Abstract
In this paper, we propose a unified account of conditionals inspired by Frank Ramsey. Most contemporary philosophers agree that Ramsey's account applies to indicative conditionals only. We observe against this orthodoxy that his account covers subjunctive conditionals as well-including counterfactuals. In light of this observation, we argue that Ramsey's account of conditionals resembles Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics supplemented by a model of belief. The resemblance suggests to reinterpret the notion of conditional degree of belief in order to overcome a tension in Ramsey's account. The result of the reinterpretation is a tenable account of conditionals that covers indicative and subjunctive as well as qualitative and probabilistic conditionals.
Item Type: | Journal article |
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Faculties: | Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Religious Science |
Subjects: | 100 Philosophy and Psychology > 100 Philosophy |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-106762-6 |
ISSN: | 0039-7857 |
Language: | English |
Item ID: | 106762 |
Date Deposited: | 11. Sep 2023, 13:43 |
Last Modified: | 29. Sep 2023, 10:16 |
DFG: | Gefördert durch die Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) - 491502892 |