Abstract
Two 'order effects' may emerge in dynamic tournaments with information feedback. First, participants adjust effort across stages, which could advantage the leading participant who faces a larger 'effective prize' after an initial victory (leading-effect). Second, participants lagging behind may increase risk at the final stage as they have 'nothing to lose' (risk-taking). We use a randomized natural experiment in professional two-game soccer tournaments where the treatment (order of a stage-specific advantage) and team characteristics, e.g. ability, are independent. We develop an identification strategy to test for leading-effects controlling for risk-taking. We find no evidence of leading-effects and negligible risk-taking effects.
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | Tournaments, order effects, leading-effect, risk-taking, randomized natural experiments |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Munich Discussion Papers in Economics |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C93, C21, D01, L83 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-15452-0 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 15452 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 26. Jun. 2013, 09:54 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 08. Nov. 2020, 11:16 |
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