Abstract
Are reforms towards individual taxation politically feasible? Are they desirable from a welfare perspective? We develop a method to answer such questions and apply it to the US federal income tax since the 1960s. Main findings are: As of today, Pareto-improvements require a move away from joint taxation. Revenue-neutral reforms towards individual taxation are not Pareto-improving, but attract majoritysupport. Such reforms are rejected by Rawlsian welfare measures and supported by ones with weights that are increasing in the secondary earner’s income share. Thus, there is a tension between the welfare of “the poor” and the welfare of “working women.”
| Item Type: | Paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords: | taxation of couples; tax reforms; optimal taxation; political economy; non-linear income taxation |
| Faculties: | Economics > Collaborative Research Center Transregio "Rationality and Competition" |
| Subjects: | 300 Social sciences > 330 Economics |
| JEL Classification: | C72, D72, D82, H21 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-103772-5 |
| Language: | English |
| Item ID: | 103772 |
| Date Deposited: | 03. Jul 2023 10:50 |
| Last Modified: | 03. Jan 2024 09:58 |
| DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 280092119 |

