Abstract
https://ssrn.com/abstract=38538We study information revelation via analysts’ questions in earnings conference calls and its implications for firms’ information environments. Better-informed analysts (who have higher ex-ante forecast accuracy) reveal less new information in their questions than less-informed analysts. Consistent with strategic safeguarding of their information advantage, analysts reveal less (more) information when exposed to strong competition (high information uncertainty). Information revelation is linked to ex-post benefits (higher absolute forecast accuracy) and costs (lower relative forecast accuracy) to analysts. Finally, it is associated with the informativeness of managers’ answers and affects trading volume, bid-ask spreads, and returns. We conclude that analysts’ strategic information revelation shapes firms’ information environments. 69
Dokumententyp: | Paper |
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Fakultät: | Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Rechnungswesen und Wirtschaftsprüfung
Betriebswirtschaft > Institut für Unternehmensrechnung und Controlling |
Themengebiete: | 300 Sozialwissenschaften > 330 Wirtschaft |
ISSN: | 1556-5068 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 105686 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 11. Aug. 2023, 11:52 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 11. Aug. 2023, 11:52 |