Abstract
Predictive processing framework (PP) has found wide applications in cognitive science and philosophy. It is an attractive candidate for a unified account of the mind in which perception, action, and cognition fit together in a single model. However, PP cannot claim this role if it fails to accommodate an essential part of cognition-conceptual thought. Recently, Williams (Synthese 1-27, 2018) argued that PP struggles to address at least two of thought's core properties-generality and rich compositionality. In this paper, I show that neither necessarily presents a problem for PP. In particular, I argue that because we do not have access to cognitive processes but only to their conscious manifestations, compositionality may be a manifest property of thought, rather than a feature of the thinking process, and result from the interplay of thinking and language. PaceWilliams, both of these capacities, constituting parts of a complex and multifarious cognitive system, may be fully based on the architectural principles of PP. Under the assumption that language presents a subsystem separate from conceptual thought, I sketch out one possible way for PP to accommodate both generality and rich compositionality.
Dokumententyp: | Zeitschriftenartikel |
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Fakultät: | Philosophie, Wissenschaftstheorie und Religionswissenschaft |
Themengebiete: | 100 Philosophie und Psychologie > 100 Philosophie |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106760-5 |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Dokumenten ID: | 106760 |
Datum der Veröffentlichung auf Open Access LMU: | 11. Sep. 2023, 13:43 |
Letzte Änderungen: | 29. Sep. 2023, 10:14 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |