Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale

Garratt, Rod and Tröger, Thomas (May 2005): Speculation in Standard Auctions with Resale. SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 42

Abstract

In standard auctions with symmetric, independent private value bidders resale creates a role for a speculator—a bidder who is commonly known to have no use value for the good on sale. For second-price and English auctions the efficient value-bidding equilibrium coexists with a continuum of inefficient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction and makes positive profits. First-price and Dutch auctions have an essentially unique equilibrium, and whether or not the speculator wins the auction and distorts the final allocation depends on the number of bidders, the value distribution, and the discount factor. Speculators do not make profits in first-price or Dutch auctions.

• Item Type: Paper (Discussion Paper)
• Keywords: standard auctions, speculation, resale, efficiency
• Collections: Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems; Special Research Fields > Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems > A6 - Typenvielfalt, Loyalität und die Bildung von Handelsnetzwerken
• Subjects: 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics
• JEL Classification: D44
• Language: English