Abstract
In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and managers’ financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by firms’ economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent.
Dokumententyp: | Monographie |
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Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Rechnungswesen und Wirtschaftsprüfung |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-105017-3 |
ISBN: | 9783631754986 ; 9783631527078 |
Ort: | Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien |
Bemerkung: | Zugl.: Bochum, Univ., Diss., 2004. Digitale Originalausgabe 2018 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 105017 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 25. Jul. 2023, 09:15 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 04. Jan. 2024, 12:10 |