Abstract
Are reforms towards individual taxation politically feasible? Are they desirable from a welfare perspective? We develop a method to answer such questions and apply it to the US federal income tax since the 1960s. Main findings are: As of today, Pareto-improvements require a move away from joint taxation. Revenue-neutral reforms towards individual taxation are not Pareto-improving, but attract majoritysupport. Such reforms are rejected by Rawlsian welfare measures and supported by ones with weights that are increasing in the secondary earner’s income share. Thus, there is a tension between the welfare of “the poor” and the welfare of “working women.”
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Keywords: | taxation of couples; tax reforms; optimal taxation; political economy; non-linear income taxation |
Fakultät: | Volkswirtschaft > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
JEL Classification: | C72, D72, D82, H21 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-103772-5 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 103772 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 03. Jul. 2023, 10:50 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 03. Jan. 2024, 09:58 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 280092119 |