A Note on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments

Gürtler, Oliver (October 2005): A Note on Sabotage in Collective Tournaments. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 61

Abstract

In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases their team's performance more significantly than sabotaging stronger members does. As a consequence, sabotage activities are only directed at a team's weaker members. This finding is quite interesting, as previous results on individual tournaments indicate that oftentimes only the stronger participants should be sabotaged.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: Collective Tournament, Sabotage, Complementarities
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > B4 - Die Gestaltung von Turnieren im Rahmen der Corporate Governance
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: C72, J33, M52
• Language: English