Abstract
We put forth an account for when to believe causal and evidential conditionals. The basic idea is to embed a causal model in an agent's belief state. For the evaluation of conditionals seems to be relative to beliefs about both particular facts and causal relations. Unlike other attempts using causal models, we show that ours can account rather well not only for various causal but also evidential conditionals.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106759-3 |
ISSN: | 0924-6495 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 106759 |
Date Deposited: | 11. Sep 2023, 13:43 |
Last Modified: | 29. Sep 2023, 10:14 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |