Abstract
We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China’s implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors’ violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | delegation; responsibility-shifting; One-Child policy |
| Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | D02, D04, D90, J18 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-103471-3 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 103471 |
| Date Deposited: | 20. Jun 2023 14:26 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Jan 2024 09:58 |

