Team reasoning without a hive mind

Radzvilas, Mantas und Karpus, Jurgis (2021): Team reasoning without a hive mind. In: Research in Economics, Bd. 75, Nr. 4: S. 345-353

Abstract

The theory of team reasoning has been developed to resolve a long-lasting niggle in orthodox game theory. Despite its intuitive appeal, the theory has received little attention from mainstream game theorists and economists to date. We believe that this is so because of two theoretic issues, which the theory of team reasoning itself needs to resolve. One of these presents a worry that the theory achieves its explanatory and predictive success by abandoning ontological individualism - a fundamental precept in mainstream economics, including game theory. Here we argue that the theory of team reasoning is compatible with ontological individualism. We show that the core principles of the theory - those that give rise to the above worry - are in fact implicitly assumed in some branches of orthodox game theory itself. We also argue against the methodological approach that construes team reasoning as involving a transformation of the interacting players' payoffs in modelled games. (C) 2021 University of Venice. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

• Dokumententyp: Zeitschriftenartikel
• Fakultät: Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft
• Themengebiete: 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie
• ISSN: 1090-9443
• Sprache: Englisch