 2006) and limit the picture to that of a structurally discriminated religious minority in a state that is discussed as 'Islamic' (Gabriel 2007). Such images of the situation negate the intimacy, which also shapes the relation between the religious minority and 'the state'. At the end I am thankful to the local police and security agencies who with their mistrust made me realize the intimacy of that relation. While I had – not least because of the common representations of Pakistani Christians as excluded and subaltern – naïvely assumed my field of research laying at the very 'margins of the state', their attention and suspicion of misusing the Christians to access 'the state' from below helped to realize that I had entered into a quite intimate and sensible relationship characterized mainly by trust.

Politics of 'subaltern citizenship'

"Jesus kingdom is based on relations". The pastor's principle not only describes his 'non-political' political strategy but reflects the very conditions of the politics of the religious minority that, as we will see, is worth to consider also as an immigrant community. To fulfill his divine mission of the 'uplift and development' of the Christian community in Gilgit – the mission was conveyed to him in a dream shortly before graduating from a bible college in Lahore – the pastor has built up a quite complex network comprising west-

ern missionaries, foreign donors, local party politicians as well as independent candidates, different local businessmen, officers from the municipality, people from police and security agencies, influential Muslim citizens and his 'mother church' in Lahore, to just mention a few. Within less then 15 years, a lot of networking and support from a handful of local Christian families, he has managed to build a school, found an NGO (that has faced strong oppositions), and realized various projects of community development, crisis relief and peace education. He also managed to bend local rules and buy land to erect a Christian colony, with a 'real church', a women's training center, two hostels for pupils (where the Christian children from the Christian community of Chilas live during school times) and a house for his family. The eight plots for private houses, that together with the walled church area make the *pasban colony*, the Shepher's Colony, were given to the church elders. The pastor's phrase tells a lot about his work and career in Gilgit. Settling down in the city as a young man with a great vision, the way to reach his aims was constant networking and negotiating. He is successful with his strategy of *doing politics* without getting involved into the sphere of formal politics. That somehow characteristic form of subaltern politics needs to be considered when sketching the field of Christian politics. When looking to political practice in Gilgit the spheres of subaltern and formal politics are difficult to be separate and I doubt that they are clearly conceptually separable. In Gilgit not only (theoretically bureaucratically accessible and distributed) goods and services provided by government agencies but also citizenship and (theoretically inalienable) rights are subjects of political negotiations that are not necessarily recognized or assumed as politics. Citizen rights have been traded like goods. It is maybe needless to say that the simple *having* of citizenship and citizen rights is nothing but a fiction of western liberal democracy. Looking to political practice, citizenship is rather to be understood as a subject and result of political struggles and democratic rights are only showing effect when practically claimed and acted out in certain ways. It is a difficult question how to talk about such practices like the trading of citizenly rights as goods: Should we name it corruption, subversion of power or cultural appropriation of rights? What I want to argue here is that not only in systems of favoritism but also wherever democracies become exclusive, certain forms of corruption like the 'trade' of citizenship, votes or rights (means things considered to be inalienable in the theory of liberal democracy) need to be assumed as possible profoundly 'citizenly' politics of the excluded. The same goes for accessing and trading goods and benefits provided by states and the global community. Through such 'citizenly' politics, the imagination of democracy and the claiming of rights outside the formal field of politics, the Christian minority of Gilgit has received various 'citizenly' goods in the past. Voting rights, to just mention one example, have been exchanged for the freedom of choice, and the community's contribution to election victory was honored

with a paved street to the church. Such practices linking the Christian community and the local political sphere need to be understood in their complexity and ambivalence as long as they move somewhere in-between trade, corruption, moral economy and democracy. Some exchange-systems thereby point quite far into the future: Building a school with a good reputation and accepting the children from influential local Muslim families is not only of help in the here and now as it helps to build moral relationships, but is also assumed as a good means to build a better future for all Christians in the country. The pastor is sure that education creates a moral bond between the privileged Muslim students and the Christian minority: When his students will be in power, they will somehow reciprocate, the pastor argued, pointing to evidence in the national history of Pakistan.

The pastor of the 'real church', embedded in a strong support network, is one among many Christians engaged in the field of politics. The first of five men I want to introduce is his antagonist in the religious sphere: the pastor of the so called 'house church'. The ongoing friction between the two pastors and their local supporters interfere deeply with community life. The pastor of the 'real church' and his people are being accused of being elitist, favoring their own people and lacking solidarity with the poor. The people of the 'house church' stylize themselves in contrast as the 'real Christians' with the 'good hearts' as they are caring for the needy. When listening to the other faction they point to the marginal role of the 'house church'-people and blame them for being stuck in a 'culture of poverty'. They are blamed of opposing their uplift strategy for the community. What is irritating is that both churches follow the same denomination and belong to the same Pentecostal mother church located in Lahore. As I attended church services and rituals in both churches, it seems that they follow quite similar cultural and religious practices. The reason for the community split isn't to be found in the sphere of religion itself but rather in the socio-political struggles, to which I will come at some later time.

The third Christian actor in the political field that I want to introduce – and this time people name his activities 'politics'– is a dreaded and widely condemned man. He is an offspring of one of the very first Christians that settled down in Gilgit. I had to puzzle together information from different sources to get a picture, firstly because the story from different factions of the community, local authorities and the newspaper differed substantially and secondly because people avoided elaborating the stories about him in detail. One reason behind was fear, as they mentioned, another an ongoing community conflict in which he was prominently involved and that was about to be fought in court. How come that man was so dreaded? He was sweeping the streets when he accidentally witnessed a crossfire in which a local politician was involved. It was his testimony in court that led to that the defendant was completely exonerated. After the incident the Christian sweeper, which

in contrast to most other Christians who originate from Punjab is from former NWFP, enjoyed great support from the family of the former defendant. The unusual alliance lead to an enduring empowerment of the sweeper and his family: He became member of his supporters' party and started a political career in Gilgit, claiming to be the *sadder* of the Christians and as their president also their legal political representative. While he is recognized as the Christian *sadder* in society – even though locals made fun of the sweeper playing the politician wearing white clothes and black vest – the Christians themselves pointed out that he was never elected by the community nor did he act on behalf of them. The reasons why he was feared were two: his influential networks on one hand and his rule when he was holding the *tekedar* position. Rumors told that he held the contractor-job of the municipality due to his networks to the local politician's family, whom he saved from jail. Christians remember these times as a 'reign of terror' arguing that he tried to establish a *chaudhary system* in the city. The term *chaudhary* origins from colonial times and is traditionally used for landlords as well as a title of honor. With *chaudhary system* people generally refer to a hierarchical system, working on the base of dependency, sometimes in form of bound labor or slavery. I knew the term from my prior research in Islamabad, where members of the Christian communities with the term *chaudhary* referred to the (Christian) landowners, as well as those men holding broker positions. Due to the fact that such systems provide benefits and social securities – just like any patronage-system – *chaudharys* are ambivalent figures. The reputation of the *chaudharys* I came across ocillated between good and bad. Usually these men were blamed for having appropriated the land and goods where their power grounded in illegitimately. In Gilgit the terms *chaudhary* and *chaudhary system* were only used in a negative sense. Stories ranking around the self-named president of the Christians accused him of corruption, of having created fatal dependencies by making his laborers drug addicted, and for having treated them like slaves. His image was drawn as that of an entirely bad man, sometimes even as 'the evil' itself. In the ascribed role of the nominal Christian betraying his community he was imagined as a mythical counterpart of all those, who played with the role of being 'the good'. He was also involved in a rivalry for the town's *tekedar* positions – a conflict that had recently dramatized: The self-named *sadder* and his sons were suspected of having murdered the two brothers of the rivaling family. They were shot in the open street in 2012. When I did my research, the suspect had left Gilgit and while some people guessed that he fled the city fearing revenge, others told that with the help of his influential friends he got a *tekedar* position in another town.

The fourth political actor that I wish to present here is the mentioned rivaling family: an extended, internally quarreling family to which the two murderd brothers belonged. During my fieldwork the family held office of

both contractor positions. The victims' older brother was in charge for organizing the cleaning of public streets and canals as well as the town market, being the *tekedar* of the municipality. His brother in law was holding the *tekedar* position offered by military. The latter's job is to organize the cleaning of the so called NLI market and a public toilet, which are both located on a former military compound in the very center of the city. Both men have settled down in Gilgit about seventeen years ago. Over the years they brought many relatives to the region. They were generally referred to as 'good people' as they were usually compared with the former *tekedar* and his rule. Lately though a vote of no confidence against the victims' brother in law had caused serious disturbance. I first met the men in front of the public toilet where he was hanging out with his workers. After we spent the afternoon together with his family, I was invited to attend a celebration in his house the other week. What was to celebrate was the 'first shave' of his oldest son. The huge feast, to which the whole community was invited and many families showed up, had the character of a Punjabi wedding. The shave of the boy was performed by his uncles and father – but that was a marginal scene. The climax of the evenly celebration was rather when the priest of the 'real church' opened the prayers and issued the blessing for the family and when shortly after that the guests lavished *hars* on the boy and his parents. *Hars* – necklaces made of flowers and money – are traditionally given to the bridegroom and his parents. These (money-) gifts publicly show off the family's social status. In such kind of feasts solidarity networks are not only made visible but also (re) generated, as long as giving *hars* is a social obligation that usually requires balanced reciprocation. The illuminated scene, which happened in the dawn in the courtyard of the family's house, turned out to be a great spectacle. One guest after the other posed with the freshly shaved boy and his parents in front of a plenty of pulled out mobile phone cameras. At night the guests were served generously with different meat-dishes and alcohol.

I had been curious about the ceremony as long I had never heard of, nor attended a 'first shave' before. There was a good reason for that, I learned that evening, because the first shave of a son isn't a Punjabi tradition, as the hosts insisted, but what not only ethnologists but also locals called an 'invented tradition'. By celebrating his sons 'first shave' the host while enhancing prestige and showing up as a respected man with a great solidarity network, at the same time became highly suspicious. Why did he celebrate such a costly community feast and why at that very moment? The people I talked to offered different explanations: While some argued that the host intended to create acceptance for the marriage arrangement of his under aged daughter, others related the feast to the unsettled murder of his two brothers in law – as in that context he had fallen in the community's disgrace. The whole murder-case was confusing: While the local newspaper had announced the self-made *chaudhary* as the suspected murderer, within the Christian com-

munity at least one more man was openly suspected and that was the feast's host. While the official story was one of envy between the two families rivaling for the town's *tekedar* positions, rumors circled around the inner-family problems of the victims. All stories and their variations offered deep insights into the structure and conflicts of the young Christian community in Gilgit. Still though as an ethnographer it was neither my job nor was it a good idea to get involved in the unsettled case too deep. The danger to slip into ethical dilemmas was huge. Here I just want to highlight one highly interesting aspect of the case: The double murder was widely discussed in public but in the Christian versions it was only as the murder of just one man. The second victim – brother of the first – was not only left out of the stories but literally wiped out of the community's collective memory. Why was that? It was on the cemetery where I got a hint as there was only one brother's grave. The second victim, who died shortly after the incident in hospital, had converted to Islam and was married to a Muslim woman. If my information is right, that tragic case of the two brothers was cracked in two not only in the narratives of the Christians, but also by local authorities. The case of the murder of the Christian man, who died on the spot, was still open, while the one of his converted brother seemed to be closed. To cite the local newspaper informing about the case shortly after the killing: "It should be clear that this is the first incident of this sort in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan". The article highlights that this was the first ever crime against the Christian minority, leaving no doubts that the murder was a "pure result of personal enmity". That was the result of the police investigation after hearing the testimony of the wounded brother in hospital. Such clarifications seemed necessary not least because the very performance suggested a link to sectarian tensions shaking the region for decades. It was a classical target killing: a masked man had shot at the two brothers during sweeping work from the back of a driving motorbike. While the case of the Christian victim was about to be handled in court, the case of his converted brother had been solved otherwise: within the legal framework of the sectarian tensions. As his wife's neighbors told, she had received compensation by the state which is a common relief given to families affected by acts of terrorism.

There are more figures and groups in the young history of the Christian immigrants' community, which should be mentioned when talking about politics. One that hasn't appeared so far, not least because I came across him quite late in my fieldwork and couldn't gather much information nor meet him to talk, is the democratically elected *saddar* of the Christians. The carpenter, who has his own business in the side road of Jutial, is the offspring of another one of the very first Christians who settled down in Gilgit. He somehow inherited his status from his father. An inscription on the cemetery honors him and his burial is remembered widely as it showed the great respect and central role the man played. His son not only administers the cemetery

today but also used to lead the prayers in the former community church. Today though he is an ally of the pastor of the 'real church' and holds office of an elder there. On Sundays it is him leading the small but impressive community's ritual. The tall man with the henna-red beard stands up in front of the community and after a twisted horn is blown raises his fist and shouts three times with his strong voice: *Jesus Christ victory!* Hands raise and the people echo his battle cry.

'Making a community' and struggling for a 'real church'

As mentioned before, Gilgit at the moment has two churches: a so-called 'real church' and a 'house church'. The status quo, even though it is contested, has been stable for at least six years. It is the result of a long struggle, complex involvements and negotiations not only within the Christian community but also with different local government agencies, Pakistani churches and international missions and donors. In the memory of the community, the struggle for a 'real church' is strongly connected with the 'making of community'. What that means and how it worked deserves a closer look. Thereby we will come across a whole range of politics: politics of citizenly and democratic self-empowerment of the immigrant religious minority, different forms of resistances and rivalries, negotiations and collaboration with 'the state', subversion of local power, and not least taking advantage of the local sectarian conflict in the minority's struggle for a place.

Not least was the name of the first public place for Christian prayers in Gilgit disputed. People referred to it as 'the catholic church', always emphasizing that it was not a 'real church'. Most called it the 'chapel house'. The place that after a dispute has been closed was established by nuns from Kohat/ Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa in the beginning of the 1990s. Local Christians used to hold prayers on Sundays and the nuns came every three months to perform ceremonies and give sacraments. "Sunday prayers was simply not enough, the church was in a bad condition and the area far away from people's home and not safe. Extremists were living around. The nuns disappeared and people weren't happy with the one leading the prayers afterwards. They stayed away." That was one story I was told. Another one, that even though it always created laughs disqualified the place as a proper church, told that after the nuns fled the place police filed a case against the Muslim warden who was hiding marihuana inside the church. A third one offers insights into the power games and ongoing community disputes in the field of religion and tells of the very beginning of community building of the Christian immigrants who started a life in Gilgit.

At the start of research my perspective on the Christian community was strongly shaped by the pastor of the 'real church', who indeed was a great starting point as long as he offered rich and well structured information of

the history of Christians and local institutions, especially the 'real church', school and NGO. I was very lucky to have met two Christian sweepers in university, as the fictive brothers generously helped me with my research and were open to discuss all thoughts and ideas. It was them who introduced me to many local Christian families, and while through the pastor I had come to know the uplifted, better off part of the community, they felt responsible to show me the 'real' situation, the poorer and other part of the community. They invested a lot of time to help me and were very talkative. For some reason though, the story I will tell soon was held back from me until the very end of my fieldwork. Sitting together drinking tea after another marathon of visiting Christian families in the city center, they started telling community history. The *saddar* of the community was elected before any church had been established. That time there was only the chapel house and there was no room for the community to meet regularly. A dispute arose between the people and the Catholic Church. People wanted a 'real church': a place to meet any time and a cross on the roof. The nuns filed a case against the whole community, accusing four men by name, for wanting to take over the property of the catholic monastery. The police started investigations and a couple of men were taken into investigative custody. One year before people had met in a private house and 'made a community': two representatives were selected carrying the title of *brothers*. While the duty of one of them was to visit families and to pray with them the other was elected as *saddar* of the Christians. The latter was in charge of arranging the community's affairs and organize help for people in great need. He was also responsible for negotiating the community's conflict with the nuns. There were four or five more of such plenary meetings to which each household was called to send a male representative. They all sat down in the *saddar's* house. About two years after he was elected as the religious leader of the first community church. A house was rented for church activities and prayers and it was his job to collect the money from the community to pay the rent for the 'house church' and community activities. At that time today's pastor of the 'real church' had already arrived at Gilgit. He was holding Sunday prayers in another 'house church'. People remember that he was trained by North-American missionaries and supported by the well-off Christian families who sympathized with his program of social uplift and development through education. In the aftermath of a conflict he and one of his elder who then led the prayers with him, parted ways. The conflict arose when the latter wanted to take better care of the poor families but the pastor rejected his request. As a result the church elder graduated and started studying at the bible college in Lahore. Today it is him leading the community church, the so called 'house church'. In the last years, this split of the Christian community has deepened, the two men told me. Sometimes the dispute between the pastors is acted out openly as rivalry, they argued, pointing to religious conventions that were held in Gilgit shortly

one after the other. That was a matter of truth as taking part was a sign of belonging and solidarity. As a result each side boycotted the other's convention.

The two brothers, who came to Gilgit without any relatives around, established a fictive brotherhood to help out each other in daily life and in times of need. They both belonged to the 'house church'. Church belonging has become a serious matter in Gilgit. In local debates not only 'real' Christians are split from 'nominal' Christians but belonging is also a matter of rich and poor. The two university sweepers were sure: their community comprises of the poor and honest people with good hearts. They are the real Christians as long as their church is caring for the needy and newly arrived. Knowing that I had been in touch with the other pastor and also attended prayers in the other church, their critique was sensible but they still tried hard to convince me that the other, economically better off part of the community was an elitist movement. They felt the situation deeply immoral and unjust as the other pastor had received great support from international donors and the mother church in Lahore and with that money now only helped their own people. They doubted the 'real churches' pastor being a good man as it was him who had started a morally highly dubious loan system in Gilgit. The better off people borrowed money to the poor demanding high interest rates. Morally on the right side, the needy gave back all the borrowed money once they realized the deceit. When asking the accused pastor, I heard another story of the so called *Christian welfare society*. It was the widely respected father of the elected *saddar* who founded the *komiti* (a common word used for rotating credit systems in Pakistan). When he invited him to lead the *Christian welfare society* the pastor refused. From his perspective the institution collapsed because the poor people misused it: they spent the credits on drugs instead of creating a business and as a result never paid the money back. He had his version of guilt and here the elected *saddar* was the morally dubious figure of the community. Blaming him of misusing his offices as he keeps money that he collects from the community for himself, he was responsible for various projects to have failed.

But now back to the story. How did the 'real church' come into being? With help of some North-American friends the pastor – by that time he had already started his school project and registered the NGO – bought a plot to construct the Christian colony that is supposed to stand as model for the region. That was back in 2004. After difficult personal and legal negotiations, the landowner, a local Sunni, was willing to sell and they bought the land in Jutial, paying an exaggerated price. The town engineer remembers when the pastor and his men came to him. After he had checked all the laws and as he found no regulations that spoke against building a church in Gilgit-Baltistan he authorized the construction. His story ended here as his role was marginal as long as the construction plans were already completed and the pastor and his people managed everything by themselves. The pastor remembers

all details from here. At the moment when the wall was built serious local resistance arose. The main opponents of the colony were some local mullahs but also the self-proclaimed Christian *saddar*, who was suspected to have spurred the mullahs on. The latter back then openly accused the pastor of bringing 'western agenda and money' to Gilgit and wanting to build an 'American Colony'. The pastor suggested that he acted against the project as he feared to lose his power to him. Whatsoever the mullahs went to court and filed a case against the pastor. The situation got worse but then – to make use of one of the pastor's parenthesis "Jesus is stronger than the Taliban" – the circumstances radically changed. In early 2005, Sunnis killed the local Shia leader and after a range of target killings, the leaders of both Shia and Sunni side fled the city. A curfew was imposed and the city remained paralyzed for several weeks. This outbreak of sectarian violence turned out to be a unique chance for the church project. Public attention was distracted and due to the fact that the church plot was located in the cantonment area, moving around during the curfew was possible here. With the help of community members and neighbors, who were stuck at home during the curfew and without work and income, the construction got started. Following the pastor' story, everything went very quickly and when the curfew was over the church was built. Once the church was constructed, local opponents found no more support and so in 2006 the church was finally consecrated. Since then, construction in the Shepherd's Colony went on. A women's vocational training center was raised on the top and most houses have been finished. During my stay the boys' hostel was completed. The struggle for a 'real church' though is going on. Recently the debate of the realness of the church is again on the rise as long as some critics argue that there shouldn't be anything above a church – especially not a woman's training center.

Negotiations and struggles for space and a recognition of Christians as citizens of the city are going on. The political project for next election period is already set: to get a filter plant for the community. In times of scarcity the Christian colony has no access to water. Even though they are legally eligible, the local wardens of water distribution deny supply. Whether that discrimination is grounded in faith relations or whether it is linked to their status as immigrants isn't clear. What is clear though is that there is a base for 'citizenly' negotiations. Just as the pastor said: "Jesus' kingdom is based on relations".

Thinking ambiguity. Multiplying modernity.

The situation of the Christians in Gilgit is marked by political negation *and* inclusion in 'the state', by subalternity *and* the potentiality of citizenship. Pandey's theoretical figure of the 'subaltern citizen' is useful to shed light on such paradoxical situations as well as to focus the politics of the people living under such conditions:

> *"[T]he phrase 'subaltern citizen' is not primarily intended to suggest the subordinate status of certain citizens, though of course it can be used precisely to describe such a condition in particular times and places. Nor it is used to describe a historical process of moving from status of subalternity to one of citizenship, although again such a process may indeed be traced in different parts of the world, not least in the context of the anti-colonial struggles of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries. I am concerned in the main with a somewhat different proposition, having to do with the potential that the subaltern possesses (or the threat s/he poses) of becoming a full member of community, the village, the ward and the polis."* (Pandey 2010b: 4)

The situation of Gilgit's Christians is widely marked by not being involved in democratic structures and not having citizenship. The field of 'politics' seems better to be avoided, when wanting to achieve something. Own political agency was generally downplayed by all actors. So is the early argument of Subaltern Studies right? Does the subaltern, do subaltern politics form a separated sphere? And does that sphere emerge through negation by the state and/or by self-negation in the field of the 'political'? But then how about Chatterjee's argument of increasing involvement and negotiating of subaltern subjects with the state due to democratization and creeping technologies of governance? Looking at the politics in practice of the self-designated community and its different quarrelling actors, we get quite another picture: 'Citizenly' democratic structures have been established, citizen rights are being claimed and negotiated, and – despite the status and rights aren't ascribed – in practice they prove to be accessible and it is possible to act them out. The unsettled political relation between the region Gilgit-Baltistan and the state of Pakistan not least shapes the actual socio-political situation. In the immigrated minority's struggle for a place, democratic participation, access to goods and political representation, citizen rights appear to be a negotiable and alienable good that can be traded and exchanged within highly privatized networks spanning between the minority and 'the state'. Citizenship becomes a question of appropriation and practice rather than of ascription and belonging. Pandey's philosophical argument of the potentiality of citizenship can be understood quite literally. While politics of the Christian community on the one hand seem to be shaped by a collective experience and awareness of negation and exclusion – a 'subaltern self-consciousness' – on the other hand they are formed by the experience and the vision of democracy and citizenship. Democratization is neither an 'objective condition', nor is political involvement of marginalized people necessarily a result of changing styles of governance (from above).

To understand contemporary subalternities there is an urgent need to reconsider citizenship and *democracy as imagination* and therefore as po-

tentiality. The 'citizenly' of subaltern politics is not only a matter of awareness on the side of the researcher but asks for the very recognition of 'citizenly' visions and practices not only under democratic conditions, but also where democracy seems absent. Such an approach requires reworking the very concepts of democracy and citizenship. How are democracy and citizenship imagined, experienced and acted out in everyday life? How does a citizenly self-consciousness emerge? What are rights as political practice?

Theoretical paradigms are coming and passing. They are linked to their times. But who is to decide about when it is time and what are the reasons to bury paradigms? And that time I see no need to throw out the babies with the bath. The image of the 'subaltern rebel', just as that of the 'subaltern citizen' are theoretical notions that are useful to direct attentions and create awareness of certain aspects of subalternity and power/knowledge in the past as well as in the present. Different times provoke different concepts and different concepts are useful to tell different (his)stories. Our time if anything is calling for the multiplying of (his)stories and tracing of their interrelation.

We are living in the time of multiple modernities. Concepts seemingly belonging to the past can be useful to understand the present; just as stories about the imagined *others* tell stories about the authorities who write them. Subalternities have always been partial and subaltern societal statuses complex and paradox. So are contemporary subalternities. They are marked by (partial) exclusion and (partial) inclusion, political negation and recognition, suppression and involvement, resistance and cooperation, struggle and negotiation, collaboration and sabotage, subalternity and citizenship. To research, tell and undo subalternities, paradoxical theoretical figures and attention to the potentiality of citizenship (as well as domination) are no doubt of great use. But I don't see that they are able to replace concepts that Chatterjee argues to belong to former times. Researching among the Christian minority in Pakistan and Gilgit, not only the paradox concept of the subaltern citizen but also the un-modulated concept of subalternity proves to be useful. "What an abundance of water! And the impressive caliber of the water pipes!" This was the exclamation of an old man, when I asked him about his job. He has worked all his life making bricks in rural Punjab and has come to Gilgit only lately after his wife has died, to live with his daughter's family. He found a job in one of the central mosques, cleaning the toilet. His story, and maybe also his experience subverts the dominant narration of impurity and pollution, which is linked to the precarious social status of Christians in South Asia. His narration can be read as an inversion, as it is a story of abundance and water, instead of impurity and scarcity. Water thereby is not only a strong symbol of purity and means of purification, but also privilege of locals. In the winter months water turns to a contested good in Gilgit: a hard time for non-locals and new immigrants. In many narrations that I came across during my fieldwork presence (personal) histories of labor migration were

represented as a divine plan. Coming to Gilgit, all the suffering and struggles of migration have been argued to be part of one's personal mission like the uplift and development of the poor Christian community, the building of a Pakistani nation, the establishing peace in the north, the fight against the 'evil' Christian *chaudhary*, the salvation of the unfaithful 'Christians-by name' and 'pagan' ethnic tribes of the north etc. Let me point to the fact that 'subaltern' resistance against structures of domination in the discussed case did not only take the form of an insurrection against 'the state' but that resistances also turned against the own community i.e. habitual practices or its subaltern identity. In Gilgit, one faction of the self-named Christian community is openly fighting against the Christian 'culture of poverty'. Their so-called 'fight against the broom' (the broom is the symbol of the menial cleaning-services) neither turns against the very precarious social condition of Christians which is based on the strict division of labor, nor against the South Asian narration of the Christian sweeper or discourses of im/purity, but rather turns against the 'sweeper community' itself – those of the own people who accept their fate and stick to a collective identity as the 'poor' but 'real' Christians.

It was already in the mid-eighties when Chakrabarty pointed to the ambiguity and paradoxical character of culture(s) of subalternity. The contradiction of resistance against and acceptance of a situation of domination was argued to be an effect of the very structural condition of subalternity. Chatterjee recently has argued that times have changed and so has subalternity, pointing to a shift from subaltern 'politics of resistance' to 'negotiation' and 'involvement' with the state. But are exclusion and the image of the subaltern subject as 'subaltern rebel' imaginations that belong to the past? Should the image of the subaltern subject be replaced by one of the 'subaltern citizen'? Revising the material from my research among the Christian minority in Gilgit I argued that to be a wrong move. Firstly I argued that the situation of the religious minority in Gilgit and their politics need to be understood in their wider context. The diffuse, ambivalent societal situation in Gilgit, shaped by religious plurality, ongoing sectarian tensions and the unsettled debate of the political relation between the Pakistani state and the region of Gilgit-Baltistan rather asks for reworking concepts of democracy and citizenship and a multiplication instead of the limitation of theoretical figures. Secondly I would like to point out that a reflected diversity of concepts enables the researcher to get rid of the paradoxes and complexities of subaltern societal positions, and the experiences and politics of contemporary subalternities that are crucially shaped by exclusion and inclusion as well as the imagination and potentiality of citizenship(s). And not least the diversity of theories and concepts brings the question of authority on the scene. At the end it is me who is responsible for the story told.

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The Ways of Revenge in Chilas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan: Shia-Sunni Clashes as Blood Feuds

Muhammad Azam Chaudhary

Introduction

From 1981 to 1995 I have been a member of the Pakistani-German Study Group engaged in exploring the different regions and aspects of Gilgit-Baltistan's (GB) society and cultures. In this project, I was part of the sub-group documenting rock-carvings and inscriptions discovered in Chilas, District Diamer. Besides helping the documentation of the rock-carvings and inscriptions, I was also exploring different aspects of the life of the people of Chilas. One of the topics of my research during this time was blood feuds. My initial attention to this topic was drawn by the driver of our project named Akram[1]. He was a very fascinating character. He was initially hired along with his very old jeep to drive part of our team (mainly two German cartographers) to different working stations. He was a total illiterate but brilliant in picking up words of English and German to narrate fascinating stories. Many of those stories were, unfortunately, stories of murder. He generally started these stories like this: "Buttogah, two Muslims full-finish – tischu, tischu" (Two people were killed in Buttogah; "tischu" is the imitation of the sound of bullets). For those injured during such conflicts he would say: "five Muslims half-finish". In the beginning these stories sounded like fiction to me especially because I came from a very different cultural background in Pakistan (Punjab). But then one day, a friend was murdered on suspicion of illicit sexual relations. Sometimes later, Zafaran, who worked for the project, killed his sister and her paramour in their fields for alleged illicit sex. With these, at least, last two cases I felt myself dragged into exploring about blood feuds.

In the autumn of 2013, I revisited Gilgit-Chilas after a break of almost two decades and found it very different from those days. The most striking and conspicuous of all the changes was the overshadowing presence of military in the form of security posts at almost every corner and crossing where private and public transport vehicles were stopped and searched. Intelligence agency personnel visited us in the hotels almost on a daily basis. Vehicles, especially, buses, vans and cars traveled on the Karakorum Highway (KKH) as caravans escorted by heavy police contingents. The vehicles were searched and passengers were registered, at least, at twenty different spots on the KKH.

1 All the names used in this article are fictive.

This was mainly due to the Shia-Sunni violence in GB. Many terrible acts of violence had occurred over the last two years (2012-2013). On February 28, 2012, eighteen Shias were killed on the Karakoram Highway in Kohistan district. On April 3, nine passengers were killed in Gonar Farm area close to Chilas. On August 16, some buses were intercepted at Babusar and twenty-two people were killed. In the year 1988 I was almost a participant observer in the preparations for the big *lashkar* that attacked Shia villages near Gilgit in which more than hundred people were killed. District Diamer and Kohistan, especially Chilas, was reported as the epicenter of most of the violence against the Shias. In this paper I want to explain why Kohistan and Diamer are so prominent in this violence and especially why such big mobs come together for this violence.

Much has been written on causes of Shia-Sunni sectarian violence in Pakistan at the macro level. Shia-Sunni violence has also been analyzed with particular reference to GB by several scholars (Grieser and Sökefeld [forthcoming], Sökefeld 2010, PILDAT 2011, Hunzai 2013, The Express Tribune 2012). Different reasons and dimensions of the Shia-Sunni violence in GB have been highlighted in this literature. The factors mentioned in this literature could be grouped into the background, the Pakistani political structure and the outside factors categories. The background group may relate to the spreading of Islam, the distribution of different Muslim sects in the region and the role of the colonial government and administration. The role of Pakistani state and its establishment especially the military, for instance, Zia Ul Haq's politics of Islamization makes the second group. The external factors category include the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran on Pakistani soil, the strategic location of the region, i.e. its being part of the disputed territory between Pakistan and India, and its proximity to the China's border. Such an analysis, though relevant, fails to explain the micro-sociological dynamics of the conflict which in my view are important for a proper understanding of the situation.

The focus of this paper is on what may be termed as the 'structure of violence', i.e. cultural dynamics of the Shia-Sunni violence with a particular focus on the Sunni population who inhabit predominantly the southern parts of GB, i.e. the district Diamer and its adjoining areas. My assumption in this regards is that Shia-Sunni clashes and killings are carried out like blood feuds by the people of Diamer who live in a tribal set up called *Yaghestan* (the lawless people). This is a very dynamical society especially with reference to the formation of groups which change according to the demand of the circumstances. This is comparable to what Evans-Pritchard (1940) has described about the Nuer, the so called principle of fission and fusion. Any groups, according to Evans-Pritchard, tends to split into opposed parts, these parts tend to fuse in relation to other groups. (1940: 148) The link between Shia-Sunni clashes and blood feuds became clear to me during my recent

visit (2013) to Chilas where I could interview a number of local people on topics like the planned construction of the Diamer-Basha-Dam on the Indus, Shia-Sunni clashes and blood feuds. For the people of Chilas the answer was very simple:

> *"Sunni are very frequently killed in Gilgit but because the government, administration and even media in Gilgit are almost completely in the hands of Shias, they are silently buried. But since the Sunni in Gilgit are from our area and have relatives here we get information. We stand in an obligation to take the revenge of these killings according to the local custom. Since the conflict is not personal the entire community shares this obligation."* (Field notes)

I tend to agree with Abou Zahab's (2010: 164) views that Shia-Sunni violence in GB is the result of a multiplicity of factors, most of them not related to religion. Therefore these have to be taken into account while analyzing sectarianism at the grassroots level. This proves, for instance, that the *lashkar* (civilian armed force) attacking Shia villages in 1988 were not something unique about the Shia-Sunni conflict. It happens on and off in tribal societies that an entire group or even valley takes up arms against another group of the equal size. This was also demonstrated by a very recent clash between Diamer and Kohistan, two neighboring regions of which one is part of GB and the other of the adjoining Province Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK). Both of them are Sunni. The headline in the newspaper The Gilgit-Baltistan Bulletin 2014 read: "Gilgit-Baltistan boundary claim between KPK and GB costs 7 lives." According to the details at least seven people were killed and a large number were injured in a clash between armed civil forces (*lashkar*) of district Diamer and district Kohistan. It was a dispute over the location of the boundary between two villages. The Diamer farmers claimed that the Kohistanis captured four hundred of their goats which they refused to return. A *lashkar* from Diamer attacked Kohistanis who had already come together expecting the reaction from Diamer (Gilgit Baltistan Bulletin: 2014).

I want to propose that blood feuds are part of a larger concept called *badal* or revenge in the local culture. Revenge is a behavior which demands ideally 'a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye', but in actual practice the revenge, as it was so aptly described by Durkheim, has "the tendency to surpass in severity the action against which it is reacting (…). That is because the passion which is the soul of punishment ceases only when exhausted. (…) it often extends further than the culpable and reaches the innocent, his wife, his children his neighbours, etc." (1933: 86) *Badal* does not only mean killing; it can be as simple as for instance an angry look for an angry look, or calling a bad name for calling a bad name. The case studies in the coming pages, especially No. 1 and No. 3, are also examples of *badal*. In the Case Study 3 a man runs

away with the future bride of another man. The *jirga* (council of village elders and respectables) decides that instead the sister of the man who ran away be given in marriage to the aggrieved. In Case Study 1 three brothers pronounce *ghag* (publicly declaring a woman as future wife without her and her family's consent) on the three daughters of their uncle who refused to marry them to his nephews. But of course the worst and not so uncommon form of revenge in tribal society is murder which is often linked to issues of marriage and sexuality of the women of one's family or of the opponents. For this study the relevant aspect of the revenge is the *obligation* of revenge i.e. the question of whose duty it is to take revenge, especially of murder. It is, first of all, the sons, father and brothers who must take revenge but if they are not in a position to do so automatically cousins are involved and after them the larger segments of the society and finally the entire population. This depends on the size and structure of the opponents. Where and how did the tribal structure and blood feuds come to this area? Let us start with the ethnographic setting of the area.

Ethnographic Setting

I have done my field research in Chilas where I also lived and worked for more than fifteen years until some eighteen years ago. Last year, in 2013, I revisited Chilas for a few days and was thereby able to refresh some of the data among others on topics of Shia-Sunni violence, blood feuds and the Diamer-Bash-Dam. Chilas is located approximately 130 km south of Gilgit. It is the headquarters of the Diamer District. According to the population census of 1981 it had a total population of less than 150,000 people[2] which included the subdivisions of Astor, Tangir-Darel and Chilas. Astor in the meantime has been made a separate district.

The most evident change I immediately noticed coming back to Chilas after such a long time was the expanded bazaars and presence of mobile phones. The most discussed topic at this time was the Diamer-Basha-Dam; especially the compensation money given for the land and houses which will be inundated by the reservoir to be built on the Indus river below Chilas. The people were very enthusiastic about the dam because most of them were receiving a handsome amount of compensation money. They were also discussing the future job prospects related to the construction of the dam. Interesting in this regards was the dispute about the area where the Diamer-Bash-Dam is to be built as both GB and KPK claimed this territory. This is important for the decision about who will get the royalty for electricity produced from the dam. Interesting was that in this controversy the people of Chilas took a united stand with the people of GB against KPK, their allies against the Shias in Shia-Sunni violence.

2 According to the Census Report, 1981, the total population of district Diamer was 122,690 (quoted in: Khan 1992-a: 293).

In the year 1981, when I first time came to Chilas, there was hardly any market. The KKH had only recently been completed. An important consequence of the construction of the KKH was the easy transport of the very precious forest wood to the down-country markets. This God given easy money from selling timber was mainly spent on the purchase of 'modern' weapons especially the highly prized Kalashnikovs which had been easily available since the beginning of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These weapons were highly valued because of their use for deterrence and revenge. These weapons were openly discussed and displayed on every possible occasions, such as marriage, birth of a male child or a dispute. One of my key informants told me proudly that there were as many Kalashnikov in his house as the number of males – they were eight brothers. The acquisition of such weapons led to an unprecedented increase in the number of blood feuds in the region. Some of the money though was also spent on the education but only of male children. There is a girls' school but female education has no priority especially among the dominant indigenous population groups (Yeshkuns and Shins).

This was slightly different among the non-indigenous people living in the area who do not possess any land and are therefore called *ghair-malik* (non-owners). Among them are groups like the Soniwal, but the largest of these groups was the Pukhtuns. Except those involved in the timber business, most of the Pukhtun population were of lower economic status. They were often dependent on the indigenous population. A Pukhtun informant told me once that the indigenous population considers the Pukhtuns *beghairat* (without honour), for Pukhtuns send their women to schools for education, take them to hospitals if required and sometimes even take them out in their cars (if they have) for important occasions. One can imagine the conservativeness of the indigenous population from the fact that seclusion of women among Pukhtuns is well known as is also the high rate of blood feuds among them, but Yeshkun and Shin certainly take pride in being even more conservative and having an even higher rate of blood feud.

The area belonging to the Chilas sub-division of the Diamer district has been deforested to a very large extent and the timber-money has already been consumed. The construction of Diamer-Bhasha-Dam is going to affect the land and houses of Chilas for which compensation money is being paid. Compared to the timber money which was mainly spent on the purchase of weapons most of the dam compensation money is used for buying cars and houses. I was told by some of my old informants that the institution of feuds is no more as highly rated as it used to be but I had the impression that actually no big change had taken place. I got this impression after trying to meet Hussain Ahmed who was my host and key informant during my research in 1980s. I traced him through his mobile phone but he did not disclose his whereabouts. He did not share even with his closest friends where he was, neither when, how and on which route he would be coming to an appoint-

ment. This was the first principle of blood revenge custom: Never trust anybody. I remember he told me never to come to his house in the dark and not to bring other people along.

The entire region south of Gilgit, which mainly includes the districts of Diamer (Tangir, Darel, Chilas) and Indus-Kohistan has been very different from other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan. It is, for instance, the only part of GB where the population is hundred percent Sunni. Similarly this area is different in terms of socio-political structure. It was the only region of the GB that was tribal and that had no formal system of centralized government. The other parts of GB like Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Shigar, Khaplu, Skardu, Yasin and Punial were all kingdoms in the past. It was called *Yaghestan*, that is, the land of lawlessness and warfare. A significant aspect of the Yaghestani way of life is the institution of *badal* or blood feud. A Punjabi journalist who visited the area wrote: "They love their feuds more than their children, they rather produce children for a successful vengeance and for producing many children they marry several wives" (Deed Shneed, 1992). The highest murder rate prevailed in Tangir and Darel, with Chilas having the second highest rate. Blood feuds do not exist in Astor.[3]

It is important to note that the ethnographic research[4] for the present study was carried out mainly in Chilas and, therefore, the analysis and conclusion are limited to that area. The population of the subdivision of Chilas was approximately 50,000 according to the 1981 census. The subdivision includes the town of Chilas and a number of valleys, such as Butogah, Thak, Gichi, Thor, Hodur, Thalpan and Ges. In the views of my informants the average number of murders per year was more than thirty persons. It is important to keep in mind also the large number of persons who survive the killing attempts.

There are only few families who are not involved in a blood feud. People do not dare to go out into the streets in the dark. Weapons are their permanent companions. They carry at least a pistol or a revolver under their shirts

3 Data about population and area have been taken from Khan 1992a. The statistics about the number of murders per year are from the Chilas Police records I could consult but generally not made public. Chilas had a population of 43,000 in 1981, and there were 24 and 25 murder cases in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Tangir-Darel had a population of 37,000 in 1981, and there were 23 and 30 murder cases in 1993 and 1994, respectively. Similarly, Astor had a population of 47,000 in 1981, with one murder registered in 1993 and two registered in 1994.

4 Since 1982 I stayed every year for two to three months in Chilas as a member of the Pakistan-German study group, the Research Cell of the Heidelberg Academy of Humanities and Sciences, documenting rock-carvings and inscriptions in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, especially in the region of Chilas. Special attention to the collection of material on blood feuds was given during my stays over the last four years of that period.

during the day and sleep with a gun at their side at night. Those who are on the revenging side of the feud try to keep themselves informed about the activities of the other party, in order to waylay them. They employ spies for getting information about their opponents whereas the other party tries to keep its activities a secret. There is strong social pressure to take revenge if it is due. And people are practically forced by this pressure to take revenge. Blood revenge is taken by the nearest relatives, such as the son, brother, father, uncle, or cousin, and often it is done collectively. Before coming to the question of what blood feuds are and how they are linked to the Shia-Sunni violence, let me first pursue the question how and why blood feuds came to this area.

The Genesis of Blood Feuds

I have already mentioned in the last section that the central, northern and eastern valleys of GB were all princely states each ruled by a more or less hereditary (elder son inherits rule after the death of the father) ruler. The southern regions of GB (Diamer, but also adjoining Kohistan) were without a central government and were called "republican" or "acephalous" societies in the literature. Different sects of Islam spread in the above mentioned regions from 14th to 19th century. Baltistan became predominantly a Shia, Diamer a Sunni, and Gilgit (except Nager which is Shia) an Ismaili region.[5] We know from oral traditions as well as written records that before Islamization the region of Diamer and Kohistan also had princely states. I was told by several people from Chilas that Karar, a Hindu, was the last ruler of Chilas. The names of ruins such as *Shahi Mahal* (royal palace) in Darel speak for themselves. Asad Ali Khan, a local scholar, writes: "A long time ago a Hindu Raja Chachi ruled Chilas. At his death there was a war between his two sons Mat Chack and Booth. The latter was successful and became the last ruler of the area" (Khan 1992-a: 291, English translation by the author. See also Biddulph 1977: 16). Similarly according to John Staley:

> *"The early travelers recorded traditions that several of the acephalous states were formerly governed by rulers .... In Darel people point out 'the ruler's polo ground'; in Chilas they have preserved the name of a ruler; and in Kandia they still tell stories of Kandi..."* (Staley 1982: 183)

5 Regional administrative boundaries should not be taken in the strict sense. By Gilgit I do not only mean the town of Gilgit but the upper Gilgit Valley, Yasin, Punial, Hunza, etc. The town of Gilgit is inhabited by all the ethnic and religious groups as a result of its centrality. In Baltistan, besides Shias, there are a lot of Nurbakhsis, some even estimate them to be one-fourth of the total population. There were some sectarian changes in the history of the area, but the general character of the area remained as already described.

The question arises why the new religion (Islam) should lead to the change of the political structure in the south, for example in the present Diamer District, but not in the northern and eastern parts, the areas of Baltistan and Gilgit. Staley again gives a possible explanation:

> *"(...) missionaries and religious leaders came from countries to the north and west where Islam was well established under centralized rule (....) and so they would not have thought it necessary to make political changes. (...) On the other hand the southern valleys were converted by missionaries who came from further south, from the territories occupied by the Pathans. Indeed most of these missionaries were Pathans, and they approached their task in a different way (...) No doubt their thrones and administrations were destroyed too, for these Pathan missionaries, as well as introducing a more orthodox form of Islam, seem to have imposed wholesale the institutions and practices that they were familiar with in the Pathan territories further south."* (Staley 1982: 185-87)

The further evidence of Pukhtun or Pukhtun also known as Pathan missionaries introducing the new socio-political structure is the existence or former existence of some of the following typical Pukhtun institutions: the *wesh* system (the system of periodical re-allotment of land, now no more practiced in Diamer); *kalang* lands (a contract according to which a piece of land is given for a fixed amount of money for an indefinite time under certain conditions), and joint community land and water rights, with the division of the community into owners and non-owners of these rights. The *wesh* system is a typical Pukhtun institution that was introduced in Swat, which lies around two hundred kilometers south of Chilas, after its conquest by Pukhtuns between A.D 1500 and 1600.[6] The available literature on the history of the area reflects that the *wesh* system existed here[7] before it was abolished even in Swat, the area of its origin.[8] Hence, if we accept that an acephalous system and Islam were brought to the region by the Pukhtuns and that the blood feuds began after this religious-political change,[9] the question arises whether the blood

6 For details see Ahmed 1976; Barth 1959; Ahmad 1962.

7 See Jettmar 1983; Zarin & Schmidt 1984; Staley 1982: 196.

8 For details see Ahmed (1976: 37) and Barth (1985: 69).

9 Thull (in Dir, a part of present Swat) offers another example of Pukhtun Sunni Islam giving birth to blood feuds. Keiser writes about the genesis of organized vengeance in Thull: "The cultural values, concepts, and ideas so important to organized vengeance in contemporary Thull were probably introduced at the same time Pukhtun missionaries converted the Kohistanis to Islam. Their effect on existing social organization and culture set in motion processes of change that ultimately resulted in a new, unique Kohistani sociocultural system". (Keiser 1991: 46-47).

feuds were a by-product of the new religion (Sunni Islam), or the result of the Pukhtun acephalous political culture. The two are very often mixed together but this differentiation is important because of its political implications, on the one hand, and in seeking an end to this custom, on the other hand as I will explain it now.

Let us start with the assumption that Sunni Islam gave birth to the blood feuds. As previously mentioned, the district of Diamer consisted of three subdivisions, Astor, Tangir-Darel, and Chilas. I have already written that in Astor which was, in terms of population and area, the biggest of the three subdivisions, the average number of murders per year is between one and two which is actually not part of the system of organized vengeance we are dealing with here. It is interesting that the Astoris, too, are Sunnis (though with a sizeable Shia presence), but theirs is a Sunni Islam that came to Astor via Kashmir. The other existence of Sunni Islam is in the Kaghan Valley, the southeastern neighbor of Chilas. There again, we find no system of blood feuds. Kaghan, too, received Sunni Islam via Kashmir. It is interesting that even Chilas received the first wave of Islam via the Babusar Pass (i.e. from the Kaghan side[10]), but later on, the Pukhtun influence from the south became more dominant. This is perhaps one of the reasons that until the end of the nineteenth century the blood feuds in Chilas were less frequent than today as was observed by Biddulph: “The crime of murder is rare, and the readiness to spill blood on slight occasions so noticeable among the Afghans is unknown” (Biddulph 1977: 18).

In concluding the analysis, it might be said that the acephalous or tribal political structure, introduced by the Pukhtuns, is responsible for the origin of the blood feuds in Chilas. This may be called a confirmation of, in the literature, widely debated positive link between the segmentary lineage system and the blood feuds that Knuden (2011: 2-7) has thoroughly reviewed. Without going into further details of the origin of feuds I want to come back to our main focus which is the link between Shia-Sunni violence and blood feuds. In order to understand this link it is important to understand the whole concept of blood feuds first. I have chosen to start by introducing some cases related to blood feuds..

Three Case Studies: a Prologue

The following cases are not about the Shia-Sunni violence in GB but in my view their study and analysis is important because they help us understand the core values of this society. The cases below have been chosen from the

10 Asad Ali Khan writes: "Syed Noor Shah, known as Ghazi Baba, was the first man who started preaching Islam in Thak and built the first mosque which is still there (though some changes have been made). Ghazi Baba belonged to the Syed family of Kaghan. In Tangir and Darel, Islam came from the Swat direction." (Khan 1992: 291, English translation by the author)

newspapers. There are several reasons for selecting these cases from the newspapers in spite of some possible inaccuracies in these cases. The first and most important reason is that cases of revenge are almost always related to women (as is also the case in our cases) which are very sensitive and can easily lead to very dangerous consequences especially in a relatively small community where I have done my research. Besides that the three cases chosen here represent cases that occur very seldom like for instance the case of *ghag* (publicly declaring a woman as one's future wife without her and her family's consent) and *swara* (giving of a woman as a wife to an opposed party in order to end a feud) but they represent the basic values of this society. The cases of revenge and blood feuds in Pakistan are found mainly among Pukhtuns and their neighboring territories where the impact of their culture reached as far as, for instance, the districts of Diamer and Kohistan. It is interesting and as it has already been mentioned that the instance of blood feuds is even higher in areas influenced by Pukhtun culture though Pukhtuns may not be the dominant population groups there as for instance is the case of Dir-Kohistan, Swat-Kohistan, Indus-Kohistan and Diamer. As I wrote above, some of my Pukhtun informants even told me that the local people consider them *beghairat* (without honour) especially because the Pukhtuns sometimes take their women to hospitals or send them to schools.

Case 1

A Pakistani daily, 'The News' (2013) reported that three persons used the word of *ghag* on the three daughters of their uncle and wanted to marry the girls without their consent and free will. *Ghag* is a custom whereby a person declares by spoken or written words or firing in the air in public that a particular woman stands engaged to him. This is done without her or her parents' free will. This declaration implies that her parents and other close relatives are threatened not to give her hand in marriage to any other person and that no other man should make a marriage proposal nor marry her. *Ghag* has been declared as an offence by the Provincial Assembly of KPK in 2013 and is punishable with up to seven years imprisonment or Rs 5000,000 fine, or both. Thus it is very rare but sometimes still practiced.

Case 2

'The News' (2013) reported that Ms. Amsala was engaged to Mr. Rahmatullah. Rehman a close relative of Rahmatullah, developed a love affair with the girl and they ran away together. After a few days the father, an uncle and a cousin of Rahmatullah found and killed both Amsala and Rehman. Interestingly, the police arrested Rehman's brother because he did not register the case against the killers.

Case 3

In the daily "Dawn" (August 2011) it was reported that six members of a *jirga*, including a local prayer leader, were arrested for giving a female in *swara* to a rival family for settling a dispute. According to the details the dispute originated after a woman had eloped with a man called Imran although she was already engaged with her cousin Tariq. The *jirga* was convened to settle the dispute. The *jirga* decided to give Imran´s sister in marriage to Tariq. The police arrested the members of the *jirga* for violating the 310-A section of Pakistan Penal Code which prohibits giving of females to rival families for settling feuds.

Embedding the Cases

Lindholm wrote that the most basic principle of social organization of Swat – and the social organization of Diamer is very close to it – is the:

> *"(...) principle of 'complementary opposition' (...). Each lineage or khel stands in a relation of opposition to its closest neighbour of an equal level. Thus the different sections of a village are in opposition, but will unite should they be threatened by another village. (...) this system not only structures political, economic, and social life, not only organizes people spatially, but also provides a worldview, pervades child raising, forms values, and permeates all possible spheres of human activity and thought"* (Lindholm 1982: xxvii).

In the following paragraphs while explaining and analyzing the above mentioned three cases I have referred to many other cases too for elaborating my point. These other cases I have collected during my fieldwork. *Jirga* is an old institution for conflict-resolution in the area and consists of village elders and respectable persons. *Swara* is a custom according to which women (mainly sisters or daughters) are given in marriage to the opponent families in order to end blood feuds or, as in case study 3, to settle a case of elopement which falls in the general category of illicit sexual relationships. According to the local value system, sexual relationships between a male and a female are only allowed after marriage. Marriages are arranged by families (mainly the parents) to the extent of almost excluding the consent or even the knowledge of the future couple. Engagements which precede marriage are taken very seriously and once engaged the rights and responsibilities of the future bride shift from her father/brother to her future husband and his family.

In very rare cases though, a man who is refused the hand of a woman may fire a gun in the air at her doorstep declaring the proposed woman to be his bride (case study 1). After this any other male wishing to marry this

woman will do so only at the risk of his life. But the man who claims that woman as his bride is himself on a death row because the custom demands his killing by the woman's family. Breaking an engagement is comparable to a divorce which is considered the most serious abuse only for the man in this case. If an engaged woman elopes with another man, or is married to another person, this requires *badal* which generally means the killing of both the engaged woman and her paramour by the originally chosen husband (case study 2). *Swara* which is practiced very rarely provides an alternative solution to *badal*. According to this custom a young unmarried woman (or several women) will be given in marriage to a man (or several men) of an enemy family in order to settle a dispute which generally demands the killing of one or more male members of this woman's family. In elopement cases the *swara* woman, generally the sister of the man accused, is given to the fiancée or husband whose fiancée or wife had eloped or married someone else.

A noteworthy aspect of the case study 3 is that the alleged *swara* victim rejected the charges that she had been given in marriage as a result of a compromise arrived at by the *jirga*. She did so to protect her family and the members of the *jirga*. The latter generally assemble on the request of one or sometimes both parties involved. While local custom acknowledges giving of a female in marriage in order to solve a case of illicit relations or a blood feud, the law of the state forbids this (see case study 3). A large number of state/Islamic laws contradict the traditional norms and values in general. This is particularly true for customs controlling sex and marriage issues among the local people.

The Quranic punishment for illicit sexual relations is flogging or stoning of the culprits, carried out by the state or community, after at least four trustworthy eye witnesses testify having seen the accused *inflagranti delicto*.[11] In Chilas, the punishment of illicit relations is the killing of both man and woman by the immediate relatives of the woman (husband, brother, father, etc.), without any trustworthy eyewitnesses testifying it or without any due process.[12] Derived from this right is a killing based solely on suspicion and rumors about an illicit relation, the extreme case being the killing of the man who is suspected of trying to approach or getting the attention of a woman.

11 Al-Quran xxiv: 1-64.

12 According to the Frontier Crimes Regulation, the "law for the tribes" which was established by the British and which is still at least theoretically in place, it was lawful for a husband to kill his wife and her paramour if he found them together. However, the Quran allows the following: "And for those who launch a charge against their spouses, and have (in support) no evidence but their own. Their solitary evidence (can be received) if they bear witness four times (with an oath) by Allah that they are solemnly telling the truth ... But it would avert the punishment from the wife, if she bears witness four times (with an oath) by Allah, that (her husband) is telling a lie" (Al-Quran xxiv: 6-8). This means a charge has to be launched and a decision has to be made.

In such cases it is only the men who are killed. My data shows that the overwhelming majority of the murders are based on rumors and suspicions of illicit sexual relations and only men are killed that lead to blood feuds. The characteristic feature of this system is that it is based on the private individual's conception of justice. The blood enmity could be brought to an end if the right to kill could be withdrawn from the individual.

If a man and a woman are caught *in flagranti delicto,* according to the local customs both could be killed. If both are killed, normally no blood revenge follows. It is important that both must be killed together on the spot. If they are killed in different places, blood revenge may be taken. Similarly, if the family of the murdered man does not accept the charge, revenge may also be taken. An example of this is as follows: Zafaran's sister in the case presented at the very beginning in this article, and her paramour were seen together in the fields. The brothers took out their rifles and killed both of them on the spot. One of Zafaran's brothers presented himself before the police and declared that he had killed his sister and her lover on the spot as he saw them making love. In the village, there were other stories told which differed from the story told by the family of Zafaran. For example it was told that the family of the man killed was very poor and that he was the only son. The real affair of the woman was with another rich man but the family of Zafaran did not dare to start a feud with that family. The affair was known in the village and this was a good chance to restore the *ghairat* (which may be translated here as manliness) of Zafaran. The brothers of Zafaran, though collaborators, sent the youngest of the brothers, who was jobless, to confess to the assassination. The eldest brother who had actually killed them remained in the background to arrange his release. The peace was concluded between the two families and Zafaran's brother was set free within less than six months.

The cases of Said Noor and Javaid are other examples from the area: One was killed as the result of a rumor and the other killed only out of suspicion. When Javaid came home he found his neighbor in his house where his sister was alone; he took his rifle and killed him on the spot. The woman fled to the police. The medical examination of the woman proved her innocence. Peace was arranged between the two families and Javaid was released. In the other case, Said Noor went to drink water at the house of his cousin who was not at home. When Said Noor was coming out of the house some neighbors saw him and rumor spread that he had an affair. His cousin killed him some months later. There were attempts to make peace but the family of Said Noor was against peace. It is sometimes mentioned that men kill their wives together with an enemy to get rid of both an enemy and an unwanted wife. But such killing could give rise to a double feud since the family of the wife would want to seek revenge for her murder.

The consent of the couple at the wedding is the basic requirement for any marriage according to the state law. Among the locals,[13] however, such an expression of the couple's intention is neither sought nor even considered decent, especially in the case of the bride. Similarly, eloping adults do not commit an offence under the official law while this is a grave crime, deserving death, according to the local customs. A simple engagement is of little consequence in the state law but is treated almost equivalent to a marriage in the local culture. *Swara,* as we have already stated above, is a crime in the state law.

The individual is held responsible and becomes the target of punishments in the state law. Marriage, sex, divorce, etc. are seen as individual acts and their decisions are assumed to be made by individuals. Following this ideology, in the case study 3, the sister cannot be punished (given in marriage) for the crime (eloping) of the brother. In Diamer society, on the other hand, the values are such that groups like a family act as a corporate unit and the consequences of individual actions are also born collectively. In the case study 3 the elopement had an impact on the honor of the whole family and even the tribe of the eloping woman and her fiancée and his family. Similarly, the target of the revenge is not the single individual but the whole group unless the offender family on its own kills the individual responsible for damaging the honor of the other family. The target groups are of course clearly defined and they vary depending upon the situation following the principle of fission and fusion in segmentary systems (Barth 1959, Ahmed 1976).

In our case study 3 Tariq was engaged to his cousin. She eloped with Imran. The *jirga* decided that Maryam, the sister of Imran, should be given to Tariq in marriage. Maryam, being not involved at all, is punished for the crime of her brother, Imran. When I asked *Pukhtun* female students of my M.A. class at Quaid-i-Azam University they were unanimous in their views that they would accept the role of a *swara* women if such an incident happened in their families. It is pertinent to mention that in feuds, women, children and old men are generally considered neutral and thus never directly targeted or killed in blood feuds. Comparable to *swara*, though actually experienced even more rarely, is a woman of the feuding party going to the house of the opponents with a request to end the feud. *Pukhtunwali* demands the awarding of full respect to the visiting woman and generally her action would terminate the feud. Only in very rare cases, women give testimony against their fathers or brothers upon whom they depend. People live in joint or extended families and their fates are very closely linked together. Local

13 A *Pukhtun* female university student whose life is at risk for refusing engagement with her cousin arranged by her father told me that the opinion and consent of the future brides and grooms are not only not sought it is disliked by their families. She told me, for instance, that if a parent wanted to marry a woman to her cousin but she expresses her liking for that cousin before the proposal, her parents will then not marry her to that cousin.

people may have sympathy with the *swara* woman but consider it justified for a greater cause – saving lives of brothers and fathers.

Similarly, it is not only the *swara*-women who are not asked or consulted for their marriages – generally the consent of marrying couples is irrelevant. Similarly, childhood engagements and marriages are quite common. The *swara*-women that are given in exchange for either a murdered man or an engaged woman who eloped with another man is not so different from the 'normal' marriage of a woman. At the time of marriage the family of the woman receives a sum of money as a bride-wealth. The idea and amount of bride wealth differ from family to family and tribe to tribe and even from bride to bride, depending upon her beauty, for example. Some changes have taken place in this custom in the meanwhile. Some fathers keep most of the bride-money for themselves while others are spending all incoming money – and even more than it – on gifts for the bride and the wedding. Almost universal is the idea that the woman becomes the 'property' of her husband and his family after marriage. If a married or even an engaged woman runs away with another man it will therefore be her fiancée who is to be paid the compensation. Similarly, if a husband dies early and the woman is still young, her in-laws will decide about her future, as for example, who will marry her then (Mehdi 2002: 147-178). Punishment of sisters for the crimes of their brothers has, similarly, to be seen in the collective family perspective. Death, prison, failure and success of each individual member of the family – especially of male members in this context – is the failure or success, punishment or reward of the whole family. For instance, if a brother or father is killed, all other family members including daughters and sisters are affected. Similarly, the good or bad reputation of one member affects the entire family. The punishment of the sister or the daughter is actually a punishment of the whole family.

Explaining this should not be understood as a defense of *swara*. What I want to emphasize is simply that *swara* is part of a whole value system relating to sex, marriage and family. It is crucial to mention here that *swara* is practiced only in exceptional cases. The custom ideally demands the killing of the eloped couple.

Discussion and Conclusion

Conflicts frequently occur between close relatives especially cousins, called *tarbur, a term* which means both cousin and enemy. It is no coincidence that all three case studies involved cousins. For instance in our case study 1 three brothers declared the three daughters of their uncle who has refused to give them in marriage to his nephews, *ghag* i.e. their future brides. The uncle disgraced them by refusing the hands of his daughters and they took revenge by declaring these women as their brides.

Let us now jump from the conflicts in close kinship units to violence between large groups based on territories (Kohistan vs Diamer), ethnic (Shin

vs Yeshkun) or religious groups, i.e. Shias vs Sunnis. I have already quoted in the introduction the recent clashes between two territorial units i.e. Diamer and Kohistan, both of whom are Sunni. '*Lashkars* (civil armies) took positions on the opposite mountain sides, seven people were killed and a large number injured.' This was not different from the *lashkar* of 1988 that I have already mentioned in the beginning of the article which went to fight Shias of Gilgit. There were rumors in Chilas at that time that Shias killed some Sunni in Gilgit and that they had further plans to attack and kill other Sunnis in Gilgit.

We know from the relevant literature that the Shia-Sunni clashes in the GB are older than the British rule. Biddulph wrote, for instance, that 'Being Soonees [Sunni], every Shiah who falls into their hand is put to death (…)" (1977: 15). We may not know the exact reason behind the start of Shia-Sunni violence in the region but for this analysis more relevant aspect of this violence is the characteristic feature of blood enmity that once started it runs for generations. A feud actually never ends unless and until there was a settlement between the concerned individuals and groups organized by the *jirga*. Even this may not be a guarantee for ever. I remember, at least, one case from Chilas in which a stranger came and just killed a man on the spot. Later on it turned out that the grandfather of the man killed had fled his area after killing and that the killer was grandson of that person.

The Chilasis complain that the state machinery (government, police, hospitals, etc.) and media, etc. was in the hands of Shia in Gilgit and that it is used against Sunni. They were of the view that when Sunnis are killed in Gilgit there is hardly any reporting in the media. Nobody takes any action against the killers because of Shia Government in Gilgit. The Sunnis in Gilgit are migrants from Chilas and Kohistan who still have relatives living here. Whenever a Sunni is killed in Gilgit we stand an obligation to revenge that killing.

The Shia population of GB complains that Chilasi and Kohistani are religious fanatics and brutal and they kill Shia. I do not agree with the assertion that Chilasi are religious fanatics. Chilasi society is a tribal society where in the absence of any or effective system of justice *badal* serves as deterrence. This is what Max Gluckman calls 'peace in the feud' (Gluckman 1973: 3). The reason that they do not tolerate Shias in their region is because they seem to have an old enmity with them. If they were Sunni religious fanatics then they would kill any non-Sunni/Muslim and not only Shias, for instance Ismails, Christians, etc. I was part of a research group consisting of mainly Germans and some Ismail from Hunza, who lived and worked in Chilas for more than three decades. Nothing happened ever. I think if one respects the Chilasi culture and knows how to behave, one will have no trouble there.

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Spaces of Nature:
Producing Gilgit-Baltistan as the Eco-Body of the Nation

Nosheen Ali

Introduction

A while ago, when I was studying in Grade 8 at an English-medium school in Lahore, our class was divided up in four groups for a Geography project on Pakistan. The group of which I was a part had to make a sculptural map of Pakistan, demonstrating the diverse physical and social qualities of its landscape. And so we had set about carving our country with materials like styrofoam, cotton, cloth, and cardboard. In the final map that we made, the region of Gilgit-Baltistan - then the "Northern Areas" – had remained unlabeled and unpeopled, marked only with mountains made of clay.

Even today, nature remains the primary modality through which Gilgit-Baltistan is understood within the Pakistani national imagination. Its magnificent peaks and breathtaking valleys invoke within Pakistanis a simultaneous sense of emotional attachment and proud ownership, permitting them to claim Pakistan as "beautiful". In this article, I elaborate how the aesthetics of nature constitute a key terrain for state power in Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is integral to the way in which the spatial structure, geographical essence, and physical-ecological constitution of the Pakistani nation/state is imagined, and as such, the region helps to consolidate a sense of the national self through the definition of the natural self. If maps produce the geo-body of the nation (Winichakul 1997), then representational practices surrounding the ecology of particular regions serve to constitute what I call the *eco-body* of the nation, converting natural splendor into territorial essence and epitome. I have retained the region's previous name of "Northern Areas" in this article, as the analysis was undertaken prior to the name change in 2009.

Unimagined Communities in Naturalized Landscapes

The Northern Areas - and now Gilgit-Baltistan - occupy a central place in the geographical imagination of the Pakistani nation/state. While I question the ways of seeing which normalize particular landscapes as beautiful and others not, I do not wish to deny the picturesque qualities of the landscape of the Northern Areas per se. Rather, my concern is with exploring how a mode of inclusion based on spatial appeal has come to embody and produce a number of exclusionary effects.

The first book that I examine is titled "Pakistan Studies: Class X" (Rizvi et al. 2003).[1] It is a tenth-grade textbook designed for government schools in the province of Punjab, which is the most populous province of Pakistan. I have not conducted a detailed investigation of official textbooks on Pakistan Studies used in provinces other than Punjab, but a brief overview of them has given me a sense that they treat the region of the Northern Areas in ways similar to the Punjab one that I now proceed to analyze.

The Northern Areas are conspicuous in the text by their very absence. In the entire book, there is not even a single mention of the word "Northern Areas". At one point, the text does state that the Karakoram Highway "links northern areas of Pakistan with China" (p. 139). However, due to the lack of capitalization, one gets a sense that it is "areas in the north of Pakistan" that are being referred to, not the specific region called Northern Areas which in fact contains the bulk of the Karakoram Highway. While the regional identity of the Northern Areas is unacknowledged, locations within the region are frequently referenced and included as part of Pakistan. For example, a chapter titled "The Natural Resources of Pakistan" mentions that marble is available in "Gilgat", and that the Pakistan International Airlines (P.I.A.) passenger and cargo services are available in "Gilgat" and "Skardu". Gilgit – which is consistently misspelt as "Gilgat" – and Skardu are the main towns of the Northern Areas, located in the districts of Gilgit and Skardu respectively. A chapter called the "The Land of Pakistan" more explicitly refers to the Northern Areas. It has a section on the "Physical Features" of Pakistan, which in fact, begins with a description of the "Northern Mountain Ranges". The part of these ranges that falls within Pakistan primarily lies in the Northern Areas, but this fact is not acknowledged, though specific valleys of the region like Gilgit and Hunza are mentioned. The Himalayan, Karakoram and Hindukush mountains that comprise these ranges are each described at length in separate sub-sections, and mention details such as:

> *"... between Karakoram mountains and Himalayas the valleys of Gilgat and Hunza are situated. The mountain peaks surrounding these areas are covered with snow throughout the year. When the summer season sets in these valleys are full of life. The people are busy in different activities. The hill torrents flow with great force and the green grass grows everywhere."* (pp. 87-88)

The region of the Northern Areas is thus romanticized as a scenic landscape, significant to the nation merely for its beautiful mountains and lush valleys. The abstract "people" of the region appear not as living, cultural beings but almost as physical features of the land to lend an aspect of reality to the picture. We do not get any sense of the social identities of these people, as they

1 "Pakistan Studies" is a compulsory subject in schools and colleges in Pakistan.

remain absent from the whole book – even from the chapter called "The People of Pakistan and their Culture". Of course, one can justifiably argue that government textbooks in Pakistan are generally of a very poor quality, and embody a ridiculously simplistic depiction of Pakistan. However, while all the regions of Pakistan are likely to be portrayed in selective and distorting ways, I would argue that the representations of Northern Areas are particularly invisibilizing. Moreover, they deserve attention precisely because they shape how a strategic territory is geographically and culturally mis-imagined by its school-going population. It is also important to note that the official textbook construction of the Northern Areas discussed above is not limited to one particular text. The region is similarly represented in a variety of other nation-making sites, such as in newspaper and television media, and even in unofficial sites like private school textbooks and popular/academic publications. In a sense then, there is a persistent discursive structure that characterizes the production of the Northern Areas within depictions of the Pakistani nation-state. However, this discourse is not produced in the same manner in every text and context. There are certain regularly occurring tropes, but each recurrence may also produce its own forms of inclusions and exclusions.

"Introduction to Pakistan Studies" is a book written by Muhammad Ikram Rabbani (2003), and is primarily used by 9th-11th grade private school students in Pakistan who follow the British O-level examination system.[2] This 420-page book is one of the most comprehensive texts on "Pakistan Studies" that I have come across, and also one which gives the most detailed attention to the Northern Areas. However, this emphasis is ridden with ambiguities and contradictions. The Northern Areas are not included in the "Area and Location" of Pakistan, which is the first section of a chapter titled "Geography of Pakistan" (p. 165). This is understandable, as the Northern Areas are not constitutionally part of Pakistan. On the very same page, however, there is a section called "Neighbouring Countries and Borders" which mentions Pakistan's common border with China along "its Gilgit Agency and Baltistan". The Gilgit Agency was a colonial political unit which ceased to exist in 1972 when it was merged with surrounding territories (including Baltistan) to form the Northern Areas. Hence, while the region of the Northern Areas itself is not included in the definition of the territory of Pakistan, older names of the Northern Areas or locations within it, are nevertheless incorporated into the state's territory in descriptions of the border areas of Pakistan. Likewise, while the Northern Areas remain absent from the extensive, written discussion of "Political Divisions" that is provided in the text, they are vividly present on a map titled "Pakistan: Political Divisions" (p. 183).

Similar to the official textbook discussed earlier, the major presence of the Northern Areas in this independently written textbook appears in the section on "Physiography". This section begins with a discussion of Pakistan's

2 This system is managed by the Universities of London and Cambridge, U.K.

"Northern Mountains", and talks at length about the peaks, valleys, glaciers and passes that mark the region. Unlike the previous text, however, this text recognizes that besides the physical landmarks, the north of Pakistan also comprises a place called the "Northern Areas". This place is considered so crucial for describing the physical landscape of Pakistan that it is allocated a separate sub-section, which is titled "Importance of the Northern Areas of Pakistan (F.A.N.A.)". It begins with a basic administrative definition of the Northern Areas:

> *"The Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA), include the territories of Gilgit and Baltistan (Ghizer, Gilgit, Diamer, Skardu and Ghanche) situated in the extreme North of Pakistan."* (p. 192)

It is paradoxical that this definition appears in a section on "Physiography", while the very existence of the Northern Areas remains unacknowledged in the section on the political and administrative divisions of Pakistan. Hence, it is only in the context of the physical description of Pakistan that the region is considered significant enough to be expanded upon. As the text goes on to state:

> *"The FANA is one of the most beautiful locations in the sub-continent. More than 100 peaks soar over 7000 meters (22, 960 ft.). World's three famous mountain ranges meet in the Northern Areas. They are Himalayas, the Karakorams and the Hindukush. The whole of Northern area of Pakistan is known as paradise for mountaineers, climbers, trekkers and hikers."* (pp. 192-193)

It is this tourist-adventurist gaze which defines the "importance" of the Northern Areas, and now, Gilgit-Baltistan. The text also goes on to mention how the region's rivers and glaciers serve as vital sources of water. There is no mention of the region's relationship to Kashmir – not even in separate, detailed sections on "Kashmir" that appear elsewhere in the same textbook. And this is also true for the government textbook discussed earlier. In the private school textbook, at least the nature-related glorification is specifically linked to the "Northern Areas" which is not the case for the government textbook. However, even this recognition is short-lived: while the section titled "Importance of Northern Areas (FANA)" recognizes the Northern Areas as a specific, bounded, administrative region of Pakistan, the very next section called "Valleys of the Northern Areas" displaces this unique regional identity. In this section, the valleys of the Northern Areas include those that lie in the place Northern Areas – like Gilgit, Hunza, Yasin, Ishkoman and Skardu – as well as other valleys such as Swat and Kaghan which lie in the North-West Frontier Province. This textual manifestation of the confusion between the Northern Areas and the NWFP can be linked to the geographically-related,

mystifying names of these regions, as well as the common context of "natural beauty" in which both these places are often invoked.

The tendency of claiming and acclaiming the landscape of the Northern Areas while at the same time reducing its regional identity to an ambiguous or non-existent place is also prevalent in popular and academic discourse. An example of this is provided in a prominent Oxford University Press volume called "Pakistan" (Husain 1997) which was published in 1997 to mark the 50th anniversary of the creation of Pakistan. This book is written for popular consumption, and features contributions from leading national and international scholars who work on Pakistani politics, culture, and history. Images of the Northern Areas are abundantly present throughout the book. In fact, even the cover page of the book displays an image from the Northern Areas – that of the magnificent Deosai peaks, as viewed from the Skardu district of the Northern Areas. Moreover, the book has a section on "The Land and the People" which begins with a fairly detailed discussion of the beautiful mountains and valleys of the Northern Areas. Yet again, these landmarks appear to be located directly in Pakistan rather than in a specific region called the Northern Areas. Moreover, while other regions of Pakistan – mainly the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier, and Balochistan – are expanded in separate sub-sections, no such section is assigned to the Northern Areas. Instead, the region is defined in the section on "The North-West Frontier". This is also the section in which pictures from the Northern Areas are prominently included. Hence, this text becomes yet another site where the conflation of the Northern Areas and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) is reproduced. It needs to be noted that the book does have a separate section for "Jammu and Kashmir", but the "Northern Areas" do not appear in this section. There is a reference to the fact that "Dardistan and Baltistan"[3] historically formed the north of Jammu and Kashmir State (p. 143), but in the rest of the section's text as well as in the images that accompany it, one gets the sense that "Pakistani" Kashmir exclusively refers to Azad Kashmir. Here, as in the two texts that I discussed earlier, the delinking of the Northern Areas from Kashmir exists alongside, and in fact, is produced through the romanticized landscaping of the region within Pakistan. Such depictions silence the fact that the political status of the Northern Areas is inextricably linked to the disputed territory of Kashmir, and thus, marginalize the region within discourses of Kashmir.

One might argue that the majority of people within Gilgit-Baltistan themselves do not prefer to be associated with Kashmir, and that they fought a war against Maharaja Hari Singh precisely to rid themselves of Kashmiri rule. However, as political activists in the region repeatedly emphasize, the issue is not whether Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan is part of Kashmir, but

3 Dardistan and Baltistan are historical names of regions that today form part of Gilgit-Baltistan.

rather that the region remains internationally considered as part of the dispute of Kashmir and its political status within Pakistan remains inextricably tied to the "Kashmir issue". Hence, it is important that their region and its predicament receive attention in the discourse on Pakistan as well as on Kashmir. Neither holds true in the school texts and popular books on Pakistan analyzed above.

The region of the Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan also remains predominantly absent from depictions of the "people" and "culture" of Pakistan as well as of Kashmir. For example, in the edited volume just discussed, the socioeconomic and cultural profile of Pakistan is provided on the basis of specific regions. The cultural imagining of a Pakistani national and citizen is thus associated with the regional entities to which they belong i.e. the regions of Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan and Kashmir which are seen as the constitutive units of Pakistan. Hence, the Punjabi lives in Punjab, the Sindhi lives in Sindh, the Balochi in Balochistan, the Pakhtun in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and the Kashmiri in Kashmir. Even if acknowledged, other linguistic and ethnic groups that reside in these territorial units seem to get overshadowed in this homogenizing one people-one place configuration. In the case of Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan, such a configuration is made difficult because no group can be constructed as the dominant one. The cultural landscape of the region — with its diversity of people like the Shina, the Burushaski, the Wakhi, and the Balti — cannot fit into the ethnic matrix of a nationalist discourse in which places are assumed to map onto a particular social identity. To be sure, there is mention of the "longevity and tranquility" of Hunzakuts (p. 93) and the "ancient Greek ancestry" (p. 142) of Baltis, but even these scarce, often essentializing references are not related to the place called the "Northern Areas" and thus, do not convey that Baltis and Hunzakuts live in the Northern Areas. The region is effectively reduced to an unpeopled landscape, inhabited only with peaks and valleys. This produces a double exclusion: the communities of the Northern Areas remain largely unimagined within the nationalist imaginings of Pakistan and Kashmir, and simultaneously, their subjection is also obscured from the nation's view.

This landscape-only, no-people no-region depiction of the Northern Areas is linked to the ambiguity surrounding the political status of the region, as well as its contested and dominated status which necessitates the erasure of its identity in nationalist discourse. At the same time, it is important to note that the practice of effacing people from depictions of a scenic Kashmiri "wilderness" was prevalent even in Mughal times, and continued in the colonial period particularly through the writings of European travelers (Rai 2004). This practice is not even limited to Kashmir, and extends to the depiction of mountain territories in general which have always remained barred from the realm of "culture" and "civilization". Even a historian like Braudel claims: "The mountains are as a rule a world apart from civilizations, which

are an urban and lowland achievement. Their history is to have none" (Braudel 1972: 34). This outside-history depiction of mountains often accompanies a picture of timeless isolation and inertia, as evident in the following representation of the Northern Areas in an academic text:

> *"Over many thousands of years the economy and the society of Northern Areas had changed but little. The lives and work of its people had remained isolated from the modernization of the Indus Valley. Rulers from the plains — including the British and the Chinese from across the mountains — had come and gone, but material conditions were relatively unaltered."* (Ispahani 1989: 185)

Such representations of mountain societies as history-less, timeless, isolated and backward are typical and symbolic of the lowland perspective from which historical and social analysis is often written (Stellrecht 1997). Particularly in the context of the Northern Areas, this perspective runs counter to local histories of caravan trade, travel, religious conversions, and political and military struggles that have shaped the trajectory of the region as well as that of the British Empire in India. For example, rulers of Hunza and other states that today constitute the Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan were key players in the Great Game. They frequently maneuvered the British, Russian, and Chinese authorities against each other, making their territory as one "where three empires met" and one that was central to the security and stability of the British Empire (Hussain 2003).

The global NGO discourse of environmental conservation tends to see spaces as nature zones instead of lived homes, and is thus a new form of the lowland perspective which has become dominant in the thinking about the Northern Areas/Gilgit-Baltistan in recent years – one that further entrenches the region as eco-body in material practice. Elsewhere, I have demonstrated how this eco-body is spatially configured through specific conservation projects such as national parks and community-based trophy hunting programs, which have served to re-inscribe the power of state and capital over local communities and ecologies (Ali 2009). The perception and implication of such discursive practices is captured well by the following comment from Raja Hussain Khan Maqpoon, a journalist from the region:

> *"It is ironic that the world is more worried about the falling trees; they are sad that our white leopards are vanishing day by day; the dead bodies of our Markhor frightens them; they are going all out to preserve our ecosystem. But nobody ever thinks of the people of this land."* (Mehkri 2000)

Hence, what is often common to the lowland nationalist discourse on Gilgit-Baltistan as well as the NGO-led conservation discourse on the region is the valorization of nature and a simultaneous devaluing of people.

Conclusion

The aim of this article is not to argue against a felt attachment to nature and a place-based sense of belonging. Indeed, a real connection to specific parts of the Earth and the natural world is sorely needed to counteract the managerial discourses of environmentalism that have come to dominate today (Kingsnorth 2012). Yet, we must be equally wary of the essentialist ways in which claims about regional landscapes become implicated in nationalist narratives of identity and erasure. In the textual and visual vocabulary of Pakistani nationalism, Gilgit-Baltistan has been primarily constructed as a space of nature, ecology, and beauty, thus making it into what I call the eco-body of the nation. Such constructions reduce the region to a physical and geographical territory, and effectively serve to depoliticize it. While Gilgit-Baltistan is externally produced as an idyllic tourist destination for the urban Pakistani and global trekker, it is internally managed as a suspect security zone. Moreover, the ecological nationalism through which the region is imagined has served to erase the region's political subjection and social struggles from public vision. As scholars and citizens concerned for the predicament of the region, we must remain cognizant of the nationalist narrative of nature-glorification, and continually struggle to visibilize the political contestations that this narrative serves to silence.

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Making a Nation in High Mountains: *Balawars* and Balawaristan Nationalism in Ghizer District of Gilgit Baltistan

Sohaib Bodla

Introduction

The words Balawaristan and *Balawar* are derived from a Persian word *bala*, meaning high; thus *Balawar* is someone who lives high up in the mountains, and Balawaristan is a place of heights (Sökefeld 1999: 354). These words have been coined to create a nation of the inhabitants of Gilgit Baltistan (GB), and to unite a diverse population on the basis of a shared geography, history and culture. These words do not have any historical background, though Balawaristan sounds familiar with Boloristan[1], the historic name of areas around Gilgit. Balawaristan is a classic example of what Benedict Anderson has termed '*Imagined Communities*' (Anderson 2006: 6). The name was formulated by Nawaz Khan Naji in 1988 and published for the first time in a pamphlet titled Balawaristan. Since then, the number of people who agree with the nationalist discourse of Balawaristan has steadily risen. The Balawaristan discourse about GB contradicts the Pakistani state's historical stance over GB. In the name of Balawaristan, activists challenge the Pakistan government's control over their lives and geography. Officially, Pakistan considers these areas as parts of the larger territory of Jammu and Kashmir and links their fate with the resolution of the Kashmir dispute with India. The Balawaristan National Front (BNF), the party established by Nawaz Khan Naji in the name of Balawaristan, on the other hand, considers GB as a separate territory that accommodates a separate nation. According to the BNF, these areas were not a legitimate part of Jammu and Kashmir; rather, Kashmir was controlling them by military power in collaboration with the British Crown.

The BNF calls for an independent state named Balawaristan, comprising the areas of GB plus districts of Kohistan and Chitral which are today part of Pakistan's Province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; and it also includes Indian controlled Ladakh. The movement believes in a peaceful struggle for the ultimate cause of a separate homeland for the inhabitants of these areas. Furthermore, the BNF has also struggled to highlight the demand that the people of GB should be given the right of determining their future in light of the long awaited plebiscite under the UN. Further, the BNF wants to be a fourth party in the Kashmir dispute; India, Pakistan and Kashmir being the other parties. In the current setup, the people of GB do not have representa-

1 "...Great Bolor is identical with present Baltistan, Little Bolor with the Gilgit upper valley" (Jettmar 1980: 6).

tion in the national legislature of Pakistan. Using electoral politics, the BNF is attempting to mobilize the local people to make sense of their own identity in a situation where they are surrounded by India, Kashmir and Pakistan's quest to take or to perpetuate control of the area.

The by-elections of 2011 in Gilgit Baltistan for the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) witnessed an exceptional win for BNF's leader Nawaz Khan Naji in Ghizer, the most western district of GB. In the electoral ward Ghizer 1, Nawaz Khan Naji obtained 8.299 out of 27.817 registered votes; the turnout of the elections was 67% — the highest turnout in the electoral history of GB.[2] The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) had won all elections in this constituency since the abrogation of Frontier Crimes Regulation[3] (FCR) in 1974 by the then PPP Prime Minister Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. The victory of a nationalist leader in Ghizer district paved the way for the nationalist movement to reach the masses in an unprecedented manner. Previously, the nationalist leaders in the area either remained aloof from electoral politics or secured very little votes in elections. The youth played a key role in mobilizing people to vote for the BNF, but also elders of the area supported the party by giving its candidate a chance to represent them in the GBLA. Along with the party vote, Nawaz Khan Naji also secured votes for his charismatic personality and being an active public figure.

Although the party is not officially banned, the BNF is vituperated by government authorities as an anti-Pakistan party. Previously, local people abstained from associating themselves with the party because it demanded a separate homeland for the people of Gilgit Baltistan. The strength of the BNF is the youth of GB that is getting education in down-country Pakistan, i.e. in Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Students coming from GB have formed the Balawaristan National Student Organization (BNSO) in these cities. Since GB was named Northern Areas of Pakistan before 2009, people living in the area felt the lack of a common identity when they came in contact with people from other parts of Pakistan as the designation "Northern Areas" denotes the geography of the area only in relation to Pakistan.

Founded in 1988 by Nawaz Khan Naji in Gilgit city, the party is now attracting more and more people in Ghizer district as well as in other parts of Gilgit Baltistan. The party is divided into two main groups, yet both parts disseminate the same discourse of history and identity of Gilgit Baltistan that is also shared by other nationalist parties like the Karakoram National Movement (KNM). The two groups of Balawaristan employ different strategies to achieve the ultimate target of freedom. The BNF Naji group believes

2 Data obtained from the Election Commission of Pakistan's office in Gilgit city.

3 FCR was introduced by the British in India in 1901 to control the frontier districts of their Empire in order to benefit colonial power as it lacked basic democracy. In this set-up, a political agent runs virtually all the affairs of a district. Pakistan run the GB under this legal arrangement from 1947 to early 1970s; local people call this *kala qanun* (black law).

in a peaceful struggle based on negotiations with the states of India[4] and Pakistan[5] for the solution of the Kashmir problem, while the BNF Hamid group has earned a reputation in the area of being pro-India.[6] Both groups are based in Ghizer, but the former group is strong in Punial and Gupis *tahsils* (subdistricts) of the district, while the latter has more support in the Yasin valley. The BNF Hamid group is headed by Abdul Hamid Khan, who is in exile since 2001 and operates from Europe. Being absent from the area, he is blamed by local people for receiving foreign funds for the cause of Balawaristan. BNF Naji group is headed by Nawaz Khan Naji, who is considered a *Quaid* (leader, commander) by having earned the reputation of being an honest and dedicated politician. The success of nationalist leaders in Ghizer helped the Balawaristan movement to go beyond the accusation that nationalists are engaged in separatism, in anti-Pakistan and pro-India propaganda; it made people think of a *Balawar* identity not as ominous but as a new way to look at the history and geography of the area in secular terms and also to think of GB as a place of a shared political identity, rather than adopting a policy for or against Pakistan or any other neighboring country.

On 1st of November 1947, two and a half months after the inception of Pakistan, the local people of the 'Gilgit Agency'[7] fought for their accession with Pakistan against the *Dogras* (Rulers) of Kashmir in the name of Islam. Still today, the 1st of November is celebrated as the day of freedom from *Dogra*, that is, Kashmiri, rule. These areas were virtually disconnected from the rest of Pakistan until the completion of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in 1978. The construction of the KKH was a landmark for the strategic friendship of Pakistan and China. The impact of this road on the lives of the people living in GB has been enormous.

At the time of the opening of the Karakorum Highway, the Government of Pakistan published a pamphlet that claimed that this route would bring revolutionary changes to the Northern Areas, and that it would help to promote national integration of a kind heretofore unknown to the mountain-locked inhabitants (Karakorum Highway pamphlet 1978, cited in Stellrecht 1998: 7). The highway enabled the people of Gilgit Baltistan to interact with the people of *khairo*.[8] Students from GB joined universities in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Rawalpindi and Islamabad for higher education. Many of

4 India controls the territory of Ladakh. The BNF includes Ladakh in the imagined country of Balawaristan and claims to demand the area once the constitutional status of GB becomes clear.

5 Nawaz's faction believes that Pakistan should be responsible for protecting the borders of the area, while all other rights belong to the local people.

6 The Hamid group demands the complete separation of GB from Pakistan.

7 The British Gilgit Agency comprised the areas of Gilgit, Hunza, Ghizer and Chilas.

8 In Shina language *khairo* means "down". The word is commonly used to refer to down-country Pakistan.

them started businesses or took jobs in the big cities. Those who eventually returned to their home areas became aware of their peripheral identities and compared the under-development of their own area with the more developed regions in other parts of Pakistan. Returning students established different small movements in the region to acquaint the people with their political rights. They started to imagine a Nation of Balawaristan in the late 1980s (Sökefeld 1999). On the other hand, Pakistan penetrated the areas deeply through a web of roads; the state became a visible entity in the region through the construction of roads (Haines 2012: 8). For the government of Pakistan, these roads were important to connect with the geographically and strategically important region. Today, China's wish to access the Gwader deepwater port on the coast of Baluchistan from its western provinces makes the KKH important for bilateral trade between Pakistan and China and for their long standing strategic friendship.

Gilgit Baltistan has a long history of being controlled by foreign powers: The State of Jammu and Kashmir, the British and, since the partition of India, Pakistan is controlling the area. But there has always been a considerable indigenous resistance against all colonial powers. The legend of Gohar Aman,[9] a ruler from Yasin who fought against the intruding Sikh and Kashmiri army, is still alive. The Punial Revolution of 1951[10] is an example in which local people were killed while demanding their rights. Today, many people of GB make efforts to claim their rights against the control of Pakistan over the region. The daily life of an individual in the area is replete with situations where he notices being ruled by others. People come in contact with the Pakistani state through the military and bureaucracy. All these organs of the state symbolize the holding of important powers by lowlanders and signify a sense of having no control over their own affairs among local people.

The view of nationalists of Ghizer district on their area contrasts the Pakistani view. According to my respondents, to control the routes in the region has been more important for Pakistan than for the people of the area. It is evident that in the rest of Pakistan GB is perceived as a place that is geographically important because it is the gateway to China and home of some of the world's highest mountains, and because tourists from all around the

9 Gohar Aman was a famous warrior who belonged to the royal family of Chitral and became ruler of the Yasin valley from 1830 till 1860. He extended his rule from Yasin to Gilgit and is famous for his fight against Kashmiris in 1846. He is remembered as a hero by some nationalists in GB. He is also notorious as a cruel man who killed and sold many people of Gilgit into slavery. In his home town Yasin, he is part of local poetry and portrayed as a hero of the town in Gilgit city he enjoys both cruel and hero tags. He was a *Sunni* Muslim and people regard him anti Shia.

10 In 1951 people of Punial assembled at Singal village and protested against Raja Anwar Khan of Punial. They wanted to get rid of the Raja's despotic rule. On the commands of the Raja, security officials opened fire on the crowd and killed seven of the protesters. Many others were arrested.

world come to see the region. Yet, information about GB provided in the rest of Pakistan by TV or newspapers does not include any knowledge about human beings living there. There are many travelogues about GB in Urdu[11] available all over Pakistan. These books hardly speak about the people but rather about yaks, *markhors,*[12] lakes and mountains. Hardly anyone[13] in the Punjab, the largest province and center of power in Pakistan, knows about the languages and customs of the people of GB. Since the 1980s, another aspect of GB is becoming notorious in the rest of Pakistan: the Shia-Sunni conflict. According to the nationalists I interviewed, this conflict is linked to the increasing control and presence of foreign powers, including the Pakistani state. GB and the rest of Pakistan are now linked through a web of roads, through the bureaucratic and military set up, and through mobile communication and TV. This interaction has resulted in the increasing realization of deprivation in GB as compared to the rest of Pakistan, particularly the Punjab. One of the students who studied in Karachi told me: "From Rawalpindi to Karachi I travel by train, and throughout the journey I see developed cities, factories and asphalt roads. These sights make me think of underdevelopment of my city Gahkuch."

The nationalist discourse of Balawaristan and *Balawar* identity contradicts the Pakistani state-driven discourse of identity. The Pakistani state gives primacy to religion as the basic marker of the nation's identity (Jalal 1995: 74). Furthermore, Ayesha Jalal states that "Proclaiming itself an Islamic state created on the bedrock of a non-territorially defined Muslim nation or *ummah*, [Islamic Nation] the architects of Pakistan embraced the idea of the nation-state without conceding space to territorial nationalism in their official ideology" (ibid.). The Balawaristan narrative, in contrast, unites all the sects and GB and envisages a state where religion is a matter of self-identity, rather than an identity imposed by the state apparatus.

Religion, Army, Bureaucracy and GB in today's Pakistan

Since the creation of Pakistan on the basis of the Two Nations Theory[14] Islam has been projected as the country's raison d'être. The Islamic Republic

11 The travelogues written by Mustansar Hussain Tarar are commonly read in down country. They represent GB as a land of fairies, lakes and high pastures. About the people, languages and customs these travelogues remain silent.

12 A rare wild goat which is considered a national animal of Pakistan and also a symbol of Balawaristan.

13 I completed most of my education in the Punjab and do not remember reading anything about the people of GB in my school and college syllabus. I myself came to know about the people and languages of the area when I took admission in university and met fellow students from GB who told me about the diversity of languages in the area.

14 The Two Nations theory refers to the idea that Hindus and Muslims in the Subcontinent form two different nations which cannot live together in the same state.

of Pakistan is united on the basis of its religion – Islam – though Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, wanted to form a secular modern nation-state on the European model, as he said in a famous speech on 11th August 1947.[15] Jinnah's idea of Pakistan was soon overruled. A year after Jinnah's death in 1948, the national assembly of Pakistan passed the so called "Objectives Resolution"[16] which has remained part of the preamble of the constitution since drafted. The turbulent history of Pakistan is replete with events like the separation of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a sovereign country in 1971 that prove that Islamic identity alone was not enough to keep the diverse linguistic and ethnic groups under one umbrella. There have been many separatist nationalist movements like in Baluchistan, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or in Sindh that challenge the state's narrative of a singular Islamic identity uniting all citizens of Pakistan. Although this project has not been successful, Pakistan did not see much religious tension until 1979, except riots against Ahmadis (Ahmad 2009: 20). It was Zia ul Haq's dictatorial rule that made all efforts to *Islamize* the country and invoked the authority of the Objectives Resolution along with other Islamic clauses that had been introduced in Pakistan's constitution of 1973 by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. *Islamization* became the *raison d'être* of Zia's regime and since then no government has been able to readdress the role of religion in national politics (Akhtar 2009: 23). GB is the only territorial unit of Pakistan that is dominated by Shias. Except for Diamer District all districts of GB are predominantly *Shia*. *Shias* are further divided into *Ismailis* (Sevener Shias) and *Athna Ashari* (Twelver Shias) in Gilgit Baltistan.

Religious and sectarian identities in GB have become dominant since the 1980s when the Iranian revolution was at its peak and the Saudi Arabian government supported the establishment of *madrassas* across Pakistan in order to support *Sunni* Islam: "Support rendered by Iran, Saudi Arabia and some other Muslim countries to various Shiite and Sunni groups of Pakistan resulted into the outbreak of sectarian proxy war" (Ahmar 2006: 5). The fanning of sectarianism in Pakistan in general and in GB in particular is linked with the Iranian and Saudi support to their respective groups. The USA and its allies wanted the ouster of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, and Sunni *madrassas* (Islamic seminaries) in Pakistan funded by Saudi Arabia provid-

15 The crux of his speech is: You are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.

16 Summary of this is: Sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being practiced within confines prescribed by Him. Principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as articulated by Islam shall be fully abided by. Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accord with the teaching and demands of Islam as listed in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunna.

ed *Jihadis* (those who fight to defend Islam) against the Soviet Union. It is believed by nationalists in Ghizer district that General Zia Ul Haq supported Sunni Islam for the USA and Saudi Arabia's interests; the former wanted *Jihadis* and latter was against Shiites.

During Zia's regime, also the Pakistan Army[17] was Islamized and many generals and officers propagated the cause of Islam and *Jihad* (the struggle to defend Islam against non-Muslims). This shift in the Pakistani Military from a secular force to the arbitrators of a certain definition of Islam further fractured the country as a whole, and GB was no exception. The Pakistan Army is often considered the torch-bearer of a certain Islamic ideology. In 1988, Shiite villages of Gilgit were attacked by thousands of Sunni tribesmen from Diamer district and a mass murder of Shiites occurred around the villages of Gilgit. Shiite villages were burnt down; Sunni tribesmen continued killings for days and went unhindered by the Pakistan Army that was deployed not far away from the villages under attack. This incident is still fresh in memories of local people and nationalists believe that this onslaught was realized with the help of the Pakistan Army. They call Pakistani Army a Sunni army. For the Pakistan army GB's importance lies in its geography as it borders directly with China, India, and Afghanistan and is close to the Central Asian states. A number of my respondents in GB praised the role of the more recent military dictator Musharraf. They claimed that since the area had always been seen as a strategic region by the army, it had received more development funds during military rule. The development work undertaken in GB by the Musharraf regime was enormous. Many roads and bridges were constructed between 2000 and 2006. In Ghizer district alone there are 16.734 retired army men and the total number of "martyrs" in the district, who died while in military service, is 909. The Pakistan Army is the biggest employer for people of Ghizer.[18] Retired army men bring money and establish businesses in Ghizer. Many retired army men are members of BNF and vote for nationalists. BNF activists believe that retired army men benefit the movement with their experience and exposure of down country. These roles of the army in the area make it ambivalent; its development of infrastructure increases the mobility between the villages and cities. Being the biggest employer for people in Ghizer, the army contributes to the local economy and reminds people of its institutional power.

The process to control GB by the state of Pakistan started with the arrival of the Pakistani Political Agent in Gilgit. On 16 November 1947, Pakistan sent its Political Agent to the Gilgit Agency to take its control from local people who had managed the Independent State of GB for fifteen days. The Political Agent was a Hazara named Sardar Mohammad Alam, and had

17 For details on the different generations of Pakistan army and its Islamization see Cohen 2004: 97 to 130.

18 The record has been obtained from the Soldier Board office in Gahkuch by the author.

served as an Assistant *Tehsildar* (revenue officer) before. He was welcomed with great pomp and show as the people believed that the fruit of their freedom from *Dogra* and British rule had arrived, and that now they could live in freedom, being part of an Islamic state. Yet later it turned out that Pakistan officially considered GB a part of Jammu and Kashmir, and thus under the jurisdiction of Pakistan controlled Azad Kashmir. In 1949 the government of Pakistan formally took the control of GB by the notorious Karachi Agreement without consulting anybody from GB. The bureaucratic setup established by Pakistan was reformed to some extent when Bhutto abolished the FCR in the early 1970s. However, even today the Chief Secretary, the head of the administration of GB, is never a local man but rather a bureaucrat appointed from Islamabad. The same is the case with the Force Commander Northern Areas, the army commander in GB, and the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, the federal minister who is responsible for GB. Local people started to challenge Pakistani domination in the early 1950s and established local parties like the Gilgit League in 1956 and the *Tanzeem e Millat* (National Organization) in the late 1960s.

One event in Gilgit town in 1971[19] sparked protest against the administrative structure in GB and the arrogance of the Pakistani bureaucracy in the area. Many local people believe that after this uprising that the government in Islamabad sent many clerics to the area in order to divide the people over sectarian issues. Nationalists consider this strategy a new form of colonialism. In 2009, through an ordinance, Pakistan renamed the Northern Areas of Pakistan as Gilgit Baltistan and upgraded the Northern Areas Legislative Council to the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly. For the first time, the people of the area had the right to indirectly elect their own Chief Minister. The GBLA consists of 33 members. The ordinance of 2009 gave GB a province-like status and gave the local people some control over the budget as well as the right to legislate on 61 subjects as long as legislation would not violate the constitution of Pakistan. It is interesting to note that GB is not mentioned in the constitution as a part of Pakistan. Consequentially, nationalists ask why legislation in GB has to be in accordance with this constitution if GB is not mentioned in the constitution. The process to control GB by Pakistan started in 1947 and since then many packages have been given to fulfill local peoples' demands by Pakistan, but still the constitutional status of GB lingers and the resistance of locals to achieve a defined constitutional status continues.

In today's Pakistan GB can be considered a colonized territory, as colonialism did not end with the end of British control but rather changed its

19 A local female school teacher was insulted by the wife of a Punjabi bureaucrat posted in Gilgit, and all the city got together to protest against this injustice. Many men were arrested for protesting and put in jail. Subsequently, local people attacked the jail and freed the men who had been arrested by security officials (see Sökefeld 1997: 284ff).

form. This internal colonialism, where peripheral areas are totally dependent on the center without enjoying full political rights, is evident in many parts of Pakistan including GB (Sökefeld 2005: 970) and Baluchistan.

Identity Question and Nationalist Movements in GB

GB is home of diverse languages, ethnicities, sectarian and tribal identities. Different identities are claimed by people in different contexts, yet there is no singular identity that would unite them politically. Such an identity is proposed in the name of *Balawar*. Local identities like coming from a Raja family, *Yeshkun* or *Shin* tribes, speaking a particular language and sectarian affiliation were also significant, but being associated with Pakistan served as a unifying identity. Pakistan considered GB as 'the other', and tried to accommodate the area with the rest of Pakistan (Sökefeld 2010: 252). This endeavor of Pakistan is symbolized also by a replica of the *Minar e Pakistan*[20] built on the main road in Gilgit.

By now, many students, activists and businessmen write *Balawar* at the end of their name. By searching *Balawar* on Facebook page one can find hundreds of people from GB naming themselves accordingly.[21] *Balawar* is sometimes also used as part of the name of a company.[22] The trend of adopting *Balawar* as part of one's name attracts people to inquire about this name and helps to spread the narrative of Balawaristan nationalism to a wider audience.

Manuel Castells (2010: 8) distinguishes three categories of collective identity that can be utilized to understand Balawar identity: legitimizing identity, resistance identity and project identity. A *legitimizing identity* is created by governing institutions in order to justify their domination. This applies to Pakistani identity in GB. A *resistance identity* is authored by those who are in a certain position of authority but who are devalued by others. Sectarian identities in GB can be considered as resistance identities. A *project identity* is a novice identity assumed by actors in order to construe their role in society and to propose social change. Balawar identity can be understood as a project identity. It opens an arena for political struggle and allows imagining GB as an independent state.

The Balawaristan movement has created a *Balawar* identity in Ghizer and Gilgit first. It is more popular in Ghizer than in other districts of GB,

20 It is a National monument of Pakistan built in Lahore to remember the Pakistan Resolution of 1940.

21 https://www.facebook.com/search/more/?q=*Balawar*&sid=0.47190988874953177 (visited on 16-11-2013)

22 There is Balawar Autos in the main bazaar of Gilgit and the proprietor is proud of the name of his shop. Balawar Traders, Balawar Net Cafe are in the main bazar of Gahkuch bazar. In Ghizer district, the flag of Balawaristan on back number plates of motorcycles is a common sight.

yet in all districts some people identify themselves as *Balawar*, along with their other identities. In everyday discourse of the people of Ghizer, Diamer district is considered the most backward and rigid district, but in 2010 BNF has opened an office even in Chilas, the capital of Diamer. The BNF plans to contest elections in 2014 from Diamer as well. The presence of multiple individual and group identities in GB is described as a 'multiplicity of intersecting differences' which are derived from religion, migration, locality, descent or other affiliations (Sökefeld 2010: 254). In this framework there is always a place for a new identity at a historical juncture (ibid.). Starting from 1840, historical periods of authority over local people of GB by Kashmir, British crown and Pakistan can be termed as colonial legacy.[23] *Balawar* identity is a product of the periods described above; it is not a reactionary identity but a pivot on which a new social structure for GB is being constructed.

Balawars and Balawaristan movement in Ghizer District

From 2001, BNF shifted its focus from Gilgit to Ghizer in order to participate in local elections. This was a big shift in the strategy of BNF to engage local people not on the grounds of anti-Pakistan slogans, but to disseminate the Balawaristan narrative among people through elections, and day to day interaction in a manner that is acceptable for all. Till 2001, considerable numbers of students had returned from Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar to work in Gahkuch, the headquarter of Ghizer district, as lawyers, journalists, businessmen, as employees of NGOs or as government servants. These people were part of the Balawaristan National Students Organization (BNSO) in the institutions of higher education in down country Pakistan. Gahkuch is a promising town with ambitions for future development. Due to sectarian conflicts in Gilgit and its proximity to Gilgit this town is growing quickly; there is a visible migration to Gahkuch from all over GB. The town is also situated on the way to the proposed road to the Central Asian states and the construction of that road would bring it to prominence just as the KKH did with Hunza.

In 2004, Hashim Khan, a BNF candidate from Damas village, won the seat of the chairman of the district council for five years. Yet nationalists do not so much see elections in terms of losing or winning as for them elections provide a platform to spread the Balawaristan-ideology to all and sundry. BNF-activists told: "We use elections to strengthen our membership and to spread our ideas." Hashim Khan narrated that during his tenure the BNF ac-

23 These periods of dominance have been describes by various scholars chronologically like, a) Kashmiri dominated phase between 1840 and 1890, b) British dominated period between 1890 and 1947, c) the period of Pakistani independence starting in 1947 (Stellrecht: 1997: 5, Cultural Area Karakoram Scientific Studies, Vol. 3). With little changes, Sökefeld 2005: 944 also lists these periods of dominance.

tivists used all their links and powers for the movement. He said: "Since our leadership and members come from middle or working class, we are always running short of opportunities to enhance our strength."

The leadership of the movement challenges control of politics by religious and rich people in Ghizer district in speeches and day to day discussions. In 2004 there were also elections for the Northern Areas Legislative Council. Nawaz Khan Naji contested the elections against *Pir*[24] Karam Ali Shah. During his speeches Naji repeated what the BNF had been telling people for many years: "My opponent candidate belongs to the 2% of elite class in our area; I represent the 98% of the masses as I am a poor man myself. I respect the religious position of the *Pir*, but I do not accept his monopoly in the political field, and to end his monopoly in politics, I shall keep on contending him. We [*Balawars*] talk about the identity and a nation of Northern Areas, we want to raise a young leadership of the area to bring young blood into politics, our problems won't be solved by kissing the *Pir's* hand, I request the elders of Ghizer district [to understand] that it is absolutely not a sin to vote against *Pir*, you will not be sinful if you do not vote for him. I do not agree with his authority as he materializes his religious status to get votes. And, people of the area, be aware that the time is not far when women of our area would contest elections against these religious people."[25]

If one spends a day in Gahkuch by simply walking and taking food from the local restaurants, the presence of BNF, BNSO, and *Balawars* becomes visible. Many cars and motor-cycles bear slogans, flags, and pictures related to the Balawaristan movement. Ghizer has now become synonymous with the Balawaristan struggle in entire GB. The road from Gilgit to Ghizer is replete with slogans in favor of Balawaristan and its leadership. During my stay in Ghizer I met Khadim Hussain who teaches in a local private school. He narrated that it was a usual practice in school to ask tenth grade students to write an essay on a favorite personality. He said: "In the last couple of years we observed a new trend has started where students write about Nawaz Naji and other local nationalists. Before this it was common that everyone would reproduce essays from books about Jinnah, Allama Iqbal or others from Pakistan." Jamil Balawar is one of those young people who managed the BNSO in Karachi between the years 2000 and 2005. As he came from Punial, he returned to Gahkuch and two years ago he started to run a hotel in the main bazaar of Gahkuch. His hotel is always full of customers. Since he is local and *Balawars* sit here, eat and drink, this place has become a hub of nationalists where they talk politics and plan for protests. In Pakistani hotels it is sometimes written on the wall that "*yahan siyasi guftagu mana hai*" (political discussions are prohibited here). He has written instead: "*yahan siyasi guftagu pe pabandi nahin hai*" (political discussions are not prohib-

24 *Pir* is an honorary title for a religious leader.

25 Weekly K2, 13 October, 2004, translated from Urdu by the author.

ited here). Jamil holds a Masters' degree in Management from Karachi, but he does not want to go for a job as he prefers his own business over serving the Pakistani state or being part of any NGO which in his opinion keep people busy and depoliticize them and make young people familiar with a foreign culture rather than their local one.

Hermann Kreutzmann writes that the Balawaristan movement is limited to Gilgit (Kreutzmann 2008: 213). He rightly points out that Indian diplomats and scholars have exploited the term Balawaristan for their own purposes. He further emphasizes that the Internet has played a role in spreading this name, giving it a presence in virtual space that is not matched in real life. According to my observation, however, this is only partly correct because the Balawaristan movement has undergone divisions. Only the Hamid faction is notorious for having links with and receiving funds from India. The Naji group on the other hand is considered indigenous and having no links with India. Kreutzmann is also mistaken in associating the popularity of the movement with Gilgit only. Although the movement was established in Gilgit, it is most popular in Ghizer district where nationalists contested elections for a decade now. Nationalists in Ghizer have been contesting elections for local bodies since 2004 and we saw that one of them became Chairman of the district council of Ghizer. Kreutzmann also seems to underestimate the power that social media networks have achieved in these days. The Internet has become an important tool to spread ideas that the controlling authorities try to suppress. It has now become a cliché that nationalist, feminist and identity movements across the globe rely mostly on the new social media like Internet and mobile phone. The sociologist Manuel Castells has written much about identity movements. According to him, the Internet and mobile phones have converted the world into "network society". In a new edition of his work on identity he writes: "Along with the technological revolution, the transformation of capitalism, and the demise of statism, we have experienced, in the past twenty-five years, the widespread surge of powerful expressions of collective identity that challenge globalization and cosmopolitanism on behalf of cultural singularity and people's control over their lives and environment" (Castells 2010: 2). For the nationalists of Gilgit Baltistan, the Internet has emerged as a space where no money and effort is needed to publish and circulate the literature; they just upload and let others know.

Emotions and Balawaristan movement: The case of Sher Qila village

Emotions have their place in political struggles; they evolve from constant attachment to a movement and from events that take place during the time of attachment. When I entered Sher Qila village for the first time during my fieldwork, I noticed a grave with a BNF flag hoisted over it. I read *shaheed* (martyr) on the gravestone and the date of death and I was shocked to note

that the deceased was a teenager activist of the BNSO who was killed by the security forces. This sent a chilling air all around my body. On 22nd December 2009, during elections in Ghizer, an eighteen years young activist of the BNSO was murdered by Police and Rangers in Sher Qila.[26] This terrible event united the whole of Punial against the forces who had committed this heinous crime. The Gilgit-Chitral road was blocked for many days and widespread protests took place in every village of Punial. In the chilling cold of winter, men, women and children blocked the road and protested in solidarity with the BNF and the victim's family. According to local people and newspapers people from Sher Qila were protesting on that day against unofficial election results and alleged vote-rigging when police and rangers opened fire killing one young boy and injuring two others.

The death of this young boy is never forgotten. Every year on his death anniversary BNSO arranges an event to remember him and to pay tribute to the sacrifice of *Shaheed* Zubair. This event is attended by most of the villagers and an air of sadness, anguish and high spirit prevails during the commemoration. It has become a public political ritual where activists take inspiration and vow their commitment with the cause of Balawaristan. According to Mabel Berezin, "public political rituals serve as arenas of identity, bounded spaces, where collective national selfhood is enacted" (Berezin 2001: 93). She further observes that repetitions in experience of ritual participation create a feeling of commonness among participants, and it develops collective memory (ibid.).

I stayed for a week with a family in Sher Qila. The family was divided about Balawaristan. The wife was a supporter of Naji but the husband had been an activist of ruling PPP for many years. The woman, who was educated, emphasized that Naji talked in a way that even her illiterate mother understood, while other politicians talked just for the purpose of getting votes. "Naji is one of us", she said. The emotions connected with the BNF had taken it beyond the mere politics of votes. Rather, people have started to foresee a future in which they can control their resources and make their own political decisions. The woman of the family once stated while preparing breakfast for me and her husband: "People come here from all over the world and tell us that we are living in heaven, it is so beautiful and serene here. I like to imagine that when my son is as old as you are, he lives in a place where we have all the rights and opportunities of the 'heaven' we live in."

Conclusion

This article offered a view on the Balawaristan movement and the rising *Balawar* identity. The Balawaristan movement and *Balawar* identity have

26 http://pamirtimes.net/2009/12/22/%E2%80%9Can-activist-of-bnf-killed-two-seriously-injured-in-sher-qillah-post-polling-riots%E2%80%9D/. Accessed on May 23, 2013.

achieved a level where they are accepted among the people of Ghizer and other districts of GB. They have entered the day to day discussions of many people. The *Balawars* are trying to expand their space by going for elections, jobs and businesses. The arrival of new media of communication in the shape of Internet and mobile phone access has opened new ways to spread their messages. During my fieldwork I often listened to speeches of nationalist leaders stored in people's mobiles and received many text messages from activists. These text messages clearly suggested that the new networks are helping nationalists to communicate their ideas. Nationalists struggled to publish and distribute their literature under the surveillance of security agencies.

Pakistan's policies seem confused over GB: On one hand it links GB's future with the solution of the Kashmir dispute, but on the other hand Pakistan is trying to integrate this area by different packages since 1974 as a part of the Pakistani nation. Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in its 1999 decree demanded that people of the area were given all the rights enjoyed by the other citizens of Pakistan, emphasizing that the "people of Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan, for all intents and purposes."[27] The Balawaristan struggle makes an effort to bring these areas out of the confusing status given by Pakistan, making it clear that these areas belong to the people who inhabit them and who should have the right to decide about their own lives and future.

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27 Decision of Supreme Court of Pakistan, 1999, p21, para no 14; quoted by Naseem 2007: 50.

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Die Wahrnehmung von „gendered space“ in Gilgit

Nadine Kriebel

Einleitung

Raum kann als eine „relationale (An)Ordnung sozialer Güter und Menschen“ (Ruhne 2003: 73) begriffen werden. Somit besitzt Raum eine Struktur, die aber gleichzeitig durch die darin stattfindenden Interaktionen sozial konstruiert und reproduziert wird.

Raum wird also als etwas verstanden, das von Menschen konstituiert und sozial produziert wird. Daher ist Raum nicht starr, sondern fluide und wird folglich von unterschiedlichen Akteuren verschieden wahrgenommen und genutzt. Die Korrelation von Raum und Geschlecht ist ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt für wissenschaftliche Studien (siehe u.a. Ruhne 2003; Raju 2011; Cieraad 1999). So ist die Wahrnehmung von Räumen sowie das Verhalten von Frauen und Männern häufig unterschiedlich. Renate Ruhne berichtet in diesem Zusammenhang vor allem von Unsicherheiten, die Frauen in öffentlichen Räumen wesentlich häufiger empfinden als Männer (Ruhne 2003). Zudem wird von verschiedenen Autoren und Autorinnen herausgearbeitet, dass bestimmte Räume oft mit einem bestimmten Geschlecht konnotiert sowie mit unterschiedlichen geschlechtsspezifischen Verhaltenserwartungen verbunden sind (Ruhne 2003; Cieraad 1999; Raju 2011). So gilt beispielsweise die private Sphäre des Hauses vorwiegend als „das Reich der (Haus-)Frau“, wohingegen öffentliche Räume, die zudem auch oft die wirtschaftlichen Räume einer Gesellschaft bilden, mit dem Mann verbunden werden.

Da in der pakistanischen Stadt Gilgit eine sehr strikte Geschlechtertrennung vorherrscht, die bis in die Nutzung öffentlichen Raumes hineinwirkt, spricht die Ethnologin Katrin Gratz in ihrer 2006 erschienenen Ethnographie Verwandtschaft, Geschlecht und Raum von „gendered space“ in Gilgit. Als solchen bezeichnet sie Räume oder Orte, die sehr stark mit einem bestimmten Geschlecht konnotiert sind. Das *het*[1], das mit der weiblichen Lebenswelt assoziiert wird, ist sehr stark mit dem privaten Bereich der Familie verbunden, wohingegen der öffentliche Raum, vor allem der Bazar, aber auch die öffentlichen sozialen Räume, in denen das politische, ökonomische und kulturelle Leben stattfindet, ausschließlich männlich konnotiert ist (Gratz 2006: 171ff).

1 Das Shina Wort *het* beschreibt eine Nachbarschaft, die idealerweise nur aus Haushalten der patrilinearen Verwandtschaftsgruppe besteht. Durch die fortschreitende Urbanisierung Gilgits verändern sich allerdings die *heti* (Gratz 1998: 493).

In diesem Artikel soll nun herausgearbeitet werden, wie Räume von jungen Frauen in Gilgit wahrgenommen und genutzt werden, in welcher Wechselbeziehung die Nutzung von Raum mit einem bestimmten Geschlecht steht und mit welchen geschlechtsspezifischen Verhaltenserwartungen sich die jungen Frauen konfrontiert sehen. Dazu stütze ich mich auf die Daten aus meiner zweimonatigen Feldforschung an der Karakorum International University (KIU) in Gilgit.[2] Ich besuchte im Sommer 2013 die Universität fast täglich, um mich mit Studentinnen und Dozenten zu unterhalten. Zudem begleitete ich ein paar Studentinnen, die vorwiegend Ismailitinnen waren, über mehrere Wochen hinweg an der KIU. Ich versuchte mein Verhalten an das ihre anzupassen, wozu auch gehörte, keine mir nicht bekannten Männer zu interviewen. Die Mädchen lebten zum Teil bei ihren Eltern in Gilgit oder im Wohnheim der KIU. Sie waren alle schon seit mehreren Semestern an der Universität, wodurch sie bereits an die ständige Interaktion mit Männern gewöhnt waren und damit recht locker umgingen.

Pardah und *gendered space* in Gilgit

Das „öffentliche" Stadtbild von Gilgit wird sehr stark von Männern dominiert, wohingegen Frauen hier nur sehr selten und für kurze Zeit sichtbar werden. Das hat vor allem mit der in Pakistan praktizierten *pardah*[3] zu tun. Als *pardah* wird eine Art „Verhaltensregelwerk" bezeichnet, das die Mobilität und soziale Kontakte von Mädchen und Frauen prägt und in letzter Instanz dazu dient, Frauen vor nicht-verwandten Männern zu verbergen. Dies ist sowohl physisch (räumliches Verbergen der Frau) wie auch symbolisch (Verschleierung der Frau) zu verstehen. Aber auch die „Kontrolle des Blicks" und das Schweigen oder wenigstens das Senken der Stimme in Anwesenheit nicht-verwandter Männer ist Form der *pardah* und gehört zum Ausdruck „weiblichen Wohlverhaltens" (Gratz 2006: 8ff; Ask 1994: 66). Durch die Einhaltung der *pardah* bringt die Frau Bescheidenheit, Schamgefühl und Desinteresse beziehungsweise Distanz gegenüber dem Mann zum Ausdruck. All das zeichnet eine gute, ehrenhafte Tochter/Frau aus und hat Einfluss auf die Ehre (*izzat)* der Frau und ihrer Familie: „So purdah strengthens izzat as izzat strengthens purdah" (Mandelbaum 1988:24).

Wie streng *pardah* praktiziert wird, ist sehr stark vom jeweiligen gesellschaftlichen Kontext abhängig: Im eigenen Haus, im privaten Raum sozusagen, und vor nahen Familienmitgliedern (Vater, Bruder, Ehemann, Schwiegervater, Schwager, etc.) verschleiern sich die Frauen nicht oder nur sehr selten, um ihren Respekt für eine anwesende Person zum Ausdruck zu

2 Die Feldforschung fand im Rahmen des Projekts „Coping with change in Gilgit-Baltistan" statt, welches vom DAAD finanziell gefördert wurde. Für die Möglichkeit der Teilnahme und die finanzielle Unterstützung möchte ich mich an dieser Stelle recht herzlich beim DAAD bedanken.

3 Der Begriff *pardah* stammt aus dem Persischen und bedeutet „Vorhang".

bringen. Vor Fremden und außerhalb des eigenen *het* verschleiern sich die Frauen hingegen schon. Frauen verdeutlichen durch die Art und Weise, wie und ob sie sich verschleiern und *pardah* praktizieren, wie eine soziale Situation von ihnen eingeschätzt wird (Gratz 2006: 9ff).

Somit wird anhand geschlechtsspezifischer Verhaltenserwartungen deutlich, mit welchem Geschlecht ein Raum assoziiert wird: Männer können sich lange auf dem Bazar, in Parks oder anderen öffentlichen Räumen aufhalten und dort verweilen. Ein solches Verhalten wird man bei Frauen nicht oder nur sehr selten beobachten. Frauen brauchen immer einen Grund, um in den Bazar zu gehen, und würden das nie ohne Begleitung von Verwandten oder anderen Frauen tun. Im Bazar sind die meisten Frauen streng verschleiert, so dass oft nur ein kleiner Augenschlitz vorhanden ist. Sie bewegen sich unauffällig, sind still und halten sich nur so lang wie nötig dort auf. Frauen stechen hier hervor und werden oft angestarrt, was in letzter Konsequenz dazu führt, dass sie sich unwohl fühlen und solche Orte meiden: *„Gilgit is not good for girls. There the men stare at us as if we are aliens. Even covered they stare at us“,* erklärte mir eine Studentin aus Danyore.

In Wohngebieten hingegen ist es Männern nicht möglich zu verweilen, zu beobachten oder lange stehen zu bleiben. Besonders fremde Wohngebiete werden von Männern gemieden und nur wenn nötig gekreuzt.

Gleichzeitig werden anhand des Verschleierungsverhaltens von Frauen die Übergänge von weiblichem zu männlichem Raum sichtbar. Je „öffentlicher“ ein Ort ist, desto stärker wird er mit dem männlichen Geschlecht assoziiert und desto stärker ist beispielsweise die Verschleierung der Frau (Gratz 1998: 490ff, Mirza 2002: 15ff). Im privaten Raum hingegen, beispielsweise im Haus, tragen Frauen meist nur eine *Dupatta*[4] , die oft auch nur lose über die Schultern gelegt ist. Betritt ein Mann oder eine weibliche Respektperson das Haus, wird die *Dupatta* schnell zurecht gezogen. Je „öffentlicher“ der Raum ist, desto stärker verschleiern sich die Frauen. Wenn sie das *het* verlassen, tragen sie meist einen *Chador*[5] oder eine *Burqa*[6] (Gratz 2006: 609ff). Dabei kann die Verschleierung aber auch dazu dienen, den weiblichen Raum auszuweiten und so Frauen den Zugang zu männlich assoziiertem Raum zu ermöglichen (Mirza 2002: 59f). Es würde daher zu kurz greifen, würde man versuchen, die Handlungsspielräume der Geschlechter auf die jeweiligen Räume zu reduzieren:

> *„Women are present and take part in public life although the spaces they occupy and the ways in which they enter the public sphere are quite different from, and not as visible as those of the men.“* (Mirza 2002: 15)

4 Ein Tuch, das Haare und Brust bedeckt.
5 Eine wesentlich größere *Dupatta*, die oft bis zu den Knien reicht.
6 Ein langer, schwarzer Mantel, der den Körper von Kopf bis Fuß bedeckt.

Zudem wäre es falsch, das *het* als rein privaten Raum aufzufassen, denn auch dort gibt es eine (weibliche) Öffentlichkeit. Wenn Männer morgens das *het* verlassen, um arbeiten zu gehen, besuchen Frauen ihre Verwandten in der Nachbarschaft. Der allergrößte Teil weiblicher Interaktion findet demnach in der eigenen Familie und Verwandtschaft statt. Gerade die Familie spielt eine essentielle Rolle in Bezug auf wirtschaftliche, finanzielle und soziale Beziehungen, die durch die Interaktion der Frauen untereinander auch mitgestaltet werden (Hastings et al. 1997: 229; Gratz 2006: 75ff, Weiss 1998).

Vielmehr sollte man von sich überlappenden Räumen ausgehen, die zwar mit einem bestimmten Geschlecht assoziiert und von diesem auch dominiert werden, die sich aber ständig verändern und neu definiert und verhandelt werden (Hastings et al. 1997: 208ff; Gratz 2006; Mirza 2002: 15ff).

Zur Veranschaulichung sollen hier zwei Beispiele aufgeführt werden: Seit einigen Jahren wird in Gilgit immer mehr auf das sogenannte *car-shopping* zurückgegriffen. Das bedeutet, dass sich Frauen von einem männlichen Familienmitglied mit dem Auto in den Bazar fahren lassen und die Verkäufer die gewünschte Ware direkt an das Auto bringen. Die Frauen sitzen oft hinter verhängten Fenstern und müssen meist gar nicht mit dem Verkäufer in Interaktion treten. Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass hier das Auto als eine Erweiterung des privaten, weiblichen Raumes verstanden werden kann und somit die Verschleierung im Auto sehr locker ist, obwohl sich die Frauen physisch an einem sehr öffentlichen Ort aufhalten, der sehr stark mit Männern assoziiert wird.

Zudem findet man inzwischen in vielen Restaurants, auch im Bazar, sogenannte *family areas*, die mit Hilfe eines Vorhangs vom restlichen Teil des Restaurants abgetrennt sind und nur für Frauen und ihre Familien zugänglich sind. Somit haben auch Frauen die Möglichkeit, Restaurants im Bazar aufzusuchen, selbstverständlich aber immer nur in Begleitung von männlichen Verwandten (Mirza 2002: 52ff).

Frauen entwickeln also verschiedene Strategien, die es ihnen erlauben, öffentlichen, männlichen Raum zu nutzen. So werden Räume ständig ausgeweitet, neu verhandelt und neu definiert. Gleichzeitig wird der weibliche Raum, das *het*, in jüngster Zeit immer weiter beschnitten. Durch den Zuzug fremder, nicht-verwandter Familien und den Bau mehrstöckiger Häuser reichen die Mauern, die ein Haus umgeben, nicht mehr aus, um die Frauen vor dem Blick nicht-verwandter Männer zu schützen. Somit müssen Frauen nun oft auch in ihrem eigenen Hof zumindest eine *Dupatta* tragen und oft einen *Chador* wenn sie sich im *het* bewegen (Gratz 1998).

Seit kurzem gibt es zudem einen „Lady's Bazaar" im Zentrum Gilgits. Dieser Ort wird durch ein großes, unscheinbares Tor von der Hauptstraße getrennt. Dahinter befindet sich ein kleines Areal, in dem viele Frauen einen kleinen Laden besitzen. Dort werden hauptsächlich Stoffe, Accessoires und Beautyprodukte verkauft. Frauen haben hier eine der wenigen Möglichkei-

ten, ein eigenes Geschäft aufzumachen und ihr eigenes Geld zu verdienen. Der „Lady's Market" ist einer der wenigen Ort Gilgits, an dem sich Frauen außerhalb ihres *het* treffen können, um mit anderen nicht-verwandten Frauen zusammen zu kommen. Männer haben hier keinen Zutritt.

Die sozialen Kontakte von Frauen zu anderen Frauen werden ebenfalls durch *pardah* geprägt. So interagieren Mädchen und Frauen hauptsächlich mit Familienmitgliedern und weiblichen Verwandten. Während der Schule, die selbstverständlich geschlechtergetrennt ist, haben die Mädchen auch Kontakt zu nicht-verwandten Klassenkameradinnen, welche sie aber nur äußerst selten besuchen, und dann auch nur, wenn sie in derselben Nachbarschaft wohnen. Zu Jungen oder Männern haben sie, abgesehen von den Männern, die mit ihnen im selben Haus wohnen, nur sehr wenig Kontakt. Zu nicht-verwandten Männern und potentiellen Ehepartnern innerhalb der Verwandtschaft sollte der Kontakt unbedingt vermieden werden, da sonst schnell Gerede entstehen kann, das sich auf den Ruf des Mädchens und den seiner Familie negativ auswirkt. Manchmal lässt sich der Kontakt zu nicht-verwandten Männern jedoch nicht vermeiden, beispielsweise wenn es sich um einen Fahrer oder Ladenbesitzer handelt. In einem solchen Fall wird oft dazu übergegangen, den Mann mit bestimmten Verwandtschaftsbezeichnungen anzusprechen (*uncle*, *bhai* [Bruder], etc.). Indem ein älterer Mann beispielsweise als *uncle* bezeichnet wird, werden bestimmte Erwartungen an die Person ausgesprochen, die mit der entsprechenden Verwandtschaftsbeziehung einhergehen: Ein Onkel trägt die Verantwortung für die Sicherheit und Ehre der weiblichen Familienmitglieder. Indem eine Frau einen nicht-verwandten Mann nun mit *uncle* anspricht, drückt sie aus, in welcher formellen Beziehung sie zueinander stehen und welche Erwartungen und Verhaltensweisen damit verbunden sind (Mirza 2002: 60ff; Weiss 1998).

Gendered Space an der Karakoram International University (KIU)

Der Campus der 2002 eröffneten Karakoram International University (KIU) liegt außerhalb der Stadt Gilgit in Konodas. Hier studieren über 1.800 junge Männer und Frauen, überwiegend aus der Region Gilgit-Baltistan.[7] Zahlenmäßig bilden Frauen die Mehrheit (ca. 60%), da Männer häufig im Tiefland studieren. Entsprechend der Diversität der Bevölkerung von Gilgit-Baltistan gibt es an der KIU eine große sprachliche, religiöse und regionale Vielfalt, an die sich die jungen Studierenden anfangs gewöhnen müssen. Oft entstehen Freundschaften auf der Basis gemeinsamer regionaler Herkunft, Sprache oder Religionszugehörigkeit sowie aufgrund des Studienfaches. Die Studierenden können nur über zwei Tore den Campus betreten, an denen ihre Identität geprüft wird. Unbefugten wird der Zutritt verwehrt. Auf dem Campus befinden sich mehrere kleine Gebäude, in denen die Fakultäten unterge-

7 http://www.kiu.edu.pk/about_kiu.html

bracht sind, ein Verwaltungsblock mit einer Aula, eine Bibliothek sowie eine kleine Mensa und zwei Kioske. Am hinteren Rand befinden sich die Häuser der Dozierenden sowie ein kleiner Sportplatz. Ein Mädchenwohnheim steht gleich hinter dem Campus.

Im Sommer ist vor allem der Kiosk *sabzaza* Dreh- und Angelpunkt des studentischen Lebens. Hier werden vor allem Snacks wie *chai* (Tee), Saft, *samosas* (gefüllte Teigtaschen), *roti* (Fladenbrot) und Kekse verkauft. Der Kiosk liegt im Schatten vieler kleiner Bäume in der Mitte des Campus und ist von Holzbänken und weiteren Sitzmöglichkeiten umgeben. Die Studierenden verbringen dort ihre Freistunden, treffen sich hier mit Freunden und tauschen sich aus. In den Sommermonaten ist das der „öffentlichste" Raum der KIU. Viele Studenten und Studentinnen nutzen aber auch ein privateres Schattenplätzchen in der Nähe ihrer Fakultäten.

Die weibliche Lebenswelt an der KIU

Viele der Studierenden wohnen in getrenntgeschlechtlichen Wohnheimen oder bei Verwandten, wobei besonders in den Mädchenwohnheimen sehr strenge Regeln gelten. So dürfen Frauen das Wohnheim nur in Begleitung einer autorisierten Aufsichtsperson, eines *guardians*[8], verlassen und es ist ihnen nicht erlaubt, Besuch zu empfangen. Um beispielsweise Besorgungen auf dem Bazar zu erledigen, können die jungen Frauen entweder mit einem ihrer *guardians* gehen, oder sie brauchen die schriftliche Erlaubnis des Vormunds, dass sie bei einem vom Wohnheim organisierten Ausflug auf den Bazar mitfahren dürfen. Die Studentinnen, mit denen ich mich unterhielt, gingen höchstens ein Mal im Semester in den Bazar.[9] Auch die Nutzung eines Mobiltelefons wird oft von der Leitung des Wohnheims reguliert. So ist es im KIU Wohnheim den Mädchen untersagt, nach 22 Uhr das Handy zu benutzen. In anderen Wohnheimen, wie beispielsweise dem *Mountain Refugee Girls Hostel*, das vorwiegend College-Studentinnen beherbergt, ist es den Mädchen gänzlich verboten, ein Mobiltelefon zu besitzen, es sei denn, sie sind bereits verheiratet und ihr Ehemann erlaubt es ihnen.

Die männlichen Studenten hingegen sehen sich mit wesentlich weniger Regeln konfrontiert. In den meisten Wohnheimen steht es ihnen frei, wann sie wohin gehen und wann sie zurückkommen. Sie brauchen dafür auch keine Erlaubnis einzuholen.

8 Als sogenannte *guardians* gelten weibliche, unverheiratete Dozentinnen, die ebenfalls im Wohnheim leben und dort auf die Mädchen aufpassen, sowie männliche Verwandte der Studentinnen, die die Verantwortung für sie tragen, solange sie von ihrer Kernfamilie getrennt sind.

9 Die meisten Studentinnen finden einen Ausflug nach Gilgit nicht sehr attraktiv. Die Stadt und ihre Bewohner haben bei den Studierenden den Ruf, konservativ und altmodisch, besonders in Bezug auf die Einhaltung von *pardah*, zu sein. Besonders die Studentinnen fühlen sich auf dem Bazar nicht wohl und empfinden die Stadt als sehr einschränkend.

Die Mädchen verbringen ihre Freizeit lieber mit ihren Kommilitoninnen auf dem kleinen Campus der KIU oder im Wohnheim. Viele der Mädchen bleiben oft wesentlich länger als nötig auf dem Campus, um mit ihren Freundinnen Zeit zu verbringen. Die Mädchen aus Gilgit genießen vor allem die Abwechslung und Zeit außerhalb des *het* und ihrer Familie: *„We enjoy a lot here! You meet so many people from different areas and you can sit together and talk"* erklärt Reshma[10]. Freundschaften, besonders zu nicht-verwandten Mädchen, spielen für sie eine sehr große Rolle. Die Mädchen erfreuen sich daran, Zeit mit Gleichaltrigen zu verbringen und mit Mädchen aus anderen Familien und Regionen befreundet zu sein (Gratz 2006: 301ff). Meistens enden Mädchenfreundschaften nach der Schule oder der Universität, da die Mädchen nach ihrem Abschluss in ihre Dörfer und zu ihren Familien zurückkehren, wo sie sich wieder primär im Haus aufhalten. Somit besteht oft keine Möglichkeit mehr, Freundinnen zu besuchen und Freundschaften zu pflegen.

Die meisten Mädchen würden jedoch lieber an einer Universität im Tiefland studieren. Die großen Städte wie Islamabad, Lahore oder Karachi werden bei ihnen mit einer größeren Freiheit assoziiert. Viele der Mädchen hatten bereits eine Zusage für eine Universität im Tiefland. Schlussendlich hat sich die Familie aber dafür entschieden, dass ihre Tochter besser in ihrer Nähe bleibt und in Gilgit studiert. Das hat zum einen mit den Mehrkosten des Studiums im Tiefland zu tun. Studiengebühren, Unterkunft und Verpflegung sind dort um einiges höher. Hinzu kommen die Transportkosten. Da eine Frau nicht alleine reisen sollte, muss sie von ihrem Bruder oder Vater ins Tiefland gebracht werden und von dort auch wieder abgeholt werden, wodurch die Transportkosten um ein Vielfaches ansteigen. Des Weiteren entzieht sich die Tochter durch die Entfernung und die Anonymität der Großstadt weitestgehend der Kontrolle der Familie. So bleiben den Mädchen oft nur ihre Erinnerungen an Ausflüge ins Tiefland oder die Geschichten von Freundinnen. Saalima, die ihre Collegezeit in Islamabad verbrachte, verfiel darüber immer wieder ins Schwärmen: *„I wanted to live in Islamabad because I was looking for something new: new environment, new people, new impressions. I found that in Islamabad. There is so much diversity, so much social life. From time to time my guard took me out and we went to the park or to his place or the Bazar. You can't find such places here in Gilgit. There is no social life in Gilgit. There is no place where we women can go."*

Für die meisten Studienanfängerinnen ist die Universität der erste Raum, in dem sie mit nicht-verwandten Männern in Kontakt kommen und mit diesen gemeinsam unterrichtet werden. Besonders für die Mädchen ist diese ungewohnte Situation anfangs sehr nervenaufreibend (Sales 1999: 409). Dozenten haben mir berichtet, dass viele Erstsemesterinnen einige Monate brauchen, um sich an den Universitätsalltag mit Männern zu gewöhnen und um für sich einen Weg zu finden, mit dem sie *pardah* und *izzat* wahren

10 Alle Namen wurden geändert.

können. Allgemein gilt: „*meeting with purpose of study*" ist akzeptiert, und sollte dann auch am besten an einem sehr öffentlichen Ort, wie dem *Sabzaza,* auf dem Campus stattfinden. Sitzen Männer und Frauen irgendwo abseits zu zweit, kann es schnell passieren, dass sie Opfer von Gerüchten werden oder Sicherheitsmänner der KIU sie bitten, sich an einen öffentlicheren Ort, wie beispielsweise den S*abzaza*, zu setzen. Die „Öffentlichkeit" funktioniert hier als eine Art „Moralpolizei" und bestimmt das Verhalten der Studierenden. Die Leitung und die Mitarbeiter der Universität sowie die Studierenden selbst sind sehr darum bemüht, dass die Universität und die Studierenden keinen schlechten Ruf außerhalb des Campus bekommen. Dies beginnt bei den Sicherheitsmännern, die darauf achten, dass Studierende verschiedenen Geschlechts nicht zu viel miteinander interagieren, geht weiter mit den Studenten selber, die via Gerede und direktem Ansprechen „auffälliger" Personen dafür sorgen, dass man sich nie unbeobachtet fühlen kann. Weiterhin erlassen Universitätsleitungen beispielsweise Kleidungsregeln für den Campus. So geschehen an der National University of Science and Technology (NUST) in Islamabad: Studenten wurden hier gebeten, „anständige" (decent) Kleidung zu tragen. Zudem wird in der Onlineausgabe der pakistanischen *Tribune* davon berichtet, dass Studentinnen der NUST eine Geldstrafe zahlen mussten, weil sie enge Jeans oder keine *Dupatta* trugen. Die Reaktionen darauf und auf den Artikel waren kontrovers, was verdeutlicht, wie heikel das Thema des gemischtgeschlechtlichen Unterrichts in der pakistanischen Gesellschaft diskutiert wird (Anonym 2013).

Ismailitische Studentinnen berichteten mir immer wieder, dass sie sich oft unwohl fühlen, wenn sie keine *Dupatta* auf dem Campus tragen: *„Education at KIU is good. But the mind of the people, the perception and environment is not good. We are bounded too much. We have to wear Dupatta and long shirts. Otherwise people start talking: ‚Look at this girl: she is not wearing a Dupatta. She talks to everybody. She is too open. She is no good girl.' "* Daher bevorzugen es viele ismailitische Studentinnen, unter sich zu bleiben. Doch auch die männlichen Ismailis achten sehr genau darauf, wie sich die Mädchen verhalten*: „If we talk to boys from our sect it's ok. We can sit with them when we need help or when we have some problems. But we shall only sit with Ismaili boys. My cousin is also a student at KIU and he is having a look with whom I sit together and how I talk to them."* Die Studentin Nisha erklärt mir weiter: *"The boys from our sect are used to girls. But the boys from the other sects, especially the kashroti-boy's*[11]*, are too much close-minded. They think when you talk to them you are their girlfriend."*

So wird also von allen Seiten dafür gesorgt, dass der Ort „Universität", an dem Männer und Frauen in einem Alter zusammenkommen können, in dem sie eigentlich verheiratet werden sollten, und an dem daher stren-

11 Kashrot ist ein Stadtteil von Gilgit, der hauptsächlich von Sunniten bewohnt wird.

ge *pardah*-Regeln gelten sollten, bei der Stadtbevölkerung von Gilgit keinen schlechten Ruf bekommt.

Markieren von Raum an der KIU

Da die Universität nicht nur mit einem Geschlecht assoziiert wird, sondern von jungen Männern und Frauen gleichermaßen genutzt wird, kann man die KIU nicht als genuin männlichen oder weiblichen Raum verstehen. Zudem kann man nicht anhand des Verschleierungsverhaltens der Mädchen erkennen, wie sie einen Raum einordnen. An der KIU studieren viele Ismailis, die vor allem aus Hunza, Gojal oder Yasin kommen. In diesen Regionen findet bei weitem keine so strikte Segregation der Geschlechter statt wie in Gilgit. Auch gibt es dort unter anderem, gemischtgeschlechtliche Schulen, so dass es die Mädchen aus diesen Regionen gewohnt sind, zusammen mit Jungen unterrichtet zu werden. Zudem besuchen die meisten Kinder in Hunza oft ein ismailitisches ‚Religious Education Center' (REC), in dem Jungen und Mädchen von klein auf zusammen in religiösen Belangen unterrichtet werden. Mädchen und Frauen arbeiten hier auch auf den Feldern mit und sind zumeist unverschleiert im Dorf unterwegs. Viele der jungen Frauen an der KIU, die aus diesen Gebieten kommen, möchten sich diese „Freiheit" nicht nehmen lassen und haben oft nur eine *Dupatta* über die Schultern gelegt. Die Mädchen aus Gilgit hingegen tragen oft ein sehr enges Kopftuch, das die Haare verbirgt, und meist auch eine *Burqa*. Einige tragen zudem auch noch ein *Niqab*.[12] Selbstverständlich gibt es auch Ausnahmen, so sieht man auf dem Campus immer häufiger Ismailitinnen, die eine *Burqa* oder ein enges Kopftuch tragen. Maha, eine Ismailitin aus Hunza erklärte mir, dass sie das enge Kopftuch mit *Niqab* trägt, weil sie sich so auf dem Campus wohler fühlt: „*The men stare at me. When I'm wearing the Niqab they don't look at me.*" Für eine andere ismailitische Studentin hat der *Niqab* vor allem einen praktischen Nutzen: er soll ihr Gesicht vor der Sonne schützen. Da sie in zwei Monaten heiratet, möchte sie eine besonders helle Haut haben.

Dennoch kann man beobachten, welche Strategien von Männern und Frauen angewendet werden, um einen Raum als den ihren zu markieren. Die jungen Männer versuchen vor allem durch lautes Reden, Singen oder ausschweifendes Gestikulieren einen Ort zu dominieren. Studentinnen haben mir oft berichtet, dass Jungen im *Sabzaza* am Nebentisch laut wurden, als die Mädchen sich setzten, und ihnen Kommentare zuriefen. Mir wurde auch berichtet, dass junge Männer immer wieder Frauen auf ihren Kleidungsstil hin ansprachen, dass sie also als eine Art „Moralpolizei" auftraten und die Mädchen dazu aufforderten, ihre *Dupatta* über den Kopf zu ziehen oder zurechtzurücken. Dies führt dazu, dass Studentinnen sich sehr genau überlegen, wo sie sich hinsetzen. Sie meiden die Anwesenheit großer Männergruppen, vor allem wenn es unbekannte Studenten sind.

12 Als *Niqab* wird ein Tuch bezeichnet, das über Nase und Mund gespannt wird.

Auch im Universitätsbus ist mir das immer wieder aufgefallen. Der Bus, der die Studierenden aus Gilgit-Stadt abholt und zur KIU bringt, ist in der Mitte mit einer circa 1,60m hohen Wand geteilt. Vorn sitzen beziehungsweise stehen die Studentinnen, hinten die Studenten. In beiden Abteilen befindet sich ein älterer, männlicher Aufpasser, der den Ein- und Ausstieg regelt. Das Mädchenabteil ist meist überfüllt und so stehen und sitzen sie eng aneinander gedrückt da. Zu Fahrer und Aufpasser („uncle“) wird keine große Distanz gewahrt, zu dem hinteren Jungenabteil hingegen schon. Je näher man dem Abteil kommt, umso lauter und präsenter werden die Jungen und umso stiller die Mädchen. Die Studentinnen gehen oft dazu über, mittels ihres Handys Musik zu hören oder sich anderweitig mit dem Handy zu beschäftigen, um Desinteresse an dem Geschehen hinter ihnen zu demonstrieren. Die Jungen hingegen spielen laut Musik ab, reden, lachen und tanzen sogar manchmal. Sie zeigen deutlich ihre Präsenz und lassen sich nicht von der Anwesenheit der Mädchen irritieren, sondern versuchen so den Raum zu dominieren.

Auf dem Campus verstehen es aber auch die Mädchen, sich ihre eigenen Räume zu schaffen. Besonders Orte, an denen Mädchen in größeren Gruppen zusammen sind, werden von Jungen gemieden. Das können Klassenzimmer sein, aber auch beispielsweise der *Sabzaza*, dann aber ein wenig abseits des Kiosks. In einem solchen Umfeld kommt es vor, dass Mädchen zusammen reden, lachen, herumalbern und überschwänglich gestikulieren. Wenn Männer solche Orte kreuzen oder passieren, verhalten sie sich meist unauffällig und gehen schnell weiter. Wie gut es Mädchen schaffen, sich Räume anzueignen, hängt unter anderem vom zahlenmäßigen Geschlechterverhältnis ab. Orte oder Räume, in denen besonders wenige Jungen, aber viele Mädchen sind, werden relativ leicht von Mädchen angeeignet. Bezeichnend ist zudem das Umfeld, in dem sie sich aufhalten. Studentinnen nutzen immer eher Räume und Orte, die etwas abseits liegen oder die man abschließen kann. Entscheidend ist auch, ob (männliche) Verwandte in der Nähe sind. Junge, unverheiratete Frauen müssen ganz besonders auf ihre *izzat* und ihren Ruf achten und daher strikte *pardah* einhalten (Ask 1994: 71). Darauf achten auch ihre Verwandten, denn: „A family’s izzat is at risk anytime women leave the home.“ (Weiss 1998: 83).

Zudem kommt es natürlich auch auf den Hintergrund und die Persönlichkeit der Mädchen an. Studentinnen im ersten Semester fällt es tendenziell schwerer, sich einen Raum anzueignen und trotz der Anwesenheit von Männern einen Raum zu dominieren. Mädchen hingegen, die in Dörfern aufgewachsen sind, in denen sie schon mit Jungen zur Schule gegangen sind und es daher kennen, sich einen Raum mit dem anderen Geschlecht zu teilen, haben weniger Schwierigkeiten, sich in einem öffentlichen Raum zu positionieren.

Ausblick

Die Akzeptanz einer universitären Bildung für Frauen ist in den letzten Jahren immer weiter angestiegen. Familien sind stolz darauf, wenn sie es ihren Töchtern ermöglichen können, eine Universität zu besuchen. Zudem erhöht ein Universitätsabschluss auch die Chancen auf dem Heiratsmarkt. Da Frauen für die Erziehung der Kinder verantwortlich sind, legen viele Familien Wert darauf, dass die Frau gebildet ist (Gratz 2006: 314ff).

Die Karakorum International University in Gilgit-Baltistan bietet hier vor allem jungen Frauen aus der Region die Möglichkeit, einen akademischen Abschluss zu erlangen. Durch die geringe räumliche Entfernung der KIU zu den Wohnorten der Familien entziehen sich die jungen Frauen nicht ganz dem Einflussbereich ihrer Familie, so dass auf die Einhaltung von *pardah* und *izzat* geachtet werden kann. Vor der Eröffnung der KIU besuchten Frauen in Gilgit-Baltistan überwiegend Fernkurse, um eine höhere Bildung zu erlangen, beispielsweise die Kurse der Allama Iqbal Open University (Marsden 2008: 419f). Viele Frauen aus Hunza und Gojal besuchten aber auch Colleges und Universitäten im Tiefland.

In meinen Interviews habe ich erfahren, dass die meisten Studentinnen vorhaben, später einen Beruf auszuüben, vor allem um ihre Community zu unterstützen. Eine Studentin aus Hunza erklärte mir diesbezüglich: *„What is the benefit of our education if we are not doing a job and give our knowledge to the young generation? So we have to do a job afterwards.“* Dies steht für sie aber in keinerlei Widerspruch zur Gründung einer Familie. Durch das Zusammenleben mit den Eltern des Mannes, dessen Brüdern und ggf. deren Familien und seinen unverheirateten Schwestern ist die Betreuung der Kinder und die Organisation des Haushaltes gewährleistet.

Dennoch besitzen berufstätige Frauen oft eine Sonderrolle. Sie durchqueren wesentlich häufiger männlich assoziierte Räume und können sich in diesen aufhalten, auf der anderen Seite laufen sie dadurch aber auch Gefahr, Opfer von Gerüchten zu werden. Berufstätige Frauen befinden sich in einem ständigen Konflikt zwischen der Nutzung des öffentlichen, männlichen Raumes und der Wahrung von *pardah* und *izzat*.

Wie in diesem Artikel verdeutlicht wurde, verstehen es Frauen manchmal, männlich assoziierten Raum zu nutzen und ihre Präsenz in der öffentlichen Sphäre immer wieder neu zu verhandeln. Frauen werden in diesen Räumen immer sichtbarer und bewegen sich dort inzwischen selbstbewusster, ohne dass es zwangsläufig Auswirkungen auf ihren Ruf oder den ihrer Familie hat.

Ich habe „gendered spaces“ in Gilgit als Räume wahrgenommen, die mit einem bestimmten Geschlecht assoziiert werden und mit dementsprechenden Verhaltenserwartungen konnotiert sind, die sich aber überlappen und nicht strikt abgegrenzt sind. Die Räume werden immer wieder neu verhandelt, umdefiniert und zum Teil neu angeeignet. In diesem Zusammenhang

spielt auch die Auslegung von *pardah* eine entscheidende Rolle. Denn auch *pardah* kann als ein durchaus anpassungsfähiges System von Überzeugungen, Werten und Normen verstanden werden, das durch die Akteure manipuliert und interpretiert werden kann und somit die Nutzung von öffentlichem Raum durch Frauen erleichtert. (Gratz 2006: 8ff).

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Fieldwork Encounters: Being Foreign and Female in Gilgit

Anna Grieser

> *"Neither of us was ready for the sense of powerlessness and dismay resulting from our lack of control over how we were perceived. This was both loss of control of the direction of the research and also loss of control in terms of their self-presentation. A woman entering a male-dominated setting is often the target of innuendo, rumour and boasting. A female ethnographer, though, is expected to deal with this situation such that the research does not suffer."* (Gill and Maclean 2002: 4.4-4.5)

The discussion of subjective and intersubjective aspects of fieldwork arrived in mainstream anthropology in the 1970s when anthropologists started to turn their attention towards a reflection of the fieldwork process and the resulting representations. As Kirsten Hastrup contends, knowledge grows out of registered – or silenced – experiences, roles and frames in the field (Hastrup 2004: 456). "The connections that the anthropologist makes are not so much backed by an experience of culture as by an experience of the contingency of frames within which everybody plays his or her part" (ibid.: 467).

In this article I argue that fieldwork experiences are shaped by an interplay of the researcher and local patterns, and describe how my fieldwork in Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan in the North of Pakistan, was shaped by aspects of foreignness and femininity.[1] As such, this is one way of arguing that

1 This contribution is a by-product of a two month pre-study visit to Gilgit from October to December 2011 and approximately six months of fieldwork in Gilgit from April to September 2012. Both visits were conducted within a doctoral research project in social anthropology on the social and cultural meaning of water in the high mountain areas of Pakistan as a sub-project of the Research Network *Crossroads Asia*, generously funded by the German Federal Ministry for Education and Research. Permission for fieldwork has been kindly granted by the Pakistani Ministry of Interior. The contribution goes beyond my central research topic of looking at the waterscape in Gilgit. As I argue in this article, I believe that the collection of data and data analysis are shaped by fieldwork experiences, as well as by rules and patterns of social interaction. As I will argue, gender is the variable that most obviously affected the research process in the current project. Matters of gender thus have to be problematized, negotiated and understood both during the fieldwork and in writing, as is suggested by Coffey (1999: 78) – a task which I attempt in the current article.

what anthropologists get to know and can claim to know "is inseparable from their relationship with those they study" (Mosse 2006: 937). In other words, knowledge about other cultures, other people, and other settings is not something that can be just extracted or plucked like berries from a bush. Instead, the knowledge which is imparted or gained from fieldwork is being created in the course of the fieldwork, and it is being created in interaction. Thus, it is shaped by the locale, the people there, their frames of actions and ideas, as well as by the fieldworker and the way he or she is seen and fashioned by the people. As Golde maintains, the question as to which particular aspects of the "fieldworker-self" or which relational issues[2] will be of the most importance is established in the field; they will be "dramatized" in the interaction between the fieldworker and the local people and can only be controlled by the fieldworker to a limited degree. During my fieldwork in Gilgit the biggest issues revolved around local images and expectations with regard to foreigners and women, shaping the way people in Gilgit saw and reacted towards me and how I, in turn, tried to navigate through a field dominated by gender ideals and gender boundaries that radically differ from those at (my) home. I maintain that gender issues (and the way they were dramatized through malicious rumours and resulted in suspicion, surveillance, self-surveillance, and more rumours) came to the fore in my fieldwork process because people were confused between the attributes of "female gender" and "foreigner" and because different people put the emphasis on one or the other. The problem is that those two attributes engender totally different roles, expectations, and reactions.

This article first gives an introduction to theories about intersubjectivity in fieldwork, the fieldworker's subjectivity, and "embodied fieldwork". The main part discusses gender boundaries in Gilgit, the unresolved status of single women, how I attempted to be acceptable in the field (resorting to changed bodily practices, monitoring my own and others' behaviour), and how the local idea of Western women's "hypersexuality" subverted such attempts. In conclusion I argue that my experiences certainly question the idea of first-time fieldworkers that one can ultimately control the data collection process. I want to contend, though, that too little attention is sometimes paid to the subjection of fieldworkers to local norms and standards and the resulting impairments. My fieldwork in Gilgit-Baltistan rather raised questions

2 Such aspects may be tentatively distinguished as dimensions of the "fieldworker-self" that contains variables such as age, personality, origin, or skin colour, while issues of language, reciprocity or commensality may be termed "relational issues". Although the aspects listed here seem to be quite heterogeneous in kind and although we might sort them tentatively into these two categories, these variables and the manner in which they affect the research process might be less separable than it seems at first. Additionally, all are subject and open to interpretation, and the fieldworker is only partially able to influence them as well as people's interpretations and reactions.

about the potential powerlessness of the fieldworker who may be subjected to local frames, games and rumours.

Since this means that my account is to a large part (auto)biographic, it is necessary to protect the privacy of both the people I interacted with and myself. Hence, I chose to anonymize persons and blur identities where this seems necessary and advisable – not only out of stylistic and narrative constraints, but out of the need and the right to protect both other people and myself. In order to limit damaging consequences as far as possible, some sections and episodes are left fragmented (cf. Flueckiger 2013: 4).

(Inter)subjective Aspects of Fieldwork

The reflection and discussion of subjective and intersubjective aspects of fieldwork was long ignored in anthropology; as Golde argued in 1986, "perhaps because it would have been considered unessential or irrelevant to the communication of information about other cultures, the central scientific task" (Golde 1986: 1). Interviewing and observation were long considered to be objective methods; hence, little importance was attached to either the biography or the social position of the researcher in the respective locale or the relations established by him/her in the field. Consequently, the ethnographer made him/herself invisible in the written ethnography, focusing solely on the other culture (ibid.; Kulick 1995: 3). For many ethnographers the "reportable significant knowledge" was distinct from and thus needed to be kept separate from the "participatory details of the fieldwork experience [that] is still considered as embarrassingly unprofessional" (Tedlock 1991: 70–71). An empathic but distancing methodology was hoped to produce data that is "scientific" because of its disengagement from reflection, while at the same time reproducing "the native's point of view", as was famously propagated by Malinowski in 1922 (ibid.: 69). Thus, fieldwork experiences either went by the board or were published separately or even under a pseudonym (ibid.: 72).

After the reflective and representational turn of the 1970s and 1980s most anthropologists acknowledged that the analysis and reconstruction of the research material is to a large extent shaped by the personal context and the field experiences of the researcher (see e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Tedlock 1991; Collins and Gallinat 2010; Flueckiger 2013). Such an understanding went hand in hand with self-examination and the examination of the processes of fieldwork, and resulted in ethnographic accounts that analysed "the political, philosophical, and poetic implications of such work" (Tedlock 1991: 79)[3]. It was acknowledged that if we want to understand "the

3 At the same time, ethnographies became treated as a literary genre, which means that the process of writing came increasingly under scrutiny as well. In this context, the debate around the process of "Writing Culture", as collected in the famous anthology of Clifford and Marcus (1986), is exemplary and seminal.

other" (even if this idea of an "other" should be dealt with critically), we must also improve our understanding of the fieldwork encounter itself; that is, we have to explore its context and its human intersubjectivity (cf. Tedlock 1991; Collins and Gallinat 2010). The idea that it is possible to "do objective science" and that researchers need to avoid under all circumstances the pitfall of "going native"[4] has come under criticism. Instead, the notion of "human intersubjectivity" was fostered. This means that shared dialogue and shared experiences are understood to create an intersubjectivity which enables the ethnographer to understand the other (Tedlock 1991: 70-1). The fieldworker and his or her biography hardly exist in a cultural vacuum. Instead, one is "placed in a cross-cultural encounter" which is ultimately made up of interpersonal relations and relationships that have to be kept track of, scrutinized, and analysed. As has been called for by Okely, "the autobiographical experience of fieldwork requires the deconstruction of those relationships [in the field] with the rigour demanded elsewhere in the discipline" (Okely 1992: 2).[5]

Thus, ethnographies shifted from allegedly scientific accounts of "others" to analyses which include the time and experiences shared by the ethnographers with those others in the field. This also increasingly resulted in auto-ethnographies that explicitly engage with the ethnographic self and its interactions with other selves in the field. They focus less on the understanding of the other or of the self than on the understanding of the shared and the dialogic; as Okely put it: "the lived interactions, participatory experience and embodied knowledge" (ibid.: 2–3). Tedlock discusses this development as a shift from participant observation to the observation of participation. The "embodied lived experience" ought to enliven and consolidate the writing and production of theory, and reveal the interests of the researcher and the people in the field, the course of the research process, as well as frictions in the making of the ethnography (Tedlock 1991: 78-1). After all, as Šikić-Mićanović argues, "the researcher's experience is crucial as it is not the unmediated world of others but the world between ourselves and others that adds reality to the field" (Šikić-Mićanović 2010: 45; cf. Okely and Callaway 1992; Hastrup 1992: 117).

4 The term "going native" designates and criticises a comprehensive secondary acculturation to the perspective of those set out to study. "Going native" involves the inability to return to one's original culture successfully, the loss of a scientific perspective, and the inability to ponder differing perspectives (see e.g. Spittler 2001: 14).

5 A next step, as Mosse argues, would be to end the separation of fieldwork from deskwork. Based on the actual relationships in the field, we have to do away with "ethnographic objectifications" of those we presume to write about. Through this, Mosse, too, argues the case that "what anthropologists know is inseparable from their relationship with those they study" (Mosse 2006: 937). Personal narratives, dialogue and collaboration are recently tested solutions to this issue; another alternative is "objectivity" through the possibility to object to the resulting ethnographic product (ibid.: 937-9).

Although it remains disputed whether the author's emotions and intentions are accessible to the reader (or even to the author him/herself), many authors claim that through (self-)reflexivity personal experiences *are* accessible and can thus be used as a source of ethnographic data. Šikić-Mićanović, for example, argues that experiences can and should be used for a critical understanding of the research process, its development and outcome (Šikić-Mićanović 2010: 46-7). But as Okely maintains, this reflexivity and disclosure in the ethnographic work must not be misunderstood as a form of narcissism or navel-gazing. Self-reflexivity and self-awareness involve scrutiny which is rarely flattering or complimentary (Okely 1992: 2).[6]

But while the fieldwork process is generally an intersubjective process, I argue that we still can distinguish local patterns which come to the fore in shared time, shared space and shared experiences. As Hastrup argues: "The situation of the fieldworker is characteristic of the conditions being studied [...]. This is the reason why fieldwork is a valid way of gaining knowledge about other people, even if it cannot be backed by positive evidence in the old sense of the term" (Hastrup 2004: 466). At the same time Hastrup contends that although our experience is embodied we can understand our parts and roles only *partially* and only describe them through inference. Whatever happens always remains liable to individual contestations: "The connections that the anthropologist makes are not so much backed by an experience of culture as by an experience of the contingency of frames within which everybody plays his or her part" (ibid.: 467).

The Fieldworker's Self and Subjectivity

While we have argued so far that ethnographic accounts are shaped in intersubjective events which are, in turn, shaped by local patterns and frames, this also includes the other side of the coin, i.e. the fieldworker, his or her cultural background and personal attributes. It is a contested question whether ethnographies are just as subjective as fieldworkers. In her discussion of ethnographic writing of the 20th century, Tedlock (1991) claims that the researchers' subjectivity was neglected most of the time. The fieldworkers and their experiences (the "data") were mostly kept separate, i.e. from the analysis and even more so from the resultant text. Often the researcher is considered the primary instrument of data collection; yet we need to keep in mind that the researcher is not a neutral instrument but an embodied social actor. "What is presented to the host community is a body: a size and shape, hair and skin, clothing and movement, sexual invitation or untouchability" (Warren 1988: 24-5; see also Moreno 1995: 246; Coffey 1999: 60). The research is always shaped by the specific conditions of its setting, by how the researcher

6 Okely argues to the contrary that "indeed those who protect the self from scrutiny could as well be labelled self-satisfied and arrogant in presuming their presence and relations with others to be unproblematic" (Okely 1992: 2).

is perceived and how the ensuing intersubjective interaction plays out. Leaving these processes out of reflection, analysis and writing reduces everyone involved to mere carriers of information that lack agency and importance as individuals.

The subjectivity of the fieldworker is discussed in terms such as "positionality" or "embodiment". Positionality refers to different aspects of identity that either the researcher him/herself or his/her partners of interaction perceive, such as age, gender, sexuality, class, race, religion, nationality, personality "and other attributes that are markers of relational positions in society" (Šikić-Mićanović 2010: 46). Coffey discusses this matter under the term of embodiment, e.g. the "bodily conduct and bodily presentation" of the fieldworker and how these are interpreted and charged with meaning. The researcher's body is thus "part of the identity work of the ethnographer" (Coffey 1999: 64). Although this may be possible only to a limited extent as we will discuss below – most field researchers actively or passively *seek* to produce a "physical body image, acceptable to the research setting" (ibid.). Which particular aspects of the fieldworker-self or other relational issues (for example, which language is spoken, which, how much and with whom food is consumed, or how reciprocity is enacted) will be most significant is established in the field.

I believe that, as Golde suggests, this is a process which the fieldworker is largely unable to control, and which will "become *dramatized by events*" rather than by the fieldworker's intentions (Golde 1986: 10; emphasis added). On the other hand, I believe that the researcher's biological sex and social gender, as well as associated issues such as sexuality – depending on the fieldworker as well as on the research setting and locale – can be of greater or lesser importance, but they will always matter. Starting from feminist and post-colonial criticism, especially gender is discussed as having an important influence on the fieldwork process. Gender is often taken as the prime case in point to illustrate the influence of the researcher on qualitative research. As Coffey asserts, "issues of bodily conduct and bodily presentation" also encompass gender, sex and sexuality (Coffey 1999: 65). Gender thus can become a variable that can easily be used to acknowledge the fact that the research process and its results are invariably influenced by the researcher, and also to acknowledge and learn to appreciate the impact of subjectivity (Golde 1986: 2; Gill and Maclean 2002). Gender and sexuality, literally embodied in the fieldworker her/himself, are always relevant, no matter whether they are dramatized or neglected. Gender and sexuality are part of every social research process just like other characteristics of the fieldworker-self (cf. Coffey 1999: 77).

During my fieldwork in Gilgit, aspects of female sex, gender and sexuality were the variables that were dramatized most, whereas they might also have come to the fore but not have such dramatic consequences for other

foreign yet male anthropologists working in the same region[7]. Cook's (2007) research on foreign, i.e. Western women living in Gilgit in the 1990s also affirms the importance that is attributed to gender and sexuality. Although her interlocutors were not anthropological fieldworkers, I find emotional parallels and practical similarities in how those women experienced their time in Gilgit, especially with regard to their physical appearance and their bodies. The constraints stemming from the limitations and boundaries set for women (be they local or foreign) then beg the question of methodology, especially of how to design the research with regard to male-female interaction. While in my case this matter had a rather detrimental effect on the research, fieldworkers might ideally try from the beginning to design their object of research and methods in a way that is less disastrous, or even advantageous, for the research. Yet, all conversations prior to the fieldwork with other male and female researchers who had done research in Pakistan, had not prepared me for the intensity with which the matter of gender would influence my fieldwork. Thus we may infer that it may not always be possible to schedule and achieve the task to commit ourselves to a specific topic, plan of work or method.

Embodied Fieldwork in a Gendered Field

Inadvertently (due to my cultural upbringing) and methodologically (by my obligation to do research) I was not able to completely conform to local ideals of how a woman should behave, i.e. basically not to interact with men who are not related. Since I came to Gilgit with a research topic that did not focus on the women's sphere (as did, for example, Marhoffer-Wolff 2002, Cook 2007, Varley 2008, Gratz 2010, Halvorson 2011), interaction with men was part of the research design. On the other hand, other women had done their research work with local men before (for example, Stellrecht 1978, Göhlen 1997, Schneid 1997, Lentz 2000, Ali 2009). Consequently, the question arises as to how to conduct fieldwork when, because of cross-gender contact, one is impeded in the field by a number of people in the locale. A second question follows: to what extent can and should the researcher make efforts to be locally acceptable? What consequences is he/she ready to bear, and which efforts are acceptable so as to render fieldwork possible?

In Gilgit, gender seems to be the most obvious and immediate aspect defining both a person's role and the response of people. Conforming to the local gender role, however, was not as easy for me as it first seemed. A commonly held (erroneous) assumption – which at the beginning of my project had been held by my supervisors and me as well and had caused my trouble

7 While some male colleagues working in Gilgit-Baltistan completely refrain from contact with women, others have contact with women but, for example, only with Ismaili women who handle gender segregation by and large less strictly.

in the first place – is the idea that in a society and locale where the male and female realms are separated, female fieldworkers may have access to both male and female social circles and thus may have an advantage over male fieldworkers.[8] Unfortunately this is not always true, as becomes apparent from my own experiences and as publications of other female researchers made clear later onwards. In certain settings with a certain degree of gender segregation, the female ethnographers, too, have to restrain themselves in order to do their research successfully. Particularly to engage in the public realm may be perceived as "misbehaviour". Often women are met with (subtle) disapproval, even if there is not necessarily any verbalized reprimand or open restrictions (e.g. Golde 1986: 8-9; Gill and Maclean 2002: 1.2). Gill and Maclean who did fieldwork in Britain and Scotland, for example, argue that female behaviour is often scrutinized much more critically in the field than that of male fieldworkers and that female ethnographers thus become (maybe consequently) often "more aware of their sexual status and its impact on fieldwork and relationships" (Gill and Maclean 2002: 1.8; see also Golde 1986). As Gill recounts, while she considered herself "basically a genderless entity", she was (unexpectedly) perceived and treated "as a gendered and sexual being" (Gill and Maclean 2002: 2.5). Gill and MacIean conclude that ultimately they were not able to exert much influence on how the local people chose to see them (ibid.: 3.11). They argue that gender-related problems during fieldwork had impacts both on them (emotionally) and on the research process.

Hence, I would like to stress the fact that one's own gender and local gender conceptions may always influence the research process, although male researchers hardly discuss this as an issue. This so-called "male bias" has been identified and strongly criticised by feminist anthropology: though the question of the role of gender and sexuality within fieldwork is very significant, it has been addressed only rather reluctantly (Golde 1986; Bell 1993: 1; Moreno 1995; Coffey 1999: 77). Ethnographies written by men have long kept an air of imparting some gender-neutral, generalised knowledge that applies to the whole population. The misperception and confusion of "male and white" with "neutral" becomes obvious only in the critique from feminist and post-colonial perspectives. In locales where gender segregation is practiced, male fieldworkers often simply restrict themselves to the male realm, e.g. to male interlocutors and male spaces, either voluntarily or due to restrictions imposed by the conventions and habitus of the local people.[9] Additionally, the male space is often erroneously understood as being equivalent with the whole society. Women's ethnographies, in contrast, are mostly un-

8 See also Moreno (1995: 247-8).

9 Talking to Western male researchers doing fieldwork in Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan, I got the impression that for them the chance to meet local women are nearly non-existent – a circumstance which for some of them is unfamiliar and not easy to cope with either. Conversely, this also entails that they get less the chance to flout gender norms.

derstood as being "limited", speaking only for the local female population (cf. Bell 1993: 2-3). From the 1960s onward, female ethnographers in particular began to consciously reflect on their gender, sexual and marital status, and the impact those matters have on the fieldwork. It came to be realized that the fieldworker-self is not simply a given, but is subject to curiosity and concern in day-to-day interactions with the research participants and therefore inadvertently influences the research process (Coffey 1999: 79). However, one common reason why issues of gender and sexuality are often concealed is that by discussing them, researchers fear to risk their respectability and their careers (cf. Kulick and Willson 1995: 4; see also Moreno 1995: 246, Gill and Maclean 2002: 1.11).

Hence, we can say that the researchers' self is always a partial, positioned self that is engaged in different contexts (cultural, historical, political, gendered and sexual). Conversely, however, positionality ultimately allows us to generate awareness of the fieldwork itself, of the relationships established and the knowledge produced (Coffey 1999: 94). I therefore support the argument that trying to render oneself "asexual" in the field (as well as ahistorical, apolitical or unbiased, for that matter) and to establish a strict boundary between personal and professional life means "to reinforce a false dichotomy between the fieldworker self and other selves. This in itself denies the reality and complexity of fieldwork and the identity work that it entails" (ibid; see also Kulick 1995). As Gill and Maclean argue, by ignoring gender-related issues in the field and thus ignoring the intersubjectivity of fieldwork, much experience and insight will be missed, since the very advantage of such engagement and encounter would be left out of consideration: "The ethnographer ceases to be a 'complete' person, being portrayed as a machine for the recording and analysis of data" (Gill and Maclean 2002: 1.12). Correspondingly we have to infer that the usual ignorance of these issues may reduce the interlocutors and those involved in the research to mere "data-carriers".

The positionality of the researcher always influences the research process and its outcome. Many ethnographers now acknowledge that this positionality should not be seen as a limitation, but on the contrary can be used as an advantage that helps to generate new ideas and insights (ibid.). Okely, for example, encourages graduate students

> *to value their own resources. Individual personality, biography, ethnicity, nationality and gender will all have specific implications. The anthropologist should recognize that seeming weaknesses, along with incomer naivety, are qualities to explore creatively. The traditional, often masculinist mask of competence has to be dropped.* (Okely 2009: 3)

Nonetheless, entering a field as a complete outsider with completely different patterns of behaviour is difficult. Behaviour and ways of interaction that are normal at home suddenly become inappropriate (or as the case may be

even immoral) with regard to gender norms and interaction between women and men (cf. Gill and Maclean 2002: 4.2).[10] While fieldwork manuals suggest that an "appropriate" gender role or identity should be adapted, Kulick points out that this is not as easy as it seems at first hand. Firstly, each local gender identity is not necessarily coherent in itself and may also be contrary to the researcher's own convictions. Secondly, such manuals diverge or even contradict one another, some advising to appropriate a local identity, others cautioning the ethnographer to remain secure in his/her own identity (Kulick 1995: 9-11). Anxiety about how to behave is a common consequence for fieldworkers. Not everyone feels comfortable with the implementation of what is often subsumed under "the glib phrase 'adaptation'". Often this would include to submit oneself to a "set of disciplinary practices that seems to demand (in order to avoid rejection and expulsion) evasion, concealment, and lying about one's opinions, identities, and activities outside the field" (ibid.: 11). Therefore, uncomfortable situations seem to be unavoidable, regardless of whether the researcher adopts local habits and behaviour or sticks to his/her own identity and behaviour (even though it needs to be stressed, in order not to paint a thoroughly gloomy picture, that there are always happy and comforting moments during fieldwork as well).

Gender Boundaries in Gilgit and their Transgression

Life in Gilgit-Baltistan, including its capital Gilgit City, is very thoroughly influenced by *pardah,* i.e. quite strict gender segregation in space and communication. In most parts of society, *pardah* rules are defined rather strictly and transgressions are quickly noticed.[11] As is discussed by Cook, however, many Western *women* in Gilgit – whether they visit for a short time or live there for some years – willingly or unwillingly transgress local social boundaries and do not strictly observe *pardah*.[12] For example, they "frequently violate boundaries between public and private space" (Cook 2007: 70-1); they enter (and are invited to enter) spheres that are prohibited for (local) women, interact with men who are not their relatives, wear different clothing, visit games of polo, use the non-*pardah* section of restaurants, participate in work conferences, or (by mistake) use the part of public transport that is more or less reserved for men instead of the front seat next to the driver which is al-

10 Questions and insecurities of how to behave are not limited to a *pardah* society, but can as well arise in European contexts (e.g. Gill and Maclean 2002; Dubisch 1995).

11 Vis-à-vis foreigners, though, transgressions are hardly directly reprimanded and advice on how to behave properly is given only reluctantly, which, at first, seems very tolerant and open-minded.

12 While male visitors are more or less automatically included in practices of gender segregation (i.e. they will not get the chance to enter women's spaces), female visitors almost inevitably touch the male space, while they may also be invited into the female realm as well.

located for women (ibid.). Thus, the question is: how to actually behave? As Cook writes after her own research in Gilgit,

> *Western women are never sure how they should act and where they belong. I often experience negotiating daily life in Gilgit as if I were walking a tightrope without balancing aids. Is my dupatta [headscarf] placed properly? Is it appropriate for me to sit in the back of the Suzuki [the local public transportation] with Gilgiti men? Is my raucous laughter acceptable? Am I free to visit the library or see a movie without a chaperone? (*Cook 2007: 61-2)

Such seemingly banal issues may cause serious problems such as malignant rumours, as well as distortions of one's self, as I will show below. In my case I attribute those to being a foreign woman, which is locally associated with an ambiguous status.

Following Golde's seminal compilation, I maintain that such boundary-crossing activities by foreign women (be they regular visitors or researchers) are considered problematic by local people for at least two reasons. Firstly, they are problematic because of the perceived vulnerability of women and the provocation as which such boundary-crossing may be understood (Golde 1986: 5-6). Secondly, boundary-crossing behaviour and non-conformity may be understood as threatening the local habits (ibid.: 8-9).

In order to explain my argument, I will go into some detail. I had come to Pakistan the first time in October 2011 for a pre-study visit for my doctoral dissertation. Beforehand, my supervising professors from Germany and Pakistan had submitted my project outline to the Ministry of Interior and successfully applied for a research visa on my behalf. However, my introduction to Gilgit-Baltistan took a quite unfortunate course.

Due to fortuitous circumstances, the first Pakistanis I got to know were young men from Hunza, a valley in the North of Gilgit-Baltistan. They showed me round in Gilgit and their home town Hunza, introduced me to local NGOs and also to their cousin who worked in the local bureaucracy. (They were of the opinion that I should meet him because he might help me in case I got into any difficult circumstances.) I was glad for someone at my side while beginning to navigate unfamiliar and sometimes intimidating situations. In view of my dissertation project on water, they took me along on a work trip to evaluate drinking-water projects in villages, showed me gardens, fields and irrigation channels, as well as local cultural heritage sites. They invited me to their homes, introduced me to their families, invited me to join them for dinner, and even offered me accommodation. I was grateful for their help and advice, and the idea that something was going wrong did not cross my mind. Only months later did I realize that I had been enticed by situations and behaviour that seemed familiar but were actually not; this ultimately made it

difficult to navigate and successfully appropriate local "proper" behaviour, especially concerning gender norms and seclusion. As turned out bit by bit, despite or because of their guidance I was flouting local rules and gender norms – but not willingly; I was rather following my acquaintances' suit.[13]

The resulting problems can presumably be attributed to jealousy and mistrust that were acted out, along my being both a woman and a foreigner – two identities which, taken separately, involve completely different and opposing roles and reactions and, taken together, result in considerable ambiguity.[14] While a number of activities may be tolerable in a foreigner, they are not in a woman, and while most interlocutors handled me as a foreigner, others (such as agency officers) may have expected me to behave like a woman. Retrospectively I picture that the young men whom I had met in the beginning of my fieldwork and whom I regarded as helpful did not think about the public image that resulted from our interactions. They cautioned me to be careful not to trust others (a common warning in Gilgit which at the same time is never explained or elaborated). However, they too were not aware – or failed to enlighten me on the matter – of how negatively some activities (like going for a hike, or having dinner in a restaurant) might be interpreted and construed by others – including their cousin in the bureaucracy. I was well aware that actions are not only culture-specific but also culture-specifically interpreted, and already made efforts to adjust myself. But many activities did not even occur to me as being problematic since they were rather ordinary for me at home and were portrayed as ordinary by my acquaintances. For example, I wrongly assumed that it would be innocuous to pay visits to different city quarters on my own or in company, or to talk to men in public, that is, under public control. But although such activities were not reprimanded immediately, they were later made the basis for rumours and fabrications about immoral behaviour. Additionally, I trusted that the people with whom I interacted would point out local dos and don'ts. However, if advice was given it was mostly given rather hesitantly and vaguely or seemed rather odd, such as the advice to bluntly lie to people and tell them that I was happily married and had four children and a husband waiting for me at home. As Nancy Cook carefully puts it after her own research in Gilgit, "local guidance can be valuable, if offered, but miscommunications and misinterpretations abound" (Cook 2007: 61). Similarly, Emma Varley, an anthropologist also working in Gilgit, remarked that transgressions often only become clear af-

13 I am extremely thankful though to the persons and families from Gilgit, Hunza, Yasin and other places, who hosted and cared for me, my unusual activities notwithstanding.

14 Gratz points out that she, too, felt as if people might see her as a kind of hermaphrodite, in the sense that she was a woman (even if without a husband [at hand] and without children) but nonetheless moved about autonomously like a man. In Gilgit, such (men- and childless) women are otherwise the most restricted in their mobility (Gratz 2006: 105).

ter certain lines are irreversibly crossed and personal ties are finally broken (personal communication).[15]

Ambiguous Status of Woman and Foreigner

To further my argument, I will expand on the ambiguous status that is locally attributed to foreign women. Local gender norms for a woman and the role of a foreign researcher can be conflicting. This may lead to confusion and resentment on the side of the interlocutors and interaction partners in the field, as well as for the researcher herself (cf. Golde 1986: 8; Gill and Maclean 2002: 4.10). Thus, during the course of the fieldwork I attempted to actively shift my appearance and behaviour from "foreigner" to "woman". I tried to comply with local conventional notions of femininity and made efforts to conform to local gender roles through bodily practices, most noticeably dress and demeanour, though I was not wholly successful. At the same time, to conform to local gender norms was difficult in the light of my research objective.[16] Furthermore, my efforts were not appreciated by everyone (for example, not everyone appreciated my efforts to wear the local dress), and also they lead to culture shocks and serious distortions of myself, both in and out of the field.

The uncertainty of how to behave begins with seemingly trifle matters such as clothing or taking food in public (for example, where to dine, with whom, or maybe rather: if at all) and culminates in the most basic but also most difficult question of where to go, with whom to interact, and how. For example, to arrange interviews and to go there alone may be interpreted as unrespectable and dangerous. However, going with a local woman is possible only within her own family or neighbourhood. Going with a local man, on the other hand, may give rise to rumours. Thus, during every field stay I tried different modes of doing interviews, all of which were deemed problematic either by local people or by me.

During the course of the fieldwork these matters were points of uncertainty not only for me but also for the people interacting with me. Torn between the often opposing ideas of "foreigner" and "woman" and contradicting sets of proper behaviour and proper reactions, it must have been difficult for people to classify me and thus to determine appropriate behaviour towards

15 When I – naïvely but without bad intents – once badly breached norms of proper behaviour myself (an episode on which I will not go into detail here), I had to face grave consequences; some people found my conduct unforgivable. Others, however, pardoned me and offered support even after they came to know my transgression, for which I am extremely thankful. They excused my inattentiveness to local norms and procedures with my different cultural background.

16 Neither was I planning to focus solely on women´s perspectives, nor, as it turned out, did the biggest number of women feel able to answer even questions regarding household water (see also Gratz 2006).

me.[17] This was disconcerting both for me and the people whom I met in the field. For example, physical contact is generally avoided in Gilgit between men and women who are not first-grade family members.[18] Yet many men in Gilgit feel that it is their responsibility and an expression of respect to shake hands with foreigners. Giving preference to the attribute of "foreigner", this also includes *foreign women*, even when men would not shake hands with *local* women. In the beginning of my fieldwork I found it unsettling when men did *not* offer me their hand to shake, since I interpreted this as disregard of women. Later on, a friend of mine explained that not shaking hands was actually meant as a sign of respect, and advised me to act in the manner of local women and not shake hands with men at all. Thus followed a period in which both I and many men seemed to be at a loss about how to greet at initial hellos; despite local female clothing, some men kept seeing me first and foremost as a foreigner, and offered me their hand to shake. Since I found it too impolite to leave them standing there with their hand put forth, I reluctantly and half-hearted shook hands contrary to the advice until my research assistant explained that with this – even if unintentionally – I was expressing distrust or hostility.[19]

Furthermore, even if the researcher learns certain rules, such as to avoid contact with men, uncertainty may remain about whether she/he is actually willing and able to adapt to the rules. In addition, there is no guarantee that following such rules will be successful. Noncompliance, on the other hand, may have nebulous but often frightening consequences such as disapproval – being laughed at, ridiculed, scorned and disrespected for social misconduct (cf. Cook 2007: 61-2) – and even the threat of rape.

The Unresolved Status of a Single Woman

Regardless of my conduct in the beginning – when I was as modest just as my acquaintances' behaviour was modest – my role was quickly associated by a number of people with notions of gender, sexuality, and related norms and behaviour (cf. Gill and Maclean 2002: 1.6; 4.10). Doing research and living

17 Ruth Göhlen, a female researcher who had been researching in the neighbouring valley of Astor in the 1990s, and who had been talking to men as well, also notices that she seemed to flout the norms for a woman, and that as a result she was placed in the category of men. She infers this from the fact that she was sometimes addressed as "Mister Ruth". She explains: "The public sector is exclusively that of men. […] As a foreign female conducting field research and moving in the public sector, it was obviously difficult for men to place me in the social and gender-specific categories" (Göhlen 1998: 465).

18 Deprived of and depriving myself of physical contact in the field, I experienced that even shaking hands can get charged with importance and meaning.

19 Another female colleague of mine generally refused to shake hands with men for introduction, which was met either with appreciation or disapproval by different people.

in Gilgit as an unaccompanied woman without a spouse or fellow researcher was more problematic than expected. In addition, the topic of marriage is a very pressing issue in Gilgit for any unmarried person over 18, and the pressure to get married grows drastically as people grow older; this is true for everyone: male and female, local and foreigner.

Correspondingly, marriage, sexuality, and the marital status of women are topics not only of interest to anthropologists, but also to the people in the field (cf. Kulick 1995: 3; Coffey 1999: 79). Coffey asserts that the status of a woman who is on her own[20] is one that is prized but has to be solved in the long run. Being on one's own implies to be unmarried and thus potentially vulnerable or even abnormal; "hence it is indicative of a problem for which the solution is attachment, usually to a man and usually through marriage" (Coffey 1999: 79).

In the same vein, Golde writes tongue-in cheek that the marital status of the researcher, especially of female researchers, is always of interest to the local people:

> *If the fieldworker is single, the community will be concerned about why she is not married; if she is married but her husband is not with her, people will wonder about that situation; if she is with her husband, attention will focus on why she has no children. These questions are irksome rather than troubling, but they do require the researcher to search for explanations that are meaningful to informants.* (Golde 1986: 10)

She furthermore points out that a lone woman's vulnerability is not only dangerous for the woman herself; her status may look like a provocation for men to take advantage of this situation or, the other way round, to feel seduced into a liaison – a culpability that increases when the woman in question is considered attractive in local terms (ibid.: 6).

Nonetheless, I found the immediacy of these issues, with which I was confronted in the field, inescapable and overwhelming. As a young woman on my own, educated, assumedly affluent, young, tall, blond, and having a fair complexion, I seemed to fit many criteria of attractiveness or prestige, and to represent a potential sexual or even marital partner to many young men and young men's families. When I once complained to a female friend of mine that some men (i.e. the bureaucrat and his companions) had created serious troubles (such as creating rumours that set the intelligence agencies on me) which hindered me in conducting my fieldwork, she explained to me that it was simply my bad luck that I was so pretty in local people's understanding – according to her this was the source of all my troubles. Indeed, I received

20 Coffey talks about this under the term of "virginity" which I find too narrow here.

a two-digit number of proposals, overtures, and offers for marriage,[21] as well as for romantic and sexual relationships. Some of the more overt offers, encroaching comments and harassments were based on the general assumption that Western women customarily have non-committal sexual relationships.[22] In the light of the trouble I had, the same friend's father offered to find me a husband for the period of research so as to resolve my fieldwork difficulties related to singleness: with a husband I would have someone to protect me both from harassment and troubles with intelligence and law enforcement agencies.[23]

More or less quickly I became aware of the overall problem regarding my gender status and transgressions of gender boundaries but found it impossible to find a good way to end misunderstandings or transgressions.[24] One way might have been to change my research plan and restrict myself to the realm of women. Instead, I chose to act as much gender-conformist as possible and to conceal my (lacking) marital status. I did this by asserting that I had a "husband" or "fiancé" in Germany, using these more definite terms for my partnership, as well as wearing a golden ring, in the naïve hope that these tactics would lend me a more acceptable status and that mentioning a partner back home would be enough to deflect interest and romantic attention (cf. Pollard 2009: 11). I adopted such strategies (trying to appear modest and sexually unavailable) in the hope to reduce sexual attention during fieldwork.

21 One aspect that certainly also plays a role in Gilgit is the aspiration for social upward mobility connected with the oftentimes high social status of Westerners (Wade 1993: 204; 210). This is not meant to say that genuine affection for the woman may not be the case if a relationship is contracted; I would argue that in most cases a mutual affection will be the basis for most cross-cultural marriages in Gilgit. Nonetheless, there are many stories and allegations of local men marrying (older) foreign women simply for their money and the foreign passport. Additionally, motives of social upward mobility or intergenerational physical change may easily be presumed at least by others, as Wade suggests for Colombia: "Such a motive may be absent, but may easily be inferred by others" (Wade 1993: 210).

22 As Willson sums up, in many locales the idea prevails that Western women are sexually available and open for liaisons. This is fostered by media representation, as well as by Western women themselves (who think of themselves as sexually liberated). This then results in the concept of Western women as morally "loose" (Willson 1995: 262-3). The large number of foreign tourists in Gilgit-Baltistan in the 1990s – who were possibly equally open for non-committal sexual liaisons – will have contributed to this image here as well (see also Cook 2007).

23 Curiously, this was not the offer of a *mutah* (temporary marriage) which is allowed in Shia Islam. The person suggesting this was a Sunni recommending a permanent marriage that could be kept or divorced at the end of the research, according to my wish.

24 Other articles suggest that I am not alone with this dilemma (e.g. Gill and Maclean 2002: 3.14; Moreno 1995: 247-8).

In addition, there is a commonly held idea that modesty and chastity are "considered the norm during anthropological fieldwork" (cf. Wade 1993: 211; Dubisch 1995: 30; Kulick 1995: 9-10; Coffey 1999: 89).[25] On top of my deliberate attempts, some interlocutors actually interpreted even more aspects in this light; one, for example, claimed that my plain clothing must have been a tactic aimed at deflecting men's attention, too (a tactic which, according to his statement, would not be successful though).

Despite all efforts to conform to gender rules and models, people (especially intelligence officers) judged me in the first place according to my gender and related gender stereotypes (measuring stereotypes of foreign women against local women's), and only to a lesser extent by other criteria such as my age, nationality, or language – in the words of Golde "dramatizing" the aspect of gender (Golde 1986: 10).[26] Set off by rumours started by the bureaucrat, a number of sexualized and malicious rumours, gossip and insinuations of wrongdoing were spread. This resulted in efforts of the local intelligence officers to control and restrict my movement and contact with local people, since they concocted the idea that I might seduce local men in order to elicit confidential information.[27] As Golde explains, such local reactions reveal local people's attitudes. At the same time, they "serve as mechanisms of social control. They contain a message that may be manifestly solicitous, but at the same time constitutes a veiled warning to both the field worker and the community that the limits of tolerance may not be pushed too far" (ibid.: 6). The rumours came up due to my spatial mobility, contact to a number of families, and the fact that I talked to people (including men) – i.e. essentially all activities that are the basis of anthropological research. The act of moving and collecting data was transformed into the concept of "roaming around", which is perceived in a negative way.[28]

Consequently my freedom of movement was limited and controlled by the agencies, my hosts, and increasingly also by myself. Conversely, I also began to monitor and evaluate *men's* behaviour, looking for "improper" behaviour on their side, as I was anxious not to give any motive for misun-

25 As Wade adds, it is common that sexual encounters are later on suppressed in the writing for fear of impacts on the professional reputation (Wade 1993: 211).

26 For a similar idea see also Hastrup who speaks of "living our part" and the notion that "this 'part' is very much a part allotted to us by the others" (Hastrup 2004: 465).

27 Golde sums up such actions towards women, remarking that "the fieldworker who is physically attractive in terms of the prevailing aesthetic standards of the community she is studying will pose a greater threat and will suffer these suspicions to a greater degree" (Golde 1986: 6).

28 Gratz attests that in Gilgit spatial mobility of women is restricted. Women who move about extensively risk their good reputation; her motives and aims are questioned and people assume immoral activities. It requires thus a lot of work and social skills to keep a good reputation (Gratz 2006: 675).

derstandings or for rumours about improper behaviour. But what is more, I increased my "self-surveillance of 'good' conduct" in the attempt to be and appear modest (Cook 2007: 65; see also Ali 2009: 107). While this was appreciated by many women, it prompted reproaches from research assistants and friends, who warned me not to make a fool of myself (for example by covering my head at all times). I constantly scrutinized myself for "good conduct", to the extent that my research assistant eventually reproached me: according to him, my attempts to behave shy like a local woman would irritate people and would be detrimental to my actual goal to do interviews and to collect data. Effectively, just like many women felt shy and unable to answer my questions in interviews, I myself felt increasingly shy and unable to ask. I had internalized not only the interpretation of the "male gaze", but also often felt embarrassed, ashamed, and guilty when I transgressed – consciously or by mistake – gender boundaries or local social rules (as did the women in Cook's study), even if this was necessary in light of the research, and even if it would be considered perfectly normal at home. With each stay in Gilgit, the feeling of being constrained and limited in the access to social events increased; these constrictions were due to both by my own aspirations to comply with local notions of femininity and surveillance by local agencies.[29]. I felt trapped in the restrictions, and regularly when returning to Gilgit from a short trip to the surrounding valleys I started to cry once the city came into sight. To counter such feelings I tried to adapt to the situation and find relaxation joining families with whom I was friends for their everyday activities – an endeavour which later on was also vetoed by friends who explained that spending time with families would again not leave a good impression.

Modest Appearance and Monitoring of the Body

As Coffey discusses, impression management, negotiating and establishing (an) acceptable field role(s) is part of a salient and conscious presentation of self during fieldwork. Among other things this includes most importantly dress, demeanour, and speech and is directed towards producing a "fieldwork body" that is acceptable as well as plausible. Many texts that deal with conduct during fieldwork address physical appearance and dress and give advice on how to successfully accomplish "impression management". But as Coffey complains, most authors touch this issue rather superficially. The requirements actually go much beyond simply wearing "appropriate" clothes (Coffey 1999: 64-5), although even this is not as easy a matter as it seems.

29 I had to report to local intelligence agencies when and where I intended to move and whom to meet and had to submit reports about my actions for vetting. I was successively restricted to eat in restaurants, meet persons for "private purposes", visit local NGOs, talk to government employees, as well as to move out of Gilgit without their approval. Furthermore, they successively and on a seemingly random basis prohibited me to visit places like glaciers or other touristic areas of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Since clothing and public conduct go hand in hand with judgements about morality, I wore jeans and long shirts from the beginning, trying at a compromise between my usual jeans and shirt and full *shalwar-kameez* – a dress prevailing in South Asia with matching long shirt (*kameez*), loose-fitting pants (*shalwar*) and scarf (*dupatta*). However, I soon realized that I felt uncomfortable in Gilgit when wearing jeans and not covering my head in public.[30] I was stared at by both men and women, and approached by random men on the street who did not perceive a (respectable) woman but a foreign-

30 While in Gilgit all women cover their heads in public (many also in the private space of the family), there are different styles and cloths to do this. Inside the house, a smaller head-scarf (*dupatta*) is preferred. A *dupatta* mostly measures a bit less than 1 by 2 metres, is mostly from a rather lightweight quality (even to the point of translucent) and often matches a set of s*halwar-kameez*. It is usually worn around the head and upper part of the body. It may be worn rather loosely, showing hair or hairline (though it is sometimes fixed with a pin on the top of the head), or rather tightly, covering all hair. Especially when in one's own house, *dupattas* may also be worn only over the shoulders covering the chest, but they are put up in order to cover the head as well, especially when men other than one's husband, father, or brothers are present. Many women tie them tightly at the time of the prayer-calling (*azan*) and during prayer, as well as during physical work in the household. When leaving the house, many women resort to an additional larger head-scarf, in Gilgit referred to as *chador*. *Chadors* are often a bit bigger than a *dupatta*, but also around 1 by 2 metres, opaque, and bought independently of a set of *shalwar-kameez*. They are worn around the head and upper body, showing only the face by virtue of their sheer size. (*Chador* here does not refer to the big circular black cloth worn in Iran.) A few women (particularly Shia) may wear a *hijab* when leaving the house, as is fashionable in Iran. *Hijab* are worn tightly, veiling hair and chest, and often the women combine with the *dupatta*, or *chador*. A number of women (particularly Sunni) wear an *abaya* when leaving the house (a kind of cloak, in Gilgit referred to as *burqa*). The *burqa* is often black or grey and often of a firm synthetic cloth. Fashions differ and they can be either loose or slim-fitting. *Burqas* are combined either with a loose *dupatta*, a tight *hijab* or with a *niqab*, a sewed cloth that covers head and face. While many women, particularly Ismaili, do not cover their heads at home, probably all cover their heads when stepping into the public space. I cannot recall a single time that I have seen a woman in public in Gilgit without some kind of veil. (One exception may be the picture of a female police officer which I found on a social media platform). How much of the head and body is covered, and how, is related to the respective space and identity (see e.g. Gratz 2006: 614-5; 623-4). While Gratz (2006: 651-5) writes that up to the 1990s some women were wearing all-encompassing *burqas*, covering from head to toe, I never saw this kind of *burqa* in Gilgit. Gratz reports that in the 1990s when she conducted her fieldwork, women would describe the idea to walk in the bazaar without the face covered as strange due to the intense looks of the men (Gratz 2006: 645). Whereas I myself often got disturbed by my head-scarfs, local women laughingly explained that they are completely used to have the scarfs on their heads and are not disturbed at all.

er.[31] I thus resorted to outward signs of "modesty" and "respectability" such as wearing plain, unadorned clothing and increasingly bigger *dupattas* and *chadors*.[32] Only during my third visit to Pakistan did I begin to wear more colourful and fashionable clothing again, but I hid it almost completely under a big *chador* when leaving the house.

But while Cook (maybe mockingly) writes that her female Western research partners "hope that shalwar kameez will define them as morally acceptable and culturally appropriate to indigenous people for the sake of work, family, and personal safety" (Cook 2007: 114), I can only confirm this. After I wore full *shalwar-kameez* and covering my head, encroachments by local men (even if not the staring) were drastically reduced. Nevertheless, during every stay in Gilgit I encountered men and women who curiously and sometimes even reproachfully asked me why I did not continue to wear jeans and instead switched to wearing full *shalwar-kameez* and covering my head with *dupatta* or *chador*. Many local women seemed to resent that I did not attempt to pioneer in making trousers and jeans acceptable for women in Gilgit as well. Local men in particular seemed to interpret my switching to *shalwar-kameez* as masquerade and an attempt to disguise, some ridiculing me for my odd attempts to fit in and challenging me to wear "my own" clothes instead. However, throughout the research I found that much discomfort remained with me, even when I was making all efforts to conform. I often felt awkward in the local dress, like an actor trying to fill a strange and debilitating costume. Time and time again I wondered why I had adopted this attire in the first place. Then the memory of the disbelieving stares on the streets and the rape warning I had been given by the bureaucrat (when wearing jeans and a long shirt with sleeves that exposed my wrists) came to my mind, leaving me to wonder why I had begun and continued research in this location in the first place.

As a consequence of trying to appear modest (or what I imagined as being modest), I inadvertently changed not only in dress but also in demeanour. I walked less upright, avoided to look men into their eyes or to shake hands, and was careful to avoid to even accidentally touch men, for example, when handing over money to a shopkeeper or driver. I made efforts to avoid any appearance of "moral laxity" by curbing my range of vision, and to limit interaction with men in public as far as possible. For example, when avoiding to look into men's faces in public spaces such as the street I sometimes became aware of persons known to me only after a loud greeting from them, through which

31 Out of curiosity or boldness, many asked about my whereabouts, or for example, steered towards awkward conversations in which I was immediately requested to provide invitation letters for Germany, a German visa, or even a German spouse for them.

32 Cook mentions as well that *dupattas* (while they are loathed by all foreign women of her research) are presented as a marker of solidarity and respect (Cook 2007: 113).

I recognized them by their voice. While I adopted these features during my stays in Pakistan, they sometimes lasted even longer. Of course I knew how I was supposed to behave at home, but some of those practices had become so habitual that I could not switch back quickly, even if it was disturbing for me and people back home. For example, when male friends and acquaintances at home expected me to greet them with a friendly hug, it took weeks after having come back from Pakistan until I did no longer offend or alienate them by flinching and backing off.

Strategies of behaving and dressing modestly in public in Gilgit, including the observation of gender segregation (avoidance of [eye-]contact with men, trips to the bazaar etc.), are effectively strategies to elicit local sympathies and respectability, as is suggested by Cook (ibid.: 114); yet we have to keep in mind that such strategies are only copying the behaviour of local women. In contrast to Cook though, who refers to the Western women's internalization of "their interpretation of the indigenous male gaze" (ibid.: 73), I maintain that the issue is more complex. One the one hand, when I was in public space both men and women stared at me; the notion of an "indigenous male gaze" is thus only one side of the coin. On the other hand, local women affirm that men stare at them, too, when they are in the public space; in this case it is rather a *general* challenge between women and men and less between foreign and local (or its odd twin-term "indigenous" employed by Cook). Local women, too, have to deal with such situations, often feeling similarly uneasy in a public context, subjected to male gazes or assaults.[33] Local women take measures for their protection, such as covering their heads or even wearing a *burqa*, avoiding contact with non-family men, leaving the house only in daylight, hardly ever moving unaccompanied and especially never unescorted after nightfall, and even locking the doors of their rooms at night.[34] Their behaviour has to be "in line with the culturally prescribed notion of femininity supportive of the man they are with" (Lowe et al. o.A.: 127); if they do so, their men or male family members will go to any lengths and to the full extent of their capabilities to protect them.[35]

But to wear *shalwar-kameez* and to limit contact with men as far as possible was not only a strategy to feel well or less uneasy in Gilgit and to gain

33 For example, Gratz also refers to the local women´s complaint about intense looks of men in the bazaars due to which they cover their bodies in public (Gratz 2006: 645). Beyond that, local women may be or feel even more regulated due to a close monitoring by their family.

34 I would thus argue that many women in Gilgit are not only "afraid of violating male space" (Lowe et al. o. A.: 127) but also afraid that men may violate them, even when they are at home, i.e. in their own / the right space.

35 When I had complained from time to time that some persons damaged my research by spreading malicious rumours, some interlocutors offered to go and beat that person up. Another offered to marry me and to kill anyone who would continue to thwart his wife-to-be.

acceptance. It touches on the question of whether and how it is possible for the researcher to live up to local ideals like that of gender segregation and whether clothes may help by publicly displaying modesty, especially when full compliance with the local gender ideals cannot be achieved. Advice on how to behave is not as easily checked off as is sometimes suggested in travel literature, ethnographic handbooks, or supervisors' suggestions; either type of behaviour – compliance with or resistance to local expectations – may be very difficult to manage and may have much more far-reaching consequences than discussed generally in fieldwork manuals and ethnographic publications. While my supervisors suggested that I should dress "properly", wearing *shalwar-kameez*, under certain circumstances even this attempt may be rather ineffective, as I want to illustrate along Fischer's reference to the *burqa* as a "symbolic clothe": Fischer suggests that the *burqa* is not a sign of modesty and honour as such but "an expression of non-interaction". Hence, even when a woman wears full *burqa* as a sign of honour, this is being challenged when she is seen interacting with a man outside her family (Fischer 1991: 109). Likewise, wearing *shalwar-kameez* alone does not necessarily lend respectability or legitimacy (although I happily admit that I was, for example, approached a lot less by random strangers on the street). So the question remains as how to behave, and how to accomplish interviews and fieldwork, if one has to work in a setting that will, for instance, construe the mode of the work (e.g. talking to [male] people) as morally problematic.

Hypersexuality and Fear of Change

In the last part of this contribution I will explore the question as to what "morally problematic" means in relation with gender ideals and stereotypes in Gilgit. In her thesis on female Western development workers in Gilgit in the 1990s Nancy Cook comes to the conclusion that the Western women who participated in her study perceive local men in Gilgit as "'lascivious' racialized men, who pose an overriding threat to white women due to their sexual, cultural, and racial 'primitiveness'" (Cook 2007: 65).[36] I want to argue that this apprehension may be exaggerated on one hand and not as unidirectional as it seems on the other. The attributes of being "uninhibited", "morally lax", "morally suspect" and "lascivious" which, according to Cook, are ascribed to local men by foreign women, are equally assigned to Western women by local men (less so by local women), and especially by law enforcement of-

36 According to Cook, a colonial narrative informs Western women's discourse about men in Gilgit. She criticizes that colonial narrative, according to which sex is threatening the "moral order of Western civilization" (Mercer and Julien 1988: 107, cited in Cook 2007: 50) and according to which colonizers, in a civilizing mission attempted to transform the "naked, uninhibited, impetuous 'savages' [...] into cultured individuals" (Cook 2007: 50).

ficers.[37] From a local perspective, Western women are construed to be sexually dangerous; Western women's moral laxity is a widespread stereotype in Gilgit. They are said to have affairs with married and unmarried men alike, tempting them into indecent liaisons. This notion is often rationalized by referring to Western female tourists' behaviour and the local interpretation of that behaviour; that is, talking to men, shaking hands with men, not covering their heads, as well as (assumed, offered or actual) sexual relationships with local men are (even if not unanimously) interpreted as obvious signs of Western women's immorality.[38] Particularly female foreigners who contracted relationships (whether formal or informal) with men from Gilgit may have contributed to the idea that Western women are morally lax and have frivolous sexual relationships. As Cook mentions, this gives rise to the idea (shared both by locals and the Western female development workers of her study) that "unknown and transient foreign women are apparently freer game" (ibid.: 61).[39]

While Cook writes that Western women perceive themselves as (sexually) vulnerable and "Gilgiti men as the source of sexual danger" (ibid.: 65), I want to elaborate on her argument and then to broaden it. Cook relates this fear of the "lascivious male Other" to colonial discourses of educating and civilizing the colonial subjects (an idea that in colonial times was also referred to as "the white man's burden"), inscribed in colonial narratives and perpetuated in travel writings; otherness of the colonial subjects would lead to "racial anxiety" which finds expression in sexuality and sexual fears (ibid.). The perceived fear that "social, sexual and spatial boundaries" are transgressed is also implicated in such racialism (ibid.: 74). Cook argues that these notions result in a "monitoring of sexually dangerous Others" (ibid.: 65), which she relates to the monitoring of local men and their actions by foreign women in Gilgit. I argue, though, that this idea needs to be broadened to include the monitoring of foreign women by locals as well. My experience was that intelligence and law enforcement agencies conceived or construed *me*

37 Cook hardly discusses the question of how and why local men in Gilgit may understand Western women as equally sexually dangerous, yet she gives some indications and relates that "non-Muslim, Western women, especially those traveling unchaperoned, are morally suspect" (Cook 2007: 61; see also ibid.: 120). Unfortunately, since, as Cook herself concedes, "Gilgitis are largely overlooked as independent social agents in [her] project" (ibid.: 23), she does not pursue this problematic much further, and instead concentrates on the Western women´s allegations against local men.

38 In Gilgit, "Westerners" or "angrez" are the terms used for foreign visitors, almost all of whom are from North America, Europe, East and South-East Asia.

39 This is by no means a phenomenon related to Pakistan; as Dubisch relates for Greece, there, too, "loose" and "foreign" are almost synonymous (Dubisch 1995: 31).

as being a threat. Prompted by rumours about alleged improper behaviour – be it drinking alcohol, alleged illicit relationships or "roaming around at all hours" – they spread and checked these rumours, searching for evidence of improper behaviour. In search of people who would support their suspicion they interrogated first and foremost my hosts and interlocutors as well as their employers, telling them stories of improper behaviour and testing their reactions. One intelligence officer, for example, gave one of my interlocutors a hard time because he had suggested that I join him on his trip to a nearby valley for the duration of a religious holiday that sometimes results in fierce clashes between different religious groups. Due to the monitoring of my movements the officer had been informed about our plans to leave the city. Getting pressurized from all sides via the mobile phone, we had to turn round and cancel the journey. Later on, the officer insulted my interlocutor by asking why "enjoyment with the foreigners" should be reserved for him; with that remark he indirectly alluded to alleged immoral behaviour and expressed the idea that female foreigners are ultimately "fair game" who – when unaccompanied – may be chased by any man (i.e. my interlocutor as well as himself) (cf. ibid.: 61). Images of Western women as morally suspect on the one hand and as approachable and desirable as fair game on the other hand are thus not necessarily mutually exclusive as one might infer. Instead, Western women seem to be viewed as combining both characteristics at the same time, being both detestable and desirable (cf. Golde 1986: 8). Officers, for example, did not refrain from accusing me of behaving immorally *and* from hitting on me.[40] While Cook refers to a perceived "hypersexuality" of local men (Cook 2007: 48), I argue that this is accompanied by a "hypersexualization" of Western women (see also ibid.: 56). In my case such a hypersexualization became especially apparent in the suppositions of bureaucrats and law enforcement agencies. They not only spread rumours that I spied on the terrain and on geological resources used in international warfare, but also rumours alluding to sexual misconduct, e.g. insinuating that I used my physical assets to seduce local men in order to elicit secret information. As I was a woman unaccompanied by a spouse or colleague, interaction with men was transformed into the idea of a seductress and spy. Two locally popular fears may have contributed to this: firstly, allegations which suggest that foreigners are spying (both historically as well as recently), and secondly, the fear that today it is particularly women who are spying. Suspicions, mistrust, and fears actually apply to Cook's lascivious male Other, but on top of this also to a lascivious female Other.

40 One high ranking official, for example, extended an invitation for dinner and barbeque, to exchange movies and to spend time in the valley of Hunza, which is popular with tourists and where, as he indicated, the water makes men sexually very active. Diverse officers also commented on my appearance – a liberty that in Gilgit is else essentially restricted to persons of the same gender and to spouses.

As Golde remarked about the lone female researcher, she may be seen as a provocation herself. She is presumed to be naïve; a person "who may become a dupe for those who will be ready to capitalize on her incapacity and inexperience" (Golde 1986: 6). This also results in the perceived need to protect her. "Protection, then, has a double aim–the direct need to insure the safety of the woman, and the protection of others through the prevention of situations that might provoke others to exploit her" (ibid.: 5-6). If a lone woman is seen as fair game, all men have the potential to either protect or trap her. In the end, however, although there were many attempts to trap me, for example through malicious rumours, there were more people who trusted, protected and helped me, and this in spite of continuous allegations of immorality.

I think that the suspiciousness of Western women as being lascivious and immoral can be explained as an anxiety about uncontrollability and change. In an attempt to explain such hypersexualizations of female foreigners, Willson suggests that "nearly any woman outsider who cannot be controlled by the norms of the dominant society is typecast as loose: loose because she is truly independent, and because she is not controlled by the male-ordered society" (Willson 1995: 263). Western women may thus be anticipated as pioneering in behaviour which is regarded as immoral but may (nonetheless) be appreciated and copied by local women. As Cook mentions, drawing on a discourse about female British Muslims, "women are regularly constructed as biological reproducers of the nation, carriers of culture, and bearers of the markers of group identity, their roles, activities, bodies, and sexualities are often controlled to serve the collective interest" (Cook 2007: 41). Local women are thus rarely allowed to follow the lead of Western women. Conversely, we can infer how difficult it may be for local women to (re) define gender roles and identities. For example, the aspiration of local women to work outside the house (probably alongside men) is a fiercely discussed issue in Gilgit. Women are often denied permission to work or study by their families, who will refer to possible dangers connected with potential boundary-crossings regarding *pardah*. For instance, when I had been to the parental home of a female Sunni interlocutor, we had gotten into a hot discussion with her younger brother who had reprimanded her for her ambition to go to the U.S. for further education. On the way home she explained to me that her husband had given her the support and permission to pursue her plans. Hence, while her husband was less concerned about *pardah*, her brothers were much stricter. Even when she was seen greeting a male neighbour her brother would rebuke her while her husband had no problem with this. Many local families are very reluctant to let their daughters leave for extended stays in Western countries – even if they accompany their husbands – for fear that they might return "changed". Likewise, a presumed increase in pre-marriage (emotional or physical) romances is condemned and blamed on the increased private space created by mobile telecommunication and an increasing moral

laxity in Gilgit – all of which is greatly bemoaned by many, especially older people.[41] Perhaps the importance attached to my clothing and the rumours about my "sexual" conduct in Gilgit were also an indicator of such fears of change. Foreign women are especially said to have lax morals and may thus be seen as role models that pose a threat to local morals. Drawing on an article on fieldwork, mobile phones and rumours in Mozambique, I argue that in Gilgit, too, women's behaviour and conduct may be evaluated in the light of "broader socio-economic reconfigurations"; it is feared that they intensify transformations in "a time when intimate relationships, household formation and gender hierarchies are being redefined, alongside changing consumption patterns" (Archambault 2009: 8). As Golde summarised regarding issues of women, rumours, and social expectations:

> *Gossip and rumors, insinuations of wrongdoing, overt and disguised sexual encounters initiated by men, and active attempts to control and limit the [foreign] women's freedom of movement are further expressions of this attitude. [...] Such behaviors not only reveal these attitudes, but they also serve as mechanisms of social control. They contain a message that may be manifestly solicitous, but at the same time constitutes a veiled warning to both the field worker and the community that the limits of tolerance may not be pushed too far.* (Golde 1986: 6)

I thus argue that while one's actual conduct may influence people's ideas to a certain extent, it may not always be possible to anticipate local ideas, patterns and stereotypes and find ways to behave that seem acceptable to everyone (including the researcher him/herself). Doing things one way or the other, one is ultimately subjected to the local patterns of interaction and assessment. It seems as if in Gilgit withdrawal is the only way to counter this – withdrawing to one's own house and family and limiting social contacts and participation in events, which again raises the question of how to do research based on participation and on communication with diverse people.

Other female researchers equally found themselves enmeshed in rumours about their immorality. After not being responsive to a local man, colleagues of mine were accused of being lesbians; others were accused to prostitute themselves, based on a confusion of persons, time, space, and dirty imputations. By the same token, allegations that I had affairs or relationships with various men must have abounded, and I am sure that only a fraction of those rumours was eventually conveyed to me. While many rumours were

41 For example, love- and elopement-marriages are discussed in Gilgit with awe. Though it is common knowledge that there are romantic and physical relationships before (and also outside) marriage, people seem to be torn between admiration of the romantic bravery and disgust of the involved supposed immoralities. While young men frequently speak with fascination and desire about this topic, it is nonetheless socially unaccepted.

just framed in terms of improper behaviour, others were carrying additional allusions to spying. Several interlocutors told me that a group of people – incidentally the bureaucrat I had been introduced to in the beginning for support, but who had continuously kept putting obstacles in my way, and his colleagues – repeatedly nurtured malicious rumours about me, suggesting that they had seen me visiting the Five Star Hotel in Gilgit with a number of men, such as an intelligence agency's colonel or the local Chief Secretary.

But while such lies may have been spread by the bureaucrats on purpose, they resorted to a mode of speculation which seems to be common in Gilgit. To illustrate this point, I want to elaborate on one particular rumour that exemplifies the common mode of hypersexual imaginations in Gilgit. According to this rumour, I had caused the transfer of the Chief Secretary of Gilgit-Baltistan by involving him romantically. More than one interlocutor had heard this explanation of his transfer, and had related this rumour to me. The rumour has the following backdrop: when I was mid-way in my research, several months had already passed in the process of obtaining a second research permit; hence, some families who were friends of mine eventually approached the Chief Secretary, the highest bureaucrat in Gilgit-Baltistan, for help in my case. While at this point in time the Chief Secretary's order for transfer had already been decided for at least one week, this information was not disclosed to the public. When receiving the information that the transfer was finally set for the next day, I swiftly got the opportunity for a quick meeting the same evening; since the introduction of a new office-bearer takes some time, I gladly took this chance. When both social media coverage of our meeting *and* news of his transfer were released the next day, some people immediately related his transferral to our meeting, drawing on the idea of the (imaginary) hypersexuality of foreign women.[42]

While Willson argues that the authority of female anthropologists may be dismissed within the scientific community by negative portrayals that undermine women's "objectivity" and ability to do science, I experienced in the field that there, too, "a woman with authority is a threat to a male established order" (Willson 1995: 266). In my case, paradoxically, malicious rumours projected women's power in order to undermine and diffuse their threatening authority.

Conclusion

I have argued that my experiences in the field question any authority of the fieldworker as well as the ability to control the course of the research and the outcome.[43] At the same time, the fieldworker him/herself may be exposed to

42 Other people related the Chief Secretary's transferral to the doing of the Chief Minister, drawing on issues of envy and nepotism, as well as negotiation of hierarchy and competencies between politician and administration.

43 This may apply especially to Western fieldworkers in non-Western settings.

local modes of speculation as well as (power) games, experience powerlessness and lack (full) control over the progress of the fieldwork as well as the manner in which he or she is seen by the people in the field – both issues which go hand in hand to a large extent. Although I attribute the difficulties I encountered mostly to my female gender, I maintain that such problems are not necessarily limited to women. As Hastrup suggests, fieldwork experiences have to be considered more generally with regard to control, power relations and knowledge in fieldwork. Anthropological knowledge is emergent from and dependent on the fieldworker, his or her background, as well as the people and the circumstances in the field. Being rendered unable to take control over the process of fieldwork and data collection may lead to diverse problems, such as extremely fragmented knowledge or emotional impairment. The question that remains, however, is how fieldwork can be done when fieldwork itself is contrary to local norms of acceptable behaviour; this question equally touches methods, logistics, ethics, and emotions.

Arguably, a different researcher in the same field may have very different experiences and face less damaging dilemmas, or may be able to use the existing local patterns and norms to his or her advantage. At the same time, the data generated through such impaired work is by no means invalid. As Hastrup argues, anthropological knowledge is always performative and relational. Thus, anthropological writings gain authority less through what other disciplines regard as positivistic evidence but instead through individual and interpersonal experiences and "narrative ethics". While this also makes anthropological writing vulnerable to positivist demands for proof and evidence, Hastrup reasons instead that "the ethical demand is to 'get it right', not in any ontological sense, but in being true to the world under study and to the epistemological premises of anthropology" (Hastrup 2004: 469). Even if lack of control as to the direction of the research as well as one's self-presentation results in powerlessness and dismay, as Gill and MacIean observe in the introductory quotation, this does not mean that the results are invalid. To the contrary: I contend that even if the topic the researcher initially set out to study cannot be studied as easily as expected, it is the core premise of anthropological work that the specific social environment in which the data is collected has to be understood and used as the background against which the data must be reflected and analysed. For example, through my experiences I learned a lot about issues of mis- and distrust, but also about the importance and joy of trust – especially when it is granted in view of events and rumours that, if taken at face value, argue against it.

Even though my experiences illustrate the disadvantages and even dangers of entering a setting naïvely and unprepared for backlashes, when I discussed the events with colleagues their statements supported the notion that it is hardly possible to prepare oneself from top to bottom for what will happen during fieldwork; to the contrary, unexpected fortuitous events may

quicken the fieldwork and often make the very advantage of anthropological work. This is meant to say that the researcher should remain flexible and adjustable to essential local circumstances, currents and frames. Instead of trying to pursue only some certain, expected knowledge, it may be fruitful to value and expand on one's own individual experiences and explore them creatively in order to do justice to oneself, the people in the field, and the academic output.

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Disaster and (im)mobility: Restoring mobility in Gojal after the Attabad landslide A visual essay

Martin Sökefeld

Introduction

Very often, disasters set people in motion. Volcano outbreaks, floods or earthquakes destroy the homes and livelihood of people and often leave them with little choice but to flee the site of disaster. While many of the affected people move out, agents of humanitarianism rush in. In some cases, however, people cannot move to safer places because the required infrastructure has been destroyed, too. The destruction of infrastructure may be long-lasting, resulting in an ongoing obstruction of mobility. This article details such a case. It deals with a disaster that suddenly trapped highly mobile people in their area and tells how mobility was restored but remained precarious nevertheless.

On the morning of January 4, 2010, the Hunza valley in Northern Pakistan was hit by an extraordinary landslide: The whole flank of a mountain broke off and, together with half of the village Attabad, rushed down the steep slope. An immense mass of rubble and boulders filled the valley. The blockade created by the rockslide is more than a kilometer wide. This huge mass blocked the flow of the Hunza River and buried the Karakorum Highway (KKH), the only road leading from Pakistan into the upstream area of Gojal (Upper Hunza).

While mobility has increasingly become a focus of social theory, I am of the opinion that it cannot be fully understood without considering its opposite, immobility. Mobility is a synecdoche for the dynamics of contemporary society and it can be understood both literally, as physical movement, travel and migration, and metaphorically, as social movement and mobilization. Mobility has become the normality of life. While most of the time it is simply taken for granted, the centrality of mobility in social life becomes visible when it is suddenly interrupted. Yet even then people do not simply "freeze" but take great efforts to overcome the state of motionlessness. Paradoxically, immobility mobilizes people, both literally and metaphorically. This is also the case with the Attabad landslide. Thus, a period of immobility may be a trigger for significant social dynamics and change. In this article I describe the consequences of the sudden immobility created by the landslide for the people of Gojal, the efforts to restore movement and the creation of a new traffic system. I am doing this only in part by a written text. In addition, I rely on visual representation through photographs which capture the environment created by the landslide much better than words. In this article, visual representation of the disaster focuses on the boats brought to the lake. Before the landslide, there have never been such boats in area. In my own perception and experience the boats became the symbol of the disaster of being trapped in the mountains, of the precariousness of connection and of the people's struggle to regain mobility.

While I had come to Gojal for the first time during fieldwork for my PhD thesis in Gilgit between 1991 and 1993, I visited the area for the first time after the landslide in November 2010. I still remember vividly how I crossed the debris and caught a glimpse of the lake for the first time. I was struck by the lucid blue-green color of the water, such a stark contrast to the normal grey of the Hunza-River which is due to its heavy load of silt from the glaciers. During all my visits I felt a stark contradiction between the visual beauty of the lake, especially on sunny days, and the destruction it had brought. Since my first visit I have travelled to Gojal once or twice every year and followed the unfolding of events especially in the village of Gulmit. The focus of my research has largely been on the political consequences of the disaster as it has engendered unprecedented mobilization of protest in Gojal (Sökefeld 2012). This protest was directly connected with the issue of (im)mobility: People demanded the reconnection of their area and protested against what they perceived as insufficient action undertaken by the government in this regard. The present text, however, focuses more on movement in the literal, physical sense. In local perception, disconnection and immobility is not simply the consequence of the disaster, it is the disaster.

Mobile Gojal

Gojal is a sub-district of Hunza-Nager district in Gilgit-Baltistan, the high-mountain area in Northern Pakistan. Villages are situated between 2.400 and 3.000 m above sea-level and many of the surrounding peaks reach beyond 7.000 m. The inhabitants of Gojal belong to three ethno-linguistic groups. Wakhi is the most widely spoken language, followed by Burushaski and a tiny Domaaki minority. All groups are affiliated with the Ismaili branch of Islam which is headed by the Aga Khan.

While people living in high-mountains are often described as being “isolated” and rather “cut-off” from the rest of the world, this was absolutely not the case with Gojal. Even long before the age of modern road construction the people from Hunza were well known for their quick movement and extended raids, mainly into the Kirghiz areas of what is today the Chinese province of Xinjiang. While the people have never been simply “stuck in the mountains”, mobility grew exponentially after the completion of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) in 1978. The KKH links Pakistan with China. It became a busy trade-route and helped much to integrate Hunza and the whole of Gilgit-Baltistan economically into Pakistan.

Gojal is the last Pakistani area before the KKH enters China over the Khunjerab-Pass, at an altitude of 4.700m. In the village Sost Gojal houses a dry-port where goods from China and from Pakistan are reloaded, stored and exchanged. For many people from Gojal, the KKH was the route of migration to down-country Pakistan in search of education or employment (Benz 2013). After more than thirty years, many Gojali families have become multi-local. They have branched out spatially, with significant parts being settled in Gilgit, the capital of Gilgit-Baltistan, or in the big cities of Pakistan, especially in Karachi and Islamabad. Individuals move frequently between the sections of their families that are located in different cities. However, the KKH was not only important for movement between Gojal and Pakistan, but also for mobility within Gilgit-Baltistan. Many goods and services are available in Gilgit city only, or require at least a visit to Aliabad, the center of Hunza. Life in Gojal was to a great extent synonymous with moving or "wayfaring" (Ingold 2009) along the KKH.

The initial phase of the disaster

Compared with the large-scale disasters which Pakistan saw in recent years – like the earthquake of October 2005 with more than 80.000 victims – the Attabad landslide was only a minor disaster. It claimed the lives of nineteen inhabitants of the village. Its consequences, however, did not only affect Attabad village but the whole population of the upstream area of Gojal (Upper Hunza), around 20.000 people.

Disaster research distinguishes between “slow onset” and “quick onset” disasters. The Attabad landslide combined both types. The village of Attabad was hit by a quick onset disaster which in a few minutes destroyed half of the village, its terraces, fields and orchards. Also the road was destroyed in this sudden moment of disaster. Yet the landslide also blocked the flow of the river and created a lake that grew continuously over the following six months until the water spilled over the crest of the debris. By then the water had inundated one village, Ayeenabad, completely. Considerable parts of two more villages, Shishkat and Gulmit, had also gone under water, while a few houses each were affected in Ghulkin and in Husseini. In addition, bazaars, fields and orchards were inundated.

Gojal has probably never been self-sufficient in terms of food – most mountain communities rely on a mixture of economic strategies for survival, including trade. With easy mobility on the KKH, exchange with and dependency on "the outside" – especially "down-country" Pakistan – had increased. Taking advantage of their very high level of education which is facilitated by the strong commitment of the Aga Khan Development Network in the area, many people from Gojal have found employment with NGOs in Hunza, Gilgit, or even beyond. But also those who continued agriculture did not produce in the first place for their own consumption but for the market. In the last decades Gojal had become a prime area for the production of seed potatoes which were sold to the markets of the Punjab.

When people from the upstream area saw the dimension of the landslide, they immediately realized that their area would be cut-off from Pakistan and from the flow of supplies for a longer time. A food crisis was imminent. People rushed to the shops in their villages and stored provisions. But the shops were soon emptied. In the first days after the landslide, Gojal was indeed cut off. Because the border-post on the Khunjerab-Pass is generally closed from December to May, there was also no exit to China at that time. Moving stories tell how in this time people shared wheat flour needed for their staple bread because their neighbors had ran out of stock. These are examples for the disaster communitas that often characterizes calamity-hit areas immediately after the impact. Post-disaster altruism, however, quickly gives way to the “normal” state of affairs, and especially the arrival of relief goods generally causes competition and conflict over the distribution of such goods.

In Gojal, however, there was no relief for the time being. In the first weeks it was possible to climb over the mound of debris but this was a hazardous undertaking and it was not possible to carry larger quantities of supplies over the blockade. In early February, when the water started to submerge Ayeenabad village, the KKH between the village and the blockade was flooded and it was no longer possible to reach the barrier by road or even on foot as in this section perpendicular cliffs of solid rock rise out of the water. The water level was increasing by more than 0.5 meters per day.

Gojal could only be reached by the helicopters of the Pakistan Army and the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), but due to adverse weather conditions sorties were often suspended for several consecutive days. Stories about the helicopters tell about the growing alienation between "the people" and "the government": People complained that they often had to stay behind because some important officers "wanted to have a look". In any case, the limited helicopter services were utterly insufficient to supply the population of Gojal with food and other necessary goods. In this time, a food crisis was imminent. In order to point out the gravity of the situation, the coordinator of the World Food Program (WFP) for Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir who happened to be from Gojal himself, told me later that "the people started to eat their own potatoes." In the local conception, potatoes are not considered as staple food but only as sabzi (vegetable): Sabzi alone does not fill the stomach but wheat which is needed for all kinds of bread, the staple food, was getting short because the local farmers produced mostly potatoes for export and people were used to buy cheap, subsidized wheat flour from the shops.

Moving Boats

In mid-February the NDMA brought some boats to the lake for the transport of people. There have never been any boats in the area before. But these boats were old, leaky and unsafe, and soon they were defunct. In March traders who were eager to resume transport because they still had goods stored in the Sost dry-port, launched larger wooden boats. These boats mainly carried goods but also took passengers. The Frontier Works Organization (FWO), an army engineering corps, had started to dig a spillway through the debris and also built a provisional access road, literally a “dirt road” across the barrier down to the KKH. Slowly, a new way of travel and transport developed: Because the road across the block-ade was steep and very bad, trucks could not reach the shore of the growing lake. Thus, goods arriving by boat had to be loaded on tractors or jeeps that carried them across the debris down to the KKH where they were loaded onto the trucks for further transport to down-country Pakistan.

The boats were initially brought from the Tarbela-Lake, the large reservoir further down on the River Indus, and owned by non-Gojali traders. The boats are fitted with two outboard engines and propellers, one on each side. They are manned with a "captain" who steers and who is mostly also from the Tarbela region, and a helper who starts the engine and collects the fees from the passengers. Over the years, the people got used to the boat service and a new travel routine was established. In the first year, boat traffic was tremendous as many goods from China were still stored in the Sost dry-port. On the way down, passengers often had to sit on top of the cargo for want of other space. As much less goods are exported from Pakistan to China than in the opposite direction, boats are often empty on the way up which was consequentially much more comfortable. Because the KKH did not only connect Gojal with the outside but served also as connection between the villages of Gojal, also travel within the region was affected.

After the boats came also relief in the form of food aid: In autumn 2010 the World Food Program brought flour, rice, and other items sufficient to feed the whole population of Gojal for two months across the lake. More aid, however, came from the opposite direction: China provided food for about eight months and repeated this aid in the years 2011 and 2013.

Travel and transport by boat is arduous, costly and prolongs the journey to Central Hunza, Gilgit and beyond. It is especially difficult for old people and for patients, including emergency cases, who have to take the boats as there is no doctor in Gojal. In every winter, the lake froze for several weeks. During these weeks Gojal was completely cut off again. Also when the lake is not completely frozen, strong winds that prevail in winter in the valley often make the journey dangerous or even outright impossible. Several patients lost their lives because they could not reach a hospital in time.

Economic Crisis

Transport of goods became very expensive as cargo had to be reloaded several times. This gravely affected agriculture in Gojal. Because the transport of potatoes became so expensive, traders offered local farmers only very much reduced rates for their produce. Often, farmers were offered only one third of the rate they had received before the landslide. In autumn 2010, many sacks of potatoes were shipped across the lake. Recognizing, however, that potato farming was not remunerative anymore as the returns did not even cover the expenses for fertilizer and diesel for the tractors, most families gave up potato farming in the following years. Many reverted to wheat cultivation for their own subsistence or left their fields fallow. Thus, the landslide and the blockade of the road had significant economic consequences for the people of Gojal: Prices for “imported” goods soared while the income of most families was very much reduced. This had severe implications for education: Many families were unable to pay the school or university fees for their children. Many local schools are organized by the people themselves and draw all their revenue from the students’ fees. These schools now lacked the funds to pay the teachers. In spite of a one-time government subsidy the whole system seemed to be jeopardized. Because of the great value that is put on education the greatest worry was thus that the landslide endangered the people’s future.

Disaster economy: Opportunities and conflicts

But the lake also brought new economic opportunities. Many men started to work as porters at the boat-stands at both ends of the lake and especially in the first years they were able to make good money there. Work is self-organized. Workers are grouped in parties the members of which mostly derive from the same village or at least the same area. A munshi ("writer") has to take care of the equal distribution of work to the parties. Beside men from Gojal especially men from adjacent Nager do these jobs as the southern end of the lake is close to this area. Initially, Nagerkuts worked at both ends of the lake.

In summer 2011 a dispute about the distribution of cargo work between parties from Gojal and from Nager at the northern end of the lake, which at that time was near the Gojali village of Hussaini, escalated to a fight. Many transport contractors are from Nager and the Gojali workers had the impression that the contractors favored the laborers from Nager, giving them more jobs than the Gojalis. Both parties called for help and more Nagerkuts (people from Nager) rushed across the lake to support their fellows. In the fight, a few nearby houses were attacked and damaged. They were stopped only by the intervention of Shia imams from Nager. After that, workers were strictly separated and men from Nager remained at the southern end of the lake while only Gojalis worked at its northern shore.

Other economic opportunities were taken up by the boat owners and the captains. Initially all of them were from outside the region, but in 2011 some local people pooled resources and had their own boats built. Yet the boat business was quite risky and many boats were destroyed in winter when the lake froze, resulting in heavy losses for some of the owners. Further, at both ends of the lake small make-shift bazaars developed, with little restaurants, shops and diesel sellers catering for the needs of workers and travelers. While the southern end of the lake, at the spillway, remained fixed, the northern end shifted according to the length of the lake. Initially, the lake, measuring more than twenty-five kilometers in length, reached up to the village of Hussaini and the boat-stand was located there. All the tributaries of the Hunza-River come from glaciers and carry a huge load of sand and silt with them which quickly filled the lake between Gulmit and Hussaini. In addition, the water level was lowered in consequence of the FWO's efforts to dig the spillway.

Thus, the northern end of the lake moved consecutively southwards as did the boat-stand. Since winter 2012/13 it was located at the southern end of Gulmit, just opposite Shishkat, where before 2010 a bridge across the river had connected the two villages. At my last visit in March 2014, the lake had moved even further south and did not even properly reach Gulmit anymore. Sand has been banked up there in order to enable access to the boats. But because in winter this particular spot is regularly hit by avalanches, it was closed for passengers and only heavy goods were allowed for loading and unloading there. Passengers had to disembark the boats at Shishkat on the lake's opposite bank. In order to reach Gulmit and the rest of Gojal, one had to cross the quite vast area of the village, to climb down to the river at its other side where a small and shaky wooden foot-bridge had been constructed in order to cross the river to the Gulmit side. From there it was still half an hour walk to reach Gulmit village. Thus, travel had become once more time-consuming and troublesome, especially if one carried loads and luggage – or much more expensive if one was lucky enough to catch a jeep or a tractor that carried one across Shishkat and, from the other side of the bridge, further on to Gulmit. In addition, this arrangement was not very safe as the bridge had already been washed away once, only a few days after its construction. Thus, people almost constantly had to adjust to new routines of travel.

Although the southern end of the lake remained fixed, the spillway changed its character considerably over the years. Most importantly, the access road across the barrier was extended and improved and since summer 2013 trucks and heavy machinery could directly reach the shore of the lake.

Efforts to drain the lake completely remained inefficient and the water-level could not be reduced sufficiently to bring the KKH completely out of the water again. Especially the Chinese government was highly interested in re-aligning the KKH because the highway is a significant link between Western China and the Pakistani deep-sea port at Gwadar in Baluchistan. Also Gwadar Port had been constructed by China in order to facilitate Chinese exports. In January 2012 an agreement was signed for the realignment of the KKH through the construction of three tunnels between the spillway and Ayeenabad village over a length of altogether seven kilometers. Being mostly funded by Chinese loans the project was given to the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC). Works started in Summer 2012 and progress at a very high pace. At the time of writing in spring 2014, the digging of two of the tunnels was completed and the third one was well underway. Completion of the realignment of the KKH, including the completion of a new bridge between the villages of Gulmit and Shishkat, is expected for late 2015 or early 2016.

Displacement – another movement

While the focus of this article is the obstruction and reconstruction of mobility from Gojal to Pakistan and within Gojal, also another kind of short distance mobility has to be mentioned that has been induced by the disaster. This concerns the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Since the Swat crisis of 2008 and 2009, when the battles between the Pakistani army and the Taliban over the Swat valley displaced around two million people from their area, "IDPs" has become a an often used concept in Pakistan. In the context of the Attabad disaster, those persons are categorized as IDPs who have lost their homes to the lake. This concerns altogether about 450 households. They were displaced in different ways: While those from the villages of Attabad, Ayeenabad and Shishkat moved to preliminary shelters in two camps in Central Hunza because no safe land was available in these places, those from Gulmit did not have to leave their village but were accommodated by their own relatives. The IDPs received small aid packages from different NGOs. In 2011, government paid a compensation of 600.000 PKR (ca. 4.800 Euro) per household. In addition, they received a larger share of the food relief provided by the Chinese government.

Initially for the purpose of getting government compensation, the IDPs formed a committee which is now generally representing the IDPs interests. In contrast to the IDPs from the other villages those in Gulmit are now resettled in new houses. Many other inhabitants of Gulmit resent very much that the IDPs still claim "IDP-status" and successfully fought for the lion's share of China's food aid in 2013.

The opposition of IDPs versus non-IDPs is now a pervasive feature of village society. In a certain respect, the IDPs became a new social category.

Conclusion

The Attabad landslide brought movement out of Gojal to a sudden halt. While only a few families were directly affected by the landslide, the entire population of the sub-district suffered from the disconnection and the ensuing economic crisis. Yet people did not remain immobile but struggled to reestablish connection and mobility. The years after the landslide were a period of hardship which deeply impacted social routines. However, also new techniques and routines were developed. The establishment of the boat-traffic across the lake brought new issues of social organization and conflict and, besides all difficulties, also new economic opportunities. Drawing also on other examples of disaster, it is safe to conclude that post-disaster periods are not only times of suffering but also of creativity and innovation.

Given the speed with which the Chinese company and their sub-contractors are building the new road including tunnels and the bridge, it seems indeed possible that the gap in the KKH will be closed soon. During the boat-trip after my last visit in Gulmit in March 2014[1] the thought crossed my mind that this might have been my last boat-journey across Attabad Lake as I will be able to return only more than a year later, when, possibly, the road will be realigned again. But even when the boats are gone, traces of the disaster will remain: in memory and narratives, and perhaps even in social structure.

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1 Since 2010, fieldwork in Gojal took place within the framework of different projects funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and German Academic Exchange Service. I am grateful to all these agencies for their generous funding.

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Captions of the photographs

P 2: The spillway in November 2010
P 3: Watching the lake from the blockade
P 4: Destroyed houses in Gulmit
P 7: Starting the engine
P 9: A wedding party leaving Gulmit by boat
P 10: Sacks of potatoes at the spillway in November 2010
P 12: Truck drivers seeking shelter behind cargo in January 2011
P 13: The boat-stand at Hussaini just below the ice of Hussaini-Glacier in January 2011
P 14: Ice on the lake in February 2012
P 15: Loading tyres from China on a boat at Gulmit boat-stand in September 2013
P 16: The munshi distributing work
P 17: The boat-stand at the spillway in September 2013
P 19: Laborers awaiting a boat at the spillway
P 22: Clouds of dust from the construction of the tunnels



Sketch-map of Gojal (not to scale) showing the lake at the time of its longest extension in summer 2010.

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Als Ethnologin in der Familienwissenschaft: Der interdisziplinäre Studiengang „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften“ an der HAW Hamburg. Ein Werkstattbericht

Astrid Wonneberger

Einführung

Innerwissenschaftliche ethnologische Berufsfelder außerhalb der Museen, des MPI in Halle und der universitären ethnologischen Institute sind in Deutschland rar. Umso erfreulicher ist es, wenn die Expertise von Ethnologinnen und Ethnologen[1] bei der Einrichtung neuer interdisziplinärer Studiengänge gefragt ist. Das geschieht gerade an der Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften in Hamburg (HAW). Hier wird seit dem Sommersemester 2013 der neue Master-Studiengang „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften“ eingerichtet, an dessen Entwicklung und Aufbau Wissenschaftler verschiedener Disziplinen beteiligt sind, die sich aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven mit dem Phänomen Familie beschäftigen.

Interdisziplinäre Studiengänge boomen nicht nur in Deutschland seit der Bologna-Reform, die die europäische Hochschullandschaft seit über zehn Jahren umstrukturiert. Von *Integrated Coastal Zone Management* (Universität Oldenburg) über *European Studies* (Universität Passau), *Arbeits- und Sozialmanagement mit Schwerpunkt Recht* (Universität Hamburg) bis hin zur *Angewandten Systemwissenschaft* (Universität Osnabrück) – viele Hochschulen bieten inzwischen Bachelor- und Masterabschlüsse in solchen neuen fächerübergreifenden Studienformaten an. Über die Vor- und Nachteile wird (nach wie vor) viel diskutiert: Auf der einen Seite befürchten Kritiker, das Studium sei eher ein „Studium light“ und das Wissen der Absolventen weniger fundiert als in den klassischen Einzelstudiengängen. Auf der anderen Seite sehen Befürworter die Vorteile in gesteigerter Effizienz, im umfassenderen Expertenwissen, in übergreifenden Fachkenntnissen und in einer größeren Methodenkompetenz, da die fächerübergreifende Ausrichtung einen Blick über den Tellerrand ermögliche und fachliche Spezialisierung erleichtere.[2]

Dass die Vorteile zumindest bei den Interessenten zu überwiegen scheinen, zeigen die hohen Bewerberzahlen für viele dieser Studiengänge, die wir

1 Zugunsten der Lesbarkeit wird im Folgenden auf die weibliche Form verzichtet. Falls nicht anders angegeben, sind immer beide Geschlechter gemeint.

2 Von den vielen Artikeln zum Thema seien nur einige stellvertretend genannt, die diese Aspekte diskutieren, so z.B. Bernzen 2011; Neue Studiengänge an deutschen Unis 2013; siehe auch ausführlich zu dem Thema Repko 2012.

für die Angewandten Familienwissenschaften ebenfalls verzeichnen konnten – doch dazu später mehr.

Interdisziplinäre Studiengänge werden zwar seit der Bologna-Reform stark nachgefragt, und ihre Zahl ist seitdem stark gestiegen[3], dennoch sind sie weder neu noch ist ihre wachsende Bedeutung allein auf Bologna zurückzuführen. Das Bewusstsein um die Stärken interdisziplinärer Ansätze steigt schon seit Jahrzehnten kontinuierlich (Repko 2012), was die Einführung fächerübergreifender Programme an vielen Universitäten, wie etwa die bereits Anfang der 1990er Jahre (vor Bologna) eingeführten *Lateinamerikastudien* an der Universität Hamburg, illustriert.

In den USA wächst die Zahl an interdisziplinären Studiengängen besonders seit Ende der 1990er Jahre, wie Untersuchungen des National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (2013) belegen. Aber auch hier sind einige Studiengänge schon wesentlich länger etabliert, darunter auch die Familienwissenschaften, die in den USA (und im gesamten englischsprachigen Raum) als *Family Science* oder *Family Studies* bezeichnet werden.

Zur Geschichte der Familienwissenschaften

Die Entwicklung dieses Studienfaches[4] begann bereits Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, als gravierende soziale, demographische und ökonomische Veränderungen in den USA neue Probleme, aber auch neue Alltagskulturen schufen. Die Land-Stadt-Migration und die Entstehung riesiger urbaner Vororte trugen dazu bei, dass sich in urbanen Zentren Kinderarmut, Gewalt, Drogen ausbreiteten; die wachsende Emanzipation der Frauen, die immer mehr Berufe außerhalb der Familie ergriffen, und eine zunehmende Technisierung des Haushalts veränderten und verkürzten die Hausarbeit und stellten neue Anforderungen an die Bildung der Frauen, die für diese Aufgaben überwiegend zuständig waren. Dieses sind nur einige der Faktoren, die für die Entwicklung der Familienwissenschaften entscheidend sein sollten.

Als Reaktion auf die wachsenden Probleme sah sich der US-amerikanische Staat verpflichtet, Familienhilfsprogramme zu starten: Das wiederum erhöhte den Bedarf an Sozialarbeitern und *community workers*, die es bis dahin in dieser großen Zahl nicht gegeben hatte.

Durch die gravierenden ökonomischen, technischen und sozialen Veränderungen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts sahen sich Forscher verschiedener wissenschaftlicher Disziplinen angeregt, sich mit diesen neuen Problemen zu beschäftigen: Der Soziologe Robert Angell erforschte beispielsweise 1936 die Auswirkungen der ökonomischen Depression auf ameri-

3 Siehe z.B. Fischer/Minks 2008, die sich allerdings auf Ingenieurswissenschaften beziehen.

4 Die folgenden Ausführungen beziehen sich, soweit nicht anders angegeben, auf Bailey und Gentry 2013, Hollinger 2003, NCFR Task Force 1987, 1988, Day 2010.

kanische Familien in seiner Studie „The Family Encounters the Depression". Der Psychologe Lewis Terman erstellte 1938 eine Studie, in der er versuchte, den Erfolg oder das Scheitern von Ehen zu erklären und vorauszusagen, und auch die Studie „The Family: A Dynamic Interpretation" (1938) von Willard Wallers, ebenfalls Soziologe, wird heute als einer der Meilensteine der Entwicklung der Family Studies angesehen.

In den 1930er Jahren wurden auch die ersten familienwissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften gegründet, wie die Groves Conference on Marriage and the Family (1934) sowie die National Council on Family Relations (NCFR), die bis heute eine der wichtigsten wissenschaftlichen Institutionen für Familie in den USA darstellt.

Besonders vorangetrieben hat den Prozess, Familienwissenschaften als Disziplin zu etablieren, der Soziologe Ernest Groves (Boston University). Bereits 1922 hatte er die Bedeutung des Feldes „Familie" als eigenständigen Untersuchungsgegenstand erkannt und unterrichtete den ersten Kurs über Familie unter dem Titel „The Family and its Social Functions". Einige Fachhistoriker sehen deshalb den Beginn der Familienwissenschaften bereits 1922, nämlich in diesem Kurs.

In den folgenden Jahren erstellte er erste Lehrbücher, führte Konferenzen durch und errichtete 1939 den ersten Studiengang mit dem Titel „Marriage and Family" an der Duke University (Durham NC). In seinem oft zitierten Aufsatz in der Fachzeitschrift *Marriage and Family Living* mit dem Titel „Professional Training for Family Life Educators" (1946) betonte er den großen Bedarf an einer Familienwissenschaft und hielt ein klares Plädoyer für den Aufbau einer solchen Disziplin, indem er hervorhob, dass es sich um eine interdisziplinäre Wissenschaft handeln müsse, damit Spezialisten Familie aus ganz verschiedenen Blickwinkeln betrachten könnten:

> *"The establishment of a definite program for the training of specialists in the field of marriage and the family means that several sciences must contribute to the instruction. The outcome will be a science of marriage and the family carried out by specialists who will [...] not be sociologists, home economists, or social workers, but persons who are committed to the gathering and the giving of information that concerns marriage and the family [...]." (Groves 1946: 26)*

In den folgenden Jahren entstanden in den USA immer mehr Fachzeitschriften, die sich interdisziplinär mit Familie beschäftigten. Heute gibt es etwa 95 solcher Journale. Auch die Zahl an Lehrbüchern und Handbüchern stieg kontinuierlich und nicht zuletzt auch die Zahl an Studiengängen, insbesondere an den *State Universities*. Um dem wachsenden Bedarf an Fachkräften im Bereich Familie nachzukommen und als Folge des zunehmenden Interesses an Familienforschung wandelten ab den 1950/60er Jahren viele Univer-

sitäten ihre *home art/economics*-Studiengänge um, die in dieser Zahl nicht mehr benötigt wurden, da sie sich ursprünglich an Frauen in ländlichen Gebieten gerichtet hatten, die in der *art of homemaking* ausgebildet werden sollten, und gründeten stattdessen *Family Studies* als Curricula.

1982 boten bereits über 20 US-amerikanische Universitäten ein Promotionsprogramm in Familienwissenschaften an und weitere 30 einen Masterabschluss, insgesamt gab es also über 50 entsprechende Curricula. 1994 war die Zahl bereits auf 157 Master- und Promotionsprogramme an 134 Universitäten gestiegen. 2005 belief sich die Zahl auf 245 Programme an 227 Hochschulen und Universitäten (Bailey und Gentry 2013: 861-886).

Trotz der rasanten Zunahme an Studiengängen blieb es lange Zeit unklar, ob Family Studies als eine eigenständige Disziplin anzusehen waren oder nicht. Die lange Debatte wurde letztlich durch einen Artikel beendet, der die wichtigsten Punkte zusammenfasste und analysierte: Wesley Burr und Geoffrey Leigh kamen 1983 in ihrem Artikel „Famology – a new discipline" anhand von sieben Kriterien zu dem Schluss, dass Familienwissenschaften eine eigenständige Disziplin sind, die zu einem interdisziplinären Forschungsfeld arbeitet. Seitdem herrscht unter Familienwissenschaftlern zumindest in den USA ein weitest gehender Konsens, dass Familienwissenschaften ein Teil ihres Wissens zwar aus anderen Disziplinen erhalten und viele Forscher aus anderen Fächern stammen, aber dass sie als eigenständige Disziplin auch eigene Paradigmen, Methodologien und Ansichten entwickelt haben.

Die Ethnologie als Teildisziplin der Familienwissenschaften

Welchen Stellenwert hat nun die Ethnologie bzw. die Cultural Anthropology innerhalb der Familienwissenschaften in den USA? In welchem Umfang sind dort Ethnologen beschäftigt?

Wenn man sich die Ausbildung, Ausrichtung und Spezialgebiete der Professoren und Dozenten an den Instituten anschaut, findet man folgende Disziplinen (sortiert nach Häufigkeit der Ausbildung der Dozenten):

In fast allen Studiengängen[5] vertreten sind die Psychologie (mit verschiedenen Schwerpunkten, insbesondere Entwicklungspsychologie, Klinische Psychologie, Sozialpsychologie), *Human Development and Family Studies*, Erziehungswissenschaften (*Early Childhood Education, Elementary Education, Language Education* etc.) sowie die Soziologie. Häufig vertreten,

5 Als Grundlage für diese Einschätzung dienten mir die Angaben (Modulhandbücher, Seminarpläne, Dozentenlisten etc.) der Studiengänge Family Studies, Family Sciences u.ä. der State Universities, die alle einen solchen Studiengang haben. Ich habe ausgezählt, wie oft welches Fach bzw. welche Dozenten welcher Fächer in den Studienplänen vertreten sind, und die Ergebnisse in drei große Kategorien („kommt in fast allen Curricula vor", „kommt in mehr als der Hälfte vor", „kommt ab und zu/mehr als einmal vor") zusammengefasst.

d.h. in der Mehrzahl der Studiengänge vorhanden, sind die Ethnologie bzw. *Anthropology*, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Gesundheits- und Pflegewissenschaften, Politikwissenschaften, Beratung (*Counseling*), Gender Studies, Verhaltens- und Humanbiologie. Seltener findet man die Gerontologie, Rechtswissenschaften, Geschichtswissenschaften, Linguistik, Administration und Management, *Consumer Science*, Philosophie und andere.

Die Ethnologie gehört damit zwar nicht zu den am häufigsten vorhandenen Fächern, nimmt aber unter den vertretenen Disziplinen einen zentralen Platz ein. Unter den Dozenten und Professoren der *Family Studies* sind Ethnologen regelmäßig, d.h. in mehr als der Hälfte der Curriculumsangebote, zu finden; kaum ein familienwissenschaftlicher Studiengang kommt ohne Ethnologen aus. Das verwundert kaum in einem Land, das schon lange seine kulturelle und ethnische Vielfalt (an)erkannt und erforscht hat. Verwiesen sei hier nur kurz auf die lange Tradition der ethnologischen Verwandtschafts- und Familienforschung durch Maine, Morgan und unzählige weitere Ethnologen seit den 1870er Jahren, die das Thema Verwandtschaft auch im interkulturellen Vergleich zu einer der Paradedisziplinen der Ethnologie und damit zu einem der am besten untersuchten Gegenstände unseres Faches gemacht haben.

Auch in den aktuellen Curricula, Modultableaus oder Stundenplänen der Familienwissenschaften in den USA finden sich häufig ethnologische Inhalte: Neben obligatorischen Theoriekursen, psychologischen Kursen über zwischenmenschliche Beziehungen (z. B. Eltern-Kind-Beziehungen, Generationenbeziehungen), die menschliche Entwicklung, Seminaren zu Krankheiten, Drogen, Armut und anderen Familienkrisen, Einheiten zu Familienökonomie, Familienrecht und Familienpolitik legen die Studiengänge in allen Universitäten, die Familienwissenschaften anbieten, auch einen Schwerpunkt auf kulturelle Facetten von Familie sowie das Thema Migration. So gibt es beispielsweise Themen, die aus interkultureller Vergleichsperspektive betrachtet werden: „Families in cross-cultural perspective“, Gesundheit in verschiedenen kulturellen Kontexten, die Rolle des Vaters in verschiedenen Kulturen oder ähnliche Veranstaltungen.

Auch die USA als Einwanderungsland werden oft thematisiert. Regelmäßig zu finden sind Veranstaltungen zu *Black Families*, *Hispanic Families* oder *American Indian Families*. Da viele dieser Gruppen zu denen zählen, die in den USA am meisten von sozialen Problemen betroffen sind, bietet sich ihre Erforschung im Hinblick auf die späteren Tätigkeitsfelder der Absolventen besonders an.

Darüber hinaus hat die Ethnologie auch auf methodischer Ebene einiges zu den Familienwissenschaften beizutragen. Da sich die Familienwissenschaften als empirische Wissenschaften verstehen, bieten die Institute und Departments auch eine Ausbildung in den Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung an: Neben quantitativen Methoden sind hier vor allem auch

die qualitativen gefragt (auch wenn diese Trennung natürlich fließend ist), einschließlich der Parademethoden der Ethnologie: Teilnehmende Beobachtung, ethnographische Interviewverfahren, genealogische Methoden u.v.m.

Family Studies/Science sind heute in den USA fester verankert und weiter verbreitet als in jedem anderen Land der Welt. Auch ein Großteil der interdisziplinären Studien zu Familien stammt aus den USA und beschäftigt sich überwiegend mit Familien in den USA. D.h., es gibt noch viele Forschungslücken zu Familien in Europa und dem Rest der Welt, vor allem auch deshalb, weil viele amerikanische Forscher offenbar gar nicht auf die Idee zu kommen scheinen, dass es in anderen Ländern anders sein könnte als in den USA – diesen Vorwurf macht jedenfalls Bernardes (1997) den amerikanischen Forschern in seiner Einführung zu Family Studies.

Familienwissenschaften im deutschsprachigen Raum

Im Gegensatz zu der langen Tradition des Faches in den USA gibt es im deutschsprachigen Raum erst wenige Versuche der Etablierung von Familienwissenschaften als eigenständige Disziplin mit entsprechenden Studiengängen. Die wenigen existierenden fachübergreifenden Ansätze, sich wissenschaftlich mit der Familie auseinanderzusetzen, bestehen überwiegend aus regionalen Zusammenschlüssen, sind auf Projektebene angesiedelt und gehen damit oft auf persönliche Initiativen einzelner Wissenschaftler zurück. Beispiele sind die Interdisziplinäre Forschungsstelle Familienwissenschaft (IFF) an der Universität Oldenburg (deren Tätigkeiten allerdings seit 2005 ruhen) und das Interdisziplinäre Zentrum für Familienforschung an der Ruhr-Universität Bochum. Andere familienwissenschaftliche Projekte sind in Form von (außeruniversitären) Forschungseinrichtungen institutionalisiert (die jedoch keine Lehre anbieten) wie z.B. das Deutsche Jugendinstitut München (DJI) oder das Staatsinstitut für Familienforschung Bamberg (IFB). Ein Stiftungslehrstuhl für Familienwissenschaft, eingerichtet von der Hertie-Stiftung an der Universität Erfurt 2002, wurde bereits 2007 wieder gestrichen.

Trotz dieser genannten Initiativen ist Familienforschung in Deutschland also nach wie vor in erster Linie Sache der verschiedenen Einzeldisziplinen, und es existiert bisher noch kein Studiengang, der einer fachübergreifenden Disziplin Familienwissenschaft entsprechen würde. Dabei gäbe es durchaus Bedarf, um der großen und komplexen Bedeutung von Familie, familienbezogenen Programmen und Institutionen in unserer Gesellschaft sowie Familienforschung in nationalen und internationalen Wissenschaften Rechnung zu tragen, und es gibt und gab immer wieder Stimmen, die diesen Bedarf in Worte fassen. So stellte beispielsweise Max Wingen bereits 2004 fest, dass es „den Familien als gesellschaftlichen Grundeinheiten mit ihrem für den einzelnen und die größeren gesellschaftlichen Gebilde hoch bedeut-

samen Aufgaben- und Leistungsspektrum [...] nicht gerecht [wird], sie (nur) in verschiedenen Disziplinen ‚mitzubehandeln'; sie sind darüber hinaus als gesellschaftliche Grundeinheiten von einem möglichst ganzheitlichen wissenschaftlichen Ansatz her zu sehen und zu untersuchen" (Wingen 2004: 48), und Ingeborg Schwenzer und Sabine Aeschlimann schreiben „Zur Notwendigkeit einer Disziplin ‚Familienwissenschaft'":

„Die Errichtung einer eigenständigen Fachdisziplin Familienwissenschaft [...] setzt voraus, dass im Bereich der Aus- und Weiterbildung interdisziplinäre Kurse und Zusatzausbildungen angeboten werden, welche auf eine disziplinäre Grundausbildung aufbauen. Namentlich sind Postgraduiertenkurse, insbesondere ein Master in Familienwissenschaft, einzurichten." (Schwenzer und Aeschlimann, 2006: 509-510)

Der neue Studiengang „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften" an der HAW Hamburg

Diesen seit langem in der interdisziplinären Familienforschung geäußerten Forderungen nach der Einrichtung eines Studiengangs Familienwissenschaften kommt die Einrichtung des berufsbegleitenden und weiterbildenden Masterstudiengangs „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften" an der Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften (HAW) Hamburg nach. Dieser Studiengang ist Teil des seit 2011 laufenden Forschungsprojekts „Fit für soziale Netzwerke" (kurz: „Fit Weiter"), in dessen Rahmen u. a. fakultätsübergreifend mehrere Weiterbildungsformate an der Hochschule entwickelt werden.

„Fit Weiter" ist eines von bundesweit 26 Projekten an 55 Hochschulen und Forschungseinrichtungen, die im Rahmen der ersten Förderrunde des Bund-Länder-Wettbewerbs „Aufstieg durch Bildung: Offene Hochschulen" vom Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung (BMBF) gefördert werden. Ziel dieser 2008 gestarteten Qualifizierungsinitiative ist die Förderung des Lebenslangen Lernens, auch an Hochschulen. Insbesondere Personen mit Familienpflichten, Berufstätigen ohne formale Hochschulzugangsberechtigung, Berufsrückkehrern, Studienabbrechern und arbeitslosen Akademikern soll in neu zu entwickelnden innovativen, nachfrageorientierten und nachhaltigen Studienformaten die Möglichkeit geboten werden, neue Bildungschancen wahrzunehmen. Dadurch sollen langfristig die Durchlässigkeit zwischen beruflicher und akademischer Bildung verbessert sowie das Fachkräfteangebot dauerhaft gesichert werden. Auch die internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit des Wissenschaftssystems soll durch nachhaltige Profilbildung im lebenslangen wissenschaftlichen Lernen und beim berufsbegleitenden Studium gestärkt werden. [6]

6 Siehe ausführlich die Webseite des BMBF zum Wettbewerb unter http://www.wettbewerb-offene-hochschulen-bmbf.de/ (abgerufen am 12.12.2013)

Um der Komplexität des Gegenstands Familie gerecht zu werden, ist das Programm des Weiterbildungsstudiums an der HAW genau wie in den USA interdisziplinär aufgebaut und bezieht Forschungsansätze, Sichtweisen und Ergebnisse der Psychologie, Soziologie, Geschichts-, Rechts-, Politik- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften mit ein – und eben auch der Kulturwissenschaften und der Ethnologie.

Die wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiter, die die Inhalte des Curriculums nicht nur entwickeln, sondern auch unterrichten, stammen aus der Soziologie, der Psychologie und der Ethnologie. Hinzu kommen (in der Startphase) Lehrbeauftragte aus den Rechts- und Erziehungswissenschaften.[7]

Das folgende Modultableau benennt den fünfsemestrigen Aufbau und die verschiedenen Schwerpunkte des Studiengangs:

5. Sem.	**Modul 11** MA-Thesis mit Forschungskolloquium 18 CP			**18**
4. Sem.	**Modul 9** Politik, Recht und Ökonomie der Familie 6 CP	**Modul 10** Familie und Migration 6 CP	**Modul 8** Vertiefung Anwendungs-Kompetenzen (Wahlpflicht: 2 von 3 Strängen) 1) Forschen 2) Beraten 3) Führen + Leiten 12 CP	**18**
3. Sem.	**Modul 6** Klinische Familienpsychologie 6 CP	**Modul 7** Kulturen der Familie 6 CP		**18**
2. Sem.	**Modul 3** Allgemeine Familienpsychologie 6 CP	**Modul 4** Soziologie der Familie 6 CP	**Modul 5** Einführung Anwendungs-Kompetenzen (Forschen / Beraten / Führen + Leiten) 6 CP	**18**
1. Sem.	**Modul 1** Grundlagen der Angewandten Familienwissenschaften 12 CP		**Modul 2** Wissenschaftliches Arbeiten 6 CP	**18**
				90

Abb.: Modultableau Angewandte Familienwissenschaften (Stand 2013-2015)

7 Die Einrichtung und Entwicklung eines neuen (weiterbildenden) Studiengangs erfordert neben fachlicher Vorbereitung vor allem administrative, politische und verwaltungsbezogene Aufgaben, auf die ich an dieser Stelle jedoch nicht genauer eingehen möchte. Verwiesen sei hier auf die Wettbewerbsinternetseite des BMBF (2013), auf der die Ziele und Aufgaben der geförderten Projekte dargestellt sind.

Als Ethnologin bin ich inhaltlich in erster Linie für die Module zu Kultur und Migration zuständig. Wenn man sich die schier unendlich scheinende ethnologische Literaturlage zum Thema Familie und Verwandtschaft anschaut, wird schnell klar, worin eine der Herausforderungen besteht: Welche der Themen sollten in einem familienwissenschaftlichen, weiterbildenden Studium unbedingt berücksichtigt werden?

Da abgesehen vom Grundlagenmodul die kultur- und migrationsbezogenen Module erst im Laufe dieses Jahres anstehen, kann ich an dieser Stelle nur meine Planungen und Ideen kurz vorstellen. Mir scheint es vor allem wichtig zu sein, den Studierenden die Bandbreite an sozialen Organisationsmöglichkeiten näher zu bringen, um ihnen die kulturelle Relativität unserer Vorstellungen von Familie, Verwandtschaft, Haushalt, von Kindererziehung, dem Umgang mit alten Menschen und allen anderen Werten, Normen und Verhaltensweisen im sozialen und familiären Zusammenleben deutlich zu machen. Das, was Menschen als Teil einer Gesellschaft gelernt haben und als normal empfinden, ist nur eine Variante unter vielen Möglichkeiten, die alle irgendwann und irgendwo realisiert worden sind (und dort als normal gelten), aber alle Menschen sehen es in der Regel als so selbstverständlich an, dass ihnen gar nicht bewusst ist, was daran so alles „kulturell" ist.

Dazu ist es nötig, den Begriff „Kultur" zu klären, um sich dann mit den wichtigsten Begriffen aus interkultureller Perspektive und mit Fallbeispielen aus aller Welt zu beschäftigen. So wird es u.a. um die Bandbreite von weltweit vorkommenden Familienformen gehen, um Regeln des Zusammenlebens in gemeinsamen Haushalten, um Verständnisse von Verwandtschaft und Abstammung und letztlich auch um die Frage, wie eine interkulturell brauchbare Definition von Familie aussehen könnte. Ob diese Definition dann auch interdisziplinär einsetzbar ist, ist eine andere Frage, die zwischen den aus verschiedenen Disziplinen stammenden Lehrenden auch zu spannenden Diskussionen führen kann und sollte.

Ebenfalls viel zu bieten hat die Ethnologie zum Thema „Ehe" und „Heirat", angefangen von Heiratsregeln, über Residenzregeln bis hin zu Allianzen und ökonomischen Transaktionen, die ebenfalls ausführlich und interkulturell vergleichend behandelt werden sollen.

In einem interdisziplinären Studiengang besteht darüber hinaus noch eine besondere Herausforderung darin, immer wieder explizite Bezüge zu den anderen Disziplinen herzustellen. Um die interdisziplinäre Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Lehrenden zu erproben und solche inhaltlichen und analytischen Bezüge herzustellen, war das Grundlagenmodul im ersten Semester nach zentralen Themen der Familienwissenschaften gegliedert. Die Lehrenden stellten anhand der Begriffe „Familie", „Ehe und Partnerschaft" sowie „Generationenbeziehungen" exemplarisch wichtige Ansätze, Fragen, Probleme, Definitionen und Theorien ihrer jeweiligen Disziplinen vor, die oft zu lebhaften Debatten führten, die nicht nur die Komplexität der Gegenstän-

de, sondern auch die Verschiedenheit der Wissenschaften deutlich zum Ausdruck kommen ließen. Aus dieser *inter*- eine *trans*disziplinäre Wissenschaft zu machen, wäre eine Aufgabe für später – so schwierig es auch sein mag.

Die Auswahl der weiteren Themen für meine späteren Module wird – abgesehen von den spezifischen Inhalten, die ich bereits oben skizziert habe – im Sinne einer interdisziplinären Sichtweise auch immer davon geleitet werden, welche familienbezogenen Themen von den anderen beteiligten Disziplinen ebenfalls als wichtig erachtet werden. Um immer wieder die verschiedenen Perspektiven und Sichtweisen, die unterschiedlichen Fragestellungen und Herangehensweisen unserer unterschiedlichen Fächer deutlich werden zu lassen, wird es wichtig sein, gemeinsame Themenfelder zu finden, anhand derer diese verschiedenen Fragen und Ansätze verdeutlicht, diskutiert und schließlich zu neuen Erkenntnissen weitergeführt werden können. Zu diesen Themenfeldern können z. B. die Komplexe Kindheit und Erziehung gehören, ebenso wie Alter/n oder der Umgang mit dem Tod und toten Verwandten, die Wohnsituation von Familien oder die Bedeutung des sozialen und kulturellen Umfelds, zu denen es neben psychologischen oder soziologischen eben auch umfangreiche ethnologische Studien und Erkenntnisse gibt. Das weite Themenfeld Migration hält dann ebenfalls wieder eigene Fragen bereit, die oft auch nah am Alltag der Studierenden sein dürften – denn viele von ihnen arbeiten im Rahmen ihrer beruflichen Tätigkeiten mit Migranten in unterschiedlichen Kontexten, und einige haben auch selbst Migrationshintergrund.

Nicht zuletzt ist die Ethnologie auch methodisch im Curriculum der Angewandten Familienwissenschaften verankert: Denn neben der Vermittlung von wissenschaftlich-theoretischen Inhalten geht es im Studium vor allem um den Erwerb bzw. die Vertiefung professioneller Handlungskompetenzen im so genannten „Anwendungsstrang". In den entsprechenden Modulen wird die Lehre intensiv mit der Praxis verzahnt, indem die Studierenden Projekte in ihrem eigenen beruflichen Umfeld durchführen. Neben den Schwerpunkten „Führen und Leiten" und „Beraten" liegt ein großer Studienteil im Modul „Forschen", in dem mit Hilfe der Vielfalt sozialwissenschaftlicher Methoden empirische Forschungsprojekte zu Fragen und Problemen rund um die Familie von den Studierenden durchgeführt werden. Mit der teilnehmenden Beobachtung und diversen Interviewtechniken kann nicht zuletzt auch hier die Ethnologie einen wichtigen Beitrag für das Curriculum leisten.

Der Start des neuen Studiengangs an der HAW war bisher vielversprechend: Auf die 33 Plätze der Pilot-Kohorte, die im Sommersemester 2013 eingerichtet wurde, hatten sich 113 Personen beworben, und es gibt weiterhin eine große Nachfrage für die nächsten (bisher nur geplanten)[8] Durchgänge. Ausgewählt wurden nach einem Auswahlverfahren mit intensiven Einzelge-

8 Vorbehaltlich der Finanzierung ist ein weiterer Start des Masterprogramms für 2015 geplant.

sprächen 30 Frauen und drei Männer zwischen 27 und 54 Jahren. Geleitet von dem Gedanken des Wettbewerbs, „nicht-traditionelle" Studierende – dazu gehören u.a. Studierende mit Familienpflichten – zu fördern, hat die Mehrheit der Studierenden Kinder und/oder leistet andere Familienpflichten wie die Pflege von Angehörigen. Bei den abgeschlossenen Studienfächern handelt es sich mehrheitlich um Sozialpädagogik/Soziale Arbeit, Bildung und Erziehung in der Kindheit, Soziologie und Erziehungswissenschaften. Aber es ist auch eine Ethnologin dabei. Als Teilnehmende an einem weiterbildenden Master-Studienprogramm verfügen alle Studierenden über eine mehrjährige einschlägige Berufserfahrung, überwiegend in der Familienberatung, der Familienhilfe und Kinderbetreuung. Die Motivationsgründe für die Aufnahme des fünfsemestrigen Masterstudiums bestanden insbesondere darin, den eigenen Horizont zu erweitern, Neues dazuzulernen und sich persönlich weiterzuentwickeln, berufliche Kompetenzen zu verbessern und die Karrierechancen zu erhöhen.[9]

In der akademischen Bildungslandschaft sowie dem entsprechenden Arbeitsmarkt der USA ist die Disziplin Family Studies inzwischen nicht mehr wegzudenken. In welchen Bereichen unsere Absolventen schließlich langfristig beruflich arbeiten werden und welchen Stellenwert ein (Master) studium der Familienwissenschaften auf dem Arbeitsmarkt langfristig haben wird, bleibt abzuwarten. Erfreulich wäre eine solche Entwicklung sicherlich aus Sicht der Ethnologie, da sich hier ein neues akademisches Berufsfeld in deutschen Hochschulen und Universitäten ergeben würde, das den bisher doch eher engen akademischen Arbeitsmarkt erweitern und den Nutzen ethnologischer Forschung auch außerhalb von Fachkreisen bekannter machen würde.

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9 Siehe ausführlich Stelzig-Willutzki 2012, Weidtmann 2013.

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Dr. Astrid Wonneberger, Privatdozentin für Ethnologie an der Universität Hamburg, ist als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin im Projekt „Fit Weiter“ an der Hochschule für Angewandte Wissenschaften (HAW) Hamburg im Rahmen des neuen Masterstudiengangs „Angewandte Familienwissenschaften“ tätig.

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Andrea Blätter

Dieser Band umfasst vierzehn Beiträge, welche die AutorInnen, zumeist ProfessorInnen an ethnologischen Instituten in Deutschland, aber auch ein Soziologe und ein Politikwissenschaftler, auf einer Vortragsreihe zum Thema „Was ist ethno an der deutschsprachigen Ethnologie?“ zusammengetragen haben. Dabei stellen sie ihre Arbeitsgebiete vor und liefern ein auf breitem historischem Fundament fußendes, vielschichtiges Bild vom Zustand der deutschen Ethnologie, ihren besonderen Qualifikationen und Aufgaben im 21. Jahrhundert.

Im einleitenden Kapitel beschreiben die Herausgeber die institutionellen Entwicklungen innerhalb und außerhalb der Universitäten angesichts steigender Studierendenzahlen und der Herausforderungen des Arbeitsmarktes. Sie thematisieren den Wandel der epistemischen Praktiken und die Modernisierungsanstöße des Faches seit den 1970er Jahren. Feldforschung als zentrale Methode und die ethnologische Grundhaltung des systematischen Perspektivwechsels werden ebenso angesprochen wie Themen der zeitgenössischen deutschen Ethnologie und ihre Zukunft als Teil einer symmetrischen Sozialwissenschaft.

Bernhard Streck beschreibt die perspektivische Besonderheit der Ethnologie. Am Beispiel der Arbeit von Anett Oelschlägel (2010) bei den südsibirischen Tyva erläutert er einen Konzeptdualismus, der die Konfrontation von Traditionalismus und Moderne transzendieren kann. Mit ihrem Pluriperspektivismus kann die Ethnologie, so Streck, unterschiedliche Sinndomänen begreifen, vergleichen und übersetzen.

Im folgenden Beitrag widmet sich Richard Rottenburg dem Thema Ethnologie und Kritik. Er benennt als drei wesentliche Merkmale der Ethnologie ihr Rehabilitationsethos, ihre Binnenperspektive und ihren naiven Realismus, verweist aber auch auf ihre Kritik des Eurozentrismus und auf die von ihr thematisierte Krise der Repräsentation. Als blinden Fleck der kritischen Ethnologie sieht er die Unmöglichkeit der Trennung von Gesellschaft, Politik und Ökonomie. Als Pluspunkte sieht er eine erhöhte Reflexibilität, eine Emanzipation aus gesellschaftlichen Zwängen und eine Neubewertung des Konzeptes der Institution, welches er an dem Beispiel der Hexerei bei den Azande nach Evans-Pritchard darlegt.

Thomas Bierschenk folgt mit einem Plädoyer für eine feldforschungsbasierte Ethnologie, in dem er mit einem Beispiel aus der Sportsoziologie die

ethnologische Faustregel ‚besser mit Leuten reden als über sie' und ein erweitertes Feldforschungsparadigma skizziert. Die Bedeutung einer Ethnologie der Gegenwart sieht er in der Untersuchung von Transferobjekten und meint damit empirische Phänomene, die Ergebnis eines Übertragungsprozesses sind. Bierschenk warnt vor einer Soziologie-Blindheit der Ethnologie, die zu einem Hang zur Exotisierung führen kann.

Judith Schlehe stellt in ihrem Beitrag das Tandem-Lehrforschungsprojekt Freiburg/ Yogyakarta, Indonesien vor. Bei dieser methodologischen Neuerung in transkultureller Forschungskooperation arbeiten seit 2004 Ethnologie-Studierende der Universitäten Freiburg und Yogyakarta, supervisiert von den DozentInnen und ProfessorInnen der jeweiligen Gastuniversitäten als interkulturelle Teams in Deutschland und Indonesien bei Übungsfeldforschungen zusammen. Durch Themenwahl, Forschungsausrichtung und theoretische Ausrichtung soll dabei die kategoriale Trennung zwischen Europa und Asien in Bewegung gebracht werden. Diese neue, transkulturelle Lehrkonzeption beruht auf Symmetrie, Reziprozität und Multiperspektivität und trägt zur dringend erforderlichen Dezentrierung von Wissen bei der bestehenden Nord-Süd Wissenskluft bei. Grenzen und Erweiterungen des Tandem-Lehrforschungsprojekts sowie der dort zu lernende Umgang mit kulturellen Differenzen und wechselseitigen Übersetzungen sind weitere Themen dieses erfrischend praktischen und zukunftsweisenden Berichts, der die Stärke der Ethnologie im spielerischer Umgang mit Fragen und Perspektiven sieht und auf die Frage ‚wer oder was ist ethno in der deutschen Ethnologie' fröhlich mit ‚Alle' antwortet.

Das in der Ethnologie zentrale Konzept von Kultur wird von Carola Lentz erläutert und zwischen Identitätsdiskursen und Wissenschaftspolitik verortet. Dabei geht es, ausgehend von Edward Tylor und Franz Boas, zunächst um die Geschichte ethnologischer Kulturkonzepte, bei der die amerikanischen Kulturrelativisten, Talcott Parsons' Arbeitsteilung zwischen Ethnologie/ Kultur und Soziologie/ Gesellschaft sowie Clifford Geertz' Entsoziologisierung des Kulturbegriffs in seiner Arbeit zu Kultur als Text thematisiert werden, bevor nach einer Zwischenbilanz Kritik und Revisionsvorschläge unterbreitet werden. Angesprochen werden dabei *‚Writing for or against culture'*, Kultur als Prozess der Aushandlung und die Zukunft des Kulturkonzepts. Lentz fragt abschließend nach dem Gegenbegriff von Kultur (was ist nicht kulturell?) und fordert ein für den transdisziplinären Austausch offenes Kulturkonzept.

Karl-Heinz Kohl plädiert für das ethnographische Archiv als einzigartigem Schatz der Ethnologie. Bei einem Forschungsgegenstand im Wandel und den Transformationen eines Faches ist das ethnographische Archiv eine Grundstärke und Konstante des Faches. Das Vorhandensein von Materialsammlungen und Archiven, die historische Studien ermöglichen und in denen noch viel unbearbeitetes Material ruht, ermöglicht beispielsweise

indigenen Kulturen die Durchsetzung von Rechtsansprüchen und ist so auch für die ehemals Beforschten von größtem Wert. Viele andere verwenden die ethnologischen Aufzeichnungen, um die Lebensweisen ihrer Vorfahren zu rekonstruieren und sie für ihre Ethnisierungsprozesse zu nutzen. Kohl sieht in einem digital verfügbaren ethnographischen Archiv deshalb eine wichtige Zukunftsperspektive.

Mit der bundesdeutschen Ethnologie zwischen 1945 und 1990 befasst sich Dieter Haller. Er zeigt die geisteswissenschaftlichen Strömungen nach 1945 auf und benennt Institutionen und Strukturen des Faches. Der Einfluss in Gesellschaft und Politik wird untersucht und als kaum vorhanden bedauert. Als Stärken der Ethnologie werden Krisenbewusstsein, Referenz auf die Vielfalt der Kulturen der Welt, ihr Augenmerk auf Alltagskulturen in ihren Verästelungen und ihrer Komplexität, ihre Durchdringung lokaler Kontexte und die Erarbeitung lokaler Expertisen genannt. Dabei bleibe die deutsche Ethnologie weiter dem Humboldtschen Bildungsideal verpflichtet und die Bedeutung von Feldforschung bleibe im Fach unumstritten.

Michael Bollig skizziert die Situation der Ethnologie in Deutschland heute. Er vermittelt grundlegende Zahlen, Strukturen und institutionelle Entwicklungen. Er positioniert die Ethnologie im weiteren Kanon kulturwissenschaftlicher Fächer und beschreibt die Struktur ethnologischer Institute und Stellen, Studierendenzahlen und Studiengänge. Diagramme geben Auskunft über die regionalen und thematischen Orientierungen in Dissertationsschriften und in von der DFG geförderten ethnologischen Forschungsprojekten. Nach Bolligs Einschätzung werden die Rolle der Ethnologie-Institute und die Zahl der Ethnologie-Studierenden weiter anwachsen. Notwendig scheint ihm deshalb eine fachinterne Auseinandersetzung um Lehrinhalte. Vor allem die Verkürzung der Feldforschungszeiten findet er problematisch. Auch fordert er eigene Promotionsformate zu schaffen und die Bezüge zwischen Master-Abschluss und Promotion neu zu justieren. Als Fazit stellt Bollig fest, dass sich die deutsche Ethnologie als drittmittelstark und international sichtbar erweise. Sie sei in leitender Position an verschiedenen Verbundforschungsprojekten beteiligt. Die Arbeit an thematischen Schnittstellen zeige, dass der gleichzeitige Blick auf Handlungsräume und Strukturen und die ständig mitgedachte komparative Perspektive die Ethnologie für integrative Arbeit prädestinieren.

Larissa Förster hinterfragt die Bedeutung von ethnologischen Museen und beschäftigt sich mit ihrer Rolle als öffentliche Kulturinstitution, als internationale Forschungsstätte und postkoloniale Kontaktzone. Sie plädiert für eine bessere Kooperation zwischen ethnologischen und historischen Museen und beleuchtet die ambivalente Beziehung von ethnologischen Museen zu Kunstmuseen. Förster weist auf die enge Zusammenarbeit mit ethnologischen Institutionen an Universitäten und auf die grundlegende Rolle der Museen als Forschungsstätten hin. Die Bedeutung von Museen als postkoloniale

Kontaktstätte ist vergleichsweise jung und wurzelt in der Einmischung indigener Gruppen in die Museumsarbeit. Sie hat zu kollaborativen und partizipatorischen Ansätzen des Kuratierens geführt und geholfen, ethnologische Museen zunehmend zu Plattformen transkultureller Aushandlungsprozesse und Beziehungsgeflechte werden zu lassen. Förster sieht das Besondere am ethnologischen Museum in der Perspektivierung seiner Gegenstände. Dabei werden eigene europäische Standpunkte reflektiert und bewusst unterschiedliche Zeiten, Orte, Akteure, Machtverhältnisse und Perspektiven ins Spiel gebracht.

Gisela Welz beschäftigt sich mit den Transformationen der deutschen Nachkriegsvolkskunde hin zur europäischen Ethnologie. Sie vollzieht dabei zunächst den anglo-amerikanischen Diskurs über *ethnology* zu *anthropology* und weiter zu *ethnography* nach. In den 1960er Jahren begannen dann amerikanische Ethnologen, kleine Gemeinden in Südeuropa, auf dem Balkan, den britischen Inseln und im Alpenraum zu untersuchen und den Weg für eine ‚*anthropology of Europe*' zu bahnen. Seit den 1990er Jahren gibt es auch eine ‚*anthropology of Europeanization*', der es um eine Untersuchung der Fortentwicklung der europäischen Einigungsprozesse, um den Grad der Identifikation der Bewohner europäischer Länder mit der europäischen Union und die Herausbildung unabhängiger Staaten in Ost- und Südosteuropa nach der Öffnung des „Eisernen Vorhangs", der Auflösung der UdSSR und Jugoslawiens. Welz weist darauf hin, dass EthnologInnen inzwischen auch Prozesse von globaler Reichweite untersuchen und viele heute ihre Forschungsfelder in sozialen Gruppierungen finden, auf die selbst ein reformierter, kritisch reflektierter Ethnos-Begriff nicht anwendbar ist und appelliert, den Grenzverkehr mit den Lebenswissenschaften zu intensivieren.

Stefan Hirschauer betrachtet die zeitgenössische Ethnologie von soziologischer Seite. Er versteht Ethnologie und Soziologie als zwei Seiten einer Medaille. Mit der ethnologischen Kulturanalyse verbindet er das Verstehen des Fremden und die Exotisierung des Eigenen, während er in der Soziologie bei ihren Untersuchungen von Alltagswissen einen Mangel an Fremdheit sieht. Er beschreibt die Chicagoer Schule als frühe Verbindung beider Richtungen, welche gerade durch die Multiplikation von Fremdheitsrelationen so fruchtbar ausgefallen ist und findet, dass die Soziologie des Alltäglichen Befremdung des Vertrauten gebrauchen kann. Sein soziologischer Blick auf die Ethnologie urteilt: Diese trete zu bescheiden auf, das habe sie nicht nötig. Fremdverstehen erfordere schließlich keine Selbstverleugnung und EthnologInnen haben das ‚Ganze' einer Gesellschaft eben besonders gut im Blick, weil sie als kulturell Fremde Glaubenssysteme klarer sehen können.

Der Politikwissenschaftler Klaus Schlichte erklärt anschließend, was die Politikwissenschaft von der Ethnologie lernen kann. Auch er lobt vor allem die Spezialisierung im Perspektivenwechsel, nicht nur bei theoretischen Paradigmen, sondern auch bei Weltauffassungen und Kosmologien.

Er versteht die Ethnologie als global operierende Mikrosoziologie und sieht Konvergenzbewegungen von Teilen der Politikwissenschaft und der Ethnologie. Ein Fluchtpunkt dieser Konvergenzbewegung könnte für ihn ein Verständnis von Politik sein, das um die Frage der Legitimität zentriert ist. In Konflikten gehe es schließlich immer um Ansprüche auf Legitimität, also um die Verwandlung von Macht in Herrschaft durch Institutionalisierung. Abschließend skizziert er drei mögliche gemeinsame Forschungsthemen, nämlich politische Alltagspraktiken und -diskurse, in denen Herrschaft reproduziert oder erodiert wird, den Alltag der Sicherheitspolitik, mit dem Zusammenspiel von legitimierenden Diskursen und disziplinierender Macht, Legitimierungskonflikten und Eigendynamiken sowie die Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen und der Internationalisierung von Herrschaft und dabei auftretender Intensivierung, Akkumulation und Verdichtung von Macht mit ihren unterschiedlichen Legitimitätsformen. Schlichte vermerkt, dass die Internationalisierung von Herrschaftsbeziehungen eine Zunahme der Kontrollen und Sanktionen darstelle, die auch neue Subjektivitäten mit sich bringe, die keine sozialwissenschaftliche Disziplin allein begreifen könne und deshalb nach Interdisziplinarität verlange.

Zum Abschluss fasst Matthias Krings die Potentiale zusammen, die aus den unterschiedlichen Beiträgen hervorgehen. Als deutliche Signatur der Ethnologie zeigt sich ihre besondere Optik und Methode sowie die Offenheit für Interdisziplinarität. Ausführlich wird auf drei wichtige Kontaktzonen eingegangen, die bisher nicht genannt worden waren. Fruchtbare gegenseitige Impulse, die sogar zur Implementierung neuer Fachrichtungen führten, gibt es schon lange mit Kunst, Medienwissenschaft und Medizin. Auch die ethnologische Methode (Grenzüberschreitung, teilnehmende Beobachtung, Perspektivwechsel) zeigt sich als Exportschlager, ist dann aber in der Regel nicht mit Kulturwechsel verbunden. Krings skizziert einige neue und doch nicht so neue Trends der amerikanischen *anthropology* im beginnenden 21. Jahrhundert (*anthropology at home*, kollaborative Forschung). Er betont die Bedeutung der Auslandsfeldforschung und bedauert, dass die hochschulpolitische Favorisierung des Zügigen und Effektiven, der Exzellenz und Elite letztendlich dazu beiträgt, dass die nicht-virtuellen Kontakte mit leibhaftigen Menschen im Feld sich weiter reduzieren werden. Zusammenfassend kann er aber konstatieren, dass Totgesagte länger leben, jedenfalls im Fall der Ethnologie.

Die vielseitige Darstellung der zeitgenössischen Ethnologie ermöglicht LeserInnen eine gute Orientierung in Strukturen, Studienbedingungen und Forschungsausrichtungen des Fachs. Weil man seine Vergangenheit kennen muss, um die Gegenwart zu verstehen und eine Zukunftsperspektive entwickeln zu können, wird die Geschichte verschiedener Forschungsansätze und Fachrichtungen in vielen Texten fundiert zusammengefasst, ebenso wie das ethnologische Kulturkonzept. Das wird vor allem Studierende interes-

sieren. Für FachkollegInnen sind, neben den statistischen Darstellungen von Strukturen und Forschungsthemen, die Anregungen der Vertreter aus der Soziologie und der Politikwissenschaft und die Möglichkeiten von Völkerkundemuseen als postkoloniale Kontaktzonen inspirierend. Für Ethnologinnen ist die Nachricht vom Zuwachs des Frauenanteils unter Professoren auf 40% besonders erfreulich. Damit haben wir die meisten anderen Fachbereiche weit überflügelt. Besonders ans Herz legen möchte ich aber den Beitrag von Judith Schlehe, die, mit typisch ethnologischer Bescheidenheit, ihre Tandemforschung vorstellt. Sie hat damit eine neue, kollaborative Forschung entwickelt, die den Anforderungen einer postkolonialen Wissenschaft (nach Smith 2012) im 21. Jahrhundert entspricht und nach Nachahmung ruft. Erfrischend und angenehm ist natürlich auch das durchweg positive Abschneiden der Ethnologie im Urteil der Kollegen über ein Fasch, das nur noch von ewig Gestrigen als Orchideenfach belächelt werden kann.

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